The Theology of Aeschylus. by Simon J, Trafford
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
The Theology of Aeschylus.
   
Trafford, Simon J
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Trafford, Simon J (2013)  The Theology of Aeschylus..  thesis, Swansea University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42603
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 The Theology o f Aeschylus
By
Simon J. Trafford
Submitted to Swansea University in fulfilment of the requirements of the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Swansea University
2013
ProQuest Number: 10805361
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10805361
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
^ N® § \
UBHARY
SUMMARY (ABSTRACT)
This thesis examines the theology of Aeschylus through a close text-based discussion 
of the nature and justice of Zeus. This will not be a dogmatic investigation that looks for 
signs o f monotheism or ‘proto-monotheism’. Rather, this thesis will examine the presentation 
o f the god in Aeschylus, as he is found in his plays, free from any desire or attempt to form a 
rounded, comprehensive ‘Aeschylean theology’.
The first chapter considers the two closely connected divine terms, 0so<; and baipcov. 
The clear-cut and easily discernible meaning of Gsoq acts as a constant with which the more 
ambiguous and less determinable word baipcov can be compared and contrasted. This chapter 
discusses both those instances where baipcov seems to be synonymous with Gsoq and where it 
does not, where the term seems to possess a meaning close to that of an individual’s fortune 
or destiny in life. This is done in order to conclusively see how Aeschylus uses the word 
baipcov in the Eumenides as part of his characterisation of the Erinyes, which enables us to 
see more clearly what role divine terminology plays in the presentation of Zeus and the god’s 
justice.
The remaining chapters o f this thesis examine Zeus in Aeschylus. First, attention is 
given to the old debates concerning the potential and respective influence of Homeric, 
Hesiodic and Presocratic conceptions of divinity on the theology of Aeschylus. Then, the 
final chapter of the thesis looks at the justice of Zeus primarily through a discussion of one 
question, whether we should understand Agamemnon as guilty in the eyes of Zeus, which it 
is argued we should not.
It is shown that Aeschylus does not present an optimistic idea of Zeus or divine 
justice, and the god’s rule is seen as neither kind nor benevolent. Rather a pragmatic and 
pessimistic view is presented to us by Aeschylus, one which recognises that Zeus is an all- 
powerful being in need of respect and honour and whose will must be carefully observed.
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INTRODUCTION
The language o f the divine is so closely intertwined with the plot and structure of the 
ancient Greek tragedies themselves that the gods are an inherent part of their make-up. 
But, while it seems impossible to conceive of the Greek tragedies without some divine 
or supernatural aspect to them, it is necessary to think of the ancient Greek gods in a 
different way from how we conceive of the nature of divinity today. The gods of the 
classical world were an everyday reality, whether these were the Olympians gods of 
the traditional pantheon or unknown, unnamed deities. In what way the Greeks 
‘believed’ in the gods or to what extent is not of the strictest concern for my thesis. 
What is o f concern is how the gods were conceived and thought of in the plays of 
Aeschylus. More than the younger Sophocles, Aeschylus was engaging in or reflecting 
on philosophical speculation concerning the nature of the gods and, in particular, Zeus. 
What this thesis will thus focus on is the ‘Theology of Aeschylus’ and how Aeschylus’ 
understanding of the nature of the gods, and especially Zeus, is presented in his plays.
In recent decades, it has been unpopular (with a few exceptions, for which see 
below) to examine the nature of the gods in Aeschylus and it is equally unpopular, if 
not more so, to label such a discussion as the ‘theology’ of a pre-Christian author, be it 
Aeschylus or any other. For such reasons, it must be stated from the outset that this 
will not be a dogmatic investigation that looks for signs of monotheism or ‘proto­
monotheism’, with one eye on finding any indication that could give credence or 
plausibility to Christian teleological ideas. Rather, this thesis will examine the 
presentation of the gods in Aeschylus, as they are found in his plays, and will do so 
free from any pre-conceived desire to form a rounded, dogmatic ‘Aeschylean 
theology’. The theological concerns of this thesis focus on a range of ideas, centred 
round the way the gods are depicted by Aeschylus in the plays in an attempt to gain a 
firmer understanding about the nature of the gods in Aeschylus, particularly the 
highest and most powerful god, Zeus.
The term ‘theology of Aeschylus’ is also used here in order to tap into the 
debates concerning the presentation of the gods in Aeschylus that have continued for 
the best part of two centuries, (broadly speaking) from those in the nineteenth-century 
who saw Aeschylus as a pioneering proto-Christian poet;1 to those in the earlier half
1 See, for example, Tyler (1859, 2006).
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of the twentieth-century who posited a more moderate view of Aeschylus, stopping 
short of claiming anything proto-Christian in his works, but yet seeing something 
more ‘advanced’ than what was presented in Homer or Hesiod;2 and then to Lloyd- 
Jones in the latter half of the last century, who, reacting against those commentators 
before him, claimed that there was nothing in Aeschylus that could not be found 
expressed by Homer or Hesiod.3 Indeed, since Lloyd-Jones’ The Justice o f  Zeus in 
1971 there has been little movement in the field concerning the dedicated study of the 
presentation o f the gods in Aeschylus.4 The view of the divine in Aeschylus laid down 
by Lloyd-Jones has held sway in one way or another and there has been something of 
a dearth in the number o f works on the gods in Aeschylus since then. Few have 
considered that in Aeschylus’ presentation of the gods there may be something more 
than or at least different from what we find in Homer; or that there was a more 
nuanced position in the works o f a poet who was writing during an age o f intense 
philosophical speculation, where new ideas concerning the nature of divinity were 
flourishing.
What I hope to do in this thesis is to re-open the debate concerning the 
presentation o f the gods in Aeschylus by re-examining the primary material. Though 
the discussion of Aeschylus’ theology undertaken in this thesis will give consideration 
to all of the plays, especially in the chapter on daipcov, the focus of the thesis in the 
discussion of Zeus in the second part will primarily be the Suppliants and the 
Oresteia, as these plays present far more information on the nature of Zeus. In the 
final chapter ‘The Justice of Zeus’, all is subordinate to the Oresteia. In this chapter, I 
put forward the notion and demonstrate that in the view of Aeschylus the gods are not 
kind or benevolent and that the rule of Zeus, though not explicitly hostile towards 
mankind, does not care for its betterment.
A Century of Scholarship on Aeschylus and the Divine
There is a long history of scholarship on the nature of Zeus and the gods in the 
plays of Aeschylus and in archaic and classical literature as a whole, dating back well 
over a century. It is beyond the scope of this Introduction to give even the most
2 Murray (1940), Comford (1952), Kitto (1961).
3 Lloyd-Jones (1956), (1971); cf. Denniston and Page (1957).
4 Notable exceptions are Geisser (2002) and Bees (2009) for which see below in the section ‘A Century 
o f  Scholarship on Aeschylus and the D ivine’; but, the Anglo-American tradition remains particularly 
quiet on this front.
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summary of discussions of all the significant scholarly works in this field, and so I 
will restrict myself to a survey o f a handful of them that have a particularly important 
bearing on this thesis.
O f those works that deal with the presentation of Saipcov in early Greek 
literature, there are three which are of particular significance for the arguments 
presented below in Chapter 1. The earliest of these is Ehnmark’s The Idea o f  God in 
Homer (1935). In this work, Ehnmark looks at -  among other things -  the way the 
terms 0£oi ‘gods’, Qsog ‘god’, batpcov ‘daimon’ and Zexx; are employed generically in 
the ‘indefinite mode of expression’ in relation and as opposed to when a god is 
referred to by its actual name.5 Ehnmark presents his arguments with consistent 
reference, in particular, to the works of Jorgensen6 and Heden.7 Jorgensen was the 
first to examine the differing ways the narrator and human speakers (characters) refer 
to divine activity in the Homeric epics and how human speakers -  except when 
narrating past events — tend to use vaguer, more indefinite divine terms, such as ‘the 
gods’, ‘god’, daimon or sometimes Zeus rather than other specific names. Jorgensen 
argued that such usage was determined by conventional literary practice. A few years 
later, building on the work of Jorgensen (though by no means following him), Heden 
argued that the indefinite mode of expression was employed by Homer as a way of 
distinguishing between poetic language and the language of everyday religious life. 
This, Heden claimed, is borne out by the frequency with which the indefinite mode of 
expression is used in the poems over the actual names of the gods themselves, and that 
such frequency was the result o f growing scepticism concerning traditional religious 
faith, with the religious belief of people becoming more abstract in its view of the 
gods. In response to these two scholars’ arguments, Ehnmark asserts that Homer was 
in all likelihood attempting to supply his human characters with psychologically 
accurate speech and modes of thought, rather than simply following established 
literary formulae, as is argued for by Jorgensen. Indeed, while Ehnmark’s own views 
could be seen to come close to those of Heden with regard to the use of vaguer terms 
by human characters as an accurate reflection of everyday usage, he does not claim, as 
Heden does, that the difference is the result of a distinction between poetic language 
and the everyday, but rather that it is the result of a difference in the degree to which
5 Ehnmark (1935) 59-85.
6 Jorgensen (1904) 357-82.
7 Heden (1912) passim .
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someone is privy to what knowledge: i.e. the poet/narrator and the gods have access to 
knowledge of the unfolding of events which the ‘normal’ human characters of the 
poems do not.
The second work of scholarship concerned with daipcov that has specific 
significance for this thesis is Gilbert F ra n c is ’ Le Polytheisme et L ’Emploi au 
Singulier des Mots 0EOL, AAIMQN dans La Litterature Grecque d ’Homere a Platon 
(1957). In this work, Franfois comprehensively discusses the meanings of 0s6<; and 
daipcov. The work is set against a backdrop where many within the academic 
community still maintained that 0bo<; on its own, with or without the definite article, 
could mean ‘God’. F rancis, however, shows conclusively that the word 0so<;
possesses no monotheistic tendencies in archaic and classical literature, except in
8 9specific philosophical contexts such as, for example, in Xenophanes or Plato. 
Rather, it is shown that when 0eo<; is used generically without specific reference to a 
known deity, it has a meaning close to 0£ol and that the presence or absence of the 
definite article has no bearing on the meaning. F rancis  also argues that 0so<; and 
daipcov are in most instances synonymous and have a collective, generic sense when 
not specifically referring to a known deity.10
After F ran c is  it was not until Franziska Geisser’s Gotter, Geister und 
Damonen (2002), nearly half a century later, that the meaning and nature o f daipcov in 
Aeschylus was made the explicit topic of an extended discussion again. In her 
monograph, Geisser focuses on four ‘daimonic’ words: daipcov, d ip ,11 aMaicop, apa. 
In contrast with Ehnmark and F rancis , Geisser does not look for the meaning of 
daipcov as a concept in itself, but for its dramatic role within the plays of Aeschylus as 
an Unheilsmacht, a ‘force or bringer of evil’. Indeed, this difference in emphasis is 
indicated in the subtitle of the work: Unheilsmachte bei Aischylos -  zwischen 
Aberglauben und Theatralik. Although Geisser does point out that daipcov does not in 
itself denote a bringer of evil, the scope of the work which looks only at the negative 
and destructive characteristics of daipcov naturally means that the discussion of the 
term is narrower than Ehnmark’s or F ra n c is ’ examinations of the word. It also means
8 Francois (1957) 160-71. For discussion o f  Xenophanes and Aeschylus, see Chapter 3 and the section 
Anthropom orphism an d  Invariance.
9 Fran?ois (1957) 246-304.
10 This thesis w ill, however, show that w hile Salpcov and Osoq regularly behave as synonyms (and in 
this respect Francois is correct), 5alpcov often presents meanings far more nuanced than Osoq (which is 
neglected somewhat by F ran cis).
11 For a recent discussion o f  arr| in Aeschylus, see Sommerstein (2013) 1-15.
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that there are many aspects of the nature of Saipoov which are left untouched. So, 
while Geisser’s work does discuss the employment of Salpwv in the plays o f 
Aeschylus, it does not look at the term as a rounded concept in possession of a range 
of potential meanings within the wider context of the plays or how its usage is linked 
to the context in which it is used.
In contrast with the rather limited number of works that deal with the nature o f 
daipcov in Aeschylus, there is an abundance of material which has been produced on 
the nature and justice of Zeus in the plays of Aeschylus. As a consequence of the vast 
amount o f literature, only those works which have a significant impact on this thesis 
will be given consideration here. Before the authenticity o f the Prometheus as a play 
of Aeschylus came to be widely questioned in the 1970s,12 many works which focused 
on the nature and justice of Zeus in Aeschylus did so by discussing the contrasting 
portrayal of the god in the Prometheus (as a despotic figure) and the Oresteia (as a 
more kindly, benevolent figure). The Prometheus is now widely regarded not to be a 
genuine play of Aeschylus, and many of the earlier works and arguments dealing with 
the nature o f Zeus in the plays are, if not obsolete, severely compromised for the 
purposes of this thesis; but there are two exceptions: Reinhardt’s Aischylos als 
Regisseur und Theologe (1949); and Solmsen’s Hesiod and Aeschylus (1949). Both o f 
these scholars regard the Prometheus as a play of Aeschylus, but both, in differing 
ways, counter the ‘progressive’ model then commonly applied to the Zeus o f 
Aeschylus between the Prometheus plays and the Oresteia, which sees Zeus as 
somehow changing and becoming a more enlightened god throughout the course o f 
the action in these plays.
Reinhardt argues that Zeus in the Prometheus does not develop into a merciful 
or benevolent god in the Prometheus Unbound, because the conflict between the two 
opposing figures of Prometheus and Zeus does not give room for either figure to 
develop or change in any way without detracting from the action. Although Reinhardt 
only makes this point for the Prometheus and not the Oresteia, it is nevertheless an 
important step towards seeing Zeus as something other than a benevolent god or on 
his way to becoming one, a god who only has the best in mind for mankind -  which in 
the Prometheus, he obviously does not. Similarly, in his book published the same
12 See, in particular, Griffith (1977). Though cf. Porzig (1926), who also regards the play as inauthentic. 
See below  in the Introduction for further discussion o f  the issue o f  the authenticity o f  the Prom etheus 
Bound  and the position taken in this thesis.
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year, Solmsen argues that at the end of the Eumenides it is not Zeus who changes in 
the way he conducts justice, but the Erinyes themselves -  though, in contrast with 
Reinhardt, he argues in favour of a change in the position of Zeus in the Prometheus. 
In differing ways and in discussion of different plays, both Reinhardt and Solmsen 
argue against a progressivist view of Zeus that sees the god becoming a more merciful 
and benevolent figure, reconciling himself with older deities and changing his justice 
in order to incorporate these gods into his order. These works provide a starting point 
for how we think about the nature and justice of Zeus and such considerations become 
increasingly significant in the final chapter where we are faced with a manner of 
conceptualising the justice and rule o f the highest god which is not kind.
Arguably the most influential scholar on the theology of Aeschylus in the 
second half of the twentieth century is Hugh Lloyd-Jones, with his article ‘Zeus in 
Aeschylus’ (1956) and the book The Justice o f  Zeus (1971). Lloyd-Jones’ importance 
to the Aeschylean scholarship rests largely on his opposition to the view prevalent at 
the time that Aeschylus’ religious world-view was more ‘advanced’ than that of 
Homer and Hesiod, or that he was greatly influenced by Presocratic thinkers, such as 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Rather, Lloyd-Jones states that Aeschylus’ presentation 
of the gods is no different from what we see presented in Homer or Hesiod. For 
Lloyd-Jones, Aeschylus should not be seen as some great ‘thinker’, presenting 
anything more nuanced or developed than either Homer or Hesiod.
However, in the same year that Lloyd-Jones’ The Justice o f  Zeus was 
published, there appeared an article by Joseph Fontenrose, ‘Gods and Men in the 
Oresteia'. While this piece has not received nearly as much attention from the 
scholarly community as Lloyd-Jones’, its importance should not be underestimated 
when it comes to discussions of the justice of Zeus. In his article, Fontenrose states 
that scholars are mistaken when they claim that Zeus wants Agamemnon or Orestes 
punished and that Clytemnestra is an instrument of the god’s justice. By taking this 
position, Fontenrose re-opens and reignites the debate concerning the justice of Zeus 
and the benevolence o f the god, which hints at the type of arguments made previously 
by Reinhardt and Solmsen twenty years earlier. While Fontenrose’s conclusions are 
less than satisfactory and do not do justice to the central thesis of the paper, arguing 
that Aeschylus presents the gods as partisans, with the Olympians on the side of 
Agamemnon and the chthonic gods on the side of Clytemnestra, the questions which it 
raises about the desire o f Zeus for Agamemnon’s death are significant. Indeed, the
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importance of the article rests, in many respects, not with the answers it provides, but 
rather with the questions it raises, in particular, how we should view the nature of 
justice when the highest and most powerful god not only does nothing to avenge the 
killing of a young, innocent girl by her father, but may even view such a killing as a 
just act.
In the following years, though they do not follow his central thesis, there are 
two works especially which take a similar pessimistic view of the plays to 
Fontenrose’s and do so by discussing the importance of grammatical and syntactical 
considerations in the Hymn to Zeus for our understanding of the nature o f justice in 
the Oresteia as a whole. The first o f these, Maurice Pope’s article ‘Merciful Heavens: 
A Question in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon’ (1974), discusses the differing implications of 
two well-attested variant manuscript readings of lines 182-3 (at the end of the Hymn 
to Zeus) for the presentation o f justice and Zeus in the trilogy. With regard to the more 
widely accepted of these readings, there is a divine grace in the justice of Zeus; on the 
other, no comfort can be found in Zeus or the manner of justice presided over by the 
god.13 A few years after Pope’s article, P. M. Smith, in his monograph On the Hymn 
to Zeus in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (1980), also puts forward arguments that can be 
seen to fall within the pessimistic tradition in its reading of the Hymn to Zeus. 
However, while the arguments made by Smith in the initial stages of the work 
concerning the close connection of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the will of Zeus are 
in keeping with the pessimistic tradition -  which sees Zeus’ rule and the nature of 
justice over which the god presides as being questioned in the Oresteia -  this position 
is then seemingly abandoned in favour of a more optimistic understanding of the 
Hymn, seeing Zeus’ rule as an unquestioned and unquestionable grace (%apic;) -  a 
view which is apparently confirmed by the author’s reading of Ag. 182-3.14
A recent work that discusses ‘guilt’, the Erinyes and justice is Sewell-Rutter’s 
Guilt by Descent: Moral Inheritance and Decision Making in Greek Tragedy ’ (2007). 
Sewell-Rutter’s book brings out the inter-connected causality surrounding the death of 
Agamemnon in the Oresteia; but the idea of what makes someone ‘guilty’, and in 
whose eyes, is never addressed. Indeed, while the nature of Dike as a multi-faceted 
concept in archaic Greek thought is touched upon, nevertheless by what criteria we
13 For discussion of.4g . 182-3 and the various readings o f  the lines, see Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ 
and the section The Hymn to Zeus.
14 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ and the section The Hymn to Zeus for discussion o f  the 
optimistic and pessimistic readings o f  Ag. 182-3.
7
should judge Agamemnon, Eteocles or any other tragic figure is left unsaid. So, 
although the concept of justice is alluded to, we are left with little idea about how we 
should read or understand the nature of justice and the role of ‘guilt’ within the 
Oresteia. Moreover, the discussion of the Erinyes in the Eumenides does little to 
investigate these deities as dramatic figures within the structure of the play or how the 
relationship between the Erinyes and Zeus impacts on our understanding of 
Agamemnon’s ‘guilt’ or the nature of justice within the trilogy as a whole. So, while 
Sewell-Rutter’s book overlaps in its topics with many of the areas discussed in my 
thesis, its methods and approach are quite different.
The most recent publication to supply an in-depth discussion of the nature of 
Zeus in Aeschylus is Robert Bees’ Aischylos. Interpretationen zum Verstandnis seiner 
Theologie (2009). While the work does not advance the discussion in any meaningful 
way, it is worthwhile to give a brief overview of its key points and the position it 
holds within the Aeschylean scholarly tradition. Bees sets himself in direct opposition 
to Lloyd-Jones and Denys Page, who argue that Aeschylus presents nothing new in his 
plays with regard to his religious or philosophical views, nothing at least which cannot 
already be seen in Homer or Hesiod. However, rather than moving the debate on from 
the polemical view championed by Lloyd-Jones towards a more nuanced 
understanding of the presentation of the gods in Aeschylus, Bees instead takes a 
position reminiscent of the type held by scholars in the first half of the twentieth 
century, before Lloyd-Jones first presented his arguments in his paper ‘Zeus in 
Aeschylus’ (1956). Bees argues in such a way that the Zeus of Aeschylus seems to be 
presented as a proto-Christian ‘God’ and the plays as a dogmatic tract. But, while the 
underlying position of Bees’ work is not an unreasonable one — i. e. that everything 
that happens in the plays is the will of Zeus -  the manner in which the arguments are 
presented is far too closely tied to Christian teleological ideals to provide any 
meaningful advancement within the field.
The Prometheus Bound
This thesis will not adduce passages from the play as evidence to support 
arguments made and as a result it is necessary to discuss the scholarly debates 
surrounding its authenticity as a genuine play of Aeschylus and to account for my 
decision not to use it within the main body of this work. This is not the place, 
however, to list every single argument and counter-argument, as this has been done by
8
others in great detail.15 Instead, I will give the key areas of debate, the major trends o f 
thought regarding the issue and to state clearly my own position regarding it.
There is no indication in the ancient sources that the Prometheus Bound was 
regarded with any suspicion as an inauthentic play of Aeschylus, at least from the 
third century B.C., and no doubts are recorded in the scholia. Indeed, the grandiose 
nature of the play’s theme seems in keeping with the Aristophanic portrayal of the 
poet in the Frogs.16 On the other hand, there is no contemporary fifth-century 
testimony and in quite a few respects the play ‘seems’ or ‘feels’ different from the 
other six unquestioned genuine plays. As a result, much of the debate surrounding the 
play’s Aeschylean ‘genuineness’ is based upon the play’s internal evidence and 
scholars’ argumentation about Aeschylean style and thought. On whatever side of the 
debate one falls down on, there can be no real certainty. As it has been put by one 
scholar writing on this very issue: ‘Indeed, the ease with which a scrap o f external 
evidence might overthrow the most soundly based indications of style and structure 
should counsel caution in any approach to stylistic analysis of the play.’17 One need 
only look at how the publication of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri 2256 Fr. 3 in 1952 
changed our understanding of not only the Suppliants as a play itself, but also how we 
understand Aeschylus’ work as a whole.
Arguably the earliest significant work to question in an extended manner the 
authenticity of the Prometheus Bound as a genuine work of Aeschylus was Schmid’s 
Untersuchungen zum gefesselten Prometheus (1929) -  although, as noted above, 
Porzig had already questioned the play’s authenticity in his Die Attische Tragodie des 
Aischylos (1926). In his work Schmid argues that the Prometheus Bound was not a 
play o f Aeschylus, because it praises the work of Prometheus and mankind to the 
disadvantage of the highest god. Schmid sees the Prometheus Bound as inauthentic, 
but the (lost) Promtheus Unbound as authentic -  the latter the work of a pious mind, 
the former an impious. Thus, the questions raised by Schmid over the play’s 
authenticity were not concerned with stylistic or technical concerns about the play’s 
use of language, metre, the length of choruses or of staging, but were theological and
15 For example, Herington (1970), Dodds (1973), Griffith (1977), Taplin (1977), Podlecki (2005), 
Ruffell (2012).
16 Further, there are possible references in Aristophanes to the play: see Prom. 59, 613 and Griffith’s 
notes (1983).
17 Ireland (1986) 36.
centred round how appropriate or likely it was that the author of the Oresteia could 
portray Zeus in so different a fashion.
Although I will not provide a detailed list of the counter-arguments to this
view, it may be worthwhile to highlight a couple of them. An interpretation such as
Schmid’s depends, first, upon seeing the Oresteia, in particular, as presenting Zeus as
a kind and benevolent figure -  something that is brought into question in the final
chapter o f this thesis. Secondly, -  if I may put to one side for one moment my own
arguments concerning the benevolence or otherwise of Zeus in the Oresteia and take
up a more traditional view which sees a kinder Zeus in the trilogy (and the rest of the
unquestioned Aeschylean corpus) -  such an interpretation of the theology of
Aeschylus also depends upon (i) Aeschylus never changing his presentation of Zeus to
suit his dramatic purposes, and (ii) Zeus not tempering his rule in the following play,
18if we accept the general view that the Prometheus Bound was part of a sequence, 
whether the first or second play,19 allowing for reconciliation, which in turn would 
dovetail nicely with the conclusion of the Eumenides.20 It is thus difficult to conclude 
one way or the other from theological concerns alone whether the play is Aeschylus’ 
work or not.
During the latter half of the twentieth century doubts about the play being the 
(sole) work of Aeschylus have focused less on the theology of the play and its author 
and more on stylistic points, such as language, metre and staging (among other 
things).21 To summarise and paraphrase the list supplied by Griffith in his 
commentary on the Prometheus Bound, the main areas of suspicion concerning the 
play’s potential spuriousness are:
i) The simpler and more prosaic style of the play as a whole.
ii) The length and metre of the choruses and their less integrated nature into the
tragedy as a whole, which is more similar to the later tragedies of 
Sophocles and Euripides.
iii) The episodic structure, notably the Oceanus and Io scenes.
18 Most scholars accept that the Prom etheus Bound  was part o f  a trilogy. The possibility has been raised 
that it was one half o f  a dilogy; see W est (2007a) 361 for criticisms.
19 For discussion o f  the play’s position within the trilogy, see: West (2007a) 359-96.
20 For further and more detailed discussion concerning the theological concerns surrounding the 
Prometheus Bound, see: Taplin (1977) 468-9, Winnington-Ingram (1983) 175-97, Ireland (1986) 34-6.
21 Among the main works to discuss such issues are: Herington (1970), Griffith (1977), Taplin (1977) 
West (1990), (2007a).
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iv) Problems of staging and the requirement of machinery and stage buildings not
99available to Aeschylus.
v) The occurence o f ‘un-Aeschylean’ language, including words common in
Sophocles and Euripides.
vi) The use of sophistic and rhetorical language more in common with Sophocles
• 9 “5
and Euripides than Aeschylus.
It is not the time or the place to go into the merits of each point, nor is it necessary for 
the purposes here. Even if we accept the merits of the concerns and stylistic 
‘evidence’ as listed above at face value, it is still difficult to conclude with complete 
certainty that the Prometheus Bound is not a genuine play of Aeschylus. While the 
issues raised by Griffith that are listed here above and are expressed in greater detail 
in his book The Authenticity o f  the Prometheus Bound are important, we nevertheless 
have relatively little comparative evidence, aswe possess less than 10% of Aeschylus’ 
entire corpus, and similar percentages for Sophocles’ and Euripides’ plays, in addition 
to no other work from the numerous other Attic playwrights {Rhesus notwithstanding). 
So, we are left, on the one hand, in a situation where there are serious and cogent 
doubts about the play’s style and structure. But, on the other hand, we must admit that 
we have relatively little comparative data and that we have no source which presents 
any doubts about its authenticity, at least from the third century B.C. onwards, as well 
as possessing nothing in the scholia that suggests any concern.
Two reasons have been put forward which could account for the presence of 
both Aeschylean and un-Aeschylean elements in the Prometheus Bound. The first of 
these reasons advances the possibility that the play was written for production in 
Sicily on or for one of Aeschylus’ trips to the island, perhaps in the final years of his 
life.24 In this way, one could see Aeschylus producing a play for a relatively 
uneducated audience unused to the high-flung styles of Athens. The second 
possibility, which has gained far more favour, is that the play was posthumously 
produced, that is was unfinished at the time of Aeschylus’ death and subsequently 
finished and staged by his son Euphorion, whom we know to have been a playwright
22 On this see, especially, Taplin (1977) 240-75, 460-9; Griffith (1977) 143-6; Ruffell (2012) 80-104.
23 See Griffith (1983) 33-5.
24 For bibliography, further discussion and criticism o f  this issue, see Dodds (1973) 37, Taplin (1977) 
463, Griffith (1978), Ireland (1986) 35, Ruffell (2012) 16, 138 n.19. The late dating o f  the play could 
also account for the Sophoclean and Euripidean elements present in the play.
11
himself. This hypothesis would account for a number of the problems, allowing one to 
see Aeschylean elements o f the play as the great poet’s original work and at the same 
time the authorship o f Euphorion supplies a reason for those elements of the play 
which seem un-Aeschylean. But again we cannot know, since there is no positive 
evidence to support this ingenious solution.
My view and the one which accounts for the exclusion o f analysis o f the play 
within the main body o f this thesis is one which I alluded to toward the beginning of 
this section: on whatever side of the debate one falls, there is no certainty concerning 
the authorship of the Prometheus Bound -  that is until some new papyrus is found 
which will show conclusively one way or the other, just as happened with the dating 
of the Suppliants and the Oxyrhynchus Papyri 2256 Fr. 3. So, to base any conclusions 
about the theology o f Aeschylus on a play which is considered by a significant 
number o f modem scholars as (at the very least) not wholly the work of Aeschylus is 
fraught with problems.
Methodology and Structure
In the following pages, my discussion of the nature of the gods in Aeschylus 
will be based on a close discussion and analysis of the texts in order to see precisely 
what Aeschylus says about the gods and how he presents them in relation to other 
divinities and mankind. The thesis takes as its starting-point three closely connected 
divine words: Gsoq, 5oupcov and Zeus, the three words which are used more than any 
others of the gods in the plays. Not only does the frequency with which these three 
words are used help to give a good cross-section o f when, where and how the gods are 
spoken of and referred to in the plays; but in modem discussions, Geoc;, 8aipcov and 
Zeus have also on occasion been placed together and understood as synonymous terms 
in what has been called the ‘indefinite mode of expression’. The indefinite mode of 
expression, which -  as will be discussed -  is often used when no single god can be 
identified as responsible for an event, brings together the generic nature with which 
0so<; and Salpcov can be used to refer to ‘a god’, together with the over-arching power 
and position of the god Zeus. But, while these three words can on occasion be used 
synonymously, this is not to suggest that 0eo<; always means the same as 5alp©v, 
5ai|iGov the same as Gsoc;, or that Saipcov denotes the same thing as Zeus, or 0so<; the
25 For this view  see especially W est (1990) 67-72; for further discussion, see Dodds (1973) 37-8, 
Sommerstein (1996) 326-7, Ruffell (2012) 16.
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same as Zeus. Indeed, what this thesis does is to take these three divine terms, which 
have a well-defined and widely acknowledged similarity and area of overlap in the 
‘indefinite mode of expression’ and work outwards, discussing the meaning of each 
term in context and how context has an effect on the meaning. I hope that this will aid 
our understanding of the plays themselves and, by extension, conceptions of divinity 
that were being put forward in public spaces in fifth-century Athens.
Although there is much that connects Gsoq, Saipcov and Zeus, the treatment of 
the three terms below differs in its approach. First, Osoq and Saipcov are taken together 
in the opening chapter. ©so<; needs little discussion, as there is almost no confusion or 
ambiguity regarding its meaning and what it is used to denote; Saipcov, by contrast, is 
an ambiguous term, whose meaning, as modem scholarly discussion shows, is often 
far from certain. In order to come to an understanding about the meaning of Saipcov in 
all of its occurrences in Aeschylus, the word and its meaning-relation with 0eo<; is 
examined in the various contexts in which it appears. While Saipcov sometimes 
presents a meaning similar to, if not synonymous with, 0so<;, there are numerous 
occasions when the two terms clearly denote different ideas. The clear-cut and easily 
discernible meaning of Qsoq acts as a constant with which the more ambiguous and 
less determinable word Saipcov can be compared and contrasted. So, in the chapter on 
Saipcov, there is initially discussion of those instances where Saipcov seems to be 
synonymous with 0£o<;, where it seems to be used to denote a known or unknown 
deity, before moving on to dicuss those instances where Saipcov does not seem to 
present a meaning close to that of 0so<;, where the term has often been thought to 
possess a meaning close to that o f an individual’s fortune or destiny in life. The 
chapter concludes with an in-depth consideration of the way in which Saipcov is used 
of the Erinyes in the Eumendies, how it is used to assist their depiction in relation to 
the Olympians and thus how it affects the presentation of the theology of Aeschylus. 
This chapter not only gives a starting-point for engaging with passages discussed 
throughout the thesis, but it also provides a context for what is to come, especially for 
the culminating discussion of the Erinyes and Olympians in the Eumenides.
The subsequent chapters are concerned with the presentation of Zeus in 
Aeschylus. The approach taken in these chapters differs from the one taken in the 
previous chapter on Saipcov. Rather than treating the name Zeus as an ambiguous term 
that presents various meanings, examining it in various contexts and its meaning- 
relations, the various aspects of the nature and character of Zeus are discussed in turn.
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In contrast with the term Saipcov, Zeus is, as a named divinity, an established figure 
within the Greek literary tradition, a character who has the same (or very similar)
characteristics specific to his divinity from the works of Homer onwards. So, in the
26chapters on Zeus in this thesis, no attempt is made to find the meaning of the name, 
but rather the qualities that are given to Zeus himself: what, in essence, the nature o f 
Zeus is. In undertaking this investigation, I look at the respective ‘characters’ of Zeus 
in the first chapter, working chronologically through the plays of Aeschylus from the 
Persians, Seven Against Thebes, and Suppliants to the Oresteia trilogy, the 
Agamemnon, Libation Bearers and Eumenides?1 In this way, it can be established 
whether there emerges from the plays a unified or common picture of Zeus, or 
whether Aeschylus’ views concerning the nature of Zeus changed in any discemable 
way throughout the fifteen year period to which his extant plays belong. The 
possibility is also entertained that Aeschylus did not have views about the nature of 
Zeus and used the god for dramatic purposes. The chapter aims to see whether it is 
possible to create an over-arching picture of Zeus in Aeschylus through characteristics 
which are unique to the god in individual plays and which are common to the god 
between plays.
In the second chapter on Zeus, entitled ‘The Nature of Zeus’, we consider the 
old debates concerning the potential and respective influence of Homeric, Hesiodic 
and Presocratic conceptions of divinity on the theology of Aeschylus. It is in this field 
that the views o f Hugh Lloyd-Jones have held sway for the best part of half a century. 
However, in this thesis, rather than taking an over-arching view of ‘Aeschylean 
theology’, seeing it as something either ‘primitive’ or ‘advanced’, the different aspects 
of Zeus’ nature which are brought out by Aeschylus in his plays are examined, first 
and foremost in the various contexts in which they appear. It is only after close 
analysis o f the individual passages that we discuss whether any rounded picture can be
26 The etym ology o f  the name o f  Zeus and its connection with the sky has little bearing on the 
characteristics o f  the god in extant Greek literature. For further discussion o f  this aspect o f  Zeus and 
related bibliography, see Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’, section The P ow er and Limitations o f  Zeus.
271 do not discuss the Prometheus Bound  in Chapter 2, due to the uncertainty concerning whether the 
play is by Aeschylus. See the discussion o f  the Prometheus Bound  in the Introduction above. In 
addition, I do not discuss the fragments in this chapter. The lack o f  context that is inevitable due to their 
fragmentary nature entails that the information gathered about the god does not present a rounded 
picture and so does not sufficiently add to what is already taken from the plays them selves to be 
worthwhile -  at least, in this chapter, which looks for a broad picture o f  what the god is like. In the 
subsequent chapter, which looks for hints and indications that Aeschylus was interacting with 
Presocratic conceptions o f  the divine, there is some discussion o f  some fragmentary pieces, notably 
Fr.70.
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drawn concerning Aeschylus’ presentation of the god in his plays. This examination 
o f the nature of Zeus is undertaken by looking at certain aspects of the god’s nature 
which have been the key areas of contention within the Aeschylean scholarly 
tradition. The first of these areas is an apparent contradiction in the nature of Zeus. In 
the section The Power and Limitations o f  Zeus, it is discussed how Aeschylus depicts 
Zeus as both an almighty god and as a god who is limited and restricted in his divinity 
by the existence of other gods. Aeschylus’ presentation of Zeus is then compared with 
the Homeric and Hesiodic presentation o f the god, in order to see to what extent and 
in what respects Aeschylus’ own view varies from the earlier conceptions of the god.
The second section of this chapter continues the discussion with another set of 
seemingly contradictory aspects of Zeus’ nature: Anthropomorphism and Invariance. 
This section looks at the relation between a god who is presented as omniscient, 
omnipresent and invariant and a god who is presented anthropomorphically and in 
possession of the limitations of men. This is done with particular attention to 
Presocratic conceptions of divinity which are discussed in order to determine their 
potential influence on Aeschylus -  or, at least, in order to consider them as examples 
of a similarity in thought that could point to an intellectual environment in which 
received ideas were being reviewed and the understanding of the nature o f the gods 
was being discussed and debated. The third section continues to consider the potential 
influence of Presocratic thought on Aeschylus by looking at Zeus as a Primal 
Substance. Here, the discussion is focused around one particular fragment from 
Aeschylus’ Heliades, Fr. 70, and its similarity (or not) to the manner of thought 
expressed in the works of philosophers such as Empedocles, Anaximenes of Miletus 
and Diogenes of Apollonia. The fourth and final section of the chapter, Zeus and 
Hades, examines the relation between Zeus and Hades in Aeschylus in order to see 
whether the poet intends anything more than simply a synonym for Hades when he 
refers to ‘Zeus o f the dead’. In this section, we consider Homeric usage o f the phrase 
‘Zeus of the dead’ and Presocratic usage of the name of Zeus, as well as how the name 
o f Zeus is connected with the god of the dead in Sophocles and Euripides.
The final chapter, ‘The Justice of Zeus’, discusses arguably the most 
significant aspect of Zeus’ nature as the highest and most powerful god of the Greek 
pantheon. How we understand the nature of Zeus in Aeschylus depends to a large 
degree, as will be shown, on how we understand the nature of justice. While the will 
o f Zeus and his over-arching power as the highest god can be seen to underpin many
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of the events that occur in the plays of Aeschylus, the god should not be seen as 
responsible for any and every event: he is not omnipotent, omniscient or omnipresent 
in the way the Judaeo-Christian God is often conceived as being. As is discussed fully 
in the chapter ‘The Nature of Zeus’, Zeus’ will is limited by the existence of other 
gods, their own spheres of power and their own individual wills. In Aeschylus, the 
nature of Zeus and justice is shaped by the presentation of the unfolding events and 
individual characters’ actions, how these events and actions are related to Zeus, and 
by what individual characters say in the plays. It is necessary to guard against 
grandiose or sweeping statements in considering the justice of Zeus, and instead to 
look at the justice of Zeus within the framework of the extant material and to work 
from the examples gathered from the plays themselves. In this chapter, this is done 
initially by discussing one particularly important question. The initial question posed 
in this chapter is whether Agamemnon should be considered unjust in the eyes of Zeus 
for sacrificing Iphigeneia and, in part as a consequence, whether Clytemnestra acts 
justly in killing Agamemnon.
Rather than starting the discussion by looking at the actions (and inaction) of 
Agamemnon himself, we first consider Orestes and his actions in the section: Orestes 
SiKff(pdpoQ — a test case. Simply put, because Zeus deems Orestes’ act o f killing 
Clytemnestra as just and thus not requiring punishment, Clytemnestra must have 
committed an unjust act that requires punishment, which is stated in the Libation 
Bearers as being the killing of Agamemnon. This then leaves the question, if the 
killing of Agamemnon is thought of as unjust, should he be seen as having committed 
an unjust act in the eyes of Zeus and the Olympians that requires punishment and thus 
his death? This is not to say that Agamemnon does not deserve his death because 
Clytemnestra is killed as a direct consequence of killing him. Rather, this chapter 
addresses the possibility that there is insufficient evidence in the Agamemnon itself, or 
at least ambiguous evidence, which suggests that Agamemnon is killed in line with the 
desire of the highest gods or at their behest. It is not argued that divine justice is 
presented by Aeschylus as some sort of zero-sum game, i.e.: Agamemnon must be 
innocent because Clytemnestra is killed for killing him. The possibility put forward 
throughout this chapter is that events and passages in the Agamemnon can be read in a 
way which indicate Agamemnon did not commit any action which angered the gods, 
but instead purposefully strove to keep Zeus and the Olympians on his side; while, in 
contrast, Clytemnestra can also be seen to have transgressed the will and desire of
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Zeus and the Olympian gods and can clearly be seen to have been punished by them 
or at their behest as a consequence. Indeed, this reading will also bring in arguments 
concerning the ‘unity’ of the Oresteia and demonstrate how my reading of the ‘guilt’ 
of Agamemnon gives greater cohesion to the trilogy.
The following section, The Killer o f  Agamemnon, examines who killed 
Agamemnon, giving consideration to both the natural and supernatural agents 
mentioned as responsible for his death. Although the answer to the question: ‘who 
killed Agamemnon?’ is, of course, a simple one -  ‘Clytemnestra, with the assistance 
of Aegisthus’ — the issue is complicated by divine involvement and by the daimonic 
forces which seem to possess the House of Atreus. This section investigates how 
daimonic forces can be seen to act as mitigating factors in Clytemnestra’s act of 
killing Agamemnon, whether there is any indication that Zeus and/or any other 
Olympian wants the death of Agamemnon, and how such considerations affect our 
understanding o f divine involvement in his death.
The next three sections work chronologically through the Agamemnon, picking 
up on the key areas of action and how Agamemnon is presented, whether as someone 
who acts justly or not. The first of these, Zeus Xenios, establishes within the structure 
and plot of the play the primacy of Zeus’ will in Agamemnon’s decision to avenge the 
theft o f Helen. The second, The Anger o f  Artemis and the Sacrifice o f  Iphigeneia, 
looks at the role of Artemis in the king’s decision to sacrifice his daughter, and how 
the wills o f the goddess and o f Zeus determine how Agamemnon acts in the scene. 
The third, The Hymn to Zeus, examines how the Hymn gives clear signs about the way 
the justice of Zeus should be understood and how Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice 
Iphigeneia fits with the doctrine of 7id0si paGoq, the meaning of which is also 
discussed. Together, these three sections put forward the notion that the justice of 
Zeus, though completely rational, is neither kind nor benevolent nor merciful.
The following and final two sections counter common assumptions about the 
so-called ‘guilt’ o f Agamemnon through an examination of the individual passages 
commonly supplied as examples of the king’s ‘guilt’. First, Agamemnon’s Excessive 
Actions at Troy, discusses assumptions connected with the ‘transgressive nature’ of 
Agamemnon, such as that he committed acts of excess at Troy, and that he was o f a 
nature that inclined him to commit acts of excess, as is demonstrated by treading on 
and destroying the ‘tapestries’ on his return. These notions are then discussed by 
going through each of the passages commonly seen as demonstrating that
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Agamemnon acts in an excessive manner, and arguing in turn that each example 
presents at best very slim evidence of transgressive and unjust behaviour. The final 
section, A Fitting End?, argues that there are also no examples within the play that can 
be supplied as evidence for the death of Agamemnon fitting the will of Zeus or any 
other Olympian god. Rather, it is demonstrated in this section that there is an 
abundance of examples within the Agamemnon and the Oresteia as a whole that give a 
clear indication that the gods favour Agamemnon.
After discussion of the ‘guilt’ of Agamemnon, the chapter widens to consider 
the justice of Zeus in the Oresteia as a whole. This is done by investigating the 
conflict between the Olympian gods and the Erinyes in the Eumenides. The trial of 
Orestes in the Eumenides is of significance to our understanding of the nature of Zeus 
and justice in Aeschylus, because it depicts the coming together of old gods with new; 
simple eye-for-an-eye retribution with a court-based system; and, it has been argued, 
the introduction of a new form of justice in the Oresteia with the establishment of the 
Areopagus court, which demonstrates a progression from retributive justice in the 
Agamemnon to something more enlightened in the Eumenides. However, what this 
section hopes to demonstrate in conclusion, and what the chapter The Justice of Zeus 
as a whole intends to show, is that there is no underlying change in the nature of Zeus 
or the manner of justice over which he presides, but that the god’s justice is entirely 
consistent throughout the three plays of the trilogy. This is not to discount or overlook 
that there is an important and noteworthy change in the manner o f the presentation and 
manifestation of justice in the form of the Areopagus court. But, nevertheless, the 
argument that is put forth and made in this chapter is that in spite of this development, 
the ultimate outcome is and will always be the same, because the will of Zeus will 
always be fulfilled. So, if the outcome is seemingly fixed and determined, irrespective 
of the creation of the court, can it be said that there is an underlying change in the 
nature of justice?
The over-arching aim of my thesis is to supply a comprehensive study of the 
nature of the divine in Aeschylus in the hope of re-opening discussion about how the 
gods are presented in his plays. The chapter on baipcov will give a clearer indication 
about how one of the most commonly used divine words in Greek literature presents a 
range of inter-connected meanings and how what it denotes in each case is often 
dependent on context. The opening chapter also discusses how in later Greek literature 
baipcov came to denote a separate stratum of divinity between gods and men, by
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looking at how Aeschylus himself uses the word in his plays in contexts where it 
refers to deities of a lesser power and position than 0so<;. The chapter will also look 
forward to the final chapter of the thesis, by examing how batiiicov and 0eo<; are used in 
the Eumenides to help facilitate the presentation and divide between the Erinyes and 
the Olympians.
In the chapters that examine the presentation of Zeus in Aeschylus, the main 
aims are, first, to demonstrate that Aeschylus was not writing in isolation, detached 
from the rest o f the world and from the literary and philosophical Greek tradition; 
rather, Aeschylus was influenced by a range of authors and ideas, including Homer, 
Hesiod and the Presocratic philosophers, who were speculating about the nature of the 
highest and most powerful god. But, more than this, it is my intention to show that the 
gods of Aeschylus were not kind or benevolent deities interferring in the lives of men 
in order to help or improve them. Instead, it will be argued that the gods of the Greek 
pantheon, including (especially) Zeus, were selfish gods concerned only with their 
own honour.
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PART 1: AAIMftN AND 0 E O S
20
1: AAIMftN IN THE PLAYS OF AESCHYLUS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to highlight the flexibility and 
ambiguity of the word Salpcov in Aeschylus, while also demonstrating that at times the 
word presents clearly discernible meanings. The second purpose is to show, based on 
the conclusions reached in the main body of the chapter in relation to the first purpose, 
how the meaning-relation of 5aipcov and 0eo<; adds to and aids our understanding of 
the conflict and resolution between the Olympian gods and the Erinyes in the 
Eumenides. However, this can only be done by giving detailed consideration to what 
Saipcov denotes and means in its various contexts in the plays and how the word is 
used by Aeschylus.
In relation to other divine terms such as 0eo<; or Zeus, 5aipcov appears, at first 
glance at least, to be an ambiguous word in many o f its instances in archaic and 
classical Greek literature. It seems to be used to denote a god or gods, the idea of 
fortune, an individual’s personal guardian deity, a vague supernatural force, as well as 
representing the manifestation of the ills of a family. The difficulty of understanding 
the word is also compounded to some extent by our modem English word demon, 
which is derived from the Greek 5aipcov, via the Latin daemon, and which in English 
holds sinister and evil connotations. The pejorative character which 8a(pcov came to 
hold in later antiquity, and which had an effect on later conceptions of the word, is 
demonstrated in the New Testament, where 5a(pcov, 5alpovs<; is used to refer to a 
malevolent spirit or spirits: in the King James Version of the Bible, it is translated as 
devil(s).1 But, the systematisation o f divine terminology with 5alpcov denoting a deity 
of lesser power and position than 0eo<; did not become an established idea in Greek 
religio-philosophical thought until Plato and Xenocrates,2 sometime after Aeschylus 
and the period under discussion here.
Aaipcov has been the subject of many treatments, especially with regard to its 
employment and meaning in Homer,3 as well as treatments which deal with the word
1 See Mat.%:3l, M ar.5 .\2 , Lu.8:29, Rev. 16:14, 18:2.
2 See, for example, Plato Symp. 202e-203e; Xenocrates Fr.15, 23-4; cf. Burkert (1985) 331-2.
3 Jorgensen (1904); Heden (1912); Ehnmark (1935); Else (1949); Brunius-Nilsson (1955); Wilford 
(1965); Dietrich (1967).
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in a general and over-riding fashion.4 There has been, however, something of a 
vacuum when it comes to studies of baipoov, its usage and meaning between Homer 
and Aeschylus. There are two noteworthy exceptions: Shirley Darcus’ article 
‘DAIMON as a Force Shaping ETHOS in Heraclitus’ and Franziska Geisser’s book 
Gotter, Geister und Damonen, which looks at destructive daemonic agencies in 
Aeschylus. While Geisser stands alone in looking at baipcov in Aeschylus, her work’s 
scope only really allows for an examination o f the word in its capacity as an 
Unheilsmacht and thus does not really permit a comprehensive approach to baipcov as 
a religious/supernatural concept in Aeschylus. What the discussion in this chapter 
aims to do, by contrast, is to examine baipcov as a concept and to consider it in context 
in order to see how it is used to denote different ideas and notions. In so doing, 
consideration will be given to the potential influence o f Homeric, Hesiodic and 
Presocratic employments of the word, as well as the potential anachronistic influence 
of the Platonic ‘personal’ baipcov on many interpretations of baipcov in earlier 
literature.
Traced from the root *dai-, from which baiopai ‘to divide, to distribute’ is 
derived, baipcov can be seen as ‘he who distributes, allots and dispenses’.5 From this 
etymology, it is possible to see how baipcov came to be conceptualised as both a deity 
(he who dispenses) and, derived from that, the fortune that results. But, in spite of 
these relatively easily understood meanings -  and, of course, while a word is never 
completely bound by etymology -  in a significant proportion of occurrences the 
precise meaning of the word is not entirely clear, where the idea of ‘deity’ or ‘fortune’ 
cannot be said to express fully what is being presented by the word. Before we come 
to a discussion of the more ambiguous instances of the word, the investigation will 
look at the more easily understood examples, where it can be determined without too 
much difficulty what baipcov in the singular and baipove<; in the plural denote.
4 Wilamowitz (1955, 2nd ed.) 356-63; Dodds (1951) 11-14; F ra n cis  (1957) passim; Kittel, Bromiley, 
Friedrich, Pitkin (eds.) (1964-1976) 2. 1-10; Nilsson (1967) 200-6; Kerenyi (1975) 16-20; Burkert 
(1985) 179-81. It was popular, in the late nineteenth century and in the early part o f  the twentieth, to 
look at how the nature o f  5aipcov originated out o f  the natural world and natural phenomena, and how  
what we find in Homer relates to ‘popular practice’. Cf. Usener (1896); Frazer (3rd ed., 1918). With the 
exception o f  Dietrich (1967), this practise had lost favour by the second half o f  the twentieth century.
5 For discussions on the word’s etym ology, see W ilamowitz (1955, 2nd ed.) 1.356-64; N ilsson (1967) 
1.202-4; Dietrich (1967) 14-15; Kerenyi (1975) 16-17; Burkert (1985) 180, 420 n.3; Geisser (2002) 7 
n.2; cf. Frisk (1954) 340-1; Chantraine (1968) 246-7.
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0EO E IN AESCHYLUS
In contrast with baipcov, the word 0eo<; seems to present few difficulties in 
meaning in the works o f Aeschylus and in the works of authors earlier than and 
contemporary with him. The unambiguous nature of 0so<; will offer a useful starting 
point and introduction to the subsequent, more thorough discussions on baipcov, by 
providing characteristics with which the latter term can be compared and contrasted, 
and from which firmer and more fruitful conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 
Salpcov in the plays o f Aeschylus.
©eo<;/0soi denote the idea of a god and gods respectively; they always do and 
there is no ambiguity in meaning in this respect. Nevertheless, there are a few areas 
which need to be clarified. First o f all, in Aeschylus, as well as in archaic and classical 
Greek authors more generally, 0so<; and 0sol are used both generically and 
specifically. When used specifically, 0eo<;, in the singular, refers to a specified deity, 
and this can be seen clearly, for example, when the Danaids speak of Apollo: ayvov x’ 
AnoXXco, cpuyab’ an ’ oupavou 0eov. ‘And holy Apollo, the god exiled from Heaven’6 
{Supp. 214).7 Something similar is true when 0eol, in the plural, is used specifically: it 
refers to a specified plurality of deities. This usage can be seen, for example, at 
Suppliants 159-61 in reference to the Olympian gods: xdv 7ioX,u^evcbxaiov | Zfjva xcov 
KSKpriKoxcov | i^opscOa cruv xXabou; | apxavaiq ©avouaai, | pf] xuxouaai 0ecov 
,OX.up7c(cov. ‘With boughs we will approach as suppliants the host of very many, Zeus
9 8of the departed, having died by the noose, unless we meet with the Olympian gods.’ 
And as would be expected, when 0soi is used generically it refers to an unspecified 
plurality of deities.
However, when 0soq is used generically, it can either refer to an unspecified 
god or to the gods as a whole, as a generic, collective singular, in a manner 
comparable to the way ‘man’ can be used in English. As a generic, collective singular, 
0so<; presents a meaning similar to 0sol. This we can see, when in response to the 
Herald’s announcement that Agamemnon is soon to arrive, Clytemnestra says: xi yap |
6 The Greek text o f  Aeschylus is taken from West (1998), unless otherwise stated; all translations o f  
Aeschylus are based (with some minor variations) on Sommerstein (2008), unless otherwise stated. 
Where Sommerstein’s Greek text diverges from W est’s, I supply my own translation using 
Sommerstein as a starting point.
7 Cf. Supp. 214 (Apollo), 299 (Hera), 1073 (Zeus); Ag. 1078 (Apollo) and 1204; Ch. 300 (Apollo); Eu. 
25 (Dionysus), 33 (A pollo), 282 (Apollo), 297 (Athena) and 883.
8 Diverging from the translation o f  Sommerstein (2008). For similar use o f  Oeoi, see Th. 185; Supp. 189, 
2 4 2 ,3 3 3 -4 ,3 5 4 -5 ,4 1 3 ,4 6 5 ,5 0 1 , 5 0 3 ,981 , 1014; Ag. 88-91; Ch. 784; Eu. 73.
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yuvaud toutod cpsyyot; rjbiov bpaxeiv, | arco oipaisiai; avbpa acbaavioq Oeou 17n3A,a<; 
avoT^ai; ‘What light could be sweeter than this for a wife to behold, when she opens 
the door to a husband whom a god/the gods/the divine has brought safe home from the 
wars?’9 (Ag. 601-3) It is thus possible to see that the meaning of the passage is 
effectively the same should we read ‘a god’, ‘the gods’ or simply ‘the divine’ for 08O<;.
While we cannot be sure what exactly is being conceptualised with this type of 
generic usage of 0eo<; — if, indeed, anything more than a vague notion o f the divine is 
being implied -  it is certain that it does not denote the idea of a monotheistic deity 
comparable to the Christian God. Indeed, any debate that existed regarding 
monotheism in early Greek thought and the use of 0eo<; was effectively refuted with 
the publication of Gilbert F ra n c is ’s 1957 work, Le Polytheisme et I ’emploi au 
singulier des mots THEOS, DAIMON dans la litterature grecque d ’Homere a Platon. 
F rancis shows in this comprehensive study that outside of specific philosophical 
authors such as Xenophanes10 and Plato, 0eo<; in the singular was not used to denote a 
monotheistic notion of god (or God) before 350 BC, but was often used generically, 
just as in the example from the Agamemnon.
THE INDEFINITE MODE OF EXPRESSION
The most commonly found use of baipcov in early Greek literature is as an 
unknown and unspecified agent that brings about events, and it is in this mode of 
employment that baipcov has been most frequently treated by scholars. While the 
studies in question are primarily treatments of the word in Homer, the underlying 
discussions regarding the nature of the word and its usage are nevertheless applicable 
to Aeschylus too. In studies of baipcov in Homer, the generic employment of baipcov
as an unknown, unspecified divine agent is often equated with the generic usage of
11 12  08oc;/08oi and Zeus in what has been called the ‘indefinite mode o f  expression’.
9 In the translation o f  0soo, I differ from Sommerstein, who translates it as ‘god’, which is potentially 
misleading in its monotheistic connotations.
10 This is not to say that Xenophanes exclusively uses the word Oso^Osol for his one g o d  alone: see, for 
example, Fr. B l ,  14-16, 18, 23, 34. For discussion o f  the ‘monotheistic’ fragments and their 
significance for our understanding o f  Aeschylus, see Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’, section  
Anthropomorphism and Invariance.
11 See Else (1949) for a detailed discussion o f  the generic usage o f  Zeus. For examples o f  the generic 
Zeus, see II. 24. 525-47, Od. 3. 130-83.
12 Jorgensen (1904) was the first to look at this issue. He was followed by Heden (1912) and Ehnmark 
(1935), who gives a detailed summary o f  the scholarly debate up to that date, cf. 59-71; and in the post­
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The ‘indefinite mode of expression’ is understood as a ‘device for indicating that a 
supernatural event was caused by a god as to whose identity no definite statement was 
possible or desirable.’13
An example o f this type of usage can be seen in Iliad Book 15, where the 
narrator, Teucer, Ajax and Hector all view the same event as the work of different 
divine agents, and all do so because of varying levels of insight into the divine 
workings surrounding the event. So, first, the narrator tells us that when Teucer was 
aiming his bow at Hector, Zeus protected Hector by breaking Teucer’s bow-string 
(461-5). Secondly, Teucer, who has no insight into the divine workings of the scene, 
sees a Salpcov as responsible for breaking the bow-string (467-70). Thirdly, Ajax, who 
is in a similar unenlightened state, says that a Oeoq made the bow of no use (472-7). 
Fourthly, Hector correctly sees Zeus as responsible for breaking Teucer’s bow-string 
(483-93). Hector’s naming of Zeus here has been seen as yet another instance of the 
use of the name of Zeus as an indefinite term, in much the same way as 5aipcov and 
Oeoq are used by Teucer and Ajax.14 But this is not what is being expressed by 
Hector’s use of Zeus in this instance. This is not to say that the term Zeus is never 
used in a generic manner. Zeus, as the most powerful god and as the ‘father of gods 
and men’, came to be representative of the totality o f the gods in an all-encompassing 
fashion.15 However in this instance here, in contrast with Teucer and Ajax, Hector has 
been privy to the help Zeus has given him through Apollo (cf. 15.254-5), and he is 
referring directly to the god as the source of his good luck. The differing levels of 
insight into the divine workings of this episode can be clearly seen. The narrator 
clearly tells us that Zeus is the god directly responsible for the breaking of Teucer’s 
bow-string, and Hector here, because of Apollo’s revelations at 254-5, can reasonably 
assume the god to be behind this particular event; while, on the other hand, Teucer 
and Ajax have no such insight into the specific workings o f any one god and 
consequently refer generically to a Salpcov and a Osoq as being responsible for the
war era, Brunius-Nilsson (1955) offers a discussion o f  this usage with specific analysis o f  several 
Homeric passages; cf. Else (1949); Dietrich (1967) 297-326; N ilsson (1967); Geisser (2002) 8-11.
13 Ehnmark (1935) 71.
14 Brunius-Nilsson (1955) 125.
15 Ehnmark (1935) 80; Else (1949) 26-36. For comparative examples o f  Zeus as a specific god with 
clearly definable characteristics or as representative o f  the totality o f  the gods, see Hesiod Op. Indeed, it 
is possible to see from the generic usage o f  Oeo^Oeoi and Zeus how Presocratic thinkers like 
Xenophanes came to discuss the nature o f  the gods. For a discussion o f  this topic, see Chapter 3, 
section Anthropomorphism and Invariance.
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event with each term synonymous with the other:16 both are thinking of a god as the 
agent behind the deed, but neither knows which god. It is thus Teucer’s and Ajax’s 
lack of knowledge concerning which god is involved which determines their use of 
baipcov and of 0so<; as indefinite modes of expression.
AAIMONEL IN THE PLURAL
The synonymity of baipcov and 0so<; can be seen in Aeschylus too. In one of its 
most easily recognisable applications, baipcov is used to designate a deity of whatever 
nature. The plural 5alpovs<; is employed by Aeschylus in this way only.17 In early 
Greek literature in general, on the many occasions when baipovsq is employed in 
reference to deities, it appears to be synonymous with 0so^/0sol, and as such there is 
no perceptible difference in meaning between the two words. This synonymity is 
easily shown in scenes where the statues or altars of deities are being prayed to and 
honoured.18 Statues and altars offer fixed points of reference from which it is possible 
to gather information about how the two sets of terms are used, because although the 
divine words -  5alpove<;, 0so<; and 0soi — used to refer to them change, the statues or 
altars o f the deities being honoured and prayed to are known and do not. Although 
what is being evoked or prayed to may nevertheless still change, the passages below 
can be seen in each instance to offer a secure context and a basis from which to start a 
discussion of possible synonymity of the two words.
In the parodos of the Seven, the chorus pray that they and the city may be 
saved from the Argive attack. Various individual deities and collectives of deities are 
invoked during the parodos, with 0s6q, 0soi and baipovsq being used seemingly 
interchangeably: id) id) 0eoi 0eai x \  opopevov | icaxov aXeoaaxe. ‘Oh, oh, you gods 
and you goddesses keep off the surge of evil.’ (77*. 87-8); xi<; apa pucrsxai, zic, ap ’ 
67iapK8asi | 0£cov rj 0eav; ‘Who, who of the gods and goddesses will protect us, who 
will ward them off?’ (Th. 93-4); rcoxepa brjx’ eyd) <7iaxpia> 7ipoo7r£oco | ppexri 
baipovoov; ‘Should I, then, fall down before the <ancestral> images of our
16 Cf. Else (1949) 26-31.
17 Pers. 203, 628, 724, 811, 1005; Th 77, 95, 174, 211, 236, 515; Supp. 85, 217, 483, 693, 893, 922; 
Ag. 182, 519, 635; Ch. 125, 214, 436; Eu. 23, 101, 150, 302, 920, 929, 947, 963, 1016.
18 Pers. 203, 628, 811; Th. 95, 211; Supp. 85, 217, 483, 693; A g  519; Eu. 920.
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daimones19?’ {Th. 95-6); 0soi 7ioXiaoxoi x0ovo<;. ‘Gods who dwell in this city and 
land.’ {Th. 108); tioT 5’ ext xeXoq S7idyei Osog; ‘What is the ending that [a] god has yet 
to bring?’ {Th. 157); iob 7iavapK8iq20 0eoi, | id> xeXetoi xsXeiai xs yaq | xaaSe 
7rupyo(poXxxKsq, ‘O gods that shine on all alike, o gods and goddesses with decisive 
power to guard the walls of this land,’ {Th. 166-8); id) cpiXoi 5aipove<;, | Xoxfjpioi <x’> 
dp,cpipavxe<; 7ioX.iv | 5ei^a0’ dx; q>iX,07t6X8i<;, ‘O beloved daimones, stand over our city 
to liberate it and show how you love it,’ {Th. 174-6). And directly before and after the 
parodos, Eteocles mentions both Saipovsg and 0sol where no change can be discerned 
between the deities spoken of: 7roXi<; yap eu 7rpaaaouaa Saipovaq xisi. ‘For, when a 
city enjoys success, it honours its daimones.’ {Th. 77); PpexT) nsaovoaq npoq 
7ioXiaaouxcov 0scov ‘To fall down before the images of the city’s gods’ (77?. 185). The 
manner in which Eteocles uses the two terms can be seen as effectively synonymous 
with the chorus’ own employment seen in the previous examples.
This use of Saipoveq as a synonym for 0eo<;/0eoi is not exclusive to the Seven,
but occurs in the other plays too. In the Suppliants, for example, the altars and statues
21form a similar type o f  focal point to that seen in the Seven. So, when Pelasgus tells 
Danaus to place suppliant boughs upon other altars o f  deities throughout the city, he 
does so by calling them both 0eoi and Saipoveq: kM5ou<; xe xouxooq aivj/’ ev ayKaXaiq 
Xapd>v | pcopouq 87i’ aXkovq Saipovcov eyxoopicov | 0sq. ‘Quickly take these boughs in 
your arms, and place them on the altars o f  our native daim ones.’ {Supp. 482-4); 
f]ysia08 Pcojaouq acruiKouc;, 08cbv 0’ sSpaq- ‘Take him to the city altars and the abodes 
o f the gods.’ (<Supp. 501); xai ^oppoXouciv ou 7ioXuaxopsiv xpsdw | vauxrjv ayovxaq 
xov5’ ecpsaxiov 0sd>v. ‘And you must not be talkative with those you meet while 
escorting this sailor who took sanctuary at the gods’ hearth.’ {Supp. 502-3). No  
discernible change in reference can be seen between baipovsq and Oeoi; the focal point 
remains the same, while only the divine term used for it differs, just as was the case in 
the Seven.
Aaipoveq can also act as a synonym for 0eo<;/0eoi, when no such focal point as 
icons or statues exists. In Aeschylus, there is one example outside of those references
19 I translate 5aig6voov here (and elsewhere) as ‘daimones’ instead o f  ‘gods’ as is found in 
Sommerstein. This is done in order to more readily make visible where Geoq, Geoi and 5ai^rcov, Salgoveq 
are used, whether or not any difference in meaning is intended by the author.
20 Reading rcavapicev; with West (1998), instead o f  racvaXKeii; as in Sommerstein (2008) and Page 
(1972).
211 am aware that not all editors name the king Pelasgus. Cf. Page (1972).
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to statues and altars where 8aip.ov8<; is used as a specific way of denoting deities in a 
manner synonymous with Gsog/Geol. This comes toward the end of the Eumenides 
CEu. 961-7):
Geai t’ a> MoTpai 
paxpoKaaiyvfjxai,
5aipov£<; opGovopoi,
Tiavxi 86pco pexctKoivoi,
7iavxi xpdvco 8’ £7ti|3pi0£ic; 
e v S ik o k ;  6p.iA.ian;, 
rcavxa xipicbxaxat 0£©v.
And goddesses, O Fates, our sisters, children of the same mother, daimones just in 
apportionment, sharers in every house, pressing home your just visitations at all times, 
the most highly honoured o f the goddesses in all ways.
Here, the Fates are called Geai and Saipovet; within three lines, and there is no 
difference in reference implied.22 They are even referred to as the most honoured of 
the gods a couple of lines latter. One could, of course, argue that the word 5aipovs<; 
seems to be used here with a particular eye on its etymological root dai-, as those who 
distribute, apportion, allot, playing on the meaning of word opGovojaoi ‘making right 
apportionments’23 which follows, as well as playing on the role of the Moirai as those 
who allot a man’s share in life and the connection the name Moirai has with pepog 
‘part’, which the goddesses have in the houses (and, by consequence, life) of the 
Athenians. But, regardless of the potential etymological word-play, it is still the case 
that there is no change of reference between Geai and Saipovec;, although there is a 
difference in connotation.
There are several occasions when Salpovec; does not refer to any specific 
collection of deities, but does nevertheless seem to be synonymous with Geoq/Geoi. In 
certain instances, when Saipoveq is used shortly before or after Geoi, this usage is quite 
plain to see. Such is the case in the Libation Bearers {Ch. 212-14) when Orestes tells
22 Nor is Geai a pejorative or negative feminine version o f  0eo<;. See below discussion o f  Erinyes and 
Athena.
23 Cf. Sommerstein (1989) 268.
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Electra to pray to the gods: soxoo id  ta)uia, xoiq 0soi<; xsXsacpopoix; | £v%aq
EnayyEk'kDvoa, Tuy%dvsiv Kak&q. ‘Pray to the gods for continued success, proclaiming
to them that your previous prayers have been fulfilled!’ To which Electra replies: 87iei
xi vuv 8K0tTi Saipovcov Kup©; ‘Why, what success have the daimones now granted
me?’ Both Orestes and Electra refer generically to the gods, but do so using different
words, with Orestes calling the gods GsoTq and Electra Satpovcov. In spite of two
different words being used, in both instances it is clear that GsoTq and Saipovcov refer
generically to the gods as a whole or indefinitely to any group of gods.
It is also possible to see that 8oufiove<; is used synonymously with Gsoq/Geoi
through their general patterns of employment. For instance, Aeschylus only uses Geoi
together with the word ,OX,up7cioi to refer to the Olympian gods (Gsol ’OX,i)ji7rioi), and
never uses 5alpoveq.24 0so<;/0£oi are also used to refer directly to Olympian gods
when not prefaced by the epithet ’OA.ujmoi.25 The plural Gsoi can denote both
Olympian gods and non-Olympian gods together;26 and Gsoq/Geol can even refer to
non-Olympian gods by themselves.27 Finally, Gso<;/0£oi are used to signify the
28presence of gods represented by either an altar or icons, as has already been seen.
Due to the frequency with which Geoc; or Geoi are used with specific reference, 
and because of the unambiguous nature of the words’ employment generally, there is 
little doubt that when they are used generically they refer to unknown, unspecified 
deities. The same is true for Saip.ov£<;. The unambiguous manner of the employment 
of 8aipov£<; with specific reference, where it always denotes a collection o f known 
deities, enables us to understand that when it is used generically it too denotes a 
plurality of unspecified deities. So, in the Persians, when the Queen says: G)S’ e%ev 
yvcbpr|<; S£ 7cou tic; Saipovcov ^uvr|V|/aTO. ‘It is true. One of the daimones must have 
touched his wits,’ (Pers. 724) the meaning seems quite clear that Saipovcov denotes an
24 See, Supp. 161, 981, 1014; Ch. 784; Eu. 73. This tendency is not exclusive to Aeschylus. In all but 
one instance before Aeschylus, Geoi is always used with ‘OX,i>|mot when referring to the Olympian 
gods. The only exception com es at Solon 36.4.
25 See, Th. 301-2; Supp. 214, 218, 299, 630-1, 1036-7, 1073; Ag. 1078, 1204; Ch. 300, (probably 340); 
Eu. 25, 33, 153, 224, 242, 259, 282, 297, 666a, 671, 883.
26 Th. 510-11; Eu. 20, 722, 882-4.
27 For Oeoq: Pers. 157, 643; for Geoi: Eumenides 115, 728, 825. These references from the Eumenides 
are far from unambiguous uses o f  Geoi. All three refer to the Erinyes and two o f  the instances are used, 
in all likelihood, as terms o f  flattery. These three references w ill be discussed later in greater detail 
below in the discussion o f  the Erinyes and Athena. For now it is enough to be aware that GeocyGsoi (or 
their feminine equivalents) are used o f  non-Olympian deities.
28 See, for example, Th. 185; Supp. 189, 242, 333-4, 354-5, 413, 465, 501, 503; Ag. 88-91; cf. the 
discussion above.
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undefined plurality of deities, and that it was one o f their number that assisted Xerxes 
in his decision to yoke the straits. Similarly, in the Agamemnon, the idea of an 
undefined plurality of deities is in evidence when the chorus ask the Herald about the 
storm which hit the Argive fleet on the voyage home: 7tco<; yap Xsyeiq x ^ © va 
vauxuccp axpaico | sXBsiv xsXs'uxrjaai xs Saipovcov k o x c o ;  ‘Well, how did the storm you 
speak of come upon the naval host through the wrath of daimones, and how did it 
end?’ (Ag. 634-5). Aaipovsq again identifies divine involvement in a general fashion 
as it did in the Persians, and the meaning must be that a plurality of unknown and 
unspecified deities had a role in the storm which came upon the Argive fleet.
AAIMQN IN THE SINGULAR
With the terms 8aipovs<; and 0s6<;/08oi, the idea of a god or deity is ever 
present, and this is true whenever they are employed. In contrast, the singular form, 
Saipoov, is only infrequently used to denote a god or deity by Aeschylus. There are 
two examples of it being used of a named deity. The first o f these refers directly to 
Ares (Th. 104-7):
7ipo5cbG8i<;, 7iaA,aix0a>v 
’Apr|(;, yav xeav;
a) xpuaoTcfjA.T^  Saipov, £7n5’ eraSe 7ioX,iv 
av 7iox’ sixpiXrixav £0ou.
What do you mean to do, Ares, ancient god of this land? Betray your own country? 
Daimon of the golden helmet, watch over, watch over the city which you once held 
worthy o f your love?
This is the only occasion when 5aipcov in the singular is used of a god traditionally 
associated with the Olympic pantheon.29 The only other place where it is used of 
another named deity, or at least of a non-human, supernatural being, in Aeschylus30 
comes in the Seven with reference to Typhon (Th. 523).31 What is more, this
29 For a further discussion o f  this passage and the use o f  8aipcov to refer to Ares, see the section below  
entitled Saipoov as a  deity lesser than and/or distinct from  Geoq.
301 exclude from this group Pers. 620, 641 where Darius is called a 5cupcov. See below for discussion  
o f  Darius and Saipcov in the section Saipcov as a  deity lesser than and/or distinct from  Geo;.
31 See below for discussion o f  Typhon as a deity lesser than and/or distinct from Gsoq.
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infrequency of usage is not exclusive to Aeschylus. In extant literature, there are only 
two instances before him when Saipcov is used of a specific, known deity (whether 
synonymously with Qsoq or otherwise).32 The examples can be found in the Iliad, one 
at II. 3.420, where it is used to refer to Aphrodite in the expression fjp%£ 5s Saipcov 
‘The daimon led’; the other at 15.418, ejeei p’ ekeXjclgge ys Saipcov ‘Since the daimon 
has brought them there’, refers back to Apollo (15.236-80) when the god, instigated 
by the promptings of Zeus, breathes courage into Hector’s breast and urges him on to 
assault the Greek ships.33
There is only one place in Aeschylus where Saipcov is used generically in a 
way that unambiguously conceptualises the idea o f deity or a non-human, supernatural 
being. This is in the expression, s^OsTv xiv’ auioI<; Saipov’ f\ Ppoxcov xiva - ‘Ask for 
some daimon, or some mortal, to come against them - ’ (Ch. 119). Although no deity 
is named, the idea of a deity or supernatural being is present, where the choice under 
consideration is between a mortal or divine avenger. Comparable instances of Gsoq 
being used to denote an unknown deity acting as a fulfiller of events can be seen 
elsewhere in Aeschylus. For instance, in the Persians, the Messenger states: dx; yap 
0£O<; | vacov cSgoke kuSoc; "EAAr|aiv \iayr\c,, ‘When a god had given the triumph in the 
naval battle to the Greeks,’ (Pers. 454-5). In either example, Saipcov or 0£o<; could be 
used and the meaning would not be changed; the idea of an unknown deity is present 
in both. Such usage is comparable with the indefinite mode of expression, where 
Saipcov and 0£o<; appear as synonymous terms, denoting an unknown supernatural 
force.
The employment of Saipcov as an unknown supernatural force is very common 
in Aeschylus. Aaipcov is often seen as the bringer of both good and evil when no 
specific god can be named as the source. It has long been accepted that Saipcov is not 
in itself an agent of evil.34 This view is supported by those instances where Saipcov is 
qualified by positive descriptions. So, in the Persians, for example, Darius is called
32 Excluded from this number are examples such as the use o f  Saipcov in the so-called Teucer scene in 
the Iliad, because although the poet knows that it was Zeus who saved Hector, Teucer him self does not 
and as such blames Saipcov as the cause or source o f  his foiled purpose. See section The Indefinite 
M ode o f  Expression above.
33 There are two other examples which could be seen as using Saipcov to denote gods. In Hesiod and the 
Theognidea Saipcov is used to refer to Phaethon ( Theogony 988-91) and Ganymede (1345-8) 
respectively. However, in these instances, Saipcov is used to refer to a different class or type o f  deity. 
For a further discussion, see the section below Saipcov as a deity lesser than and/or distinct from  Geoi;.
34 See, for example, Brunius-Nilsson (1955) 119-25, Broadhead (1960) 69-70, Burkert (1985) 179, 
Geisser (2002) 7-10.
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Saipova psyaoxq (Pers. 641) and in Aristophanes reference is made to an dyaGoc; 
Saipcov.35 Also, that Saipcov was not in itself an agent of evil or sinister doings during 
this period is supported by the fact that it is qualified by negative adjectives, such as 
crruyepoc; (Od. 5.396), KaKoq (Od. 10.64, 24. 149; Pers. 354), latenot; xiq (Od. 
19.201), aruyvs (Pers. 472), Soo7c6vt]T8 (Pers. 515). It is the adjectives themselves 
which give the Saipcov a negative character, not the word Saipcov itself.36 But, while 
Saipcov does not possess any negative or positive weight in itself one way or the other, 
this does not, of course, exclude it from being employed to refer to a bringer of 
destruction or a bringer of good respectively. Indeed, in Aeschylus, Saipcov is often 
employed as a bringer of evil.37 This feature is most readily apparent in the Persians, 
where Saipcov appears consistently as a destructive force working against Xerxes and 
the Persian army. The first time Saipcov is used in the play it is as a bringer of ill- 
fortune (Pers. 157-8):
Osou psv euvaxeipa nspccov, Oeou 5s xai phrqp ecpD<^  -
si' Ti pf| Saipcov 7caX,aio<; vuv ps0saxT]KS aipaicp.
Y ou w ere the spouse o f  one w h o  w as a  god  to the Persians, and you  are the m other o f
their god  too  -  un less an old  daim on has n ow  changed its stance con cern in g  our army.
Here we see Saipcov and Osoq used in juxtaposition, each presenting a meaning quite 
different from the other. While 0so<; refers to the Persian kings, Darius and Xerxes 
respectively, and the status in which they were supposedly held by their Persian 
subjects, Saipcov takes the form of an agent that has some kind of control over the fate 
of the army by changing, or by being deemed to alter, the course o f events. The 
potential threat the Saipcov presents at 157-8 becomes actualized in the course of the 
play (cf. Pers. 345, 354, 472, 515, 725, 911, 921, 942), where, by the end, a Saipcov is 
seen by both Xerxes and the chorus as the sole divine agent responsible for the 
destruction of the army: oxoxoi (3aaiXsu, oxpaxiac; ayaOfjq | xai nspaovopou xipfjq 
psya^rjc; Koapou x’ avSpcov | ovq vuv Saipcov ercsKsipev ‘Woe, my King, for that fine
35 Ar. Eq. 85, V. 525. See Burkert (1985) 180 n.9.
36 See Brunius-Nilsson (1955) 119.
37 For Saipcov as an Unheilsmacht, see Geisser (2002) 17-56.
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army, and for the great honour of the Persian empire and the men who adorned it, 
whom now a daimon has scythed away’ {Pers. 919-21; cf. 942).
The destructive nature which Saipcov frequently possesses in the Persians can 
be seen further at 345-7, where it is placed in juxtaposition with Gsol:
bXV G)5e Saipcov tk; KaiecpGetpe axpaxov, 
zaXavza (3piaa<; o o k  iooppo7icp r u y r c  
Geoi noXiv oco^oooi ITaAlaSoq Geac;.
It was some daimon that destroyed our fleet like this, weighting the scales so that 
fortune did not fall out even: the gods have saved the city of the goddess Pallas.
While the destruction of the Persian army and the protection of Athens are effectively 
two sides of the same coin, the acts o f destruction and protection are themselves very 
different. Through their respective actions it may be possible to see Saipcov, in this 
example, as denoting a divine agent that is in some way distinct from the divine agents 
denoted by Geoi, and that the two words are not simply synonyms here. Or, if one does 
not accept the notion of different divine agents, then Saipcov and 0sol could be seen as 
representing in some way a difference in connotation or implication. In either case, it 
may be possible to compare this usage with those instances of Saipcov and 0so<; that 
will be discussed below in relation to Saipcov as a deity, where Saipcov seems on many 
occasions to denote a type of deity lesser than and/or in some way distinct from 
Osoq.38 This is all the more plausible with the juxtaposition at Pers. 345-7, because the 
only positive action(s) attributed to divine agencies in the play are those ascribed to 
0eo<; (cf. Pers. 454).
Although it may be the case that Aeschylus is using Saipcov at Pers. 345-7 to 
distinguish between types of divine action and agent, with one demonstrating more 
positive attributes than the other, I do not wish to argue that Aeschylus had in mind a 
demarcation between the two terms and thus between opposing or differing classes of 
divine agency elsewhere in the Persians, not least because 0eo<;/0sot are seen as the
38 For example, Typhon and Zeus at Th. 521-5; see section below Saipcov as a deity lesser than and/or 
distinct from  Qeoq.
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cause of destruction as often as Saipcov is ,39 in spite of being responsible for the only 
positive actions in the play. Rather, what is being suggested here is that Saipcov and 
0eo<; are used on this occasion for this specific juxtaposition. This is because, as 
different words (with different histories), they possess different connotations,40 which 
could help facilitate the expression of the contrast between the destruction of the 
Persian army and the protection of the city of Pallas; or it may be that the Messenger 
does not want to accuse the (Olympian) Geoi personally of having been the agents o f 
destruction. But, for whatever reason the Messenger decides to employ these divine 
terms, it seems that Gsoi, because of its usage up to and including Aeschylus, is more 
closely associated with the Olympians than Saipcov and as a result automatically 
establishes a connection between 0so<; and the Olympians in which Saipcov cannot 
share. This Olympian connection which Geoq has and which Saipcov does not have 
could be seen to present a connection between the Olympian gods and the city of 
Pallas Athena, so that it may implicitly appear through the word’s common 
associations with the Olympians -  in contrast with Saipcov — that Athens is divinely 
protected by the highest and most powerful gods as a collective, and not just by their 
patroness, Athena.
The destructive character of Saipcov is not exclusive to the Persians, but can 
also be seen in the Eumenides, where a Saipcov laughs at the arrogant man who casts 
his wealth upon the reef of justice {Eu. 558-65):
KaXei 5’ aKooovxag ooSsv <ev> peaa 
5oG7iaX£i is Slvar 
jEka Se Saipcov etc’ avSpi 0£ppcp, 
xov oimox’ aoxoovx’ iSobv apr|%dvou;
Soaiq A.a7ta5vov ooS’ i)7t£p0£ovT aicpav 
Si’ aicovog Se x o v  7ipiv oA,(3ov 
sppaxi TtpocPatabv Alica<; 
wA,ex’ aKlauxoc; aioxoq.
39 0£o^0£oi/: 93, 283, 294, 362, 495-502, 514, 604, 741, 742; Saipcov: 158, 345, 354, 472, 515, 725, 
9 1 1 ,9 2 1 ,9 4 2 .
40 See the section below Saipcov as deity lesser than and/or distinct from  0£O<;.
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In the middle o f the eddies, unable to fight his way out, he calls, but they pay no heed; 
the daimon laughs at the headstrong man, seeing him powerless, the one who boasted 
it could never happen, in helpless distress, as he fails to surmount the crest o f the 
wave: he has wrecked the ship o f his former lifelong prosperity on the reef of Justice 
and perishes unwept, unseen.
The baipcov in this image is depicted as assisting or, at least, witnessing the man’s 
destruction of his own wealth, presenting the audience with a destructive form of 
justice. The laughing baipcov here in the Eumenides can be compared with Dionysus 
in the Bacchae?x where both present unnerving and destructive characteristics. 
Dionysus, who is frequently referred to as baipcov throughout the play (Ba. 22, 42, 
219, 272, 298, 377, 416, 481, 498, 769), smiles or laughs in a sinister manner when he 
is ‘seized’ by Pentheus’ guards {Ba. 439); and he is urged by the chorus of Bacchants 
to cast the net of death over the hunter of maenads with a smiling/laughing 
countenance {Ba. 1021). Indeed, both Dionysus and the laughing baipcov of the 
Eumenides exhibit further similarities in that they do not bring about either man’s 
destruction by or in themselves, because both Pentheus and the man in the Eumenides 
passage are in some way responsible for their own downfall.
Although baipcov is frequently used by Aeschylus to denote an agent o f  
destruction, it is not solely employed in this way. Often baipcov presents no negative 
connotations and is simply the agent by or through which an event is brought to pass. 
So, in the Persians, where baipcov is frequently associated with bringing destruction, it 
is said that: oxav b’ o baipcov suporj, 7i£7ioi0£vai | xov auxov aisv avspov oupisiv 
xi>xr|<;. ‘Whereas when the daimon sends it favour your way, you tend to be sure that 
the breeze o f good fortune will always continue to blow from astern’ {Pers. 601-2). 
Similarly in the Seven, the chorus, when trying to persuade Eteocles not to go out and 
fight his brother, speak o f the favourable way in which baipcov can change: plpv’ oxe 
cot 7rap8axaK£v, ercei baipcov | A,r)paxo<; av xp07iala XP0V^  pexaA.|X.aKT6<; i'aco<; av e>»0oi 
Oetepcoxspco | Trvsupaxi. ‘Stay, while you have the chance, since a daimon, altered in 
its purpose at the turning o f time, may perhaps come with a more kindly breath’ {Th. 
705-8). And the truly ambivalent nature o f the word is demonstrated at Ag. 1667 
where the chorus make known their hope for Orestes’ return to Argos: o u k ,  eav
41 Geisser (2002) 20-1.
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Saipcov ’Opsaxpv Ssvp’ a;rso06vr| poXsTv. ‘Not if a daimon guides Orestes to come 
back here.’ Although his return would be a happy event for the chorus, it would not be 
for Clytemnestra and Aegisthus.
AAIMHN AS AN INDIVIDUAL’S FORTUNE OR LOT IN LIFE
While there are numerous instances where Saipcov appears to be synonymous 
with 08o<;, this is not always the case. There are many occasions in Aeschylus and 
elsewhere where Saipcov seems to denote a deity lesser than and/or in some way 
distinct from 0so<;; where it seems to denote an individual’s fortune or lot in life; and 
where it seems to denote an individual’s own personal or tutelary deity -  which is 
closely connected to the former two usages.
In Aeschylus, as well as in authors before and contemporary to him, there are 
times when Saipcov is better understood as having a meaning close to that o f ‘fortune’. 
In this mode of employment, Saipcov seems to be used in two distinct, but closely 
connected, ways: first, as an -  often unknown -  agent which causes events and 
changes in men’s lives. Such instances can be directly compared with the way Saipcov 
is used in the ‘indefinite mode o f expression’, where it appears synonymous with 0so<; 
as an anonymous agent fulfilling events. The second way Saipcov is used to denote the 
idea of fortune as that which falls to any one as his lot in life. However, the two are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, but are outlined in this fashion in order to help 
gain greater understanding o f the term and to demonstrate its flexibility. It is thus 
possible to speak of someone who is fortunate as suSaipcov; someone who is 
prosperous or blessed as o^pioSaipcov; someone who is unfortunate as KaxoSaipcov; or 
someone who is unhappy as SooSaipcov, where the adjectives can be seen to describe 
the agent working for an individual or as the state created for the individual.42
When Saipcov is employed to denote the idea o f fortune, whether as the agent 
which brings an event to pass or as the state which falls to an individual as his lot, its 
precise meaning is usually far more difficult to define than when the term is used to 
denote a god or other divine being. Indeed, it is not wholly unproblematic to say that 
Saipcov is used to designate an idea close to that of fortune. In translations of 
Aeschylus, when Saipcov acts as either the agent o f fortune or as the state o f fortune
42 Burkert (1985) 180-1.
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itself, it is often translated as destiny or fate.43 Although Saipcov cannot be said to have 
any connection with deterministic notions or an over-arching will or godhead, the 
various translations which have been given to Saipcov do give some indication about 
the uncertainty surrounding Saipcov and what exactly it means. The following 
discussion will highlight the indeterminate nature of Saipcov and that it is not 
connected with the movements of an over-arching will.44 It will also be established 
that in Aeschylus there is a clear indication that Saipcov behaves as an individual 
divine force, as a personal, guardian-like deity intimately connected with a person’s 
life, affecting events for them and being representative of their particular fortune, 
always subject to change and never fated or set.
The personal and individual nature of fortune which Saipcov denotes can be 
seen in a passage from the Persians, where Darius warns of the temporal nature of 
their daimon {Pers. 823-6):
xotaoG’ opcovxcq xcovSe xaTxtxlpia 
pcpvqoG’ AGqvcov 'EAAaSot; xe, pr|5£ xk; 
i)7E£p(ppovT|aa<; x ov  rc a p o v x a  Salpova 
aXAcov cpaaGciq oX(3ov £KX£fl pcyav.
In looking upon these things, be mindful o f the damages incurred from the Athenians 
and Greece and let no one, overestimating their present daimon, squander a great 
wealth through desiring more.
What Darius seems to be suggesting in this passage is that as a result of misjudging 
one’s present lot in life, this misjudgement may lead to a desire for more wealth that 
will ultimately end in destroying what one already has. The use of Saipcov and raxpcbv 
together further indicates the impermanent nature of fortune. This type of usage of 
Saipcov can also be seen in the Agamemnon, where Aegisthus responds angrily to the 
chorus, saying that they are testing their Saipcov: vXkh xouaSs poi paxalav yX,coaaav 
co5’ d7cav01aai | KaKpataiv 87ir| Toiabia Salpovoq 7teipcopsvov<;, | ococppovoq yvcoprjq S’
43 See, for example, the translations o f  Headlam (1909), Weir Smyth (1926), Fraenkel (1950) o f  
A g.\661 . There are others who have shied away from translating Saipcov as destiny or fate at Ag. 1667, 
in favour o f  translating it as fortune, so Thomson (1938), Collard (2002) a d  loc.
44 See, Usener (1896) 292 and the idea o f  ‘A ugenblicksgdtter’; cf. Nilsson (1967) 201-6.
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apapxsiv t o v  Kpaxowx’ <6veiSiaai>.45 ‘But that these men should cull their idle 
tongues and cast such words at me, testing their daimon, and they insult their master 
in erring from moderate thought’ (Ag. 1662-4, cf. Ch. 513; Pi. 0.13.28). As with Pers. 
823-5, Saipcov denotes the idea of an individual’s (or group of individuals’) fortune, 
which can change and which is not dictated by any god or over-arching supernatural 
power, and which is not fixed. It need not overly concern us that Saipcov here extends 
to a group. The chorus act as one for the most part; but even if they did not, there is 
nothing that prevents Saipcov from referring to the fortune o f a collection of 
individuals who share a common character or lot in life.46
In Theognis we meet a similar idea of Saipcov where it refers to the fortune of 
a collection of individuals. There are those who have poor minds but a good Saipcov 
and those who have good counsel but have a bad Saipcov (Theognidea 161-4):
7to/J\.oi t o i  xpc&viai SsiAxxiq cppsai, Saipovi S’ coGAxp, 
oiq t o  Kaxov S o k s o v  yivexat eiq ayaGov
siaiv 8’ oi PooXrj x’ ayaGfj icai Saipovi SsiXco 
po/i^ODci xiXoq 5’ epypaoiv oi>x STtexai.
There are m any that have w orth less m inds, but have good  fortune,
For w hom  things w h ich  seem  bad com e to  be good;
A nd there are those w h o  take go o d  cou n sel and suffer poor fortune,
A nd accom plish m en t d oes not fo llo w  their deeds.
In these examples, it is possible to see not only how Saipcov can refer to the fortune of 
a plurality of individuals, but also how it can present a meaning close to that o f ruxn. 
Both concepts, what we would call ‘fortune’ (Saipcov) and Tuck/chance/fortune’ 
(tuxh), have a bearing on, or give an indication about, an individual’s condition in life, 
as well as at the same time being indeterminate and subject to change. The connection 
between Saipcov and tuxtj is nothing new and has been documented.47 The close 
relation between the two terms can also be seen at Pers. 345-6:
45 Text uncertain.
46 See West (1978) 182.
47 See Wilamowitz (1955, 2nd ed.) 1.358 n .l.
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a X k ’ cbSe Saipcov xiq KaxecpOeipe oxpaxov, 
xaXavxa (3piaa<; oi>K iaoppo7tcp xoxiy
But some daimon destroyed the army completely, weighing down the scales with 
unequal fortune.
Although xuxn may be seen as close to poipa, as an abstract idea of fortune, it is 
nevertheless the case that here Saipcov is that which brings about the destruction o f the 
Persian army, and xi>xr| can be seen to denote the effect of the Saipcov’s actions. 
Aaipcov is the active agent by which the event has come about, while tuxn is a 
qualitative assessment of what the Saipcov has brought about.48 Though it is possible 
to see the correlation between the agent and the event which it brings about, it is not 
this comparison alone which demonstrates the similarity between the two terms. It is 
by comparing the way in which xbxr| is used in line 346 with the way Saipcov is used 
at 823-5 that really highlights the connection between the two words. The xov 
7tapovxa Saipova at Pers. 823-5 and iaopp07icp xuxn present very similar 
characteristics and seem to have a very similar meaning.49 They both capture a 
particular state of being, as well as indicating the temporal nature of that state. Aaipcov 
denotes the fortune of a hypothetical person who may over-estimate just what this 
fortune is; while xuxn denotes the change in fortune of the Persian army. There is thus 
a clear overlap in the meaning of the two terms.
These examples demonstrate that Saipcov can be used to denote an individual’s 
or a collection of individuals’ fortune or lot. But, there are also times when Saipcov 
seems to be presented as a personal or guardian-like deity who determines the future 
of an individual or is representative o f an individual’s fortune. So, in the Agamemnon, 
the chorus, seemingly peturbed by Cassandra’s prophetic utterances, reflect on the 
possible fortune of their king and say (Ag. 1341-2):
xicg xav su^aixo Ppoxcav aoivsT 
Saipovi cpuvai xaS’ (xkoucqv;
48 A similar use o f  xuxn and Saipcov can be seen in Pindar (0 .8 .67 ), where tuxti refers to the victory 
won by Alcimedon and Saipcov to the divine assistance by which the victory came about.
49 Cf. Pers. 601-2.
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Hearing this, what man could boast to be bom with an unharmed/harmless daimon?50
Aaipcov can be read in two different ways here. First, as denoting an individual’s 
‘fortune’, with the phrase dcnve! Saipovi, meaning ‘with an unharmed fortune’. 
However, because the adjective aaivrji; can be read as both ‘unharmed’ and 
‘harmless’, the phrase active! Saipovi can also be translated as ‘with a harmless 
daimon’.51 Aaipcov would be understood as an agent coming into existence (cpuvai) 
with a person, guiding him through life and being in some way responsible for what 
happens to him. Aaipcov would thus be some form of guarding or tutelary deity 
specific to a person. Although, arguably, the earliest unambiguous examples of 
baipcov being used as a personal tutelary deity for men come some time after 
Aeschylus, in the works of Plato52 (cf. Phd . 107d; Rep. 617e, 620e), there is evidence 
of this concept of the personal deity in earlier authors.53
Hesiod is the earliest author to employ Saipcov in a way that explicitly denotes 
a personal, tutelary deity. There are two passages which support this statement.54 The 
first, found in the Works and Days, describes the condition of Hesiod’s addressee in 
the phrase: Saipovi S’ oloq er|a0a ‘but however you are by way of your daimon’ {Op. 
314).55 As Dodds remarks ‘[there is] a ... type of daemon [Saipcov], who makes his 
first appearance in the Archaic Age, [and] is attached to a particular individual, 
usually from birth, and determines, wholly or in part, his individual destiny. We meet 
him first in Hesiod and Phocylides.’56 In the passage from Hesiod, we see that a 
daimon is concerned with the health, welfare or lot of the individual addressed. The 
daimon can thus be seen as something personal and connected intimately with the 
individual it describes.
50 In order to help capture the untranslatable nature o f  Saipcov in this passage, I have provided my own  
translation and the two possile translations o f  the epithet.
51 The ambiguous nature o f  these two words is highlighted by the different ways they have been 
translated in editions o f  the Agamemnon. Hogan (1984) and Ewans (1995) both see Saipcov as a 
personal, guardian deity; while Headlam (1909), Weir Smyth (1926), Thomson (1938), Fraenkel
(1950), Grene and O ’Flaherty (1989), Collard (2002), Sommerstein (2008) all understand derive! 
Saipovi as some variation on an unhurt fortune through life.
52 For Saipcov in Plato’s Republic see Halliwell (1988) 184, 191.
53 On this topic, see Rohde (1925) 514; Dodds (1951) 42; Guthrie (1962) 1.482; Dietrich (1967) 322; 
Marcovich (1967) 502-4; Darcus (1974) 398-407.
54 Op. 314 and Op. 121-6. See, Dodds (1951) 42; Guthrie (1962) 1.482; Kerenyi (1975) 17.
55 Cf. West (1978) 235.
56 Dodds (1951) 42.
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The other such example of Saipcov in Hesiod is again found in the Works and  
Days, used of the epichthonic daimones, who are described as watchers of men and 
guardians of ill deeds (Op. 121-6). It need not overly concern us that the plural is used 
by Hesiod here and the singular in the previous example. Hesiod is speaking here 
collectively of a whole race of guardian deities watching over the whole human race.57 
The Saipoveq here act as guardians of men, watching over their actions, giving both 
good and ill.
In spite of the guardian-like nature of these Saipovsq, it has been argued that 
the epichthonic daimones should not be confused with personal tutelary deities. As 
Rohde has put it, they are of a ‘different range of ideas’ from what is seen at Op. 314 
or indeed in Plato.58 Indeed, as mortals made immortal, it is I think reasonable to 
consider the epichthonic daimones as a class of deity distinct from Gsoi ‘gods’ (those 
beings that have always been immortal) and yet more than mortal men, as immortal 
deities.59 This is consistent with how Hesiod uses Saipcov to refer to Phaethon (Th. 
991). So, in his presentation of deities, Hesiod can be seen as consistent in his use of 
Saipcov to denote mortals who have been made immortal. Nevertheless, it is still the 
case that Hesiod also uses Saipcov to denote the idea of an individual’s fortune in life, 
as at Op. 314. Regardless of the fact that Hesiod uses Saipcov to denote a different 
class of deities, can we completely separate the idea of Saipcov as a deity and Saipcov 
as an individual’s lot or fortune in life at Op. 121-6? Can we say that there is no 
suggestion at Op. 121-6 that Hesiod is merging or drawing a connection between these 
two ways of conceptualising the nature of Saipcov? Or, perhaps we should see one 
vaguer notion that is being interpreted in two ways here? Indeed, the plurality of 
daimones hints at the possibility that they can be paired off with the current race of 
men, dealing out good and bad for men and thus determining each individual’s fortune 
in life. It seems reasonable to conclude that we cannot dismiss the possibility that the 
epichthonic daimones are also guardian or tutelary daimones in this passage.60
57 See West (1978) 182 for this argument. This argument is also relevant for Phocylides Fr.16: see 
below.
58 Rohde (1925) 515; cf. 71-4. Compare the epichthonic daimones with Darius’ spirit in the Persians.
59 ‘There was a tendency to honour outstanding men after their deaths by believing them still to possess 
power for the good or ill o f  the community.’ West (1978) 182; cf. 777.991 (Phaethon), Theognis 1348 
(Ganymede), Pers. 620, 641 (Darius). See the discussion in the section Saipcov as a deity lesser than 
and/or distinct from  0eo<;.
60 I am aware that there may be a danger o f  over-specialisation by emphasising the individual and 
tutelary function o f  the epichthonic daimones over the chthonic and agricultural. However, for the
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Phocylides Fr.16, which is traditionally dated at the start of the 6th century 
B.C. and which is comparable with Op. 121-6 , has also been seen to supply evidence 
of the idea of a personal, guardian Saipcov before Aeschylus.61 The fragment reads:
a U ’ apa Salpovsc; staiv etc’ avSpaatv aXkoxz aXkoi 
oi psv srcepxopsvou Kaicoo avepa<; sicXuaaaGai.
But there are different daimones for men at different times,
Who give release from on-coming evil.62
For Phocylides there are Saipovsq who, at different times, can give assistance to men. 
At first glance, because of the close relationship between the daimones and the men, 
because there are multiple daimones for multiple men, it could seem that they are of a 
similar kind to those we find in Hesiod at Op. 121-6. However, in contrast with the 
presentation of Satpoov/Saipovec; in Hesiod, in the fragment from Phocylides different 
daimones are explicitly stated to come upon men at different times, aAAoxe. They are 
not, it seems, permanent, guiding companions as Hesiod’s guardian daimones seem to 
be. But, in fact, the notion of deities who, now and again at different times, affect an 
individual’s life (for better and for worse) is, in essence, no different from the 
Homeric conception of Saipcov. In Homer, a Saipcov is seen by some to snap Teucer’s 
bow-string (77. 15.467-8); brings Lycaon to Achilles (II. 21.93); breathed much 
courage into Odysseus in the Cyclops’ cave (Od. 9.381); and a Saipcov is said to have 
spun for (s716kA,cocj£v) the disguised Odysseus his current fate (Od. 16.64). It cannot, 
therefore, be said with any real confidence that Phocylides is saying anything radically 
different from what is presented in Homer; and it cannot be said that he is depicting a 
conception of Saipcov which sees it acting as a guarding deity for men, and thus that 
he is presenting a guardian, personal type of Saipcov similar to the kind we find in 
Plato.
purposes o f  the argument being made above in the main body o f  the text, it is more important to stress 
the guardian-like nature o f  Saipcov at this juncture.
61 For example, Dodds (1951) 42.
62 The fragment is incomplete. From what Clement o f  Alexandria says before quoting Phocylides, it 
seems relatively clear that the daimones give both good and evil; Phocylides’ fragment only mentions 
the good, but they are oi [iev, so that it would not be unreasonable to let the thought continue as oi 5e 
‘bring evil in the middle o f  good fortune’ vel sim.
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The personal and fortune-like nature of Saipcov can also be seen to extend to a 
family or house, as is the case with the Saipcov of the House of Atreus. The powerful 
and insidious nature of the Saipcov comes to the fore in the final scene of the 
Agamemnon, and does so in a gradual fashion.63 In the first speech she delivers after 
killing Agamemnon, Clytemnestra names several factors that have a bearing on her 
husband’s death, and among them is the accursed nature of Agamemnon and the 
House: xoaov5s Kpaifjp’ sv Sopoic; koikgw 68s 17tX,fjaa<; dpaicov avxoq sktuvsi potabv. 
‘Having filled a mixing-bowl in the house of so many accursed ills, he himself drank 
from it on coming here’ (Ag. 1397-8). The Saipcov o f the House is not mentioned 
straight away, but is hinted at and foreshadowed in the phrase, ‘accursed ills [of the 
house]’. It has been argued that all that these two lines indicate is Agamemnon’s need 
to pay for what he did in the past -  i.e. the killing of his daughter, Iphigeneia -  and 
that we need look no further than this.64 However, this seems, at the very least, to 
overlook the role of the divine and supernatural in the cycle of destruction within the 
House and the role of the individual family members in assisting its perpetuation.
It is the connection of the Saipcov with the ills of the family which suggests 
Clytemnestra’s statement at 1397-8 as an allusion to the Saipcov of the House before it 
is mentioned more explicitly seventy lines later. The word apalcov, derived from the 
same root as apa (apf|) ‘curse’,65 also hints at the sinister nature o f the events which 
have been befalling the House over the course of several generations. The vague and 
sinister character of the House and the forces connected with it, and seemingly 
working through it, are brought out further by the chorus shortly after at 1468-74, 
when they call this supernatural and destructive agent a daimon:
SaTpov, oc; £p7rixv£t<; Scbpam Kai Stcpol- 
oiai TaviaAiSaiaiv,
Kpaxoq <t’> iooi|A)xov sk yuvaiKQjv 
Kap8i68r]Kiov spot Kparuvsi^
£7d U  acbpaioq Slxav {poi}
Kopaxot; £x0pou oxa0£i<; EKvopax;
63 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ for a further discussion o f  the death o f  Agamemnon and the role 
o f  the Saipcov.
64 Fraenkel (1950) 3.659.
65 For use o f  curses in Aeschylus and Sophocles, see West (1999) 31-45; Geisser (2002) 198-252; 
Sewell-Rutter (2007) 49-77; cf. Parker (1983) 191-206.
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SpVOV 1JUV81V £7l8l3xsxai ***.
The daimon that assails this house and the two Tantalids so different in their nature, 
and controls it, in a way that rends my heart, through the agency o f women whose 
souls are alike! Standing over the corpse, in the manner of a loathsome raven, it 
glories in tunelessly singing a song ***.
Clytemnestra then confirms the role of the Saipcov in the killing (4g. 1475-80, 1497- 
1504). The Saipcov of the House is inherently bound up with the family and its ills: it 
is the thrice manifest Saipcov of the race, and is nurtured by blood (Ag. 1477). For this 
reason, it may be possible to see the Saipcov of the House of Atreus as a personal 
Saipcov, one which is representative of, and co-existent with, the family’s own fortune. 
Indeed, the chorus think o f the Saipcov as something more than this, as that agent 
which has actively brought destruction on the family, as that agent without which the 
family would not have been beset by ills.66
In Aeschylus, there are also occasions when the meaning of Saipcov seems to 
extend beyond denoting a person’s fortune in life to become a synonym for death. In 
this respect Saipcov presents a similar meaning to polpa, popoq or 7roxpo<;. Although 
these latter three words are more akin to the idea of fate than fortune,67 in many places 
they appear as synonyms for death -  and present this meaning far more often than 
Saipcov does.68 So, in the Seven, the Messenger reports the deaths of Eteocles and 
Polyneices, saying that they died together at the same time and by each other’s hands 
{Th. 811-12):
ootgx; opaipotc; %epoiv f)vaipovx’ ayav 
amove,' o Saipcov koivo<; rjv apcpotv apa-
66 But, it is not only those houses affected by ill-fortune that have a Saipcov. Pindar speaks o f  a Saipcov 
yevsGXioq ‘the daimon o f  the fa m ily '. 0 .13 .105 . Cf. Dietrich (1967) 322.
67 For discussions o f  fate in early Greek literature, see Ehnmark (1935) 74-82; Greene (1948); 
W ilamowitz (1955, 2nd ed.) 1.352-6; Dietrich (19 6 7 )passim .
68See, for example, Moipa: II. 16.434, 853, 19.410, 20.477, 21.83, 110, 22.5, 303, 436, 23.81, 24.132; 
Od. 2.100. Mopoq: II. 18.465, 19.421, 21.133; Od. 1.166, 9.61, 11.409, 16.421, 20.241. Moipa: Pers. 
912, 917; Ag. 1266. Mopoq: Pers. 546; Supp. 65, 804; Th. 199, 589, 704, 751; Ag. 329, 1246, 1297, 
1381, 1415, 1600,1627, 1634; Ch. 18, 444, 8 4 1 ,9 1 1 ,9 2 7 , 1074; Eu. 26, 5 0 2 ,6 4 0 , 739, 760. n otpoq  is 
only used as the fate o f  death in Homer, but is not employed in this way in Aeschylus, cf. Ag. 762, 
1005.
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Thus, they completely destroyed themselves with their kin-hands; the daimon was 
common to them both at one and the same time.
It has been argued69 that Saipcov here refers to the Saipcov of the House of Laius, and 
as such parallels the Saipcov of the House of Atreus in the Agamemnon (Ag. 1468, 
1477, 1569). While it seems to be correct to assert that Saipcov at Th. 812 does not 
refer to Apollo,70 it is difficult to see why Saipcov should refer to the Saipcov of the 
House, when no such Saipcov is mentioned in the play. The only ‘daimonic’ entity 
associated with the family of Laius in the play is the Erinys/Curse of Oedipus (Th.70, 
720-3), and while an Erinys or Erinyes are referred to as Saipcov or Saipovsq in other 
plays (cf. Eu. 150, 302, 929), Oedipus’ Erinys/Curse is never referred to as a Saipcov 
in the Seven. It is true that the Erinys is called a god unlike gods: rcecppiKa xav 
cbXsaioiKov | Osov, ou Osoic; opoiav, | 7iavaX,r|0fj, Kaicopavxiv, | 7iaxpo<; euKiaiav 
’Epivuv (Th. 720-2), which may be suggestive of a daimonic nature. But, even if it
r 71could be asserted that ‘a god unlike gods’ is equivalent to being called a Saipcov, we 
are still left with the problem of whether the Erinys of Oedipus can be equated with 
the Saipcov of the House. For, the Saipcov of the House in the Agamemnon (on which 
this model is based in modem interpretations) is a separate entity from Ate, the 
aAxxaxoop of Atreus and the Erinys/Erinyes, although part of the wide menagerie of 
‘daimonic’ entities afflicting the House of Atreus (cf. Ag. 1431-3;72 1468, 1477, 1482, 
1501, 1569). The Saipcov represents and behaves as a manifestation of the ills of the 
House of Atreus and stands alongside Ate, dXdaxcop and Erinys/Erinyes as agents of 
destruction which have seemingly helped perpetuate the cycle of familial killings
69 Hutchinson (1985) 177. Tucker (1908) 166, understands Saipcov here as the work o f  the brothers’ 
‘evil genius’.
70 With Hutchinson (1985) 177.
71 That is, o f  course, if  we can say that such a strict hierarchical model can be applied systematically to 
Aeschylean thought, with Saipcov being lesser/lower than 0so<;. The only place in Aeschylus where such 
a model could be said to exist is in the Eumenides with the Olympians and the Erinyes. But, even then, 
the nuances and flexibility o f  Saipcov and 0eo<; seem to preclude any form o f  strict hierarchy o f  terms. 
For this, see discussion below in this chapter in the section Saipcov as being lesser than and/or distinct 
from  Osoq, and in Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’.
72 It is, o f  course, the case that Clytemnestra seems to be referring to the Ate and Erinys o f  Iphigeneia at 
1433: rfj<; sprjt; 7rai5o<; AiKrjv Arriv ‘Epivuv 0 ’, with Justice, Ate and the Erinys all taking the genitive 
‘o f  my child’. In this way, one could argue that the comparison between the Saipcov o f  the House and 
the other daimonic entities o f  Ate and the Erinys is not a direct one. However, this is not the case, 
because Iphigeneia is part o f  the family, part o f  the House; her blood is that o f  her father and 
grandfather. Clytemnestra’s claim to be bringing about the vengeance o f  her daughter is a perpetuation 
o f  the cycle, a reinforcement o f  the destructive nature o f  all these similar, though distinct, daimonic 
entities.
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besetting the House. Although, it is, of course, possible to speak of similar ills 
manifesting themselves within the House of Laius, we are never presented with an 
abstraction in the Seven of the sort found in the Agamemnon. We should thus be 
careful not to merge destructive ‘daimonic’ agencies which happen to be connected 
with the ills of the family or the House.
It would perhaps be better to look at Th. 811-12 in a different way, seeing 
Saipcov as marking the moment at which the two brothers killed each other. Aaipcov 
would denote death (in a way similar to poipa, popoc; and Ttorpcx;), and in this way 
one’s fortune in life would be understood as being extended to refer to the passing 
from this life into the next. The line could, thus, be read as, ‘their death (fortune) was 
common to them both at the same time.’ It would be possible to compare this example 
with the use of Saipcov at II. 8.166, where Saipcov also seems to act as a synonym for 
death: Ttapoq xoi Saipova Scboco ‘Before that I will give you your daimon’.74 It is 
possible to see that in these two passages, just as at Pers. 823-6 and Ag. 1662-4, 
Saipcov is connected with an individual’s personal fortune, whether denoting one’s 
present position in life, as at Pers. 823-6 and Ag. 1662-4, or marking the moment of 
death, as at Th. 812 and II. 8.166. What would underlie all of these instances is a 
connection with a person’s life and the temporality o f their lot in life and present state 
of being.
HERACLITUS ON THE AMBIGUITY OF AAIMHN
In this chapter, we have discussed the meaning of Saipcov, how it appears as a 
vague, indeterminate fulfiller of events and as a personal, guardian deity that 
determines an individual’s fortune or lot in life. But this is not to say that these 
characteristics are wholly distinct from one another. There is a great deal of overlap 
between them all, especially between those instances where Saipcov is connected with 
the fulfillment of events and an individual’s fortune. In a fragment attributed to
• • • 75Heraclitus, the ambiguity of the meaning of Saipcov is shown perfectly (B119):
73 Cf. Burkert(1985) 181.
74 Cf. Darcus (1974) 3 9 5 .1 am aware o f  the controversy surrounding this particular line in the Iliad  and 
the use o f  Saipcov. But, for want o f  a more established textual tradition, I adhere to this reading o f  the 
line. See Kirk (1990) 310 for discussion o f  the textual problems o f  the line.
75 For discussion o f  this fragment, see, for example, Rohde (1925) 514; N ilsson (1967) 202; Dodds
(1951) 42; Guthrie (1962) 1.482; Dietrich (1967) 322; Marcovich (1967) 502-4; Darcus (1974) 398- 
407; Geisser (2002) 16.
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rjGoq dvGpamcp Saipcov 
Character for a man is his daimon.
There are two prevailing interpretations of this fragment. The first understands Saipcov
7 (\as a person’s fortune and as being determined by a man’s character; the other, sees 
Saipcov as an active divine agent that determines a man’s character.77 O f course, the 
difficulty of interpretation is derived not only from the ambiguity and flexibility of 
Saipcov, but also the complete lack of context of the fragment. As a consequence, 
almost any interpretation of B119 is open to criticism. Nevertheless, it is in awareness 
of these facts and recognising that the validity of the arguments made in this chapter is 
not reliant on any one interpretation of the fragment that the following discussion is 
proffered. All that is hoped is that the internal logical consistency is recognised for 
what it is, and as such that the discussion may be seen to offer an extra dimension to 
our understanding of the preceding pages on Saipcov.
As has been discussed above, Saipcov was commonly used to denote a person’s 
fortune. If we understand Saipcov at Heraclitus B 119 in this way, a man’s character 
(rjGoq) is that which determines his fortune (Saipcov) in life.78 The fragment would 
thus be read as a ‘denial o f the view, common in Homer, that the individual often 
cannot be held responsible for what he does.’79 The divine element would be 
minimized, with man understood as having control over his life. Aaipcov would have 
no real connection with the godly or divine sphere, but would simply refer to a man’s 
fortune or lot in life. This does, however, raise questions about Heraclitus’ religious 
convictions. Is he implying in this fragment that the divine has no place in the 
decisions and actions of mankind? Is he dismissing divine involvement in the lives of 
mankind? Other fragments suggest quite the opposite. While he does, of course, 
question the way in which religious customs and practises are conducted (cf. B5, 14, 
15, 93), he does not question the existence of gods or the divine.
76 E.g. Rohde (1925) 515; Dodds (1951) 42; Marcovich (1967) 502; Kahn (1979) 260-1; Kirk, Raven 
and Schofield (hereafter KRS) (1983) 211-12.
77 E.g. Dietrich (1967) 322; Guthrie (1962) 1.482.
78 A similar view  is expressed by Epicharmus, with similar language: o Tpo7ro<; dv0pcb7ioim 5aipcov 
ayaOoq, otq 5e xai Kaicoq.
79 KRS (1983)211 .
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If Heraclitus is not dismissing the role of the divine in the lives of mankind, 
what, then, is being expressed in B 119? Can, or should, the fragment be read in a 
different way? In the vast majority of occurrences of the word before Heraclitus, 
Saipcov, in the singular, rather than referring to a person’s fortune or lot in life, 
designates an active and unspecified divine agent which brings events to fulfilment. 
This is most consistently seen in the ‘indefinite mode o f expression’, in those 
instances where Saipcov appears to be synonymous with 0so^, as a vague, unknown 
supernatural agent. In such instances, Saipcov affects lives and is seemingly arbitrary, 
yet because of it and because of what it does, Saipcov shapes a person’s life. The 
active characteristics of Saipcov with its ability to affect the course of people’s lives 
give an indication about how Saipcov in B 119 can be understood as that which shapes 
a man’s character.
But, is not the ambiguity of Saipcov the very point Heraclitus is making in the 
fragment? The two potential meanings of the phrase -  Saipcov being determined by a 
man’s character and Saipcov determining a man’s character -  are themselves reliant 
on, determined by, and playing on the two most common ways that Saipcov was used 
in early Greek literature: first, as a fulfiller of events that acts as an agent of fortune; 
and secondly, as that which denotes the result of the events fulfilled.80 Aaipcov is both 
the means and the end; the cause and the effect. It points to man’s ability to shape his 
own fortune in life; but it also implies that man is never fully in control of his life in 
the face of divine agencies. These three words are a pithy summation o f Greek 
conceptions of causality: no man is wholly responsible for his own fortune in life, nor 
is he completely free from responsibility either.
AAIMHN AS A DEITY OR BEING LESSER THAN AND/OR DISTINCT 
FROM OEOE
Although both Saipcov and Salpoveq are employed by Aeschylus to denote 
deities and are on occasion employed in way synonymous with 0s6<; and 0eo1, Saipcov 
and Salpovsq are very rarely used of the Olympian gods in literature before 
Aeschylus. There are only five instances when Saipcov (singular or plural) is employed 
to refer to the Olympians (II. 1.221-2, 3.420, 15.236-80; Od. 3.160; Solon 36.3-7).
80 See Darcus (1974) for a similar view  o f  Saifiwv as an agent which brings things about and as the 
result o f  that which is brought about.
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This is, of course, in stark contrast with the terms Osoq/Oeoi in Aeschylus and those 
before and contemporary with him, which are used overwhelmingly to denote the 
Olympian gods. Indeed, in Hesiod Saipcov is never used to denote the Olympians (or 
any other of the gods), while 0so<; is used almost exclusively to do so.81
In Aeschylus and in earlier authors, the terms 0so<; and 0eoi seem intimately 
connected with the Olympian gods. In the plays, only 0soi is used with the epithet 
OX.op7tioi; and it is Oeoq/Oeoi which is used consistently to denote the Olympians 
when the epithet is not present. From the extant literature before Aeschylus, it is 
possible to come to some understanding about how the Olympian gods are spoken of, 
and about the divine terms used to denote them. There is a noticeable difference in the 
way the two sets of terms are used when it comes to the terms used to designate the 
Olympians. Whether there is something inherent in the nature of the word 0eo<; that 
makes it more appropriate to be used to denote the Olympian gods instead of Saipcov 
does not strictly matter for the purposes of this study. What does matter is the simple 
and easily observable fact that 0eo<; is used far more often than Saipcov. This seems to 
indicate that there is a perceptible (though by no means absolute) demarcation 
between Osoi; and Saipcov when it comes to the highest stratum of divinity. This is not 
to say, however, that there is a strict or dogmatic hierarchy with 0eoq always 
designating deities higher and more powerful than those denoted by Saipcov. Such a 
hierarchy does not become an established idea until Plato and Xenocrates over a 
century later, and then only very gradually.82 Indeed, to claim that there is such a 
demarcation would be to ignore those instances in early Greek literature where Saipcov 
is clearly used to denote the Olympian gods. It may even be argued that Aeschylus is 
as consistent in this regard as those before him in using Saipcov for the Olympians -  if 
not slightly freer in his usage -  because not only does he use Saipcov of the Olympian 
god Ares in the Seven, he also speaks of icons of the gods as Ppsxr| Saipovcov, which 
seem at least to include icons o f Olympian gods (Th. 90-182). Rather, what the 
following discussion will examine is the way Aeschylus uses Saipcov and Oeoc; to help 
establish a contrast or comparison between two deities or sets of deities.
81 There are thirteen occasions where jxdKapeq is used o f  the gods, but this is a relatively small 
percentage in comparison with Gso^Gsoi.
82 Cf. Burkert( 1985) 331-2.
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There is evidence in several of the plays that suggests Saipcov is used in certain 
passages in opposition to 0£O<; in order to designate deities or supernatural beings that 
are of lesser power or position than, and/or are in some way distinct from those 
denoted by 0£O<;. It is possible to see such a distinction in the Seven, where the chorus 
respond to the positioning of Hyperbius against Hippomedon at the fourth gate, where 
they draw out the comparison between the combatants and the images on their 
respective shields (Th. 521-5):
7 i87 io i0a  < x o i>  x o v  Aio<; a v x ix im o v  e^o v t ’ 
acpiX ov s v  c a m  too  x O o v io u  Sepac;
S a i p o v o g  e /O p o v  e u c a c p a  P p o x o u ; xe K ai 
S a p o p io i c i  G e o io iv ,
7 ip o c 0 s  7 tiA a v  K8cpaA,av ia \j/E iv .
I trust that he who has on his shield the adversary of Zeus, the unloved form of an 
earth-born daimon, an image hateful to mortals and to the long-lived gods, will lose 
his head before the gates.
Here Typhon is called Saipcov and named an adversary of Zeus; he stands in direct
opposition to the ruler of the gods, the father of the Olympians, and his image is said
to be hateful to both men and gods. It is not that Typhon is called Saipcov that makes
him both an adversary of Zeus and hateful to men and gods; rather, it is that he is said
to be an adversary of Zeus and hateful to men and gods that has an effect on our
understanding of Saipcov in this context. The two images of Typhon as an opponent of
Zeus and as hateful to men and gods situate him firmly outside the Olympic pantheon,
in addition to his chthonic nature and heritage of which the audience would no doubt
have been aware. This dichotomy is strengthened by the respective positions of the
two combatants: Hyperbius, who is a Theban champion (and so an insider); and
Hippomedon an Argive (and therefore an outsider). With such a distinction being
drawn by Aeschylus between not only the two mortal combatants, but between
Typhon and Zeus, as well as Typhon and those gods who stand with Zeus as
Olympians or as supporters of the Olympian order, with whom the mortal combatants
are mirrored, it is possible that the description of Typhon as a Saipcov and of those
gods who hate him as 0soi may not be purely arbitrary, but intimate something in
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itself. This would suggest that Saipcov, in juxtaposition with 0eol, is being used as part 
of the presentation of Typhon (and by extension, Hippomedon), in order to help draw 
out the distinction between the respective positions of the two deities, Zeus and 
Typhon (and the two mortal warriors).83 Aaipcov and 0eo<; may, therefore, each 
possess associations and connotations in themselves which are different from those
• * 84,associated with and connoted by the other -  at least, in Aeschylus.
In the Seven, there is another instance where Saipcov seems to be used over 
08o<; to denote a deity in a way that suggests it is considered lesser than and/or distinct 
from those deities denoted by 0eo<;/0goi. This instance comes in reference to Ares at 
Th. 104-7, where he is addressed: a> %puao;tTjX,r|  ^ SaTpov, ‘Daimon of the golden 
helmet.’ It has been suggested that the reason Ares is spoken of as a Saipcov is because 
0e6q had no vocative until later in antiquity.85 This argument certainly could explain 
why 0eo<; is not used here, but it does not explain fully why Saipcov is used in its stead, 
rather than, for instance, avad; which is commonly used by Aeschylus of other 
Olympian gods (cf. Pers. 762; Th. 130; Supp. 524; Ag. 509, 513; Eu. 85). O f course, 
the reason for the use of Saipcov may be simply that Saipcov fits metrically and was 
often used as a synonym for Oeoc;. This is all very well, but there could also be a more 
meaningful reason for the word’s use in this passage in reference to Ares, a reason that 
brings greater understanding to the presentation of the gods in Aeschylus. By the time 
Aeschylus came to compose this passage, there was already evidence in the poetic 
tradition which presents Ares in a way distinct from the other Olympian gods. For 
example, in Homer, Zeus says of Ares: £x©ioto<; 5e poi eaai 0scov oi T)X,i>p7tov 
exouaiv ‘You are to me the most hateful of the gods who inhabit Olympus’ (II. 
5.890).86 Indeed, Ares’ position as the god of war alone, as that god who brings only 
strife to men, creates a sense of disgust (II. 5.889-98). Ares appears to stand apart 
from the other Olympians. It may thus be for this reason that Ares is spoken o f as a 
5alpcov, rather than being referred to by the term avad; or any other. As we saw above 
in reference to Typhon (and as we will see in the further examples below), dalpcov can 
be used in certain places to complement the presentation of particluar deities to bring
83 Cf. Zeitlin (2009) 55-64 for further discussion o f  the role Zeus and Typhon play in the portrayal o f  
Hyperbius and Hippomedon.
84 In Hesiod, however, it is worth noting that Typhon is called Oeoq (Th. 824).
85 Wilamowitz (1955, 2nd ed.) 1.357 n .l. Indeed, it is also possible to have nominative for vocative for 
Oeoq.
86 See Otto (1954) 46-7, 247-9; Burkert (1985) 169.
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about a comparison. This is often in juxtaposition with the presentation of other gods 
with the use of 0so<;/0soi But, when 0eo<;/0sol are not used where one may expect 
them to be, and Saipcov/Saipov£<; are used instead, then it may suggest that Saipcov or 
Saipovcq is being employed to suggest something not possible by the use of 0so<;/0sol, 
as, for example here, that Ares may not be considered an Olympian god in quite the 
way the other Olympian gods are.
The manner of employing Saipcov and 0so<; in juxtaposition is not only seen in 
the Seven. In the Persians, Darius’ spirit is called Saipcov (620-1, 641), and in both 
instances his spirit is juxtaposed with the gods of the underworld. In the Queen’s 
initial request to bring Darius from the underworld, Saipcov and 0£oi are placed in 
opposition. She says (Pers. 619-22):
aXk’ co (piA.oi xorjoi icu aS e vepiepcov  
opvouq 87181) CpT|pClT8, TOV T8 SdipOVa
Aapsiov dvaKaA£ia08* yaTioicnx; S’ eycb 
npaq 7cpo7iep\|/(0 xaaSe vspiepoiq GsoTq.
N o w , friends, accom pany these drink-offerings to the nether pow ers w ith  au sp iciou s  
son gs, and ca ll up the daim on D arius; m ean w h ile  I w ill send  these honours on their 
w ay to the god s b elow , by letting the earth drink them  up.
The passage indicates that the nether 0£oi are those who have control over whether 
Darius will come up from the underworld. It is they to whom the Queen and the 
chorus offer prayers and libations for the Saipcov Darius to be conveyed from below. 
The balance of power between the nether 0£oi and the Saipcov Darius seems firmly set 
in the former’s favour. So, as was the case with the juxtaposition of Saipcov and 0£oi 
at Th. 521-5, 0£oi here seems to denote deities that are ruling deities, that are both 
distinct from and superior in power and position to the being denoted by Saipcov -  
although what is meant by Saipcov in the respective passages is, of course, different: 
the one is a non-Olympian deity, the other is the still active spirit o f a dead heroic 
human.
The second passage that I want to highlight in this sequence is when Darius’ 
spirit is referred to as vpuxD by the chorus, while the gods of the underworld are called 
chthonic Saipov£<; (Pers. 627-30):
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a X X a  xOovioi Saipovec; ayvoi, 
rf| is  Kai 'Epjafj (3aaiXso x’ evspcov,
7 tep \|/a x ’ ev ep O ev  \|/DXTjv eta; qxog'
Now, you holy daimones of the underworld, Earth and Hermes and the king of the 
gods below, send that soul up from below into the light.
Again we are faced with the juxtaposition of the spirit o f Darius and the gods of the 
underworld, yet here Saipovsg denotes something different from what Saipcov denoted 
at Pers. 619-22. The chthonic Saipoveq of this passage can be equated with those
O'J '
deities called 0sol in line 622, while \|n)XT] refers to Darius, who was previously 
called Saipcov in line 620. In the third passage in this particular sequence, at lines 640- 
3, we are faced with a similar juxtaposition of Darius and the gods of the underworld 
with the chorus calling Darius’ spirit a Saipcov, just as the Queen had done previously 
at 620:
a X X a .  ci3 p o i ,  T a  xe K ai a X X o x  /O o v ic o v  a y e p o v e q ,
Saipova peyai>%fj
iovx’ aivecax’ sk Sopcov, flepoav Soocnyevfj Oeov,
But I pray you, Earth and you other rulers of the underworld, consent to this glorious 
daimon emerging from your abode, the Persians’ god, born in Sousa.
This time the Saipcov Darius is not placed in juxtaposition with Osoi, but with the 
phrase aXkoi %Qovi(ov ayspovet;. The position of Ta and the ruling nature implicit in 
the designation aXXoi %0ovicov dyspovs<; indicates that Ta and the aXXoi %0ovicov 
ayspovsq should be equated with the nether Osoi o f line 622 and the chthonic Saipovsq 
of line 627. Indeed, it must be stated outright that although Darius is called ITepaav 
Eouaiysvfj Osov directly after he is called Saipcov at 640-3, it should not be inferred 
from this that he is a Osot; in the way that Zeus or any other Olympian is -  one would
87 See the discussion o f  8aipovs<; in the section, 5alpove<; in the plural, for the synonymity o f  the word 
with Geoi.
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hardly expect this to be the case.88 The statement is focalised through the minds of the 
Persians, who look upon their former king as a divine and godly being, contrary to the 
descriptions of Darius at 619-22, 627-30, 640-3 as a Saipcov and a yv%r\, which, due to 
their common Greek usage as terms for a dead person’s spirit (especially a great 
individual with regard to Saipcov), can be understood as far closer to what a ‘normal’ 
Greek would recognise as ‘factual statements’ concerning Darius’ nature as a spirit in 
the underworld. Such use of Osoq is comparable to the way the chorus spoke of Darius 
and Xerxes to the Queen at Pers. 157-8, although not identical. At 157-8, it seems 
reasonable to say that the chorus could either be flattering the Queen, Darius and 
Xerxes by saying that Darius and Xerxes are gods, which would indicate that such 
usage is slightly different from the use of Osoc; at 643; or, as at 643, the use of Osoq at 
Pers. 157-8 may simply be a representation of how Persians were perceived by the 
Greeks as speaking or thinking of their (dead) kings. Thus, both Pers. 157-8 and 643 
can be understood as depictions of the way Persians spoke of their kings, and not as 
common, universally recognised statements of the nature of Darius’ spirit (or indeed, 
the spirit of any deceased individual); whereas the chorus’ use of Saipcov and vj/uxrj are
• o n
similar to the common Greek usage for deceased individuals.
What is important to bring out from the three passages and the descriptions of 
Darius and the gods of the underworld is that meaning is effectively given to the 
opposing sets of divine words because of the way in which they are contrastingly 
juxtaposed and because of the hierarchy that is established with 0s6<; as a more 
powerful being than Saipcov, and Saipcov a more powerful being than vpuxn. Thus, in 
the first example, Osoi denotes deities that are more powerful than the spirit o f Darius, 
which is called Saipcov. In the second example, Saipovsq refers to the same set of 
deities as Osoi before, but this time is juxtaposed with vi/oxq, and not with Saipcov. This 
use of Saipovsc; and \]/uxrj still maintains the same balance seen in the first example 
with Osoi and Saipcov, but v|fuxn» just as with Saipcov in the first passage, refers to 
Darius, while Saipovsg refers to the gods o f the underworld. In the third of the three 
passages, Saipcov is used again o f the spirit of Darius, as in the first example, while 
Aeschylus on this occasion employs the phrase aXXoi xOovicov ayepoveq o f the ruling
88 Contra Nilsson (1967) 201, who sees Oeov here as a synonym for Saipcov, as does Garvie (2009) 99- 
100 .
89 See Rohde (1925 ) passim  (esp. 70-2 for Saipcov), Dietrich (1967) 14-58.
54
underworld deities. In each passage we are presented with the same juxtaposition: the 
presiding underworld gods and the spirit of Darius, but in each instance, Aeschylus 
shows just how flexible and subtle the meaning of Saipcov can be, and how reliant on 
context our understanding of it is.90 Aaipcov is a more flexible term and can 
encompass both, 0eoi and ij/Dxn are more specific and rigid in their meaning. Thus, 
Saipovsc; and 0eol are used synonymously for those deities that seem to have control 
over the spirit of Darius; while Saipcov and vj/uxfj denote Darius’ spirit.
Aeschylus was, of course, not the first author to conceive of the deceased spirit 
o f a great individual as somehow higher and/or more important than that of the 
average man.91 The use of Saipcov which we see with Darius in the Persians can be 
compared with the employment of Saipcov in Hesiod. Of the three instances of Saipcov 
in Hesiod,92 two refer to mortals who have been transformed into immortals, one 
employing the singular Saipcov, the other the plural Saipovsq (Hes. Op. 121-6, Th. 
988-91; cf. E. Ale. 1003). The first comes toward the end of the Theogony, where 
Phaethon, a young, beautiful man is transformed into a Saipcov (Hes. Th. 988-91):
lov pa veov Tspcv avGoq ^ r/ p v x , epncoSeoq fjpri^  
jiaTS’ a x a X a  cppoveovra <piXoppei5f)c; A(ppo5irr| 
cbpi’ &vep£i\|/apivr|, Kai piv a^0eoi<; evi vr|oi<; 
vr|07t6A,ov po%iov 7ioif|cmTO, Saipova STov.
While he was young and still in the delicate bloom of his glorious prime, a boy with 
childish thoughts, Aphrodite the lover o f smiles was stirred to action, snatched him 
away and made him her closest servant in her holy temple, a divine daimon.93
Having previously been human, Phaethon, like Darius, has become a Saipcov.94 
However, in contrast with Darius, Phaethon became one while he was still young and 
not after death. There is no indication given in the Theogony that Phaethon has died as 
such; rather he seems transformed, risen to an existence above and beyond what is 
usually experienced by a human. Nevertheless, it still remains true that both Phaethon
90 It is worth noting that Saipcov and Saipovsq are never used in juxtaposition.
91 Cf. Broadhead (1960) 163; West (1978) 182; Garvie (2009) 256.
92 There are only three instances o f  Saipcov being used in Hesiod. For the other instance cf. Op. 314-16.
93 Translations o f  Hesiod are based upon West (1988).
94 Compare with Ganymede: Theognidea 1345-8.
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and Darius are daimones and have become so after having been human beings. 
Similarly, this conception o f Saipcov can be seen in the Works and Days,95 where the 
Golden race of men is turned into Salpov£<; after death {Op. 121-6):
abxap 87usi 8f) xobxo ysvo<; Kara yaTa koI m^ ev, 
xoi pcv 8alpov£<; rim Aide; peya^oD Sia |3oi)A,a<;
£c0A,ol, ETnyGovioi, (puX,aK£<; Ovqxcdv avOpdmcov,
TtXouxoSoxar
Since the earth covered up that race, they have been daimones on the face o f the earth 
by the great Zeus’ design, good, watchers over mortal men and bestowers o f wealth.
Again we are presented with mortals turned into Salpovsc;. As with Darius, but not 
with Phaethon, this change seems to occur after death, xouxo ysvo<; K a x a  yata 
K&X,DVj/ev. But as with Phaethon, the Salpovse; here are not called as Darius is.96
In Hesiod, it is possible to see a clear distinction drawn between what is 
designated by 0£o<; and what is designated by Saipcov. In general terms it can be seen 
that, in Hesiod at least, Saipcov denotes a being that has attained immortality, having 
previously been mortal, while 0so<; denotes only those divine beings who are immortal 
from the moment of birth.97 Also, this distinction between the two divine terms seems 
to go even further, by extending to the function. Both Phaethon and the epichthonic 
daimones serve gods: Phaethon serves Aphrodite (Hes. Th. 990-1), while the 
epichthonic daimones serve Zeus and Justice as watchers of humanity and guardians 
of evil deeds (Hes. Op. 248-62). And it seems, at least superficially, that they have 
been made immortal for the very purpose of serving the god that has made them an 
immortal Saipcov.
While this last factor is not applicable to Darius, there does seem to be some 
overlap with the other two factors and with Aeschylus’ use of Saipcov at Pers. 620 and
95 W est (1978) 182 argues that in poetry Salpoveq is used as a synonym for 0£oi and that it was not until 
the fifth century that they were distinguished. He does say, however, that Hesiod could not, in all 
likelihood, have called the deceased race o f  the Golden age Geoi. Cf. West (1966) 429.
96 Contra Rohde (1925) 70-2, who equates the epichthonic daimones with souls.
97 Xenophanes (Fr.14) raises questions about gods ‘coming-into-being’. The argument put forward here 
concerning the gods in Hesiod is not intended to question the nature o f  the gods or H esiod’s theology, 
but recognises that there is a difference between divine beings that have always been divine beings and 
divine beings who were once mortals.
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641. In the presentation of Darius, Phaethon and the epichthonic daimones, Saipcov is 
used to denote a category of divinity distinct from Oeoq, which is lower in both power 
and position, as well as a class of divinity which has attained immortality having 
previously been mortal. However, the clear distinction that can be seen in Hesiod -  
though admittedly from only two instances98 -  between what terms designate what 
types of deity is not as straightforward in Aeschylus. What type of being Darius is and 
what is meant by Saipcov is far less clear than in Hesiod. It is clear that Darius is a 
‘spirit’ (Pers. 630): this is all relatively unambiguous. But what is meant by 
Saipcov? Is it purely an honorific title given to him by his wife and former subjects?99 
Or, does it denote something more? Does it indicate that while he is a soul, he is more 
than simply that? It is clear that the Queen and the chorus still hold their former king 
in high regard; indeed, it is equally clear that although Darius does not have any real 
power or position in the afterlife, he does have the power to come back from the 
afterlife in order to give advice and he has knowledge which neither the Queen nor the 
chorus possess.
On the one hand, we must bear in mind that it is in the eyes of the Queen and 
the chorus that Darius is thought of as a Saipcov, and not necessarily in anyone else’s. 
The statements could thus be subjective expressions concerning the nature of their 
former king. Should these statements o f Darius’ nature and being, therefore, be 
equated with the statement at Pers. 643 that he is a god among the Persians, and that 
he is iooSaipcov (634) and ic60eo<; (856)? But, can Darius be iaoSaipcov if he is a 
Saipcov proper? Garvie answers the question by saying of the descriptions of Darius 
(and Xerxes) as divine individuals that they are ‘meant to be an exaggeration rather 
than literally true’.100 In this case, Saipcov would not be a literal denotation of the 
nature of Darius any more than iaoSaipcov. However, that Darius is called a Saipcov is 
different from him being called Qeoq (643), iooSaipcov (634) or iaoOsot; (856). In the 
latter two instances, Darius is being likened to and/or compared with 
something/someone else; while at 643 he is referred to as a god, in what is, at the very 
least, a description of a mortal man (dead or living) unparalleled in Aeschylus or 
archaic Greek literature. He is judged by his former subjects as a god unlike the other
98 See below for a discussion o f  Op. 314.
99 Garvie (2009) 256.
100 Garvie (2009) 99. Garvie argues that there is no difference in the way 8ai(xcov and Osoq are used o f  
Darius in the Persians. Cf. 263-5.
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Persians, as well as being an equal of the gods. These are terms of flattery. When he is 
spoken o f as a Saipcov it seems to be more a factual statement concerning his nature 
than an exaggeration or complement. This is indicated by the interchangeable way 
Saipcov and are used to describe the dead Darius. As such, the use of Saipcov 
bears greater similarity to those instances where he is referred to as a v|/o%f|. This is not 
to say that Saipcov is just a synonym for v|/i)xn. What seems to be expressed by the 
Queen and the chorus in their use of Saipcov when referring to Darius is a belief that 
he is more than the average soul and more than any other normal dead person, because 
he can actively interfere and interact in their lives, if only by giving advice. This 
manner o f reference could thus be seen to bear similarity to the way the deceased were 
spoken of in hero-cult and how Phaethon or the epichthonic daimones are spoken of in 
Hesiod.101
AAIMilN AND THE ERINYES
Aeschylus’ portrayal of the Erinyes in the Eumenides offers further examples 
o f Saipcov being used to denote deities that are of lesser power and position than,
and/or are in some way distinct from those denoted by 0eo<;. Though the Erinyes are
102seen as working with or in co-operation with Zeus in the Agamemnon (Ag. 59, 749), 
from the beginning of the Eumenides, the Erinyes are depicted as isolated from the 
rest of the divine world, especially from the Olympians.103 Apollo states that no god, 
man or beast mixes with them: at<; ou peiyvuxai | 0sa>v xk; ouS’ av0pcD7io<; ouSe 0r|p 
7TOX8 ‘with whom no god ever holds any intercourse, nor man nor beast either’ (Eu. 
69-70); he continues to say that they are bom for evil and inhabit Tartarus beneath the 
earth, and are objects of hate for men and the Olympian gods: KaKtov 5’ eKaxi 
Kaysvovx’, 87tsi Kaicov | okoxov vepovxai Tapxapov 0’ fmo xOovoq, | picfjpax’ av6pa>v 
Kai 0ecQv OX.up7ilcov ‘they were absolutely bom for evil, for they dwell in the evil
101 See Rohde (1925) 115-55 for discussion o f  hero-cult; cf. Broadhead (1960) 163; Dietrich (1967) 14- 
58.
102 For further discussion o f  the Erinyes and justice in the O resteia, see Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’.
103 The distinctive and distinct nature o f  the Erinyes in contrast with other gods is not isolated to the 
Eumenides -  although nowhere else in Aeschylus is the differentiation o f  the Erinyes so marked. There 
is a noteworthy reference at Th. 720-2, where the Erinys is called a ‘god, unlike gods’ Osov, ou 0eoi<; 
opoiav, which could indicate a form o f  categorisation o f  the Erinyes and the nature o f  Saipcov. 
However, as the discussion o f  Th. 720-2 above and the present discussion highlight, we must be careful 
not to assume automatically that a strict hierarchy o f  divine beings exists in Aeschylus; though as is 
posited in this section, it may be possible to claim such a hierarchy does exit in the Eumenides.
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darkness, in Tartarus beneath the earth, and are hateful to men and the Olympian 
gods’ (Eu. 71-3); Clytemnestra honours them by night, at an hour shared by no god: 
Kai vuKxiaepva Ssikv’ S7t’ eaxapp 7rupo<; | sGuov, copav ouSevoq Koivpv Gscov ‘and I 
also sacrificed solemn nocturnal feasts at a hearth of fire, at a time shared with none of 
the gods’ {Eu. 108-9); they say o f themselves that they stand apart from the gods 
without sun: {axtpa} axisxa Siopsvat Axxxn I Gscov SixoaxaxobvT’ avT])icp Axma ‘we 
carry out our despised function, far away from the gods, in the sunless slime’ {Eu. 
385-6). Even Athena on first seeing the Erinyes states that she does not know who the 
Erinyes are, saying that she has never seen their race before: opotai 5’ ouSsvi a7tapTcbv 
ysvst, | o u t ’ s v  Gsatot 7tpd<; Gscov opcopsvaq, | o u t ’ ouv ppoxsiou; spcpspstg popcpcbpaat 
‘You resemble no race of begotten beings, neither among the goddesses who are 
beheld by gods, nor is your appearance similar to that of mortals’ {Eu. 411-12).
It is clear that the Erinyes are presented in a way that separates them off from 
the Olympians. There is something wholly ‘other’ about them. Of the few occasions 
their divinity is stated, they are referred to as Saipovsq three times: they twice refer to 
themselves as such {Eu. 150, 302); and once Athena calls them Saipovsc; {Eu. 929). In 
a similar fashion to those passages from the Seven and Persians, though by no means 
exactly replicating them, the words Saipcov and Gso<; are contrasted with one another, 
and definition seems to be given to Saipcov by the juxtaposition {Eu. 148-54):
icb rcat A io q -
£7Uld.07l0<; 7cs7t],
veo<; 5 s  y p a ia q  S a ip o v a q  K a0i7t7iaaco, 
to v  k s T a v  o s (3(dv , a G so v  a v S p a  K ai 
TOKSUaiV 7TlKp6v
tov  prppaXoiav S’ s^sK^syaq cov Gsoi;. 
xi xcovS’ spsi tk; SiKaicoc; sysiv;
Alas, son of Zeus, you are a thief, a youth riding roughshod over ancient daimones by 
showing respect for the suppliant, a godless man who injured his parents: you, a god, 
smuggled away the man who attacked his mother. Who will say that any o f this is in 
accordance with justice?
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This passage draws out a comparison between (as the Erinyes see it) old daimones and 
a young, disrespectful god. The passage highlights issues that will be central to the 
play: the matricide and the division between the Olympians and the Erinyes. Bearing 
in mind that we have already elicited information from the play that sets the Erinyes 
apart from the rest of the divine world, it is possible that, as with Typhon in the Seven, 
Aeschylus is using the word 5oupcov in contrast with 0s6<; as one aspect of his 
presentation of the Erinyes as deities distinct from, and in conflict with, the Olympian 
gods in the Eumenides. But, in contrast with Typhon, the Erinyes are called 5alpov£<; 
on more than the one occasion. It is a term used repeatedly to describe them and not a 
one-off occurrence employed to bring out a single contrast. It is something that is a 
consistent part of their presentation, which is mentioned throughout the play (cf. Eu. 
302, 929) and seems to help set them apart from the Olympians, Apollo and Athena, 
both of whom are never referred to as Salpov£<; in the Eumenides or indeed in the rest 
of Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Moreover, in contrast with the depiction of Typhon, the 
Erinyes call themselves 5alpov£<;. For them, at least, it is not a negative term. This 
does not mean that 8alpov£<; is not used by the Erinyes to differentiate themselves 
from the Olympian gods in the Eumenides. Indeed, for them it may even have a 
positive meaning. But, for whatever reason, the Erinyes use Salpov£<; in the above 
passage, the term stands in juxtaposition with Gsoc;, just as the Erinyes do with the 
Olympian gods, and the Erinyes themselves do not mean anything negative by their 
use of the word.
However, the contrast between the Erinyes as 5alpov£<; and the Olympian gods 
as 08oi is not so clearly drawn as it may first seem from this particular passage, 
because the Erinyes are not exclusively referred to as 8alpov£<;: they are also called 
0ea(. It must be stated outright that 0ed/0£ai are not derogatory or pejorative 
feminisations of 0so<;/0£oi. Athena is called both 0£o<; and 0£a interchangeably 
throughout the play {Eu. 0£&: 224, 242, 259, 671; 0£o<;: 297, 883), while commanding 
a position of the highest respect and regard. In this way, it may not be the case that 
Saipcov is used by Aeschylus in order to help facilitate the presentation of the conflict 
between the Erinyes and the Olympian order, but is simply a synonymous term used 
in conjunction with 0£ai. The employment of 0£ai to denote the Erinyes may by 
consequence affect our initial conclusions concerning the employment of Saipcov as an
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aspect of the presentation of the two conflicting sets of deities, which will now be 
assessed.
In contrast with Athena, the Erinyes do not command a position of the highest 
respect and regard in the play -  at least not initially. They are described as objects of 
hate for men and gods, they stand apart from all creatures, and their nature is 
differentiated from the Olympians consistently throughout the play by means other 
than the use of the word Saipovsq, in a way comparable to Typhon in the Seven. So, 
how are we to understand the use o f 0sal when it is used to denote the Erinyes? Let us 
look at the exact instances where the Erinyes are spoken of as Gsai. Toward the end of 
the play, Athena calls the Erinyes Gsai when attempting to dissuade them from 
wreaking revenge after losing the vote {Eu. 824-5):
o u k  ear’ ditpoi, pq5’ 'U7t£p0\ipco<; ayav 
Gsai Ppoicov ktigtiis 5'6gkt)Xov yQova.
You are not dishonoured! And do not yield to excessive anger and, goddesses that you 
are, afflict mortals with a canker on their land.
In this passage, Athena desires the Erinyes to consent to her wishes. It seems peculiar, 
especially coming from Athena, that the plural form of a word which has been used of 
her is now used of deities who have previously been depicted as ‘other’ and placed in 
opposition to the Olympians. This seems all the more out of place when we consider 
how Gsoc; (and Gsa) is used overwhelmingly of the Olympians, over Saipcov in 
Aeschylus and throughout early Greek literature. Indeed, it is possible that, because of 
the frequency with which Gso<;/Gsoi are used of the Olympians, they possess 
connotations in and of themselves which are not shared by 5aipcov/5aipovs<;. And if, 
as is observed above, the feminine forms Gsa/Gsai do not bear any negative 
associations in and of themselves, then employment of Gsai at this moment may 
implicitly connect the Erinyes with the nature of the Olympians in a way which would 
not otherwise have been possible with the employment of baipovsq. It may thus be the 
case that Athena uses Gsai as a mode of flattery that would, due to the connotations 
and associations implicit in the word Gsai, subtly bridge the gap between herself and
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the Erinyes, and so form one part of her persuasion during the final scene of the play 
to prevent the Erinyes from wreaking destruction upon Athens.104
Similarly, when the Ghost of Clytemnestra tries to wake the Erinyes, who have 
been lulled to sleep by Apollo, she calls them 0sal {Eu. 114-16):
(ppovhaax’, a) K a r a  %Qovoq Gsai. 
ovap yap upa<; vuv KXoxaipr|Gipa KaXco.
Take heed, you goddesses from below the earth: I who now call you in your dreams, I 
am Clytemnestra.
As with Athena, Clytemnestra is trying to persuade the Erinyes to do what she wants. 
The balance of power between Clytemnestra and the Erinyes is set firmly in the 
latter’s favour. Clytemnestra can do nothing about avenging her own death; only the 
Erinyes can help her to this end. It would thus seem quite natural for Clytemnestra to 
use flattery here. While, of course, she says that: ox>5si<; vnep poo Satpovcov pr|visxai | 
Kaxaocpaysiarn; 7ipo<; x£P^v pT|xpoKx6vcov ‘none o f the daimones is wrathful on my 
behalf, slaughtered as I have been by matricidal hands’ {Eu. 101-2) directly before 
calling the Erinyes Gsai, so that it may appear that Clytemnestra uses Saipovsc; and 
Gsai as synonyms, Saipovsq and Gsai are, however, used to denote overlapping sets of 
deities in a distinct manner. Aaipovsq refers generically to the totality of gods -  
whether this refers to all the gods or just those o f the underworld does not matter 
strictly here -  while Gsai addresses the Erinyes directly. The two terms should, 
therefore, not be treated as synonyms, in spite of their close proximity. As a 
consequence, it is possible to draw the conclusion that Clytemnestra uses Gsai as a 
subtle mode of flattery in her attempt to get the Erinyes to do her bidding, just as 
Athena does at 824-5, to implicitly connect the Erinyes with the highest stratum of 
divinity, which would not have otherwise been possible if 5aipovs<; had been used.
So, if the Erinyes are portrayed as distinct from the rest o f the divine world, 
and Saipcov is used to help facilitate this presentation, while Gsai is used in contexts 
where it seems to connect them implicitly with the Olympians, then these two words
104 For further discussion o f  the resolution between the Erinyes and the Olympians, see Chapter 4 ‘The 
Justice o f  Zeus’. Cf. Buxton (1982) 110-14 for the importance o f  persuasion in the resolution.
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could help indicate shifts in how the Erinyes are viewed or presented within the 
context of the play. If it is accepted that Athena’s use of persuasion in the final scene 
is enhanced or complemented by the use of Beal at 824-5, then it may also be the case 
that Athena’s use of Saipovsq at Eu. 929 indicates another shift in the balance of 
power in the play: while the Erinyes posed a threat to Athens and while Athena was in 
the process of persuading the Erinyes to desist, it was in the goddess’ interest to use 
flattery to assuage the Erinyes’ anger, and thus she uses the term Beal with all its 
connotations to assist in this end. However, once the Erinyes relent of their anger and 
are incorporated into the framework of Athenian worship, they are no longer a threat 
to the city and to the Olympian order. The balance of power and conflict between the 
Erinyes and the Olympians, which is momentarily upset and comes to a head during 
the trial scene and subsequently after, is reset by line 929. This realignment is then 
reflected in the vocabulary Athena uses of the Erinyes. So, when the Erinyes pose a 
threat and there is need to bridge the gap between the Olympians and the Erinyes, 
Athena calls them Beal; whereas, once the threat has passed, they are again called 
Saipovsc; by Athena. This indicates that while the Erinyes see, at the very least, 
nothing negative in calling themselves Saipoveq, Athena may well believe Bsai a more 
dignified term than Saipcov/SaipovBt;.
With regard to the Erinyes, they seem to use Bsai and 5aipovsq synonymously. 
This is indicated in the only remaining instance of Bsai used of the Erinyes, which 
comes at line 728, where they use it in reference to themselves {Eu. 727-8)105:
g u  x o i  TtaX aiaq 5 ia v o fia < ;i06 K axacpG ioaq  
oivcp 7tapr|7t&(pr|Gac; a p ^ a ia c ;  6sa<;.
You’re the one who destroyed the old allotment of power and beguiled those ancient 
goddesses with wine.
At this moment in the play we are awaiting the result o f the vote. The honour due to 
the Erinyes and their position within the divine world seems to be at stake. Indeed, the 
Erinyes themselves appear all too aware o f this possibility {Eu. 715-16, 727-8), and
105 Cf. Eu. 920, where the Erinyes use daipovsq o f  the gods generally.
106 Reading Siavopctc; instead o f  5aipova<; (daimones) and 5oupova<; (allotment).
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threaten the destruction of Athens if they do not win (Eu. 711-12, 719-20, 731-3). It 
seems quite natural that the Erinyes have concerns about their position within the 
divine world and feel their honour may be subordinated to (and by) the Olympians. It 
could be argued that the Erinyes use the word 0sal at this moment to give themselves 
a more magisterial appearance, to place themselves on an equal footing with Apollo 
and the Olympians, so as to present their status and honour as of equal worth and 
importance, due equal reverence. While their use of the word would be different from 
that of flattery, its desired effect would nevertheless be similar, as it presents them in a 
way that implicitly likens their nature to that of the Olympians and in particular to the 
Olympian who has been called 0sa repeatedly throughout the play and who has an 
important role in the trial: Athena. But, this could only be said if the Erinyes had 
previously presented themselves in such a way as to imply that they consider 8alpove<; 
a lesser term with which to refer to themselves -  which, of course, they have not. 
Rather, they have seemed proud to call themselves Saipovsq, as is seen above at Eu. 
148-54. In contrast with Athena, the Erinyes see nothing negative -  at the very least -  
in calling themselves Saipovsq, and as a result it cannot be said with any real certainty 
that the Erinyes use 0£od to imply anything more than if they had used Salpoveg, 
unless, and of course I think we are to undertand that, they recognise that Athena sees 
something different and more positive in the use of 0sai over 8alpove<; and so use the 
word accordingly. But, this is difficult to determine, especially as we only have the 
one instance of the Erinyes’ use of 0sod.
The two words Salpovsq and 0eai serve two distinct roles throughout the 
Eumenides helping to depict the Erinyes and the conflict between them and the 
Olympians that arises out of Orestes’ decision to kill his mother. But, the role the 
words play is determined by the characters who employ them. In the mouth of Athena, 
5aijj.ovs<; is used as a lesser term than 0s6(;/0eoi or its feminine equivalents, which is 
likely to be the result of 0soc;/08oi being the term used far more frequently of the 
Olympians throughout Greek literature; but, in the mouths of the Erinyes, while the 
two terms are treated as distinct (as seen at Eu. 148-54), neither is considered a 
negative or pejorative term.
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The relationship between the chthonic realm and 5aipcov is something that has 
been stressed in previous studies of the word.107 As an early example of this idea, such 
studies commonly point to Hesiod’s Golden Race of men turned into Saipovsq after 
they are covered by the earth. Hero cult too is cited as a ‘real-life’ parallel of mortals 
being thought of as transformed after death into god-like beings who possess power to 
influence events, with the result that the spirits of dead heroes are commonly 
understood to be 5aipove<;.108 Aeschylus’ presentation of Darius as a Saipcov hints at 
hero-cult and chthonic ideas. However, to argue that Saipcov is inherently bound up 
with the chthonic in literature would be a dangerous leap to make.109 First, Saipcov is 
used in many contexts where notions of the chthonic are not present. Indeed, in the 
Persians Saipov£<; (628) and Osoi (622, 689) are used synonymously and 
interchangeably in reference to the chthonic gods within one hundred lines of each 
other; and in the Suppliants and Agamemnon we are faced with parallel instances of 
contrasts between the heavenly gods above and chthonic gods below: ika-col is  Osoi, 
Kai papnxipoi | %0ovioi (Supp. 24-5), xcavxcov 5s Oscov xcov aaruvopcov, | im&Tcov, 
X0ovicov (Ag. 87-8), where Osoi is used of both upper and lower gods. The same is true 
of the Libation Bearers where in the three places chthonic gods are spoken of Osoi, 
Saipovsc; and pctKapsq are all used once (Saipovsq: 125; 0soi: 475; paraps<;: 476).110
It has been argued here that Athena especially uses 5alpovs<; to highlight the 
‘otherness’ of the Erinyes in relation to the Olympian gods. In the Eumenides, the 
conflict between the Olympians and the Erinyes is repeatedly presented and their 
natures are contrasted consistently throughout the play. While the Olympians are gods 
of the upper world and described as Osoi, the Erinyes are chthonic deities and 
5alpovs<;. But, it does not necessarily follow that the Erinyes are 5alpovs<; because 
they are chthonic. Indeed, the Erinyes are called Osal three times in the play, and in 
spite of sometimes being a term of flattery employed to liken the Erinyes to the nature 
of the Olympians, it is not an inaccurate description of their divinity (cf. Th. 720-3; 
Ag. 1580). Rather, it seems that the use o f Salpovst; is driven by the context of the
107 See, for example, Dietrich (1 9 6 7 )passim , esp. 55-8; Nilsson (1967) 1.200-6.
108 Usener (1896) 247-53; Rohde (1925) 71-4; Dietrich (1967) 14-58; Geisser (2002) 14-15. See also 
the discussion above o f  Darius.
109 Cf. Dietrich (1967) passim .
110 Chthonic Hermes is also referenced three times (1, 124, 727), but his divinity, whether Oeoq or 
Saipcov, is never stated.
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play, utilized to stress the difference between the Olympians and the Erinyes, and is 
not reliant or dependent on the chthonic aspect of their nature in and of itself If there 
was reliance on the use of Saipovcc; because of the chthonic, it would need to be 
explained why the Erinyes can be called Gsai and why other chthonic deities are called 
9e6<; and why Saipcov is used in contexts where the chthonic is not present. It thus 
does not seem that in Aeschylus, at least, the word Saipcov is in any way exclusively 
associated with the chthonic, nor is it the chthonic in and of itself which determines 
which divine term is used.
SUMMARY REMARKS
In looking at Saipcov in Aeschylus, it is possible to see that the word possesses 
greater complexity than may at first have been thought. Aaipcov is more than simply a 
synonym for 0s6<; or another way of denoting a person’s fortune in life; it is a subtle 
and nuanced term by Aeschylus’ time, something that seems not to have been lost on 
Heraclitus. It is through the term’s connection with an individual’s fortune in life that 
it is possible to see how -  we do not know when -  Saipcov came to be connected with 
and understood as someone’s personal guardian deity. But, more than this, Saipcov is 
often used by Aeschylus to denote a deity that is in some way distinct from or lesser 
than a deity who is juxtaposed with it and referred to as 0e6<;. While it is clear that 
Aeschylus was not operating with a strict stratification of divine terms -  though one 
could argue that he comes close in the Eumenides -  there is enough evidence from the 
way he uses Saipcov and 0so<; in his plays to say that Aeschylus used and understood 
different things by each term. Indeed, it is from a deeper understanding of the terms 
Saipcov and 0£o<; that we can see how Aeschylus is able to assist the characterisation 
of the conflict between the Erinyes and the Olympians in the Eumenides. Not only do 
the terms help depict the divide between the two sets of deities, but they even give an 
indication about subtle shifts in the conflict’s intensity and the balance between the 
Olympians and the Erinyes, as we shall see in the second half of the final chapter, The 
Justice o f  Zeus.
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PART 2: ZEUS
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Since Hugh Lloyd-Jones’ The Justice o f  Zeus, it has been rather unfashionable to 
look at the nature of Zeus in Aeschylus. Lloyd-Jones argues that the Zeus of 
Aeschylus is no different from the Zeus found in Homer or Hesiod, and that 
Presocratic conceptions of divinity played no part in Aeschylus’ presentation of the 
gods. Or in Lloyd-Jones’ own words: ‘If Aeschylus knew of modem thinkers like 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, he refrained from obtruding his knowledge upon his 
audiences. The authors who are really important influences upon him, as they are for 
his countryman Solon, are Homer and Hesiod.’1 Both The Justice o f  Zeus and Lloyd- 
Jones’ earlier article ‘Zeus in Aeschylus’ are in many respects reactions against 
earlier commentators, who saw Aeschylus as depicting a Zeus more evolved than the 
Zeus of Homer and Hesiod, a deity that was in some way a direct descendent of 
Xenophanes’ one god}  Many of these studies are attempts to reconcile the crueller 
and more despotic Zeus of the Prometheus Bound with the kinder, more ‘profound’ 
Zeus of Aeschylus’ other plays. Scholars assumed the Zeus of the Oresteia and 
Suppliants to be a more ‘developed’ divinity,3 a natural precursor to the Platonic 
Demiurge in his presentation of what were considered monotheistic qualities.4
While this thesis will not discuss the Prometheus for the reasons discussed in 
the Introduction,5 questions still remain from the issues brought out by these studies 
about whether there exist any traces of Presocratic influence on the thought of 
Aeschylus; not least, because if we accept Lloyd-Jones’ conclusions we are forced 
into a position where we effectively ignore the intervening centuries between Homer 
and Aeschylus and the development of philosophical and religious investigation. 
From this perspective alone it is worthwhile to re-examine Aeschylus. But more than 
this, if it is possible to detect traces of Presocratic thought it would add another 
dimension to Aeschylus’ works, which would not only provide new insight into the
1 Lloyd-Jones (1971) 86; cf. Denniston and Page (1957) xiii-xvi for a similar position.
2 See, for example, Murray (1940) 80-1, 108-10; Solmsen (1949) 153-66; Comford (1952) 145, 153; 
and for a ‘no holds barred’ proto-Christian reading o f  Aeschylus, Tyler (1859, repr. 2006).
3 E.g. Jaeger (1945) 263-4; Solmsen (1949); Grube (1970) 50-1. Cf. Golden (1961) for a brief 
overview o f  the ‘developmental’ arguments and a theory o f  an ‘amoral Zeus’; and see Golden (1962) 
and Kitto (1966) 68-9 for ‘two-Zeus’ theory.
4 E.g. Comford (1935).
5 See Introduction for a discussion o f  the authenticity o f  the Prometheus Bound  and the related 
bibliography.
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workings of the divine in his plays, but would also open up a whole new dialogue 
that taps into the religio-philosophical debates of the age. This is not to make any 
claim for a progressivist model of religious development by seeing a natural 
movement from polytheistic ‘primitivism’ to ‘advanced’ monotheism with a single 
benevolent god, all-knowing and all-powerful. Rather, I want to undertake an 
examination of Zeus in Aeschylus as the Zeus of Aeschylus. The discussion will 
look back to Homer, Hesiod and the lyric poets, as well as back and sideways to the 
Presocratics for potential similarities (and notable differences), but will do so only in 
an attempt to achieve an understanding of the god within the context o f the plays.
The second chapter o f this thesis will consider whether there is consistency in 
the presentation of Zeus between plays and discusses how Zeus is presented play-by- 
play, determining whether there are any similarities in how the god is depicted. In 
this and the subsequent chapter, a working distinction is made between 
‘characteristics’ and ‘nature’ of the god. The two terms ‘characteristics’ and ‘nature’ 
are not used as part of some over-arching, grand scheme of categorisation, but solely 
as aids in differentiating between how the god is depicted, perhaps inconsistently, 
between plays (characteristics); and those qualities and aspects which appear to be 
basic to and/or inherent in the god of Aeschylus (nature). The third chapter of the 
thesis, ‘The Nature of Zeus’, looks at the key underlying features of the god, 
examining qualities, such as anthropomorphism, invariance and the god’s connection 
with Hades. This is done with frequent discussion of the arguments derived from 
Presocratic philosophy. The final chapter of the thesis then considers the nature of 
justice and Zeus, focusing primarily on the question of the guilt of Agamemnon in 
the Agamemnon and the conflict between the Erinyes and the Olympians in the 
Eumenides.
In the three chapters of the second part of this thesis on Zeus, I intend to 
argue against any conception of a kind or ‘progressive’ Zeus; while at the same time, 
I intend to demonstrate that the Zeus of Aeschylus is not the same as the Homeric 
Zeus or the Hesiodic Zeus, that Aeschylus interacts with and responds to Presocratic 
conceptions of divinity, and that the Zeus of Aeschylus exhibits qualities not found 
in the epics of Homer.
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2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ZEUS
This chapter will consider Zeus as a figure within each play, seeing when, where and 
how the god is characterised. This will help to determine whether, in different plays, 
he is presented in any markedly different ways, by establishing an overview of the 
characteristics of Zeus that will highlight in a broad and overarching way the themes 
which accompany the god. Such an overview will demonstrate whether or not there 
are any clear divisions within or between the plays in the utilisation of the god: 
whether Zeus is used pragmatically and thus acts as a dramatic tool for the poet; used 
in different ways in different plays to suit the specific purposes o f an individual play; 
or whether there are underlying patterns and threads in the way the god is 
conceptualised.
The extant plays of Aeschylus span a fourteen-year period from 472 to 458 
B.C. Although Aeschylus was already a mature poet by 472,6 we should not assume 
that his thought concerning Zeus and the nature of justice must have remained 
unaltered during the period belonging to his extant plays. So, we should not take as 
writ that Aeschylus was or had become ‘stuck in his ways’ by his early fifties. Nor 
can we ignore that 472-458 was a time of political change in Athens (and throughout 
the Greek world as a whole) and the possibility that political events had an effect on 
the way in which the nature of justice was understood and presented, as well as how 
the role of the gods in the lives o f human beings was conceived. Aeschylus would 
have witnessed the breakdown o f the peace between Athens and Sparta in 462/1 
which had lasted from the expulsion of Persia from mainland Greece in 480/79; the 
ostracism of Cimon in 461; the rise of Ephialtes, his radical democratisation of 
Athens’ political institutions, and his subsequent suspicious death; and the rise of
• 7 •Pericles and his continuation of the democratisation started by Ephialtes. And while 
this will not be a discussion of the political context of the plays, nor an investigation 
into ‘what Aeschylus thought’, it is still necessary to be aware that the period 
between 472 and 458 B.C. was a time of great change and that such external factors 
may have had an effect on the portrayal of justice, Zeus and the gods in Aeschylus’ 
plays.
6 1 adhere to the traditional view  that Aeschylus was bom c. 525 and died 456/5.
7 For further discussion o f  the political context o f  Aeschylus’ plays see, here and in general, Podlecki 
(1966); for the O resteia  in particular, see also Macleod (2007), Sommerstein (1989) 25-32.
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In discussing the presentation of Zeus in Aeschylus, it would thus be 
worthwhile to start by looking at the plays chronologically, picking out where Zeus 
is involved and spoken of, highlighting areas of interest and noteworthy similarities 
or differences. In so doing, no attempt will be made to supply a detailed, full 
discussion of all the passages quoted and cited. As there are not enough references to 
the god in either the Persians or Seven Against Thebes for a discussion to be 
worthwhile or illuminating, I will look exclusively at the Suppliants and the Oresteia 
trilogy in this instance.
The chorus and its pronouncements on the nature of the gods, and Zeus in 
particular, plays an important role in the plays of Aeschylus and has a significant 
bearing on this thesis. The authority of the chorus is also something that has been the 
subject of debate over the past twenty years or so. First, Vemant and Vidal-Naquet 
have seen the chorus as representative of the civic body and able to express the 
audience’s emotions and thoughts.8 This view was countered by Gould a few years 
later, who argues that the chorus is not representative of the civic body and audience, 
but is often presented by the poet as marginal outsiders and thus lacks any real 
authority to pronounce on events.9 Gould adds that the chorus is also not a 
mouthpiece for the poet’s voice, but is a set of characters constrained by the fictional 
world they inhabit.10 Gould’s arguments were in turn argued against by Goldhill, 
who states, ‘that the chorus can speak with the full weight of a collective authority is 
crucial to tragedy’s explorations of authority, knowledge, tradition within the 
dynamics of democracy’s ethics of group and individual obligations.’11 But, while 
Goldhill gives the chorus of tragedy a privileged place within the dramatic discourse, 
aiding ‘commentary, reflection and [giving] an authoritative voice,’12 he does not 
grant it the heightened status of authorial voice (although in what manner this is 
defined is unclear).13 What Goldhill’s interpretation of the role of the chorus 
highlights is that while the context of each play is important, and the characterisation 
of the chorus within it, the chorus plays a key role in the contemplation of the events 
of each play.
8 Vemant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 24.
9 Gould (1996) 224.
10 Gould (1996) 231.
11 Goldhill (1996) 253.
12 Goldhill (1996) 255.
13 See further discussion o f  this in the chapter ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ in the section The Hymn to Zeus.
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So, when we look at the various plays in the following chapters, it is 
important to recognise and bear in mind the dramatic context which the chorus 
inhabit as well as their ability to explore and reflect on different questions which the 
plays raise. This is particularly important in the following discussions of the 
Suppliants and Oresteia. But, this is not to give greater authority to the choruses of 
either o f these plays concerning pronouncements on Zeus. What is of importance in 
this chapter and the next is not the trustworthiness or authority of the chorus, so 
much as the type of views being expressed by them and their interaction with the 
thought of philosophers. It is not that what the chorus says in either of these sets of 
plays is more important, but that what they have to say is more illuminating about 
the nature of Zeus and the author’s interaction with contemporary philosophical and 
religious thought. One may go so far as to say that these next two chapters are not 
interested in the truth, but what was perceived as true. Since the plays present on­
stage life-like characters with life-like issues (though dramatised and placed within a 
mythological setting), one can reasonably make the assumption that the beliefs, 
language, cares and concerns are not fantastic, but understood and relatable to the 
audience. In a similar way, one can understand that the Zeus of Aeschylus was 
believed in by him and presented in a way that the audience would relate to, 
understand and believe in themselves. Though certain characteristics of the god may 
change or be emphasised differently between plays, the underlying nature of the god 
would be the same.
Zeus in the Suppliants
Zeus dominates the Suppliants more than any other extant Greek play. His 
name occurs 55 times, if we restore 175a but not 574 or 967,14 as is now generally 
accepted. Zeus is the first word o f the play and he is the god under consideration in 
the final lines of it too: Zeus is a frequent point of reference throughout the entire 
play, from first to last.
In the prologue, we are introduced to several key themes with regard to Zeus. 
In the first line, the god is called on as Zsix; d(p(Kicop, Zeus the Approacher, i.e. 
‘Zeus the guardian of suppliants’. Acpucxcop is not a known cult title for Zeus and
14 See Friis Johansen and Whittle (hereafter FJW) (1980) 2.5 for the precise figures concerning 
references to Zeus from other Aeschylean plays. A ll references to Zeus in the O resteia  are discussed 
below.
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seems rather to be an Aeschylean invention used in place o f the more common title 
'Ikectux;. The etymological connection between the verbs dqwcvsopai and ucvsopai 
and their respective nominal forms is picked up on by the poet and played upon in 
lines 20-2, where the chorus of Danaids say: xlv’ av ouv x®>Pav sOcppova paM,ov 
xrjaS’ acpiKoiusOa | <ri)V xoia5’ Iksicdv eyxeipiSioic;15 | spioaxsTtxoiai kMSoicuv; ‘So, 
to what more friendly land than this could we come with these hand-held emblems of 
the suppliant, these wool-wreathed olive branches?’ In the prologue we also 
encounter for the first time the myth of Io, which occurs periodically throughout the 
play and in which, of course, Zeus is a central figure. The first explicit16 reference to 
the Io myth occurs in lines 15-19 and reads: ... KsX,oai 8’ ’Apycnx; yaTav, 60sv 5f| 
yevcx; fjpexepov, | xrj<; oicrupoSovoo Poo<; S7tacpfj<; | Ka^ S7iurvoia<; Ato<; euxopsvov, 
xsxetaoxai. ‘... and [we] put in to the land of Argos, from whence originates our race, 
which claims to derive from the touch and breath of Zeus.’ The myth of the rape of 
Io is an important factor in the discussion of the nature of Zeus, because it can be 
interpreted as either a beneficial act or a violent and negative one. The final 
reference to Zeus in the prologue sees the Danaids call on the god as the Saviour and 
the guardian o f pious men’s homes to receive them as suppliants into Argos and to 
protect them from their Egyptian cousins (Supp. 26-9). The prologue can be seen to 
establish Zeus as key figure in several different key thematic areas for the play: as 
the god of suppliants; the Danaids’ progenitor and the former sexual partner of Io; 
the Danaids’ saviour; and the just protector o f pious men’s homes.
The first choral ode begins in line 40 by referencing the Io myth with an 
invocation to the child and ancestor of the Danaids, whose name ''Enatpoq means ‘the 
Touch’ and who was the product of the union between Io and Zeus {Supp. 40-8). 
There is nothing negative in the presentation of Zeus and the conception of Epaphos 
so far in the play, only the gentleness of Zeus’ part in the act of consummation. What
15 Here I punctuate differently from W est (1998) by removing the comma after eyxeipiSiou;, and in so 
doing agree with Page’s OCT (1972).
16 I say explicit reference here, because there is a possibility that within the imagery o f  the male- 
female contrast contained in lines 8-9, which describes the conflicting relationship o f  the Danaids and 
the Egyptians, there is an allusion to the relationship o f  Io and Zeus. For this argument, see R. D. 
Murray (1958) 28, 98-102. While this argument may come under attack for presuming the existence 
o f  the Io story within the Suppliants before Aeschylus has explicitly referred to it, the connection  
between Io and Argos is, nevertheless, a natural one. For example, Ps.-Apollodorus, in reporting 
Hesiod, says that Zeus seduced/destroyed (stpOsipe) Io, which indicates that the story o f  Zeus entering 
into some form o f  sexual congress with Io was pre-Aeschylean and thus potentially known by 
A eschylus’ audience (Hesiod Fr. 124). So, in line 8, it may already be perfectly acceptable to connect 
the male-female contrast o f  the Danaids and Egyptians with Io and Zeus.
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follows at Supp. 86-103 is a passage which raises questions about the invariance, 
unknowableness and detachment of Zeus. Such a description o f the nature of Zeus 
naturally casts a light on all subsequent references to the god in the play, especially 
those instances which describe Zeus as a fulfiller of events, because all subsequent 
references to Zeus’ power as the greatest of gods can be seen to recall the image of 
his invariance and detachment from events described during the first choral ode (cf. 
Supp. 138-40, 211-12, 524-30, 624, 822-4).17 Indeed, soon after, Zeus is referred to 
in a way that encompasses several prominent aspects of his powerful nature: 
tsA^utck; 6’ sv xpovco 7iaxrip o 7iavx67ixa<; | rcpsupsvsTq kxigsisv ‘Now may the all- 
seeing Father in time bring about a propitious end’ {Supp. 138-40). First, Zeus is the 
Father, which can be seen to refer to the god as the progenitor of the Danaids, as well 
as to his traditional position as the father of men and gods. These lines also allude to 
Zeus as the ultimate fulfiller of events and do so in conjunction with the god as an 
all-seeing, all-knowing deity.
In the final four verses of the first choral ode {Supp. 151-76), Zeus again
looms large in three striking passages. First, the name o f Zeus is used to refer to the
18god of the dead: Zfjva xo5v KeKpqKoxcov, ‘Zeus of the departed.’ {Supp. 157) 
Secondly, he is called upon in a twofold vocative with Io: a Zrjv ’low; id) pfjvK; | 
pdoxsip’ sk 0sc5v ‘Oh Zeus; oh the wrath of the gods that takes vengeance on Io.’ 
{Supp. 162-3). This is the first time the tale of Zeus and Io is put in a more negative 
light. And thirdly, if they should be left to the violent advances of their Egyptian 
cousins or forced to commit suicide to avoid these advances, the Danaids ask: Kai 
xox’ oh Sucaioix; | Zei><; svs^sxai v|/oyoic;, | xov xa<; (3ooc; 7iaT5’ dxipdaaq, xov ad- | xoq 
7tox’ SKxioev yovco, | vuv s%(ov 7taAivxpo7iov | o\}/iv ev XixaTaiv; ‘And then will Zeus 
not be liable to merited censure for dishonouring the child of the cow, whom he 
himself once begot and caused to be, by turning his face away when we pray to 
him?’19 {Supp. 167-73). The Danaids’ question here demonstrates how they view 
their relationship with the god. They feel that Zeus is under an obligation, not only
17 The position o f  Zeus as the great fulfiller o f  events is something which is present throughout all 
Aeschylus: see below for passages in the Oresteia, as w ell as, for example, Pers. 739-40, 759-64, Th. 
117-18.
18 One may think that this is just another way o f  referring to Hades, but the position o f  Zeus as a god 
o f  the dead is discussed below in Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’ in the section Zeus and Hades.
19 Following West (1998), FJW (1980), and Weir Smyth (1922), who have these lines asking a 
question. Page (1972) does not see this passage as asking a question at all.
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by way of his connection with them as both their ancestor and as the god of 
suppliants, but also because he owes them protection for his role in dishonouring Io. 
The question is, indeed, focalised in such a way through the eyes of the Danaids that 
Zeus is in many ways removed from his normal state, from his position as the king 
of gods and men and the overseer o f justice, to being just another individual under 
consideration for potential crimes. His position of power and authority is thus
Of)inverted to one of being under an obligation in the eyes of the Danaids.
In the following scene between Danaus and the chorus, we are presented with 
little new information concerning Zeus. First, the god is called aiSoiou Aioq {Supp. 
192), which can be translated either ‘reverend Zeus’, with Zeus understood as the 
one deserving of reverence (aiSdx;); or alternatively ‘reverent Zeus’, where the 
epithet can be taken in an active sense with Zeus seen as the one who will give 
reverence to his suppliants.21 Friis Johansen and Whittle, in support of the former 
reading, supply references from the Odyssey which attest that aiSoioq is an epithet 
used of suppliants {Od. 7.165, 7.181, 9.271).22 Zeus is then spoken of as Zeix; 
Yswfjxcop ‘Zeus, our ancestor’ {Supp. 206), which refers to the Io story and recalls 
the obligation the suppliants feel Zeus is under as their ancestor. This is reinforced 
by the Danaids’ request that Zeus take pity on them before they die {Supp. 209). 
Danaus also speaks of Zsvq a)Jjoq ev Kapouaiv noTarac; 5iKaq ‘Another Zeus who 
pronounces final judgements on the dead’ {Supp. 231), which can be seen to pick up
23line 157, where Zeus was spoken of in similar terms as a god of the dead.
With Pelasgus’ entrance and first words at line 234 we learn more about the 
myth of Io and Zeus’ role within the tale. We are told that Zeus pi%0fjvai, ‘had 
intercourse’, with Io (295) and that Hera, having found out about this, turned Io into 
a cow (296-9). Indeed, at Supp. 295, we encounter the first occurance in the play 
when the sexual union itself between Zeus and Io is not euphemistically spoken of as 
the ‘touch’ or ‘breath’ o f Zeus. Though now a cow, Io’s appearance does not prevent 
Zeus from approaching her, which he does in the form o f a bull (300-1). As a 
consequence, Hera set up Argos as a guard (303-5) and sent Io to be driven by a
20 See Brill (2009) 161-80 on the power o f  the suppliant.
21 Thus Cairns (1993) 183-4.
22 See FJW (1980) 2.153.
23 Cf. note above; the idea o f  Zeus as a god o f  death is discussed below in Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  
Zeus’.
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gadfly (309) on a long journey until she settled by the Nile (311-12). From the union, 
Io brought forth a son, Epaphos (313-15).
For the two hundred lines or so between Supp. 320 and 523, the prominence 
o f the Io myth recedes in favour of repeated reference to the need to pay heed to 
Zeus, the god of suppliants, and the wrath of the god should the Danaids not be 
received by Pelasgus and the city (Supp. 347, 385-6, 478-9). The position of Zeus as 
the god of justice also comes to the fore in these lines (cf. Supp. 359-60, 381-6, 402- 
4, 437). When Pelasgus states that he cannot make the decision about accepting them 
as suppliants because of the possibility of causing a war with the Egyptians (Supp. 
397-401), the Danaids respond: aptpoxep’, ©<; opaipcov,24 t&8’ 87uoko7isT | Zeuq, 
8T£popp£7ifj<;,25 vspcov eiKoxax; | aSuca psv Kaicoiq, oaia 5’ swojiok;. ‘Both of these 
options, as one kindred in blood, Zeus watches over, holding the balance nicely 
poised, as ready to incline this way as that, fittingly distributing injustice to the evil, 
prosperity to the law-abiding’ (Supp. 402-4). The question of what is considered just 
and unjust, and in whose eyes, is raised here. The Danaids do this by acknowledging 
that Pelasgus’ decision is, pragmatically, a difficult one, but that this is all the more 
reason to do what is just in the eyes of the highest and most powerful god. In so 
doing, the Danaids wish to place before Pelasgus what Zeus considers just, what 
Zeus holds dear and important: i.e. the rights of the suppliant.
Once Pelasgus leaves the stage at Supp. 523, the Danaids sing an ode which 
develops the Io myth further. But, before the chorus give another account o f the 
myth, they address Zeus directly: &va£, avaicxcov, paKapoov | paicapxaxs Kai xsAicov | 
xeXsioxaxov Kpaxog, 6A,(3i£ Zeu, ‘Lord of lords, most blessed of the blessed ones, 
most perfect power of the perfect ones, Zeus giver of prosperity,’ (Supp. 524-6) The 
language the chorus uses to invoke Zeus is quite alien to the way Greeks usually 
speak of their gods. It is more reminiscent of the way the Persians and Egyptians 
spoke -  or are perceived and portrayed to speak -  o f their kings.26 Nevertheless, 
while the titles the Danaids bestow upon Zeus may be more akin to the style of 
‘eastern’ peoples, the thought behind the words is not in itself so very different from
24 Following the reading o f  FJW (1980) 2. 318-20 for line 402.
25 See Tucker (1889) 88 for meaning o f  etepoppeTrrjq.
26 The title dva£ avaKtcov is rarely found elsewhere; the best attested close analogue is paaitaix; 
PaaiAiwv, which is the standard translation o f  the Persian K ing’s title ‘King o f  K ings’. The latter title 
is also found on the tombs o f  Egyptian kings and is the form used by Plutarch o f  Antony and 
Cleopatra’s children (Plu. Ant. 54.4). See FJW (1980) 2. 408-10 for further discussion o f  this title.
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the way Zeus is referred to in the other plays of Aeschylus by Greek characters (cf. 
Th. 117-18; Ag. 973-4, 1485-8).27
When the ode does move on to address the myth of Io, it first presents little 
that is new or of significance concerning Zeus and his role in the affair. The Danaids 
claim to be descended from the race of Zeus (536) and that Io came to the grove of 
Zeus near the Nile (558). It is not until the fourth verse that we come across anything 
which affects our understanding of the god. The Danaids say: 5i’ aicovo<; Kpecov 
cotohjtoi) | < * * * * * >  | Aioq28 5’ a 7rqpavxcp obsvsi | Kai 0siai<; sTiurvolaic; 1rcabsxai, 
SaKpucov 5’ goto- | aia^ei rcsvOipov aiSco. | A.aPouaa 6 ’ sppa ATov dv|/su8 eT AAyca | 
yslvaxo 7iat8 ’ ajiepxpfj, ... ‘Ruling throughout time unceasing, she was stopped by the 
unharming might of Zeus and by his divine breath, and she let fall drop by drop the 
mournful shame of tears. Taking on the cargo of Zeus, by no false word, she brought 
forth a blameless child, ...’ {Supp. 574-81). Friis Johansen and Whittle see this 
description as an implicit assertion that Zeus has turned Io back into a human being 
and thus of the kindness o f Zeus.29 They say that aiScb^ and KSvBoq are human 
characteristics, and that the shedding of 8 &Kpoa by animals is not recorded before 
the fifth century, except in the case of Achilles’ horses at the death of Patroclus (II. 
17. 437-9). But Io is described as weeping without any indication that she has 
actually been turned back into a human. The question is really why we need assume 
that Io has been changed back into a human here at all when this is not made 
explicit.30 Indeed, there is a real similarity between the horses of Achilles and Io, 
because both possess a state transcendent of that of mere animals. They possess a
27 See Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’, which further demonstrates that the exalted manner in which 
the Danaids refer to Zeus is not unique to them, this play or to foreign, non-Greek peoples in 
Aeschylus.
28 Following West (1998), who follows the emendation by Pearson, J. (1612-86); see FJW (1980) 2. 
460-1 for further discussion o f  the textual problem.
29 FJW (1980) 2. 462-3; see Cairns (1993) 187-8, who also assumes that Io is transformed back into a 
human during this scene. He states that it is significant that Io expresses ctiScbq at the moment she is 
transformed back into human form, because ai5d)<; is the ‘human emotion p a r  excellence'. However, 
Cairns overlooks lines 562-4, which state that Io is able to feel dishonour in her toil as well as the 
painful goads: rovoiq dripou; oSuvatq is  KevxpoSa^qnm (Supp. 562-4). She is thus able to feel human 
emotions before she has sexual congress with Zeus at 574ff. Indeed, it would seem natural to make 
the assumption that the severity o f  Hera’s punishment rests on Io herself understanding the horrid 
nature o f  her punishment and transformation. So, Io seems rather simply to be a human in cow-form  
and the way that Io is presented before these two verses, as a human in mind (though not form), 
implies that she can thus experience aiScbq without being human in form. See the further arguments 
made in the subsequent main text.
30 Tucker (1908) 12-13, ad 42, also makes this argument, saying that ‘nowhere in Aeschylus [or in the 
Prometheus] is Zeus said to have restored Io to her human shape.’
77
supra-animal status, with Achilles’ horses being semi-divine and Io herself part 
human, part cow (569-70). This may mean that neither Achilles’ horses nor Io 
should be treated as just animals, and in this respect Friis Johansen and Whittle may 
be correct to say that no (mere) animal is recorded weeping before the fifth-century. 
Thus, it may be better to judge Io by a different set o f criteria, one outside of the 
parameters of what is traditionally expected of an animal. And so, as a consequence, 
we are still left with the question why it is necessary to make the leap that Io has 
been ‘delivered’ by Zeus from her animal state in this scene.
Moreover, in imagining Io as part human, part cow we need not think of her 
exterior as part human, part cow or that it implies a process of transformation. It is 
just as conceivable that the human aspect of her was her mind and the animal her 
form. First, her wanderings naturally suggest quadrupedality and 539-40 seem to 
preclude a human head. Such a depiction of Io the cow indicates that she is not some 
minotaur-esque creature, at the very least, before her encounter with Zeus. Secondly, 
when she is said to be a strange sight ov|/iv dfj0 r| (half human, half cow) for the 
inhabitants of the land at which she has arrived (565-73), she is said to be these 
things before Zeus comes upon her. Indeed, in keeping with the implied 
quadrupedality already stated, the strange sight which the inhabitants see can easily 
be understood as the mad, raving cow described in the lines directly before (562-4), 
and not a minotaur-esque creature. There is a clear break in the story at 571 with the 
use of the collocation: m i tote 5q, which denotes a temporal change and thus that it 
was then, at that time that Zeus came to Io, not before.31 The position of m i tote 8 q 
here, therefore, indicates that the description of Io as half human, half cow was not a 
description of Zeus’ transformation of her back into human form. Up until this point 
at 571 there had been no reference to the god himself32 in the retelling of Io’s 
wanderings.
Even if we could say that this scene offers a depiction of Zeus transforming 
Io back into human form ,33 Io’s tears of 7i£v0 ipov ai5a> indicate that this scene hints
31 The collocation Kai t o t s  Sfj does not occur elsewhere in tragedy, but is frequent in epic: cf. II. 1.92, 
9.590.
32 Zeus’ name does appear at 558 to refer to the ‘all-nurturing grove o f  Z eus’ ATov 7rappOTOV akaoq, 
but this is, o f  course, not the same as the god him self being spoken of.
33 Tucker (1889) 13 points out that nowhere in Aeschylus does Zeus restore Io to human form. It may 
just be that the god put an end to her wanderings, impregnated her and restored her senses. It could 
thus be these which are referred to in lines 586-9.
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at something other than Zeus’ kindness.34 It has been pointed out that there is an 
ambiguity concerning whether Io’s tears are the result of her treatment by Hera or at 
her present position as the object of Zeus’ erotic affections.35 Indeed, while the lines: 
Aioq 5’ &7cr||u.avTCp oGevsi | Kai 0siai<; £7rurvoiaa<; 17tauexat {Supp. 576-8), can be read 
as similarly euphemistic as those descriptions of the rape of Io encountered before in 
the play, the subsequent lines depict the effect of the act on Io -  something which 
until now has not been developed by Aeschylus: baKpuov 8 ’ arco-1 axa^et TtevGipov 
ai8 a> {Supp. 578-9). That the scene details a sexual assault is made all the more 
plausible by describing the child as 7iaT5’ apepcpfj, because by stressing that the child 
carries no blame -  and one presumes, because of the context, none of the hereditary 
connotations or associations of the act by which he came into being -  it could imply 
that the father’s actions are thus in some way blameworthy. So, it is possible to read 
this choral ode up to this point as suggesting that the tale is not a completely kind 
one, that Zeus is not wholly kind and that Io has not been transformed back into 
human shape.
The following verses of the stasimon continue to focus on the Danaids’ 
descent from Zeus. The chorus, having just described the conception of Epaphus in 
lines 574-82, declare that: (puai^ooo yevcx; xo5e | Zqvoq scrnv aAx|0co<;. | xiq yap av 
Kax87iauoev "H-1 pa<; voaout; s7ci(3o\)A,oi)<;; | Aioq xo8 ’ spyov. Kai xo5’ av yevot; Xsycov 
| 8<E, ’E7iacpou Kupfjoaiq. ‘Truly this is the offspring of Zeus, the begetter of life! Who 
else could have put a stop to the sufferings caused by Hera’s plotting? It was the act 
of Zeus. And if you say that our race springs from Epaphus, you will hit the mark.’ 
{Supp. 584-9). This statement of the chorus gives more information about the 
interaction between Zeus and Io. The stopping of the diseases of Hera suggests that 
Zeus has effected a cure, but must we assume that this is anything more than what 
we are already told at 578, which implies that Zeus stopped Io’s ravings and 
wanderings?
34 For readings that only see this scene as a demonstration o f  Zeus’ kindness, see R. D. Murray (1958) 
40; Conacher (1996) 92-3. Such readings may be the result o f  a misinterpretation o f  line 532, which 
has the chorus refer to the tale they are about to tell as a ‘kindly tale’, eucppov’ alvov. Taken literally, 
this would suggest that all the follow ing stasimon is a pleasant retelling o f  events and that Z eus’ 
actions with Io are something kind too. However, such a reading ignores the fact that the sexual union 
between Zeus and Io had, on the whole, been referred to euphemistically and in a way that indicates 
violence and sexual agression on the part o f  Zeus. So, reference to the story as a ‘kindly tale’, eucppov’ 
alvov can also be seen to fall into the category o f  euphemism.
35 So, FJW (1980) 2. 464-5; Cairns (1993) 187-8.
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Then, having firmly established their lineage, the Danaids give an indication 
about why they have laid out in detail the story of Io and Zeus and their child 
Epaphus {Supp. 590-9):
TIV’ (XV 0ECOV £v5lKG)T8pOlOlV  
KEK^oipav ctAoyax; £7t’ Epyoiq;
<aux6q o> Tcaxfip cpuxoupyoq aijxoysip ava£,, 
ysvotx; 7ia^ai6cppcov psyac; 
xek xcov , xo 7tav pfjxap, otipux; Zsuq.
xm’ apxa 5’ otixivoq Goa c^ov 
xo pslov Kpsiaaovcov Kpaxuvsr 
otmvoq avcoGsv f|p£vou cjePei Kpdxrj,
7idpsaxi 5’ Spyov dx; £7io<; 
a7i£\>aai. xi xcov5’ ou Aioq cpspsi cpprjv;
‘On what god could I appropriately call on account of actions that give me a juster 
claim? The Lord and Father himself, with his own hand, was my engenderer, the 
great, wise, ancient artificer o f my race, the all-resourceful one, Zeus who grants fair 
winds.
Sitting beneath the rule of no-one, he exerts a power no smaller than mighty rulers; 
there is no one seated above him whose power he reveres, and he can hasten the 
deed as fast as the word. What of all this can the mind of Zeus not bring to pass?’
These lines juxtapose the Danaids’ familial ties with Zeus with the over-arching 
power o f the god and his ability to fulfil his will. He is Epaphus’ father and theirs, 
the begetter of their race and the conductor of things to a happy end. There is no-one 
mightier, and there is nothing which his mind does not possess.36 In the Danaids’ 
eyes, Zeus truly is the correct god that they should be calling on for help: he is their 
progenitor and he is the ultimate fulfiller (cf. Supp. 92, 525-6, 824).
When Danaus re-enters the stage at line 600, he relates what happened at the 
council o f Argives and that they came to the decision to protect the suppliant
36 The image o f  Zeus’ phren  in line 599 recalls the famous lines o f  the parodos at 86-103, as well as 
Ag. 1485-9, both o f  which will be discussed in detail below in Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’.
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Danaids. In relating the events of the council, he highlights that Pelasgus persuaded 
the assembly o f Argive citizens to protect the Danaids by pronouncing that the wrath 
of Zeus of suppliants (Zrivoc; uceaioo kotov) should not be increased {Supp. 616-18). 
When the Argives ratified the decision to receive the Danaids as suppliants, Danaus 
concludes his retelling of events with the line: Zsix; S’ fbiEKpavsv xEkoq. ‘Zeus 
fulfilled this end.’ {Supp. 624) Lines 616-18 recall those references to the wrath of 
Zeus of suppliants at 347, 385, 478-9 and line 624 reaffirms the conviction of Zeus 
as the great fulfiller of events.
The following passage presents the Danaids’ response to the news that they 
will be protected by the Argives. Their first thought is to give thanks to their new 
protectors and they wish Zeus Xenios to look kindly on them {Supp. 625-9). This is 
the first mention of Zeus with the epithet Xenios in the play and it is possible that it 
indicates a shift in the dynamic of the relationship between the Danaids and the 
Argives. On reception, it seems that the Danaids feel they are no longer simply 
suppliants, but are now also guest-friends and as guest-friends they wish Zeus will 
look kindly on the Argives, giving in return the kindness the Argives have shown in 
protecting them. It is worth noting that the prominence of the Io myth disappears 
almost completely once the Danaids have been received as suppliants.
In the next strophe, the Danaids say that the Argives did not cast their votes 
in favour of men,37 being fearful of Zeus and respecting his suppliants. In describing 
the fear the Argives have of Zeus, the chorus pronounce: Atov £7ii8 6 |i£VOi 7tpdict;op’ 
asi cnco7i6v | 8ocy;t6 A£p.ov, xov outk; av Sopo<; 8%cov | S7i’ opotpcov iatvoixo' Papix; 8 ’ 
ecpi^si. ‘They heeded Zeus’ avenger, an eternal watcher against whom war is 
impossible. No house can be safe that has him on the roof: he sits there as a heavy 
burden.’ {Supp. 646-50). The image touches on the justice of Zeus and recalls a 
passage from Hesiod that speaks of the eye of Zeus and the daimones who watch 
over mortal men, recording their deeds and reporting back to Zeus {Op. 248-85). As 
Vurtheim notes, aKorcov in all likelihood, stands for 6cp0aX.)Li6v.38 The image here of 
an avenger of Zeus, sitting on top of a house also echoes presentations of Eriny(e)s,
37 For a discussion o f  the male-female contrast in the play, see R. D. Murray (1958) 27-31.
38 Vurtheim (1928, 1967) 198.
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Alastor and other daimonic powers elsewhere in Aeschylus (cf. Th. 699-701, 720-6; 
Ag. 763-72,39 1468-74).40
The chorus continue to sing of Zeus and justice, drawing on the relationship 
between a citizen body who honours Zeus and how the god sets the fate of the city’s 
laws on the right track if it does so {Supp. 670-3). The god is then later described as 
bringing fruits to perfection for a city {Supp. 688-90), thus being seen as responsible 
for the prosperity of the city both in the laws it upholds and in the fertility of its 
crops.
The Danaids’ invocations and references to Zeus change again with the 
imminent arrival of their Egyptian cousins {Supp. 71 Off). With Pelasgus nowhere in 
sight and Danaus having left to find help, the Danaids have no-one to whom they can 
turn. First, they wish to become as smoke, the neighbour of Zeus’ clouds, to escape 
their pursuers {Supp. 779-80). They then revert to calling on Zeus, asking him to 
honour his suppliants and to look unkindly on violence {i.e. o f the Egyptians), 
referring to him as 7iayKpaTe<; ‘all-powerful’ and youaoye ‘holder of the earth’ {Supp. 
811-14). Following up this invocation to Zeus as the all-mighty god and bestower of 
justice, the Danaids say: gov 6 ’ 87ri7rav Cpyov taXftv- | xoir i t  8 ’ aveo oeGev 
0vaxoTa<i> isX^iov eonv; ‘Your beam of balance is universal; what without you is 
fulfilled by/for mortals?’ {Supp. 822-4; cf. 402-6; Ag. 1485-8). Zeus is thus seen in 
light of his position as the god of suppliants, as the bestower of justice and the great 
fulfiller of events.
In the final scene o f the play, the Danaids are accosted by the Egyptian 
Herald and call on Zeus, child of Earth,41 to protect them {Supp. 890-2, thus 900-2). 
After Pelasgus has arrived and removed the initial threat posed by the Herald, the 
chorus of Danaids are joined by a demi-chorus,42 which is most commonly thought 
to be a group of Argives (which is how I will subsequently refer to them), whether 
Danaus’ bodyguard or the Danaids’ newly-appointed handmaidens.43 The demi- 
chorus of Argives act as a counter-point for the Danaids and point out that the
39 Compare the phrase apa^ov ctnoXsuov in the Agamemnon which is used to describe a Salpcov with 
the use o f  5uo7t6A£uov in the Suppliants to describe the avenger o f  Zeus.
40 See previous chapter on Saipcov in Aeschylus, as well as Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’.
41 Aeschylus was not alone in identifying Earth as the mother o f  Zeus and as Rhea/Cybele, S. Ph. 391, 
392.
42 There is some debate about whether the chorus o f  Danaids is divided in two or whether another, 
separate chorus is added. See FJW (1980) 3. 306 for a summary o f  the possible options.
43 See FJW (1980) 3. 306-8 for discussion o f  the play’s exodos and the distribution o f  lines.
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Egyptians may not be as impious, unjust or unfavoured by the gods as the Danaids 
make out: why else did they have such a good journey to Argos? {Supp. 1045-6) 
Having cast doubt on the relative justice of the Danaids’ and Egyptians’ cases, the 
demi-chorus, in words which resonate with the famous lines 86-103 of the play’s 
parodos, effectively rest the issue with Zeus, saying: on  xoi ja6 pai|i6 v saxiv, xo 
ysvoix’ a v  | Aioq ou raxppaxog saxiv | psyaAa (ppf|v anepaxoq. ‘Whatever is fated, 
this will be; not to be overcome or surpassed is the great mind of Zeus.’ {Supp. 1047- 
9; cf. 93-5, 599, 1057-8). The Danaids, however, respond by asking Zeus to ward off 
marriage. The remaining references to Zeus are versions on the themes already 
introduced in the final scene. So, the demi-chorus refer to the mind of Zeus as 
unfathomable {Supp. 1057-8) and the Danaids close the play with an invocation to 
the god to give them protection {Supp. 1073). In-between these lines, the Danaids 
also ask Zeus to (again) ward off marriage {Supp. 1062-4), but do so by referring to 
the myth of Io,44 suggesting that as he released Io from her torment, he can do the 
same now for them.
Zeus in the Agamemnon
In the Agamemnon we first encounter Zeus as a symbol of kingship and then 
in an image of retributive justice, where it is said Apollo, Pan or Zeus sends an 
Erinys against transgressors {Ag. 55-9). The image is then extended in reference to 
Zeus Xenios alone, who sends the sons of Atreus against Alexander-Paris on account 
o f the abduction of Helen {Ag. 60-2). A hundred lines elapse before Zeus is 
mentioned again, and it is in the Hymn to Zeus {Ag. 160-83) that the god is then 
spoken of, with the Hymn’s opening line the much discussed phrase: Zsu<;, oaxu; 
7tox’ saxiv, ‘Zeus, whoever he is,’ {Ag. 160).45 In the first strophe of the Hymn, the 
chorus muse on the name and nature of the god, saying that they have nothing to 
liken the burden of their minds to except Zeus. As will be discussed at length below, 
this strophe is inspired by the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the role of Zeus in it.46 The
44 This is the first time since line 592-4 that the myth o f  Io has been referenced in any explicit way. 
See R. D. Murray (1958) for use o f  imagery which implicitly recalls key themes o f  the myth, although 
even such imagery is far rarer after line 594.
45 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ for a discussion o f  the phrase and for references to secondary 
literature.
46 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ for a discussion o f  the passage and for references to secondary 
literature.
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second verse seems to move away from the immediate concern of the vain burden 
weighing on the chorus’s mind, by going back into the mythic past of Zeus and 
focusing on the ascent of the god and the generational battles which preceded his rise 
to the throne. The antistrophe then moves seamlessly into the final strophe, which 
places Zeus as the establisher and enforcer of justice for mankind. The references to 
Zeus in the prologue and parodos o f the Agamemnon thus focus primarily on the 
god’s position as the highest and most powerful god and as the overseer of justice.
In the following scene (Ag. 258-354), only one reference to Zeus is made and 
that is in relation to Mount Athos belonging to the god (Ag. 285). It is only when we 
reach the first stasimon at 355 that anything of note is again said about Zeus. At line 
355 Zeus is referred to as King Zeus and is said to have brought about Troy’s 
destruction with Kindly Night; then at 362 Zeus is spoken of as the great god of 
Guest-Friendship, who strained his bow against Alexander. The first strophe of the 
choral ode then opens with the concisely worded line to describe how Troy fell: Aio^ 
nhiyav  exouaiv gircsiv ‘They can say it is the stroke of Zeus.’ (Ag. 367) So, just as 
in the parodos, Zeus is again connected with the fulfilment of retributive justice. In 
the final antistrophe of the first stasimon, which is concerned with the fortune of 
individuals, justice and the negative effects of excessive praise, the chorus say that a 
thunderbolt can be cast by the eyes o f Zeus (Ag. 469-70) and they thus judge a life 
without envy as blessed (Ag. 471).47
With the entrance of the Herald, the presentation of Zeus as the god of justice 
and as the destroyer of Troy continues. Troy is destroyed by the axe of Zeus, bringer 
of justice (Ag. 525-6); and the grace o f Zeus accomplished the victory for the Greeks 
and brought about punishment for Troy (Ag. 582). The Herald, who sees the god’s 
involvement in the events at Troy so explicitly, extends the influence of Zeus to 
seemingly incorporate almost every aspect of men’s lives, by saying that if there is 
any news of Menelaus, then it is by the art of Zeus (Ag. 677).
The second stasimon (Ag. 681-809) goes through the origins of the Trojan 
War again. In spite of their often negative view of the war and, in particular, of 
Helen’s role within it (Ag. 681-716), the chorus are aware of the justice and 
underlying causes o f the conflict. They say that a wrath, exacting late payment for
47 Compare this with the chorus’ thoughts at Ag. 750-63, where they reflect on what they consider to 
be the nature o f  justice, arguing that it is not prosperity that angers the gods, but impious deeds: see 
discussion in the chapter on the Justice o f  Zeus below.
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dishonouring the guest-table and for dishonouring Zeus guardian of the shared hearth 
drove Helen to Troy (Ag. 700-4). The wrath exacting late-payment for Zeus recalls 
the Erinys sent by Zeus at Ag. 56-62, and the idea of the transgression o f guest- 
friendship and the laws of Zeus is again brought out by Aeschylus. Similarly, in the 
third strophe of the stasimon, Helen is said to have brought an Erinys, the escort of 
Zeus of Guest-Friendship, with her when she married Paris (Ag. 744-9).
In the following scene, Agamemnon makes his long-awaited entrance. Zeus 
is only mentioned twice: Zeus is first spoken of at line 970 in relation to making 
wine from grapes. This is an allusion to the god’s position as the sky god and the 
bringer of rain. It has little significance for the play as a whole, except to remind the 
audience of the Zeus’ all-pervading influence. More importantly, Clytemnestra says 
a short prayer to Zeus the Fulfiller to bring her prayer (and her mission to kill 
Agamemnon) to pass (Ag. 973-4) .48 A brief, four-verse choral interlude follows 
Clytemnestra’s prayer in which the chorus only mention Zeus in connection with 
crops and the curing of famine (Ag. 1015) and as stopping a man who had learned 
how to rise from the dead (Ag. 1022-4). The final reference to Zeus before 
Agamemnon’s death is spoken by Clytemnestra to Cassandra, stating that the latter’s 
enslavement is a gift from Zeus (Ag. 1036).
It is not until the final scene of the play 300 lines later that the god’s name 
recurs, when Clytemnestra exits the palace revelling in the murder of Agamemnon. 
She declares that: Kai 7t£7txG)K6 x i1 xpixryv £7i£v8 iSa)pi, xou m xa %0ovo<; | Aioq vsKpcov 
ocoxfjpoq euKxaiav %ap\v. ‘And when he had fallen I added a third stroke, in 
thanksgiving to Zeus of the underworld, the saviour of the dead. ’49 (Ag. 1385-7). Just 
as with Supp. 157, 231 Zeus’ name seems to be used to denote the traditional god of 
the dead, Hades.50 In lines 1485-9, the chorus present a notion that has seemingly 
lain dorment since Clytemnestra’s prayer at 973-4: that is, the role of Zeus in the 
lives of men as the ultimate fulfiller of events. So they say: id) ifj, 8 iai Aioq \
48 See Rosenmeyer (1982) 278-9 for Zeus the Fulfiller. While I do not fully subscribe to 
Rosenmeyer’s conclusions about how Zeus the Fulfiller acts as a dramatic tool for Aeschylus, 
presiding over significant moments o f  revelation, Rosenmeyer does importantly highlight the over­
arching power o f  Zeus both as a dramatic plot device for the poet and as a figure that holds real 
religious significance. See also the overview o f  the Suppliants above for references to the god’s role 
as the fulfiller o f  events and Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Z eus’.
49 See Fraenkel (1950) 3.652 on Zeus the Saviour for further secondary literature.
50 See Chapter 3 T h e  Nature o f  Zeus’ for further discussion o f  the use o f  the name Zeus for the god 
o f  the dead.
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7tavaixioo 7tavepyexa- | x( yap PpoxoT<; aveu Aio<; xe^Txai; | xi xcovS’ ov Geoicpavxov 
saxiv; ‘Oh, oh! And all by the will of Zeus, the cause of all things, the effector of all 
effects; for what comes to pass for mortals, except by Zeus’ doing? What of all this 
is not divinely ordained? ’51 The chorus’ inclusion o f Zeus as a cause of 
Agamemnon’s death presents the possibility of an over-arching divine dimension for 
the king’s death.52 The final reference to Zeus in the play refers to the nature of the 
god’s justice and his over-arching power and involvement in the lives of men. The 
chorus recount the ordinance o f Zeus that while the god remains on the throne it is 
for the doer to suffer (Ag. 1563-4), which recalls the notion of TiaGet paGoc; initially 
spoken o f in lines 176-8 and 250. The law of retributive justice and the synonymity 
of Zeus with the rule of justice, which is brought out by lines 1563-4, complements 
the picture of the god as the fulfiller of events in his over-arching position as the 
highest and most powerful of gods seen before in lines 1485-9. As in the parodos, so 
in the closing lines of the play: the Agamemnon is framed by Zeus, his rule and 
conception of justice .53
Zeus in the Libation Bearers
As Zeus is marked out as the god o f suppliants and god of justice in the early 
stages of the Suppliants and Agamemnon respectively, so Zeus is connected with the 
notions of vengeance and retributive justice in the Libation Bearers. Within the 
opening twenty lines of the play, Orestes prays to Zeus to be his ally in avenging the 
death of his father, Agamemnon: 00 Zex>, boq ps xeiaaoGon popov 17taxpo<;, ysvou 6 s 
^uppaxoc; Getaov epol. ‘O Zeus, grant me vengeance for my father’s death; be my 
willing ally.’ (Ch. 18-19; cf. II. 3.351). After Electra acknowledges Orestes as her 
brother, the siblings’ thoughts turn to the plot to avenge their father. Orestes invokes 
Might, Justice and Zeus, and he asks the god to watch over his deeds in the act of 
vengeance (Ch. 244-6). Moreover, with the use of the double vocative in the line: 
Zeu Zen, Gecopo<; xgdvSs Tipaypaxcov yevou. ‘Zeus, Zeus, be a spectator of these 
deeds.’ (Ch. 246; cf. 382), Orestes unwittingly recalls Clytemnestra’s own 
invocation of Zeus at Ag. 973.
51 See below for further discussion o f  this passage. For etym ologising wordplay on 8iai Aiog, see 
Fraenkel (1950) 2.333-4, 3.704-5; West (1978) 138-9; Garvie (1986) 220.
52 For the significance o f  this passage in relation to the will o f  Zeus and the justice o f  Agamemnon’s 
death, see Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’.
53 Compare with Suppliants and how Zeus is the first and last thing under consideration in the play.
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Once again, Orestes recalls the words of his mother in the Agamemnon: Zev 
Zeu, K&TCD08V d|i7i£|ii7tcov | 6 axep67roivov axav | Ppoxcov xMpovi Kai 7tavovpcp | %sipv 
xoksooi 8 ’ opccx; xetaTxai. ‘Zeus Zeus, who sends up from below late-avenging 
destruction for the overly-bold wicked hands of men. For both my parents alike, 
there will be payment.’ (Ch. 382-5). Again the double vocative is used, just as at 
246; but in contrast with 246, Zeus here appears in connection with the chthonic 
realm, with which we saw the god associated in the Suppliants and the 
Agamemnon .54 The closely related ideas of the nature of Zeus and justice are again 
brought out in Orestes’ words, and this time he recalls how the Erinys was spoken of 
at Ag. 58-9, with Aeschylus using the same word uoxepo7roivov ‘late-avenging’ (in 
the same case) to describe the manner of justice which is sought after. The passage is 
further reminiscent of Clytemnestra’s words at Ag. 973, by developing the image of 
Zeus as the fulfiller through use of xeX^ixai within just a couple of lines of the double 
vocative.
The interconnected relationship of Zeus, the Eriny(e)s, the chthonic realm 
and justice is prevalent in this play, and is exemplified between lines 380-409 where 
supernatural entities are called upon one after the other in quick succession. First, 
chthonic Zeus is asked by Orestes to send justice from below (Ch. 382-5); Electra 
then asks Zeus to bring about justice from injustice in the same breath as calling on 
Earth and the powers beneath the earth (Ch. 395-9); the chorus in turn pronounces 
how the Erinys brings destruction upon destruction (Ch. 402-4); and Orestes calls on 
the rulers of the underworld to look upon the family of Atreus (Ch. 405-9), before 
finishing his invocation with the question: 7ia xk; xpa7ioix’ av a> Zsu; ‘Where can one 
turn, O Zeus?’ (Ch. 409) This passage recalls the final scene of the Agamemnon in 
the way Orestes here and Clytemnestra in the former play attempt to bring the 
Olympian and chthonic realms together as aids or accomplices in an act of 
vengeance.
Over two hundred lines elapse until the next reference to Zeus is made, when 
the chorus raise concerns about how justice is threatend, saying: xo8’ ayxt 
TiX^upovcov £,upo<; | Siavxalav | ouxa | Siai Aucaq, xo pi) 0epi<;, (yap ou) |
Xa<E, 7is8ov rcaxoopevac; — | xo 7iav Aioq oe(3a<; 7cap£K- | |3dvxs<; ox> 0spioxco<;. ‘The 
sword pierces, sharp and penetrating, right to the lungs, because Justice, against what
54 Cf. Supp. 156-8, 231 ;A g. 1386-7. See also Garvie (1986) ad loc.
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is right, is trampled to the ground underfoot, when someone, against all right, has 
utterly flouted the majesty of Zeus.’ (Ch. 639-45). The close relationship between 
Zeus and justice is again clear, and just as at Ag. 1485-9 there seems to be 
etymologising word-play on 8 iai Aucat; and Aio<;.55
The god is next mentioned in a metaphor concerning the changing nature of 
fortune: aXk’ si xpo7iaiav Zevc, kcckow 0f)aei tcots; ‘Well, what if Zeus is at last about 
to change the wind of disaster? (Ch. 775). The image plays on Zeus as the dispenser 
of good and ill for mankind -  something naturally bound up with his position as the 
fulfiller of events. In the choral ode that follows, the chorus call on Zeus repeatedly 
to help, assist, aid and protect Orestes in his clandestine mission to avenge his 
father’s death (Ch. 784, 789, 791).
The final two references to Zeus in the play continue to draw on the 
connection between the god and justice. The first o f the two is an appeal to Zeus for 
the correct words to address the gods in a prayer to help gain goodwill for Orestes in 
his mission (Ch. 855). Following the agon between Orestes and Clytemnestra (Ch. 
892-930), the chorus declare in the subsequent ode that Clytemnestra was justly 
killed, because punishment came to her by the true daughter of Zeus, Justice, 
touching Orestes’ hand in battle: spoX£ 5’ a Kpu7iTa5 iou paxag | 8 o>a6 9 pcov 
7co(va- | sOiys 8 ’ £<v> [ia%a %epoq eifjrupo^ | Aio<; Kopa -  A kav 8 s viv | 
7cpooayop£uop£v | ppoioi ruxovT£<; kclXcoc; | oXiOpiov 7rv£ouo’ £7t’ £%Qpoiq koxov 
‘Punishment, crafty in mind, came to her who cared for clandestine battle. The true 
daughter of Zeus touched his hand in battle -  we mortals, hitting the mark well, 
address her as Justice, and she breathed her destructive wrath upon the enemy.’ (Ch. 
946-52). The etymological word-play regarding Justice and Zeus, which has been a 
feature of the trilogy thus far, appears again in this passage. This time the 
relationship between Zeus and justice takes on a genealogical form .56 The 
relationship is no longer simply a functional one, whereby justice does the god’s 
work working through and/or because o f him. The bond is now reaffirmed by 
familial ties and recalls the Hesiodic image (cf. Op. 256).
55 See Garvie (1986) 220 for etymological play o f  Siavxaiav... 5iai Aucac;... Aidq. Cf. Ag. 1485-9 
(discussed above) for similar word-play, and indeed Ch. 789, 949. See also Garvie (1986) 220 for 
ambiguity o f  5iai + gen. as instrumental or causal in Aeschylus.
56 See Garvie (1986) 308-10.
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Zeus in the Eumenides
In the Eumenides, Zeus is as prominent a figure as he was in both the 
Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers. The god is established within the thematic 
framework of the play by the twentieth line, when we are told by the Delphic 
Prophetess that Zeus divinely inspired the phren of Apollo and set him on the seat at 
Delphi to be his father’s prophet: xsxvr|<; 5s viv Zsb<; svGsov Kxiaaq (ppsva | i'^si 
xsxapxov xovSs pavxiv sv Opovou;* | Aio<; 7rpo<pfjxr|<; 5’ soxi Ao^ia<; 7iaxpo<;. ‘And 
Zeus, having endowed his phren with a god-given skill, sat this seer as the fourth 
upon the throne: Loxias is the prophet of his father Zeus.’ (Eu . 17-19). The 
implication of Apollo being the prophet of Zeus is that it places Zeus behind the 
order to send Orestes to avenge the death of Agamemnon and so places him at the 
centre o f the contention within the play. So, although the god is not a dramatis 
persona in any of the three plays of the trilogy, it is his instigation of Orestes to 
commit matricide and it is his conception of justice which are at issue and come to 
the fore in the final play.
The next references to Zeus add little to our overall understanding of the god, 
recalling notions from previous plays. First, the Prophetess calls Zeus xsteiov and 
u\|/iaxov (Eu. 28; cf. xstaiov: Supp. 525-6, Ag. 973-4, Ch. 382-5; uvj/iaxov: Ag. 55-6, 
509); Apollo then assures the distressed Orestes that he is safe, not least because 
Zeus honours outcasts and suppliants (Eu. 92; cf. Supp. passim). Shortly after, the 
chorus of Erinyes call Apollo 7iai Aioq (Eu. 149).
In the continuing exchange between Apollo and the Erinyes, Apollo accuses 
the Erinyes of deeming marriage worthless and in so doing refers to the bonds of 
marriage as the pledges of Hera, the Fulfiller, and Zeus: rj Kdpx’ axipa Kai 7tap’ 
ouSev rjpyaaco | TIpa<; xeXslac; Kai Aioc; 7itoxfopaxa- ‘Truly, you dishonour and 
reduce to nothing the pledges of Hera, the Fulfiller, and Zeus.’ (Eu. 213-14) The 
chorus of Erinyes then sing an ode concerning their position within the divine 
apparatus and how that, in spite of carrying out their office as goddesses of 
vengeance who had previously worked alongside the Olympians (cf. Ag. 59), Zeus 
nevertheless considers them unworthy of his notice (Eu. 360-6). With the conclusion 
of the ode, Athena enters the stage (Eu. 397), and as with Apollo and Hera, her 
connection with Zeus is stressed. Just as with Apollo, the Erinyes first establish 
Athena as the child of Zeus, calling her Aioq Kopr| ‘daughter of Zeus’ (Eu. 415).
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Furthermore, due to the significant role Athena comes to play in the ensuing trial and 
the delivering of justice, it is quite possible that Aeschylus is playing a similar 
etymological word-game to the one at Ch. 949 with the goddess Justice, with the 
eponym Aioq Kopr| suggestive of the role Athena will play in presiding over the trial 
to come.
During the trial scene, several references are made to Zeus. Apollo claims 
never to have said anything on his oracular throne which Zeus himself did not ordain 
{Eu. 616-21; cf. 17-19). This connection between Zeus and Apollo is then repeated at 
line 713. The Erinyes, seemingly in disbelief at the declaration, reiterate the 
statement that Zeus sent Orestes to kill his mother {Eu. 622-4). They then continue 
by saying that Zeus must honour the death of the father more than that of the mother 
— and yet he cast his own father, Kronos, in chains {Eu. 640-1). Angry at the Erinyes, 
Apollo responds by declaring that Zeus can release the fetters binding his father, but 
no-one can ever bring the dead back. He also states the ease with which Zeus can do 
anything, causing himself no loss of breath {Eu. 644-51), a notion which recalls 
Supp. 86-103.57 It is here that the debate concerning the respective rights and 
honours due to the father and mother, man and woman, begins and finds its answer 
in Athena herself, who is not only the child o f Zeus, but is the child of Zeus alone 
{Eu. 664).58
Once Orestes has been freed by the votes cast by the jury and Athena,59 he 
declares that he owes his liberty to the will of Pallas, Loxias and the third, Zeus the 
Saviour who accomplishes all {Eu. 754-60). The passage highlights the inter­
connected nature of the actions of Apollo, Athena and Zeus in the play. Indeed, 
seemingly aware of Zeus’ role in the killing of Clytemnestra and his protection, 
Orestes says of Zeus: ... oc; 7taxpcoov aiSsaOsic; popov | aco^ei pe, prjxpoc; xaa5s 
owSucouc; op(DV. ‘... [it is] he who has had regard to my father’s death and has saved 
me, seeing these advocates of my mother.’ {Eu. 760-1). The will of Zeus is also 
referred to by Athena who tries to explain to the Erinyes that it is because of the 
incontrovertible nature o f the will of Zeus that Orestes was freed {Eu. 795-9). Two 
references then follow which give a clearer understanding o f the relationship
57 Cf. Aesch. fr. 99. 2-3; Xenophanes Fr. 25-6; Soph. 7V. 147; Eur. Archel. Fr. 14. 2. Also see chapter 
on the Nature o f  Zeus for discussion o f  Supp. 86-103.
58 See Chapter 4 on the Justice o f  Zeus for discussion o f  the trial scene in the Eumenides.
59 See Chapter 4 on the Justice o f  Zeus for discussion o f  the Vote o f  Athena.
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between Zeus and Athena. First, the goddess states that she obeys Zeus and that she 
alone among the other gods knows the key to the house in which the god’s 
thunderbolt is sealed {Eu. 826-9). Secondly, Athena states how her father gave her 
understanding. So, just as Apollo’s mind was possessed by Zeus, so the god has 
given Athena her keen mind {Eu. 850).
In the closing scene of the play, the Erinyes, having relented of their anger 
towards Athena and her city, declare that Zeus, the all-powerful, dwells in Athens 
{Eu. 918). Athena, in turn, praises Zeus of the Agora for watching over her words 
and deeds in helping to free Orestes and protect the city {Eu. 974). The Erinyes again 
mention the close relationship between Zeus and Athena, stating that those who have 
learnt wisdom and sit by Athena (i.e. the Athenians) are in turn revered by Zeus for 
doing so {Eu. 996-1002). The final reference to Zeus refers to him as the all-seeing 
god and does so in conjunction with Moira (Fate) and how both together aided the 
citizens of Pallas {Eu. 1044-7).
Summary Remarks
From the information gathered above concerning where Zeus is spoken of 
and referred to in the plays, it is possible to conclude preliminarily that Zeus is 
presented in a consistent fashion by Aeschylus in the Suppliants and the Oresteia. 
There is nothing which suggests in any real way that Aeschylus was presenting a 
completely different character (with the same name) in each play, in spite of there 
being different emphases on different aspects of the god’s nature to suit the thematic 
purposes of individual plays. Zeus is consistently presented as the king of the gods, 
all-powerful, the ulitmate fulfiller of events, the dispenser and overseer of justice, the 
protector of suppliants and strangers, in addition to being the god of guest- 
friendship. It is on this basis that a discussion of the nature o f Zeus will be conducted 
in the following chapter.
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3: THE NATURE OF ZEUS
Having discussed the character of Zeus within the Suppliants and the Oresteia and 
seen that it is a reasonable working hypothesis to understand the god as being 
presented in an altogether consistent manner, the following pages will give 
consideration to those qualities which make Zeus the god he is in Aeschylus, how 
this presentation compares with those of the god in earlier literature and what effect 
Presocratic conceptions of divinity may have had on the poet. Particular attention 
will be given to qualities such as omnipotence, omnipresence, invariance, 
detachment and unknowableness in order to see what impact they have on the 
Aeschylean depiction of Zeus and the poet’s theology.
THE POWER AND LIMITATIONS OF ZEUS
In a polytheistic system, one does not expect any one god to possess the 
quality of omnipotence. The existence of a multiplicity o f gods would seem, in itself, 
to limit the dominion and potency of any one deity, regardless of their position 
within the divine hierarchy. This is, of course, if we place to one side the possibility 
that other, lesser gods are just manifestations of the will of one higher god. 
Nevertheless, if we look at early Greek literature, the extent to which Zeus appears to 
be conceived of as all-powerful is striking.
But, first o f all, before entering into this discussion, an explanation needs to 
be provided about what is meant by all-powerful here. The quality of being all- 
powerful as ascribed to Zeus in early Greek literature is not as we, a modem 
audience, may automatically understand it now. For an ancient Greek to think of 
Zeus as all-powerful, 7tayKpaTfi<;, is not to say that he was thought of as omnipresent, 
responsible for every event on earth, as the Judaeo-Christian God has sometimes 
been conceived. Rather, Zeus is considered all-powerful because he is more 
powerful than all the other gods and because if he wants something it would 
(eventually) happen or come to pass. 1 His power, Kpaxoq, is greater than all the gods 
and he rules over gods and men as a result. In this regard, the potency and authority 
o f Zeus is something which is effectively absolute.
1 So, Lloyd-Jones (1971) 82-6, Burkert (1985) 125-31.
92
Statements concerning the all-powerful nature of Zeus can be seen in all the 
plays of Aeschylus, ranging from descriptive and self-evident epithets to more 
oblique statements of the god’s over-arching power as the ultimate fulfiller of 
events.2 For example, the chorus of Theban women in the Seven Against Thebes 
beseech the god: a> 7tayicpaxs<; Zed, xpe\|/ov si<; s%0poi)<; PeXo<;. ‘All-powerful Zeus, 
turn the arrow upon the enemy.’ (Th. 255); Eteocles states that: K0 U7rd) xiq si5s Zfjva 
7ioo viKwpsvov. ‘Never yet has anyone seen Zeus conquered.’ (Th. 514); and the 
chorus of the Seven also see the god as able to bring about any and every event. 
Thus, they call on him, fearful of the pending Argive attack: aXX’ co Zso 7tax8p, 
navxoq sycov xeXoq,2 \ navxax; aprj^ov Sa'icov aXcociv. ‘Father Zeus, you who possess 
the fulfilment of all events, at all costs defend us from capture by the enemy.’ (Th. 
117-19). In the Suppliants, the Danaids speak of Zeus in exalted terms as: avaii, 
avotKxcov, paicdpcov j paicapxaxe m i xeXecov | xeXsioxaxov Kpaxog, oXpis Zso, ‘Lord 
of lords, most blessed of the blessed ones, most perfect power of the perfect ones, 
Zeus giver of prosperity,’ (Supp. 524-6);4 and later on, the Danaids also ask Zeus 
(again) to protect his suppliant descendents: aefh|^oo 5’ ixsxac; asGev, yaiao%e 
7iayicpax8<; Zed. ‘Honour your suppliants, holder of the earth, all-powerful Zeus.’ 
(Supp. 814-15). Similarly in the Oresteia, the chorus of the Agamemnon call on 
Zeus, seeing him involved intimately in the lives of men: id) ifj, 5iai Aio<; 17iavaixiou 
7ravepysx(r | xi yap ppoxoiq aveo Aide; xeXsixai; | xl xcdvS’ on Geoicpavxov saxiv; ‘Oh, 
oh! And all by the will of Zeus, the cause of all things, the effector of all effects; for 
what comes to pass for mortals, except by Zeus’ doing? What of all this is not 
divinely ordained?’ (Ag. 1485-9).5 And the chorus of Erinyes in the Eumenides also 
speak of all-powerful Zeus: 5e£,opai naXXaSoq ^nvoiKiav, | od5’ axipdaco 7ioX,iv, | 
xav xai Zexx; o 7tayKpaxf|<; ’Apr|(; | xs cppodpiov 08d>v vepsi, | pnalpcopov 'EXXavcov 
ayaXpa 8 aipovcov ‘I will accept a residence with Pallas, and I will not dishonour the 
city in which there dwell also Zeus the almighty and Ares -  the guard-post o f the 
gods, the protector o f their altars, the delight of the Greek daimones,’ (Eu. 916-20).
2 See Rosenmeyer (1982) 278-83 for a discussion o f  xcXeioq; and cf. discussion o f  tsAoc; in Chapter 4 
‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ below.
3 See discussion o f  teXo<; in Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ below.
4 See Chapter 2 above for evaluation o f  this passage.
5 For a detailed discussion o f  this passage, see Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ below.
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The depiction of the all-powerful nature of Zeus was not unique to 
Aeschylus, nor was it something which found its origins in Presocratic speculation: it 
is possible to see Zeus presented as an all-powerful deity from the Iliad  onwards. 
While Zeus is never straight-forwardly called 7rayKpaTT}<; in Homer, as we find in 
Aeschylus, his overarching power is nevertheless presented clearly and consistently 
throughout the poem. The power and position of Zeus as the supreme god is 
established in the first lines of the first book of the Iliad and clearly depicted in the 
presentation and fulfilment of the Aio^ poi)X.fj ‘will of Zeus’6 (II. 1.1-7); and in Book 
15 the god’s will can be seen in the knowledge Zeus possesses of future events, 
through which he is able to outline the course of the Trojan war (II. 15.57-71). Zeus’ 
power is even acknowledged and heeded by his brother Poseidon, aware of his 
brother’s seniority in age and wisdom (II. 13.354-60). So, when Zeus tells Poseidon 
to stop assisting the Achaeans, in spite of the latter’s chagrin, Zeus gets his way (II. 
15.184-217).
In Homer, the will of Zeus is reinforced by his might and physical power. 
Although there is the consideration that the will of Zeus is supported and sustained 
by the need for divine order and harmony,7 there is always the more prosaic concept 
of brute force lying behind it, propping up his rule. We are alerted to this 
consideration in the first book of the Iliad, where Zeus, angered at Hera’s 
questioning concerning his conversation with Thetis, threatens her by saying: aAX’ 
aKsouaa KaOqao, gpcp 5’ £7ii7C8l0so puGco, | pi) vu xoi on xpodapcoaiv oooi Gsol sio’ 
sv ’OX,i3p7i:cp | aoaov iovG’, ots ksv toi ad7uxo\)(; x^P0^  ‘But, sit down in
silence, and do what I say, lest as many gods as there are on Olympus are unable to 
ward me off as I draw closer to you and lay my irresistible hands on you.’ (II. 1.565- 
7). Then shortly after, Hephaestus warns Hera not to rile Zeus, lest he strike all the 
gods from their seats on Olympus, since he is much the strongest god of them all (II. 
1.580-1; cf.8.17-27).8
6 Lloyd-Jones (1971) 82-5 rightly sees Zeus’ ability to determine events as one o f  the key aspects o f  
the god ’s depiction in Homer, one which he argues makes the Homeric Zeus similar ( i f  not identical) 
to the Aeschylean Zeus.
7 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ for a discussion o f  the inter-relationship between Zeus, the other 
Olympians and the Erinyes; cf. Allan (2006), esp. 27-8, on the issue o f  cosm ic order and divine 
justice in early Greek epic. For discussion o f  the limitation o f  Zeus see below in this chapter.
8 These two statements o f  Zeus’ power over the rest o f  the gods are seem ingly contradicted by lines 
1.394-406, which describe the aid Thetis and the hundred-hander, Briareus, provided Zeus when the 
Olympians wanted to bind him. There is, however, no story which depicts the Olympians trying to
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In addition, the consistent use of epithets which Homer gives the god 
throughout the poem further reinforces Zeus’ supreme power and position. Thus 
Zeus is called, U7tsppevf|(; ‘exceedingly powerful’ (II. 2.350; 7.315, 481); wcaToq ‘the 
highest’ (II. 5.756); and mures Kpsiovxcov ‘the highest of all lords’ (II. 8.31). But, it is 
in the echo of Zeus’ role as the sky-god that his power is most frequently expressed.9 
He is the god who thunders on high (u\jA(3pspsxr|<;) (II. 1.354, 12.68); who delights in 
thunder (xsp^iKspauvoq) (II. 1.419, 8.2, 11.773); who is the loud-thundering 
(EpiySourax;) (II. 7.411, 12. 235) who is the lightning-maker (acxsp07ir|xf|c;) (II. 
1.580, 609, 7.443); who is far-sounding/far-seeing (supuoTia10) (II. 1.498, 5.365, 
8.206); who is of the dark cloud (Ketaxivscpfjq) (II. 6.267, 11.78); and who is the cloud 
gatherer (vscpsXriyspsxa) (II. 1.511, 7.280, 10.552). Through these images, Zeus is 
presented as all-encompassing as the limits of the sky and as powerful as the thunder 
and lightning it produces. 11 As the sky and all it includes, thus is Zeus.
In the lyric poets this theme continues, where Zeus is depicted as bringing 
about the rain: ox>5s yap o Zsuq | ou0’ bcov rcavxsaa’ av5avei onx’ ave/cov. ‘Not even 
Zeus, whether he rains or no, can please them all.’ (Th. 25-6, trans. M. L. West 
(1993); cf. Anon. Fr. 854). There is also one passage in Aeschylus, from the 
Suppliants, in which a trace of Zeus’ sky-god nature can be detected. In it the 
Danaids wish vainly to become smoke to escape the clutches of their cousins, 
referring to the clouds of Zeus found in the sky: psAxxq ysvoipav Karcvoq | v8(psa<o>i 
yetxovcov Atoc;. ‘Would that I could become black smoke, neighbour of Zeus’ 
clouds.’ (Supp. 779-80). On the other hand, Aeschylus refers six times to Zeus’
bind or overthrow Zeus in any other extant source. Briareus is, however, mentioned in Hesiod (Th. 
617-719) as helping Zeus overthrow the Titans. It is possible that Homer formed this tale and 
introduced it into the Iliad  as a plot device to place Zeus in the debt o f  Thetis. While it is interesting 
and perhaps strange to see Zeus in the debt o f  another deity, w e must bear in mind that Zeus’ power is 
limited in other ways too -  which is discussed below.
9 The etym ology o f  the name o f  Zeus is clear and its etymological connection with the sky can be 
traced throughout the Indo-European languages. The name o f  Zeus has the same root as the Indie sky 
god D yaus p itar, the Latin deus (god) and dies (day). For a fuller philological exposition and 
bibliography, see Burkert (1985) 125-6; W est (2007) 166-71.
10 See Pulleyn (2000) 247-8, who argues in favour o f  ‘far-sounding’; West (2007) 171, who argues in 
favour o f  ‘with wide vision’. But, whichever translation one employs, the sense o f  Zeus’ far-reaching 
power is evident.
11 See West (2007) 238-63, for a discussion o f  Zeus’ role as the god o f  thunder within the Indo- 
European tradition. He suggests that the role o f  the sky-god and the bearer o f  thunder and lightning 
are two separate functions and that Zeus took over the latter function in addition to his already 
established role as the sky-god (cf. Hes. Th. 501-6). This runs counter to the v iew  established by Cook 
(1925) 2.11, who argues in favour o f  the synonymy o f  the two functions: ‘Now, if  the lightning-flash 
was part o f  the aither or buming-sky, it was part and parcel o f  Zeus.’ But, be that as it may, such 
arguments have little bearing on the present discussion.
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thunderbolt in the plays, four times in the Seven (Th. 427-33, 444-5, 512-13, 629- 
30), once in the Agamemnon in reference to the envy and justice of the god being a 
thunderbolt cast by his eyes (Ag. 469-70), and once in the Eumenides, where Athena 
is trying to persuade the Erinyes not to wreak havoc on Athens, and she declares that 
she alone has knowledge of the key to the house that keeps the thunderbolt of her 
father (Eu. 827-8). In this way, Zeus thus seems very powerful and one against 
whom no one can succeed.
While it is possible to see that from Homer onwards Zeus is presented in 
possession of attributes which can be easily understood as those of an omnipotent 
god, there are many instances where this all-powerful nature comes into question, 
where gods act in opposition to Zeus’ will or his power seems limited by their 
actions. First, in Iliad 14, for example, Poseidon comes to the aid of the Achaeans 
once Hera has lulled Zeus to sleep through her trickery; or at Od. 5.286-90, Poseidon 
attacks Odysseus’ raft on its way to Scheria, acting against the decision of Zeus 
taken in Book 1. Also, in the Theogony, Prometheus deceives Zeus when he gives 
fire to men (Hes. Th. 565-9). Secondly, in the Theogony there are several examples 
of Zeus needing, or relying on, other gods to achieve and maintain power. Thus, 
Zeus is given the thunderbolt by the Cyclopes, which is arguably the greatest symbol 
o f his power (Hes. Th. 501-6); and the god distributes honours accordingly to all 
those who helped him overthrow the Titans (Hes. Th. 881-5).
Moreover, Zeus’ will is constrained by moira and a need for divine harmony. 
The Iliad presents the notion that there is a force which transcends or supercedes 
Zeus’ will. There are three times in the epic when Zeus is seen as potentially coming 
into conflict with moira, where the god seems to be considering whether he should 
transgress the boundaries of moira to come to the aid o f the Trojans. The first 
instance is said seemingly in jest by the god in order to antagonise Hera and Athena 
(II. 4.5-19), but the second and third are pronounced in all seriousness and present a
potential conflict of interests between moira and the will o f Zeus and thus have the
10potential to cause a rift in cosmic order and divine justice. In Books 16 and 22 Zeus 
considers saving Sarpedon and Hector respectively, going against what has been 
fated for the two Trojan heroes. But, each time Zeus is warned and admonished by 
other gods lest his decisions to save Troy and the Trojan heroes result in others
12 See Allan (2006) 1-35 for further discussion o f  this issue.
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saving their own favourites from death, with divine harmony and order being 
reduced to chaos (II. 16.431-57, 22.166-181). These warnings thus act as a 
demonstration regarding how Zeus’ will is tempered by concerns about the need for 
divine harmony and cosmic order.
There are similar examples in Aeschylus. In the Agamemnon, for example, 
the chorus inform us that Zeus sent the Atreidae to Troy in order to exact vengeance 
against Alexander and the Trojans for the theft of Helen (Ag. 60-2).13 It is thus Zeus’ 
will that the expedition is sent to Troy, and this is confirmed when we are told of 
Zeus’ involvement in the fall of Troy on other occasions by other parties (Ag. 355- 
84, 525-6, 580-2, 699-708, 744-9). But, in spite of this, Artemis prevents the 
expeditionary forces from leaving Aulis and exacting Zeus’ will, which she does by 
sending contrary winds (Ag. 133-8, 198-202). Her will therefore acts in direct 
opposition to Zeus’ and prevents -  at least for short a period of time — his will from 
being exacted. 14 Moreover, at the heart o f the Eumenides we are presented with a 
contention between Zeus and the Olympians on one side and the chthonic Erinyes on 
the other. As a consequence of this conflict, serious questions are raised concerning 
the respective legitimacy and authority of two conceptions of justice and two sets of 
deities, 15 which in effect means that Zeus’ will comes under scrutiny because of his 
decision (through Apollo) to send Orestes to kill his mother. Indeed, what is also 
striking about the presentation of Zeus’ will and the nature of justice in the 
Eumenides is that we witness a human court giving a decision concerning Zeus’ will 
and its validity as a means of controlling and arbitrating upon an individual’s actions 
and judgement.
With the depiction of Zeus, we are presented with a balance between, on the 
one hand, absolute power and a will that always comes to fulfilment: Troy eventually 
falls to the Greeks; Odysseus reaches Ithaca; Agamemnon and the Greeks sail to 
Troy; and Orestes is freed. And, on the other hand, the wills and power o f other gods 
limit (at least temporarily) the power and will o f Zeus. But, what we are left with is
13 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ for a fuller discussion o f  this passage and the related question 
o f  whether Zeus did in fact send the sons o f  Atreus to Troy.
14 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ for a discussion o f  the anger o f  Artemis and the sacrifice o f  
Iphigeneia.
15 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ for a discussion o f  this contention.
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the underlying truth that any instance that runs contra to Zeus’ will merely acts as a 
temporary diversion from his ultimate designs.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND INVARIANCE
Although the power and will of Zeus seem almost absolute, there are other 
considerations outside of the existence of other gods which have the potential to 
limit the potency of the god. Arguably it is the form in which Zeus is presented that 
is truly restrictive. Anthropomorphism places limits on the knowledge and 
movement of Zeus; he can feel pain at the loss of someone dear to him; he is often 
overcome by sexual urges; and he is situated within the temporal space of the mortal 
realm, because although he does not die, he is nevertheless bom and must exist 
within this world and the temporal laws which bind it.
As has already been discussed, though Zeus is often presented as omnipotent 
in Homer, it has already been shown that Zeus’ power and will are restricted by the 
existence and desires of other gods. The god’s omniscience has also been touched on 
when outlining the force of the Aio<; pouA-rj, where at II. 15.57-71 he shows the 
seemingly limitless extent of his knowledge by explaining how the course of the war 
will develop. But, nevertheless, while it is the case that Zeus displays a limitless 
knowledge of the future, the god is not omniscient, as is demonstrated by the fact 
that he is not aware that Hera’s seduction of him is a ruse designed to keep his 
attention from the intervention of Poseidon on the Trojan planes (II. 14.292-15.5).16 
Also, when Zeus turns his attention to the Thracians and the Mysians, Poseidon 
again takes the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the Achaeans (II. 13.1-9).
The movements of Zeus are similarly paradoxical. The omnipresence of the 
god is intimated in the concept of prayer. Integral to the act of prayer is the 
consideration that the gods are not limited by spatial concerns as humans are and can 
always hear the prayer17 when they are addressed. 18 It is not a requirement of any 
god to be within earshot of the person praying to be able to hear it. O f course, it is
16 Indeed, while Hera’s seduction o f  Zeus demonstrates the limitations anthropomorphism places on 
his mind, it is also demonstrative o f  the limitations o f  his power in the face o f  anthropomorphised 
sexuality.
17 Kearns (2004) 63.
18 Pulleyn (1997) 14, highlights the importance o f  address in the act o f  prayer, because though gods 
can hear from afar, he argues, that they cannot read minds or know one’s innermost thoughts.
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another matter whether the god cares to act on the prayer or not. 19 But, 
anthropomorphism limits Zeus’ movements. So, in the first book of the Iliad, Thetis 
cannot contact Zeus until he and the rest of the gods have returned from a banquet in 
the land of the Ethiopians (II. 1.423-7); and although Zeus never sets foot in the 
human sphere on the planes of Troy and always has the gods come to him (and not 
the other way around), he does flit between Olympus and Ida (II. 8.41-52, 8.438-9). 
Moreover, the anthropomorphic presentation of Zeus extends to the emotions the god 
exhibits: he feels grief at the loss of his son, Sarpedon (II  16.450-61), and at the 
death of Hector (II. 22.169-76). So, while Zeus’ power seems supreme and 
boundless, it is always tempered by the existence of other gods, their wills and by the 
form in which the god is given by the poet. It is thus the very make-up of Greek 
religion as polytheistic and anthropomorphic that limits the power of Zeus. And 
while one may raise the objection that Zeus is only given these anthropomorphic 
qualities because the plot demands it, the plot does not necessitate that the poet 
depict the gods in any way that he did not believe to be true to their nature. Indeed, 
that Homer’s presentation of the gods was not untrue to their nature is demonstrated 
by the significant position he held within the collective Greek consciousness,20 and 
this hold is as true with regard to his presentation of the gods as with anything else in 
his works.
In Aeschylus, there are similar apparent contradictions in the god’s depiction. 
While Zeus is depicted in an anthropomorphic way, pursuing his sexual desires by 
approaching and having sexual congress with Io in the Suppliants, or fighting and 
overcoming his father as he is said to in the parodos of the Agamemnon', it also 
seems, however, that Zeus lacks many of the anthropomorphic characteristics which 
so mark out the Homeric and Hesiodic portrayal of him. It is, of course, the case that 
in Aeschylus Zeus retains many, if not all, of the same characteristics and mythology 
associated with him in Homer and Hesiod. But, in contrast with the Homeric and 
Hesiodic presentation, Aeschylus seems to depict Zeus in a way that echoes thought 
expressed in Presocratic thinkers.
19 See II. 2.419-20, 12.173-4 for Zeus not listening to prayers; cf. Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Z eus’ for 
the importance o f  Zeus not listening to prayers in the Oresteia.
20 See, for example, Xenophanes Fr.10, 11 and the discussion o f  these fragments below.
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In the parodos of the Suppliants, the Danaids21 call on Zeus and describe his 
nature (Supp. 86-103):
eu 0svt| Ato<;, si navoXa-
Q&q Atoq, i'|i£po<;. oi)K eoGfjpaxoc; 8Ti>x0Ty
Sautan yap repa7u5a>v
Sacnaol is  isivou-
aiv reopot, KanSsiv atppacxov
7ii7cisi 5 ’ a c q a k tq  ou 5 ’ stuI vcb-
xco, Kopocpa Axoq e i KpavGfj repay p a  xsXsiov.
reavxa xoi cpXeysOsi
Kav okoxco pe^ aiva
£uv xhya peporeecot A.aoT<;.
iarexsi 5 ’ eXreiScov
dap’ iJvpiTuupyoov reavcbXsiq j3poiou<;,
P iav 8 ’ ouxiv’ s^oreXi^si-
reav areovov Saipovtcov
qpevoq  ov cppovripa reax;
ai)xo0sv  e^erepa^ev epreac; sSpavcov aq)’ ayvoiv.
May the desire of Zeus be set well, if in all truth it is Zeus’. It is not easy to trace. 
For, the pathways of his mind stretch out dark and thickly shaded, impossible to 
understand.
21 It is possible that this passage has been formulated by Aeschylus especially for the Danaids, and 
represents a ‘foreign’ take on Greek religion, one quite alien to a typical Greek view  o f  Zeus. But this 
does not seem to be the case. The Danaids’ language is not stilted in Aeschylus to appear foreign or 
unnatural. This is made all the more apparent when the Egyptian messenger enters toward the end o f  
the play, where his words are distorted and made to appear foreign. This is not to imply that the 
Danaids appear wholly Greek. Their costumes are notably un-Greek, as Pelasgus makes clear (Supp. 
234-7), and this would have been a constant reminder for the audience from first to last. Nevertheless, 
in spite o f  their odd appearance, the Danaids not only speak Greek like a Greek, they also behave in a 
customary Greek fashion, as suppliants. Moreover, the ideas which they present in relation to Zeus are 
not outlandish or unprecedented to those familiar with Greek philosophical thought concerning the 
nature o f  the divine. We need not, I think, be concerned about the ‘Greekness’ o f  the Danaids’ notion 
o f  Zeus and the divine. See also Hall (1989) 148. For further discussion o f  the presentation o f  the 
Danaids and the myth o f  Io see above, Chapter 2 on ‘The Characteristics o f  Zeus’.
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It falls safely, not upon its back, if a deed is brought to perfection by the nod of 
Zeus. It flares up in all places, even in the shade, with black fortune for mortal men.
He throws men from high-towered hopes to utter destruction, but uses no armed 
force; all is without effort for daimones. From that spot, seated on that august 
throne, he nevertheless somehow fulfils what he has in mind.
In the first strophe, the Danaids sing of the unknowable nature of Zeus’ will, 
explaining that it is difficult to trace: ouk enGfjpaioq stu%0t] (Supp. 87), with his 
mind dark and thickly shaded, unspeakable to tell of: bavfon yap TtpouilScGv | SdoKtoi 
is  T£tvot>-|aiv Ttopot, KaxiSeiv atppaaxot (Supp. 93-5). In the following antistrophe, 
the Danaids’ mind moves on to consider the god’s ability to fulfil events even with a 
nod: Kopotpq Aid<; ei KpavGfj repaypa is^eiov (Supp. 91). This theme continues in the 
next strophe, where Zeus is said to fulfil acts without recourse to movement, seated 
in one place: qpevcx; ov (ppovrjpa tccck; | auxoOev e^ercpa^ev 8p7ia<; eSpavoov dtp’ 
ayvdov (Supp. 101-3). Here, the presentation of Zeus as an invariant, omnipotent deity 
is concomitant with the description o f his violent and awesome power, striking men 
down and using no armed force to do so: iarexei 8’ eA-reiScov | dtp’ x)\|/urupycov 
reavcoX£i<; ppoioi3<;, | piav 5 ’ ouxiv’ 8^07t^ei (Supp. 96-8).22 The god is far removed 
from mortal man, where his will remains hidden from intelligent perception; he is 
invariant, remote and unknowable to mankind. With such a description of the 
inscrutable nature of Zeus and his will, it is perhaps understandable how F. M. 
Comford came to the conclusion that, ‘the Zeus of Aeschylus has withdrawn to the 
heights far removed from the summit of Homeric Olympus. ’23 Indeed, the 
presentation of an invariant, detached and unknowable deity who can cast men down 
without effort perhaps seems, on the surface o f things at least, a far cry from the 
Homeric anthropomorphised Zeus who flits from Olympus to Ida in the Iliad  and can 
be distracted by the cunning wiles of his wife.
The thought and imagery seen in Supp. 86-103 is, however, reminiscent of 
fragments attributed to Xenophanes o f Colophon.24 In spite of the objections raised
22 Compare the similar image at Ag. 182-3, where daimones are seated in violence upon their thrones.
23 Cornford (1952) 145.
24 It is known from the anonymous Life that Aeschylus travelled to Sicily. Despite the notorious 
unreliability o f  all ancient biographical information, there is also no reason to doubt the report that 
Xenophanes, although originally from Colophon in Asia Minor, lived part o f  his life in Sicily (A l) .
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by Lloyd-Jones that Aeschylus was not influenced by Presocratic thought, but only 
by Homer, Hesiod and Solon,25 the similarity between the passage in the Suppliants 
and Xenophanes’ Fr. B25-6, 34 seems clear and has been highlighted by scholars on 
numerous occasions. Xenophanes says of his one god: aisi 5’ ev xauxcp pipvei 
Ktvoupsvoc; oi)5ev, ox>5s pexepxecGcu piv enmpznsi aXkoxe aXA-ip ‘always he abides 
in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it seemly for him to travel to different 
places at different times...’ (Fr. B26) akX’ dredveuGs rcovoio voou cppsvi raxvxa 
KpaSaivsi. ‘But completely without toil he shakes all things with the thought of his 
mind.’ (Fr. B25). And then casting doubt on man’s ability to comprehend the nature 
of divinity, he says, icai to  psv ouv aacpsq ouxk; avfjp i'Ssv o\)5s tk; soxai | ei5dcx; apcpi 
Oscbv is  Kai a aa a  'Xejcp rcepi reavxcDV | si yap Kai xa paAioxa xuxot T8xe>£ap.svov 
sirecbv, | aux6(; opcoq ook oi8e' 5oko<; 5’ srci reaai xsxuKxai. ‘And of course the clear 
truth no man has seen nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I 
say about all things. For even if, in the best case, someone happened to speak just of 
what has been brought to pass, still he himself would not know: but, opinion has 
been given to all.’ (Fr. B34) The one god  is invariant, able to shake all things with 
his mind, and true knowledge of the god is effectively impossible. Thus, as Zeus 
remains seated on his august throne never moving (Supp. 101-103), so the one god 
always abides in the same place (Fr. B26); as Zeus fulfils whatever he has in mind 
(Supp. 101) so the one god can shake all things with his mind (Fr. B25); and as all 
things are accomplished without toil for Zeus (Supp. 100), so it is also for the one 
god  (Fr. B25). Even the scepticism which Xenophanes casts over man’s ability to 
comprehend fully the nature of the gods is echoed at Supp. 86-7, 93-5, where the 
Danaids proclaim that the will of Zeus cannot be understood by mankind. For these 
reasons, the theological philosophy of Xenophanes warrants further investigation.
While this is, o f  course, not conclusive evidence that Aeschylus was influenced by Xenophanes, it 
does nevertheless strongly suggest that Aeschylus would have at the very least heard o f  Xenophanes 
and would have had some acquaintance, at least, with his thoughts concerning the gods and 
anthropomorphism. It has been consistently pointed out by scholars that evidence regarding the exact 
chronology o f  the Presocratics is uncertain. But, it is generally accepted that Xenophanes lived for 
about ninety years (see Fr. B8), from c.560-c.470. For further discussion on the chronology o f  the 
Presocratics, see Reinhardt (1959, 2 nd ed.) (however, the arguments put forth in this work were 
rejected by almost all subsequent scholars); Guthrie (1962); Bames (1982); Graham (2010). For the 
dating o f  Xenophanes, see also the introduction to Lesher’s commentary (1992) 3-7.
25 See Lloyd-Jones (1956) 55-67, (1971) 79-103.
26 See, for example, FJW (1980) 2. 90; Guthrie (1962) 374-5; Jaeger (1947) 45-6; KRS (1983) 167, 
170-1; Lesher( 1992) 107.
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But, before entering into this discussion, it is first necessary to see whether 
aspects of Supp. 86-103 can be traced in works earlier than Xenophanes and thus 
what aspects can be thought of as unique to Xenophanes. So, while Supp. 86-103 
does indeed echo Xenophanes Fr. B25-6 in the presentation of an invariant god 
staying in one place and able to fulfil what he has in mind without recourse to 
movement, it is also possible to see traces of the Homeric Zeus in Aeschylus’ 
presentation of the god. First, the notion that Zeus’ will is not easy to trace, which is 
expressed in lines 86-7, 93-5, is already present in Homer and Hesiod (II. 8.143, Od. 
23.81-2, Hes. Op. 483-4) before Xenophanes takes up the idea. Secondly, the image 
of Zeus fulfilling his will with a nod of his head, which is seen in lines 91-2, is -  in 
extant literature -  imagined first in Homer (II. 1.524-30). In the passage, the efficacy 
of Zeus’ will is presented as concomitant with the nodding of his head. So, the god 
says: ou yap spov 7taX,ivaypexov oi)5’ a7iaxr|Z6v | ou5’ axetaoxriTOV, o xt ksv KecpaXxj 
Kaxavsuoco. ‘Nothing of mine can be recalled, nor deemed false, nor be left 
unfulfilled, to which I have nodded my head.’ (II. 1.526-7). Strictly speaking, the 
image is not identical with the one found in the passage from the Suppliants: in the 
Iliad, the god’s will is not fulfilled by the nodding of his head, but the nodding of his 
head is a sign of affirmation that his will shall come to pass. In spite of this 
difference, that Zeus’ will shall be fulfilled once he has bowed his head effectively 
makes the nodding of his head an equvialency for Zeus fulfilling his will. The two 
images are close enough to conclude that the similarity is more than simply 
circumstantial and that Aeschylus was, if not inspired by the Homeric image, then at 
least drawing from the same well from which Homer had drawn. The image of the 
god’s will flaring up in all places with black fortune for mortals is reminiscent of the 
image of Zeus’ thunderbolt in Homer and Hesiod. Indeed, it is only lines 96-103 that 
seem to be suggesting something different in Aeschylus’ depiction of Zeus. In these 
lines, the ease with which the god is said to fulfil his will in lines 91-2 appears to be 
developed or qualified to indicate Zeus’ invariance. It is here that Aeschylus may be 
tapping into a wider discourse concerning the nature of the divine.
Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to consider Xenophanes’ philosophical 
theology in its own right. For Xenophanes it was of primary importance to highlight 
the incongruity of an anthropomorphised supreme deity. This he did by critiquing 
and deconstructing the traditional presentation of the gods, as exemplified in the
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Homeric epics; and then by constructing his own god in opposition to the gods of 
established religion. He says o f the depiction of the gods in Homer and Hesiod: 
ndvxa Gsou; av£0r|Kav 'Dprjpoq 0’ 'Halo86(; is  | oocra reap’ avOpdmoiaiv ovddsa Kai 
i|/oyo<; £<mv, | Kkenxeiv poix&usiv te Kai dXA,rjX,ou<; a7tax£U£iv. ‘Homer and Hesiod 
have attributed to the gods everything that deserves reproach and censure among 
men, theft, adultery and deception of his fellow man.’ (Fr. B11). And of the nature of 
the traditional anthropomorphic gods of Greek religion: aXV oi ppoxoi Sokeoucji 
ycwaaOai Gsouq | xf)v a(p£X£pr|v £G0rjxa <x’> £%£iv (pcovf|v x£ Scpaq x£. ‘But men 
seem to think that the gods are bom, and have clothes, voice and form just like their 
own.’ (Fr. B14) Ai0io7C£<; x£ <0£ou<; acp£X£poug> otpoix; pcXavdq x£ | 0prjK£<; xe 
yXauKoxx; Kai 7ruppou<; <tpaai 7t£>t£a0ai>- ‘The Ethiopians say that their gods are 
round-nosed and black, and the Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired.’ 
(Fr. B16) £i <5e> xoi <ui7ioi> e^ov %epaq i\ (3o£<; f)£ )xovx£.q \ r\ ypa\|/ai x£ip£aai Kai 
epya x£>u£Tv d7t£p dv5p£q, | Innox pcv 0’ uncoicn, Po£<; 5£ X£ pooaiv opoiaq | Kai <ke> 
0£<x>v iSeaq Eypacpov Kai acopax’ ettoiouv | xoiauG’ oiov7i£p Kauxoi £t%ov EKaoxoi. 
‘But, if oxen had hands and horses and lions, or could draw with their hands and do 
the works which men do, horses would draw the forms of their gods like horses, 
oxen like oxen and they would make their bodies such as they each have 
themselves.’ (Fr. B15).
Xenophanes’ objections are not simply that the gods depicted are 
anthropomorphic, but that they often perform acts which demonstrate the very worst 
qualities of humanity (B 11). Indeed, Xenophanes would possibly have had less 
reason to make these criticisms had Homer (and Hesiod) not had such a hold on the 
consciousness of the Greeks. As he says: £^ dpxijq Ka0’ "Oprjpov £7T£i p£pa0rjKaat 
ndvxEq. ‘From the beginning all have since learned according to Homer.’ (Fr. BIO) 
But, the attacks go further than criticisms of the gods’ action. They also highlight the 
absurdity of anthropomorphism itself. So, Xenophanes says that Ethiopians see their 
gods as black and round-nosed and the Thracians as blonde and blue-eyed (Fr. B16), 
before extending the attack ad absurdum, claiming similar thought processes among 
animals (Fr. B15). Thus, when we read these fragments in conjunction with Fr. B25- 
6, greater light is shed on what is ‘seemly’ or ‘fitting’ £7it7tp£7C£i for the supreme god 
to do or not to do and to be like or not to be like.
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As an answer to the criticisms he raises concerning the Homeric and Hesiodic 
conception of the gods, Xenophanes posits his own god:
etc; 0eo<; ev is  0soioi Kai avOpcbmnoi psyiaioq, 
o'dti 5spa<; 0vr|ioioiv opouc; outs vo^pa.
‘There is one god greatest among gods and men, unlike mortals in form and 
thought.’ (Fr. B23)
ouA,o<; opa, autax; 8e voei, oiAoq 8e x’ (xkouei.
‘He sees as a whole, thinks as a whole, and hears as a whole.’ (Fr. B24)
aid  8’ sv x a u ic p  plpv£i Kivodpsvoc; ouSev, 
ou8e p£T£p%£a0ai ptv £7cucp£7t£i aXkoxe dMjy
‘He always abides in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it fitting for him to 
travel to different places at different times.’ (Fr. B26)
d X X > a7idv£D0£ 7iovoio vooo cppcvi m via  KpaSaivci.
‘But completely without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.’ (Fr. 
B25)
Let us first consider B23. The fragment is often understood as espousing a form of 
monotheism.27 Fragment B23 has been the subject of repeated discussion and the 
positions either side, between those who see an expression o f monotheistic thought 
in the lines and those who do not, remain deeply entrenched. For this reason and for 
its potential impact on the presentation of the gods in Aeschylus, it is necessary to 
examine the fragment again, highlighting the main arguments on either side and 
stating my own understanding of the fragment.
The contention rests primarily (if not entirely) on what Xenophanes means by 
0£oiai in the expression ev is  Oeoiai K a i dvOpamoioi, whether we are to understand 
that along with the one greatest god, el<g Qeoq... peyiatoi;, there exist other gods; or 
whether ev xe 0eo!ai K a i  dv0p67iotct is some form of ‘polar expression’ and thus,
27 Bumet (1930) 128-9; Hussey (1972) 11-14; Frankel (1975) 331; Bames (1982) 89-92; KRS (1983) 
170; M cEvilley (2002) 49; Graham (2010) 1. 131.
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because it is merely a turn of phrase,28 does not entail any actual ‘belief in the 
existence o f other gods.29 In support of this latter interpretation, it has been argued 
that, ‘In fact Xenophanes wrote of ‘gods’ in other places... this was no doubt a 
concession, perhaps not a fully conscious one, to popular religious terminolgy. It 
seems very doubtful whether Xenophanes would have recognized other, minor 
deities as being in any way related to the ‘one god’, except as dim human 
projections.’30 Indeed, that the fragment professes a belief in monotheism may also 
be seen to be supported by the primary position of elq Osoc; in the line, which lends 
itself to emphasising that this god is the one and only god.31
But, although these commentators are correct to highlight the obvious 
significance of the one god  in Xenophanes’ philosophical theology and in 
philosophical debates more generally, they do so bound by monotheistic 
considerations that are not applicable to the age in which Xenophanes was writing. 
First, it is reasonable to raise the question whether Xenophanes — in a society 
unfamiliar with monotheistic religion -  would have unnecessarily complicated his 
‘revolutionary’ thesis by using a term traditionally employed to denote the existence 
of a plurality of divine beings, regardless of whether such usage is merely a 
‘concession’.32 Indeed, Xenophanes not only refers to the existence of a plurality of 
gods in B23, but elsewhere too -  even when we discount those instances where he is 
attacking the traditional gods (cf. B 1, 18, 34). So, if Xenophanes were a monotheist 
and trying to present his ideas to a society in which polytheism was so deeply 
ingrained in the public consciousness, would he use theological terminology so 
loosely? Might he not have developed a method of stratifying theological 
terminology in a way similar to Plato, Xenocrates or the Christians later in antiquity?
28 Such use o f  080101 in a ‘polar expression’ is, indeed, not so very far detached from how Zeus is 
referred to commonly in Homer as the ‘father o f  gods and men’ or the interchangeable way that Geoq, 
5alpcov and Zeuq are used in the ‘indefinite mode o f  expression’, where any one term seems to denote 
in a similar way a loose, general idea o f  the divine. See Chapter 1 above on 5alptov in the plays o f  
Aeschylus.
29 Among those who adhere to idea that Xenophanes uses ev t s  GeoTm K ai avGpamoiai as a ‘polar 
expression’ are Burnet (1930) 129; KRS (1983) 170. To state that the phrase is a polar expression 
does, in itself, o f  course, not say anything about the content or status attached to the two individual 
terms.
30 KRS (1983) 170; cf. Frankel (1975) 331-2.
3‘ So, KRS (1983) 169; cf. Frankel (1975) 331.
32 See Stokes (1971) 76, citing Freudenthal (1886) for this argument. Cf. also Guthrie (1962) 375 who 
points out that for a monotheist the use o f  GsoTai would be surprisingly careless.
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Rather, what is significant in the thought of Xenophanes is not whether there 
is only one god, but that there is one god among all the other gods who is unlike the 
gods of Homer and the traditional anthropomorphic pantheon. It is the differentiation 
between what a god should and should not be. So, in B11, 14-16 Xenophanes states 
his criticisms of the Homeric presentation o f the gods and their anthropomorphic 
nature; while in B23-6, he states what the greatest god should be conceived of as 
being. In B23, the one god  has none of the anthropomorphic qualities criticised in 
B 11, 14-16: he is unlike mortals in form and thought (i.e. not anthropomorphic). In 
B24, the one god  is said to be omniscient, able to see, think, hear as one, and so will 
never be blind-sided as Zeus in Homer.33 The god is given completely the power of 
sight, hearing and thought. Of course, Zeus was given similar qualities of 
knowledge, sight and hearing in Homer and Hesiod,34 but what is different from 
Zeus is that the one god  has shed all of those qualities and instances which limit 
Zeus’ power.
The one god  is also invariant (B26); and able to move all things with just his 
mind (B25). The latter fragment is important to this discussion because o f its 
similarity with the presentation of Zeus in Homer, who can fulfil whatever he has in
35mind with a nod of his head, shaking Olympus in the process (II. 1.526-30). 
However, the images of the two mighty gods differ in one telling aspect: in B25 it is 
the internal processes of the mind which are described, in contrast with the external 
movement of the head in the Iliad: as Zeus shakes things with a nod of his head, the 
one god  does so with the thought of his mind. Anthropomorphism is kept to an 
absolute minimum in Xenophanes’ presentation of the one god, with 
anthropomorphic vocabulary seemingly only employed due to an inability to express 
the concept of his god in any other way. So, in B26 there is recourse to describe 
movement, but only in order to state the one g o d ’s invariance; and in B24, the 
anthropomorphic processes of sight, thought and hearing are described, but only in 
order to stress the difference between humans who see with their one pair of eyes, 
think with their mind, and hear with their ears and the one god  who sees, thinks and
33 See the discussion above in the section The Power and Limitations o f  Zeus.
34 See the discussion above in the section The P ow er and Limitations o f  Zeus.
35 The similarity between Fr. B25 and II. 1. 526-30 has been w ell noted. See Lesher (1992) 110 for an
overview o f  the respective interpretations o f  Fr. B25, between those who see it as a distinctive
religious outlook and those who see it as echoing Homer and early poets.
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hears as a whole. The one god  is thus a direct response to the Homeric gods 
criticised and rejected in fragments B11, 14-16. But, significantly, while Xenophanes 
criticises their human qualities and their human fallibility, he does not contend the 
existence of a plurality of gods.36
So, how does Xenophanes’ view concerning the nature of divinity affect our 
understanding of the passage at Supp. 86-103? At Supp. 86-103, it seems that 
Aeschylus is tapping into the dialogue surrounding the image of Zeus enthroned and 
exacting his will with a nod of his head, first found in the Iliad, then picked up and 
critiqued by Xenophanes. Aeschylus does not seem to adhere strictly to either the 
Homeric or the Xenophanic image of the supreme god in his presentation of Zeus. At 
Supp. 91-2, Zeus nods his head to exact his will, in an image comparable to that of 
Zeus at II. 1.526-30;37 but, within a few lines at Supp. 101-03, great stress is placed 
on the invariant nature of the god with three descriptions of Zeus remaining in one 
place within as many lines: qp.svo<;... aox60ev...e5pavcov acp’ ayvcov which can in turn 
be compared with the thought found in Xenophanes B26. The similarity with the 
thought of both Homer and Xenophanes continues at Supp. 96-9, where the Danaids 
say that Zeus throws men down to destruction, but does so without recourse to armed 
force. The image of Zeus casting men down to destruction is reminiscent of both 
Homer and Hesiod and the violence of the god, especially evident in the Theogony, 
while the absence of armed force (and thus of anthropomorphism) seemingly recalls 
Xenophanes. Aeschylus can be seen to start from the image of Zeus found in Homer, 
in which he is anthropomorphised, sitting on his throne and able to effect his will 
with a nod of his head (Supp. 91-2), but then develops the presentation of the god to 
one in which the god is framed in the language of invariance (Supp. 96-103).
In the Eumenides, Apollo speaks of the effortlessness with which Zeus can 
fulfil deeds: x ouxoov  87rcpSd(; o u k  8 7 io iri(J8v  7 ia x f ip  | o u p o q ,  x a  5 ’ v X E c l 7 ta v x ’ a v co  x e  
K a i  K axco | o x p e tp co v  x iO q cn v  ouSsv a a O p a lv o o v  p e v e i .  ‘My father has made no charm 
against these things; but all the rest he orders, turning it both up and down, without 
being any effort for him.’ (Eu. 649-51). This example has been seen to echo many of 
the sentiments found in the passage from the Suppliants,38 Nevertheless, while these
36 See also Stokes (1971) 78-9, Lesher (1992) for this point.
37 See discussion o f  this passage above in this chapter.
38 See, for example, FJW (1980) 3.90; Sommerstein (1989) 204-5.
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lines hint at ideas found at Supp. 86-103, it is debateable whether they strictly refer
39to the invariance of Zeus and not simply to the ease with which he can fulfil deeds.
In the passage from the Suppliants, stress is laid on the fact that Zeus can not only 
bring men to utter destruction without recourse to armed force, but that he remains in 
one spot, invariant. In the Eumenides, Apollo only speaks of the lack o f effort that 
deeds cause Zeus, with no mention of the god’s movement or lack of movement. As 
a result, it is difficult to conclude that we are dealing with a conception o f Zeus in 
any way distinct from how we see the god presented in Homer. Rather, what we see 
in Apollo’s words is a common depiction of how Zeus is able to exact his will with 
great ease.
Although there are no clear examples of Zeus being depicted as invariant 
elsewhere in Aeschylus, the fact that the god never appears on-stage as a fully- 
fledged character could suggest that there was a more broadly conceived conception 
of Zeus as an invariant god, as well as both a remote and unknowable one. Zeus’ 
absence from the plays has been enough for one scholar to say that ‘there was some 
sort of inhibition against impersonating Zeus himself on the tragic stage.’40 While it 
will not be argued here that there was an ‘inhibition’ against presenting Zeus on­
stage in Aeschylus (or in the extant works of the other two tragedians), consideration 
needs to be given to the potential effect that Zeus’ absence has on the conception of 
the god, because it is, at the very least, noteworthy that a god whose name is spoken 
more than any other in Aeschylus and whose will is often integral to the plot never 
appears as a dramatis persona.
However, before a discussion of the potential effect that Zeus’ absence has 
on our understanding of the god’s presentation in Aeschylus, we need first to 
consider the evidence surrounding the playwright’s (now very fragmentary) play, 
Psychostasia, in which, it is said, Zeus appears. It is rather surprising to find that for 
all the significance scholars41 have placed on the tragedy in determining whether or 
not Zeus appears on-stage in Aeschylus (and thus the potential likelihood of his 
appearance in Greek tragedy as a whole), we possess only two or three words from 
the play itself (279, 280, 280a, Radt), from which nothing can be deduced. Reasons
39 Cf. Aesch. Fr. 99 for the ease with which Zeus can accomplish deeds.
40 Taplin (1977) 432.
41 See, for example, Taplin (1977) 431-3; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003) 463-4; Parker (2005) 147. See 
also Sommerstein (1996) 23, 56, who assumes, without any discussion, that Zeus appears in the play.
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for believing that Zeus appears on-stage in this play, in fact, derive from two 
testimonia, both of which date from centuries after its initial production. The first 
comes from Plutarch, who in discussing the weighing of the souls of Achilles and 
Hector in Iliad 22, goes on to say: xpaycoSiav 5’ AiaxpAoq oXrjv xcp poGco 
7repis0r|Ksv, S7rvypdi|/a<; Toyoaxaalav Kai 7tapaaxfjaa<; xatq 7iMaxiy^i xou Aioq svGev 
psv xqv ©sxiv, sv0sv 8s xf]v ’Ha>, Seopsva^ urccp xoov meow paxopevcov. ‘Aeschylus 
put on a whole tragedy concerning the myth, naming it Psychostasia and placing by 
the scales of Zeus, on the one side Thetis and on the other Eos, who both make pleas 
on behalf of their warring sons.’ (Mor. 16f-17a) The second from Pollux: goto 5s xou 
0eoA.oyeioo ovxoq imsp xpv oicr|vfiv sv u\|/ei s7ticpaivovxai 0soi, ax; o Zsix; Kai oi Tispi 
auxov ev vPuxoaxaoia. f) 8s yepavoq pr|xavr|pa ecrrtv 8K psxsobpou Kaxatpspopsvov 
ecp’ aprcayfj a6paxo<;, <» Kexpx|xai ’Hdx; dp7ra^ouoa xo acopa xo Mepvovoi; ‘On the 
theologeion above the skene gods appear on high, just as Zeus and those around him 
in the Psychostasia. The crane is a mechanical device that bears things down from on 
high as with the taking of a body, as was used by Eos in taking the body of Memnon’ 
(4.130).
If we consider the evidence as it is from the information supplied by Plutarch 
and Pollux, it would seem that Aeschylus produced a play entitled Psychostasia and 
that in it Zeus plays a part, although for how long he makes an appearance and 
whether he has a speaking role is not clear. It is also not clear how accurate these 
accounts of Aeschylus’ play are. Pollux’s statement does not mention Aeschylus as 
the composer of the play; nor can we be sure that Zeus is in fact the god holding the 
scales.42 For example, Taplin argues that Plutarch may have merged two myths in 
which the weighing of Achilles’ soul occurs, because Plutarch was first discussing 
the account of Zeus weighing the souls of Achilles and Hector in Iliad 22, and then 
he moves on to discuss Zeus weighing the souls of Achilles and Memnon in 
Aeschylus’ Psychostasia,43 Indeed, the pictorial record indicates that there was a 
more established tradition which has Hermes weighing the souls of Achilles and 
Memnon, rather than Zeus.44 Of the nine extant vase paintings dating down to about
42 So Taplin (1977) 432.
43 Taplin (1977) 431.
44 O f course, the pictorial record does not in itself demonstrate categorically whether Aeschylus 
would have presented Zeus or Hermes in his version o f  the weighing o f  the souls, because the 
relationship between vase-painting and tragedy is sometimes difficult to determine and we cannot be
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450 B.C. which show the weighing of the souls of Achilles and Memnon (not 
Achilles and Hector) from the Aethiopis myth (and not the Iliad), only one depicts 
Zeus holding the scales, while the rest depict Hermes holding them.45 But, it is 
important to note that while this argument could be seen to diminish the odds of 
Zeus appearing in the tragedy, it does not remove the possibility entirely.
Indeed, Taplin’s view of the testimonia is not the prevailing one; most accept 
the sources as they are as evidence that Zeus appears as a character in Aeschylus.46 
Sourvinou-Inwood, for example, finds it hard to dismiss two different (although not 
necessarily independent) testimonia that claim it was Zeus -  and not Hermes -  who 
weighs the souls of Achilles and Memnon.47 Also, we should be careful not to 
dismiss the sources on ideological grounds, with the conviction that there was some 
'inhibition’ against presenting Zeus on the classical tragic stage, especially as both 
the ancient testimonia suggest that there was not. Indeed, it would be very odd for 
there to be such an inhibition among the tragic writers when the Greeks so freely 
depicted Zeus in other forms of literature and plastic art.
Rather, perhaps a better question to ask is what type of role Zeus had in the 
play, whether speaking or otherwise, and not whether the god actually appeared in it. 
If we accept the testimonia of Plutarch and Pollux and thus the premise that Zeus 
appeared in Aeschylus’ play Psychostasia, it would not be an unreasonable stance to 
take if we argued that the god did not have a speaking role. As Parker puts it: ‘It can 
scarcely be a coincidence that Zeus himself apparently never ‘theologizes’ in tragedy 
(though he made a remarkable appearance in Aeschylus’ Psychostasia)’, the ultimate 
explanation cannot itself be dragged on stage and required to give an account of 
itself.’48
While Greek tragedy couples the divine and the mortal spheres to the extent 
that, for the most part, no significant event can be determined as purely human or
sure from where the vase-painters got their inspiration. For a recent discussion o f  this issue, see 
Taplin (2007) 28-46. Nevertheless, for the purposes o f  the discussion here, the interaction between 
tragedy and vase-painting is not o f  utmost importance, since all that needs to be shown here is 
whether before and during A eschylus’ time there was an established tradition which shows Zeus 
weighing the souls o f  Achilles and Memnon, and how prevalent it was in relation to Hermes holding 
the scales.
45 For Zeus holding the scales: see LIMC, Achilleus 797; for Hermes: LIMC, Achilleus 798-804, 
Hermes 625.
46 Cf. Sommerstein (1996); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003); Parker (2005).
47 Sourvinou-Inwood (2003) 463.
48 Parker (2005) 147.
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divine alone, Greek tragedy is nonetheless the tragedy of the human ‘condition’. For 
Zeus to appear on-stage and to supply an over-arching explanation for the often 
terrible events that have occurred in the play would reduce the action to the level of 
the banal and the insipid. As Zeus’ will is often considered the underlying cause or 
reason for events, for the god to supply an explanation and to confirm such beliefs in 
the efficacy of his will would run this risk. Of course, gods do appear to sort out 
events in Greek tragedy, often citing the will of Zeus for their intervention. But, it is 
one thing to cite the will of Zeus, it is quite another for it to be spoken by the god 
himself. While, of course, Athena and Apollo in the Eumenides are intimately 
connected with Zeus and his will, there is still a degree o f separation between 
humanity and Zeus himself: Zeus remains detached from the events themselves.
To sum up, in Aeschylus, Zeus is not conceptualised as a fully invariant 
deity, in spite of how he is presented at Supp. 86-103. There are notable descriptions 
o f the god within the plays which indicate that there are differences in Aeschylus’ 
presentation from what we find in Homer and Hesiod, but there is no rounded theory. 
Indeed, there are too many mythological descriptions in which Zeus is 
anthropomorphised, too many instances where the god seems to have a share in 
common, traditional tales. Aeschylus seems to interact with philosophical 
speculation of his age concerning the nature of divinity, but does so without fully 
relinquishing traditional, Homeric and Hesiodic conceptions of the god.
ZEUS AS A ‘PRIMAL SUBSTANCE’
The potential influence of Presocratic thought on Aeschylus’ presentation of 
Zeus can also be seen elsewhere in the plays. In a fragment generally considered to 
be from the Heliades, some49 have seen the expression of an exalted and pantheistic 
conception of Zeus (Fr. 70):
Zz\)q sonv aiGfip,50 Zzv>q 8s yfj, Zzi)q 5’ oupavog,
Zzvq xoi xa rcavxa y&n t<x>v5’ imspispov.
49 See, for example, N ilsson (1967, 3rd ed.) 707-11; see Lloyd-Jones (1956) 55 for criticisms.
50 For Zeus as the sky-god and his connection with the aither, see Cook (1914) v .l;  West (2007) 166- 
73.
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Zeus is the aither, Zeus is the earth, Zeus is the heaven, indeed Zeus is all things and 
whatsoever is above and beyond these things.
When examining these lines, all the relevant caveats need to be stated outright. We 
do not know the context in which the lines were spoken and we do not know the tone 
in which they were said. However, these lines should not be dismissed out-of-hand 
simply because we do not know their precise context; nor should we deem them to 
mean ‘much the same as the concluding line o f the Trachiniae: kouScv toutcov o n  
jtif] Zeuq.’51 First of all, the comparison Lloyd-Jones makes is a false one. The line 
from Sophocles’ play is a statement referring to the preceeding events of the play 
and is a reference to Zeus’ will and its role in the play as a conducting force.52 Fr. 70, 
on the other hand, identifies Zeus with the heaven, earth and all that is in-between 
and above. While Lloyd-Jones says that ‘other evidence for pantheism in Aeschylus 
is lacking’53 -  which seems to be the case -  what I want to discuss and consider here 
is whether it is possible to deduce that the Heliades fragment makes allusions to 
Presocratic debates regarding what may, slightly anachronistically, be referred to as 
primal substances and their divine, all-pervasive nature. It is perhaps worth 
interjecting here and reiterating that I am not imputing to Aeschylus any dogmatic 
notion o f Zeus as some proto-Christian deity, who is omnipotent, omniscient or 
omnipresent. Rather, it is the interaction of religio-philosophical concepts of divinity 
that is under discussion here and not any single, rounded theory about the all- 
pervading nature of Zeus.
Both Anaximenes of Miletus and Diogenes of Apollonia seem to equate air 
with the material principle of the universe, as something divine and as the substance 
from which all things are derived.54 Empedocles too espoused a view of the natural
51 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 55.
52 Cf. Davies (1991) 266-7 rightly compares the passage with (among others) Ag. 1485-8, and says 
that it ‘recalls the Homeric Aioq 5 ’ £TsX.ei£TO PooA.q.’ See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ for 
discussion o f  Ag. 1485-9.
53 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 55 n.7.
54 For Anaximenes see, Aristotle Met. A3, 984a5; Theophrastus ap. Simplicium in Phys. 24 , 26; 
Hippolytus Ref. 1 ,7 , 1; Cicero de natura deorum  1, 10, 26; Aetius 1, 7, 13; Augustine de civ. D ei 
VIII, 2. For Diogenes see, Fr. 3, 4, 5 Simplicius in Phys. 152, 13, 18, 22; Fr. 7, 8 Simplicius in Phys. 
153, 19, 20. It is likely that Diogenes flourished somewhere in the region o f  twenty years after the 
death o f  Aeschylus, and as such this may be enough to conclude that his work should not be 
considered in a discussion o f  Aeschylus. However, the philosophical link between the much earlier 
Anaximenes and Diogenes him self creates a nexus o f  thought, which does seem to suggest the 
prominence o f  this particular line o f  enquiry (at least in some intellectual circles) during the first half
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world which can easily be understood as pantheistic, seeing four roots as the 
underlying material elements of the world: xsaoapa yap rcavxcov pt£,d)|iaxa rcpcoxov 
aicoDS- | Zevq apyf|<; "Hprj xe cpspsaPioq fi§’ Aibcovsix; | Nfjaxu; 0’ rj baKpuou; xsyysi 
Kpouvcopa ppoxsiov. ‘Hear first the four roots o f all things: bright shining Zeus, life- 
bearing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who wettens with tears the springs of mortal 
men’ (Fr. 6, Aetius 1, 3, 20; cf. Aristotle Met. A4, 985a31-3, DK 31, A37). While 
there is some debate about which of the four elements the four gods denote, the 
arguments and their respective conclusions are not important for the present 
discussion and so will not be gone into here. All that needs to be understood from the 
Empedocles fragment for the purposes of this investigation is that there are four 
underlying elements which are a re interpretation of four divine beings.55 This is 
equally true and important when looking at Anaximenes, Diogenes and Fr. 70, 
because although the precise details differ, the manner of conceiving and presenting 
the nature of divinity is very similar, however much or little these Presocratrics may 
have thought of themselves as speaking ‘allegorically’.
In the Heliades, it is the language in which the highest and most powerful 
god is conceived, as a being equated with the all-encompassing and principal 
substances of the universe, in particular the aither and the earth, which hint at and are 
suggestive of the philosophy of Anaximenes, Empedocles and Diogenes. While 
Aeschylus states that Zeus is the aither, the earth, the heaven and more besides and 
does not strictly make reference to the substances of air, fire, water or earth, the 
manner in which the god is referred to does nonetheless seem to allude to the 
philosophical methods of investigation of his age. However, we must be careful how 
and to what extent we apply this fragment to the rest of the Aeschylean corpus, 
because nowhere else in Aeschylus is Zeus presented in the way he is in Fr. 70, and 
as we do not possess the rest of the play it is impossible to contextualise the lines. 
For this reason, we should be content simply to note the further similarity of thought 
in Aeschylus’ work to that of certain Presocratic philosophers.
o f  the fifth-century B.C. As a result, I think it is worthwhile to consider D iogenes in this debate. On 
the other hand, the ultimately Aristotelean form o f  the summary o f  the thought o f  these Presocratics 
put forward in the text is not meant to endorse the historical accuracy o f  the Aristotelean presentation, 
but is to be considered merely as short-hand adequate for the present purpose.
55 See Guthrie (1965) 144-6 for a good discussion o f  the conflicting views; cf. also KRS (1983) 286, 
Graham (2010) 1. 423.
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ZEUS AND HADES
If we return to the main extant body of Aeschylus’ work, it is possible to see 
the name of Zeus used also as a synonym for the god of the dead, Hades. In the 
Suppliants, for example, fearing for their safety and seeking protection as suppliants 
o f Zeus, the Danaids threaten to pollute the sacred precinct by killing themselves, 
should they not receive sanctuary in Argos. They say (Supp. 156-61):
XOV 7toA,V^8VG)X(XXOV
Z r jv a  t< S v  k 8 K |i t ] k 6 tc o v  
i^ o p e c G a  o u v  kM S ok; 
a p x a v a iq  G a v o u c a t ,  
juf| r u y o u G a i  Gecov ’OX,i)|j.a)7dcov.
With boughs we will approach as suppliants the host of very many, Zeus of the 
departed, having died by the noose, unless we meet with the Olympian gods.
The most natural way to understand xdv 7toA,t)^evcbxaxov Zfjva xcov KSKprjKOxmv is to 
read it as a synonym for Hades, the traditional host of spirits in the underworld. It 
was not uncommon for poets in the archaic and classical periods to use the name of 
Zeus in this way (cf. II. 9.457, Hes. Th. 767, Op. 465, S. Aj. 571). If this is so, Zeus’ 
position as the king of the gods reflects Hades’ own position in the afterlife as the 
king of the dead, relying on the transference of what is effectively the most basic 
characteristic of Zeus on to his underworld counterpart, that of the highest and most 
powerful god in his domain.56
The idea of justice may also have been a contributing factor for Aeschylus to 
refer to Hades as the Zeus of the underworld. This is suggested at Supp. 229-31, 
where the Danaids declare:
oi>5e (if) ’v 'AiSou Gavcbv
(puyil p a x a ico v  a ix ia q  Ttpa^ac; x a 5 s .
k & k s i  b u c a ^ e i T&<p>7tXaicTj jiaG  ’ , cbc; A,oyo<;,
56 In addition, at Supp. 156-61 Aeschylus also seems to be hinting at something more than just this 
transference. A s FJW (1980) 2.130 say in reference to 7toX,u^svG)TaTov, ‘Here the allusion to his 
[Hades’] indiscriminate ‘hospitality’ has a special point: he at least w ill receive the Danaids. There is 
no doubt also a veiled ironical ref. to Zeus Xenios, who is later named by the Chorus (627).’
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Zevq aXkoq ev Kajiouoiv uoxaiac, SiKaq.
After doing such a thing he will surely not escape the punishment of his folly, even 
in Hades after death: there too, so they say, there is another Zeus who pronounces 
final judgement on the dead for their evil doings.
Here it seems clear that ‘another Zeus who pronounces judgements on the dead’ acts 
as a synonym for the traditional god of the underworld, Hades, just as we had seen at 
Supp. 156-61 with the phrase xov JtoAA^svcbiaxov Zfjva xcov kskjitikoxcov. However, 
in contrast with the example at Supp. 156-61, the idea of justice becomes a telling 
aspect in the description. Elsewhere in the play, Zeus is presented as the highest and 
most supreme judge on earth (e.g. Supp. 402-4, 437), as he is in all of Aeschylus.57 
This function of Zeus is mirrored in the afterlife where the other Zeus among the 
dead also makes judgements; but, in contrast with the ‘normal’ Zeus in the upper 
world, it is telling that the other Zeus only makes final judgements over the 
deceased. The depiction seems to balance two prevailing views of the underworld 
during this period:58 one in which the underworld is seen as a mirror o f life on earth 
(cf. Od. 11.484-6, 11.568-75; Ch. 354-62); the other sees a distinct split between the 
two worlds, with the afterlife a reflection and judgement of the acts committed 
during one’s lifetime (cf. Eu. 273-5; Pindar O. 2.56ff; Plato Grg. 523a-527a, R. 
330d-331b). The Zeus of the dead, Hades, thus seems to be presented at one and the 
same time as the mirror of the ‘normal’ Zeus who presides over mortals’ actions on 
earth and as distinct from him, making only the final judgements upon mortals in the 
underworld.
It is also possible to see Aeschylus as playing etymological word games, 
connecting Zeus with life and its converse, death, by punning on the Zr|v- element of 
Zeus’ name and its similarity with that of the verb ^fjv (to live). The first indication 
that this may be the case comes at Supp. 156-61, when the Danaids threaten to hang 
themselves and the name of Zeus, in the accusative form Zfjva, is juxtaposed with 
the qualifying noun xcov KSKjuqKOXCOv.59 While, of course, it is a common occurrence
57 See Chapter 4 ‘The Justice o f  Zeus’ below.
58 See FJW (1980) 2.184.
59 It is worth noting that neither Vttrtheim (1928, repr. 1967) nor FJW (1980) pick up on the 
etymological word-play at Supp. 156-61, in spite o f  the fact that the latter notes the word-play on the
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for Hades to be referred to as the Zeus of the dead, it is nevertheless the case that the 
similarity between the Zrjv- root of Zeus’ name and that of the verb £fjv ‘to live’, 
together with the apparent contradiction -  whether a poetic turn of phrase or not -  
for the name o f Zeus to be conceptualised as the god of the dead offers the 
opportunity for word-play. This is made all the more plausible a quarry for word­
play when we consider that one of the Danaids’ major pre-occupations is to establish 
their position as the descendents of Io and Zeus, which is alluded to from the 
opening o f the play (Supp. 15-19, 40-48) and with great frequency throughout the 
first half of it.60 The Danaids do not lose any opportunity to mention their connection 
with their ancestral father Zeus, placing Pelasgus and the Argives under no illusion 
that they do not just claim Zeus’ support as suppliants (if that were not enough), but 
as his own flesh and blood too. In the fourth antistrophe of the second stasimon, after 
the Danaids have described the rape of Io by Zeus, they say that the Earth declares of 
the child bom from the relationship and its descendents: (puoi^oou yevoq to5s | 
Zqvoq scjTiv dX,T]0ax;. ‘Truly this is the offspring of Zeus, the begetter of life.’ (Supp. 
584-5) While I do not claim that every reference to Zeus with the the Zqv- root is 
playing on its etymological similarity with the verb ^fjv ‘to live’, if one takes into 
consideration the stress that the Danaids place on their descent from Zeus and the 
meaning of the two lines at Supp. 584-5, it is not unreasonable to claim that 
Aeschylus is playing on Zeus’ name as a producer of life here. So, in turn, if we 
observe the ancestral link the Danaids wish to establish between Zeus and 
themselves as his descendents, when they then refer to Hades as another Zeus 
beneath the earth or as Zeus among the dead with the Zrjv- root, Aeschylus could 
thus be intentionally punning on the god’s name: the name of the god who is the font 
of life for the Danaids is also the name used for the god o f the dead.61
Furthermore, playing on the name of Zeus was not uncommon in archaic and 
classical Greek literature. Aeschylus himself does so elsewhere, calling Justice the
root o f  Z eus’ name at Supp. 584-5, as well as giving parallel examples from other authors (though not 
Heraclitus B32, see below).
60 See Chapter 2 ‘The Characteristics o f  Zeus’ above.
61 The apparent paradox is to some extent reminiscent o f  -  but at the same time more profound than -  
Heraclitus’ play on the sound, meaning and import o f  bios in Fr. 48. Cf. the following paragraph for 
further potential significance o f  Heraclitus in this context.
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daughter of Zeus62 and that which occurs through or because of Zeus.63 Plato also 
etymologises the name of Zeus and its root Zr\v- in the Cratylus, as Aeschylus had in 
the Suppliants, saying that Zeus is so-called because he is the cause of life (Crat. 
396a-b, 410d). But, even before Aeschylus and Plato, Heraclitus seems also to have 
picked up on the similarity between the root of Zeus’ name and the verb ^r|v ‘to 
live’. Fragment B32 reads: ev to  aocpov pouvov AiysaGou ouk sGsXei Kai sGsXsi 
Zr|vo<; ovopa. ‘One is the only wise thing, it is unwilling and willing to be called by 
the name of Zeus.’ In this fragment, the concern is the correct naming of the one 
wise thing -  and in this alone it can be compared with the thought expressed by 
Aeschylus at the opening of the Hymn to Zeus in the Agamemnon in the phrase: 
Zsi)<;, octck; 7iox’ scrctv ‘Zeus, whoever he is’.64 Within the context of Heraclitus’ 
work, it seems odd that he would feel the need or the desire to say that it is 
acceptable for the One Wise to be called by the name of Zeus, because as with 
Xenophanes, he ridicules conventional religion and religious practises (B5, 14, 15), 
saying such things as: xai xoiq ayaZpaoi 5s xooxeoiaiv euxovxai, okoiov si tu; 
8opoiai X£a%r|vsuoixo, ou xi yivaxnccov Gsoix; ou5’ Tpooa<; oixivsc; siai. ‘And they pray 
to these statues, as if one were having a conversation with their house, not at all 
understanding what gods or heroes actually are’ (Fr. B5). Indeed, Heraclitus also 
says that the One Wise is only wisdom and understanding, implying that it has 
nothing to do with the conventional religious paradigm connected with fallible 
anthropomorphic deities: sv to  ootpov smaxaaGai yva>pr|v, oktj KuPspvaxai rcavxa 
8ia Tcavxcov ‘One is the wise thing: knowing correct judgement, how all things are 
steered through all’ (B41).
So, why does Heraclitus declare that the One Wise is unwilling and willing to 
be called by the name o f Zeus? The answer, I think, rests on two points. The first of 
which relies on Zeus’ position as the highest and most powerful god of the 
traditional Greek pantheon, as the closest approximation in terms of power and 
position to the One Wise. In what appears to be a concession to conventional 
religious ideology, Heraclitus seems to be suggesting that if there were any god with
62 Ch. 949-50: Aioq Kopa -  A kav. See Garvie (1986) 308-10 and Chapter 2 ‘The Characteristics o f  
Zeus’ above for discussion.
63 Ag. 1485-9, Ch. 639-45, 789. Where the word-play is on variations o f  the phrase: 5uxi Atoq.... 
Akaq. F or/lg . 1485-9, see Fraenkel (1950) ad loc; for Ch. 639-45, see Garvie (1986) 220.
64 For a discussion o f  the Hymn to Zeus and its position within the parodos, see Chapter 4 ‘The 
Justice o f  Zeus’ below.
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which the One Wise can be compared or to which it can be likened, then it is the god 
who conducts events with, by and because o f his will and fulfils deeds with a nod of 
his head: Zeus. But, at the same time, it is telling that the One Wise is both unwilling 
and willing to be called Zeus (XsyeaGat ouk sGsX,ei Kai sGetai Zqvoc; ovopa), because 
in spite o f the concession to traditional religion in naming Zeus here, the position of 
ouk eGetai before sGs^si suggests a subtle rejection of the name, or at least a 
rejection of common associations and connotations, such as those connected with 
cult and poetry (cf. B5, 14, 15).65 The second point comes back to the discussion of 
the etymology of Zeus’ name, the use of Zrjvoq over Aio<; and the similarity of the 
root Zqv- with the verb ^fjv ‘to live’.66 While such a connection may be considered 
tenuous, it should be bome in mind that, as has been stated above, playing on the 
etymology of Zeus’ name was not uncommon in antiquity and Heraclitus was 
himself no stranger to word-play.67 So, if we accept the possibility that Heraclitus 
was punning on Zeus’ name, does such word-play enhance our reading of the 
fragment in any way? I think it does, because Heraclitus may be indicating that the 
name of Zeus is not an inappropriate denotation for the name of the One Wise, due 
to the fact that Zeus, whose name can be ‘etymologically connected’ with the verb 
Cfiv ‘to live’, is, in this way at least, suggestive of the ‘everliving fire’ with which the 
One Wise is associated (cf. B30, 31, 64, 78).68
If we now return to Aeschylus’ presentation of Zeus of the dead, the 
reasonable assumption is that when the poet refers to this god and Zeus the 
Olympian, he is denoting two separate and distinct deities, Hades and the Olympian 
god respectively. This manner of conceptualising the gods is supported by other 
references to Hades in Aeschylus where though the word Hades is used primarily as 
a way of referring to the place (Per. 923, Th. 323, Supp. 416, Ag. 661, 1291, 1527), 
there are two instances in separate plays where the god is unambiguously referred to 
(Supp. 791, Eu. 273). But, it may also be the case that there is another way of 
conceptualising Zeus of the dead and that is to see the denotation as a description of 
one of many aspects of the same god, in a way comparable to how we understand
65 Kahn (1979) 269-70; Stokes (1971) 106-7.
66 Kahn (1979) 270 picks up on the possibility that Heraclitus was playing etymological word-games; 
the possibility is denied by Kirk (1954) 392, Marcovich (1967) 445-6.
67 See, for example, the discussion o f  Fr. B 1 19 in Chapter 1 on 5aipcov.
68 Kahn (1979) 270.
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Zeus Soter, Zeus Xenios or Zeus Hikesios.69 While there are no unambiguous 
examples in Aeschylus to help demonstrate this point, there is an instance in 
Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus which has been thought to do so.70 At O. C. 1456- 
1471, Zeus is repeatedly said by Oedipus and the chorus to have thundered in the 
sky. But, then at 1604-6, the Messenger reports that Zeus of the Earth thundered 
(icru7rr|a£ psv Zsix; xOovioq) as a response to Oedipus’ departure from the mortal 
world.71 This presents the problem that we must either accept that Hades has 
dominion over the sky, which would be unprecedented to say the least; or that the 
Messenger is referring to the same god which Oedipus and the chorus spoke of 
before. In either case, we are presented with a depiction of Zeus and Hades which is 
not found -  at least explicitly — in Aeschylus. This is, however, if we accept the 
reading of KTwrr|a8 as ‘thundered’ at 1606, a direct parallel to the use of 8KTU718V at 
1456, which is used in reference to the thunder of Zeus in the sky. But, it is also 
possible to read the verb Kiu^r|0 8  as ‘resounded’ or ‘crashed’. Without any reference 
to the thunder produced in the sky. Indeed, the noun ktutco<; is used both to denote 
the sound of thunder and the sound of horses’ hooves upon ground. So, if we read 
KTU7rr|a8 in line 1606 as ‘resounded’ or ‘quaked’, the potential problems raised by 
Hades thundering in the sky are removed; rather what we are presented with is a 
repetitive and interesting use of the verb KTD7teco by Sophocles as a marker of divine 
involvement throughout the scene o f Oedipus’ death.
The ambivalence and ambiguity concerning the naming of Zeus and the god 
of the underworld is also potentially demonstrated in a fragment of Euripides (Fr. 
912. 1-8):
ooi tco 7I&VTCDV psSsovxi /Xor|v 
nslavov xe cpspco, Zsiiq d'0’ 'Ai5r|<; 
ovopa^opsvoc; ciepysic;- av 8s poi 
Guciav (urupov 7tayKap7i:£ia<;
Ss^ai TtXrjpri 7tpoxuxaiav.
an yap Sv xe 0eot<; xot<; OupaviSaiq
GKfjrcTpov to Aioq p£Ta^ £ip(^ £i<;
69 See Winnington-Ingram (1983) 163-4.
70 West (1978) 276.
71 West (1978) 276.
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xBovicov 0 ’ 'AiSfl peiexet^ apxn?-
To you who is the ruler of everything I bear young green branches and honied 
libations, Zeus or Hades you care to be named. You, receive my sacrifice, unburned, 
consisting in a libation full of offerings of all sorts of fruits. Indeed, you among the 
gods in heaven have the sceptre of Zeus in your hand and you possess a share of the 
chthonic rule in Hades.
The god goes by the name of either Zeus or Hades72 and rules over everything, 
extending his reach from the heavens down and throughout the underworld. Zeus 
and Hades are effectively both one and the same deity, with the name Hades acting 
as an appropriate synonym for Zeus in this context and vice versa. A few lines later 
the god is said to have a share of the rule in Hades, with Hades spoken of more as a 
place than a deity. But, we should not be too concerned by this, because it was not 
uncommon to refer to the underworld and the god who presides over it both by the 
name Hades (cf. Ag. 667, 1527). So, if we accept that this latter reference to Hades 
denotes the underworld, the references to Zeus and Hades in line 2 still indicate that 
the god being referred to in the fragment can be called by either name and that Zeus 
and Hades are one and the same god in this instance.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the traditional Greek gods Zeus 
and Hades are thought o f here. Rather the way the names Zeus and Hades are used in 
this fragment indicate that it is an altogether different divinity that is under 
consideration. Indeed, the way in which the names of Zeus and Hades are used bear 
greater similarity to the way Heraclitus speaks of the One Wise as unwilling and 
willing to be spoken of by the name of Zeus in B32 or how Xenophanes refers to the 
one god  in B23. The Zeus and Hades in this fragment of Euripides carry very little of 
the mythological baggage that their names usually bear. So, as a consequence, while 
both the examples from Sophocles and Euripides, on the surface of things, seem to 
add an extra dimension to our understanding of how Aeschylus presented Zeus and 
Hades in his plays, they in fact consolidate the investigation already undertaken 
above. Thus, to take an example from another play this time, the Agamemnon: when 
Clytemnestra dedicates the third strike of her sword upon Agamemnon to the Zeus
72 The question o f  naming Zeus is dealt with below in the discussion o f  Ag. 160 in Chapter 4 ‘The 
Justice o f  Zeus’.
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beneath the earth, the protector of the dead, too Kara I Aid<; vsicpcov
acoxfjpoq73 (Ag. 1386-7), it may be reasonable to suggest that there may be a wider 
concept of the highest divinity being thought of by Aeschylus, as is also evident in 
some Presocratic thought and Sophocles and Euripides.
SUMMARY REMARKS
In many respects, the Zeus of Aeschylus is similar to the Zeus of Homer: he 
possesses much, if not all, o f the same mythological baggage, is omnipotent and his 
will always comes to fulfilment. However, there are passages which also hint at key 
differences in Aeschylus’ depiction of the god. Most notable among them is Supp. 
86-103, which seems to interact with Presocratic conceptions of divine invariance. 
Also, in a more general and over-riding fashion, the Zeus of Aeschylus can be seen 
as a more detached and unknowable god than the one we find in Homer. Although 
there is one instance where Zeus did, in all likelihood, appear in one of the plays, it is 
far from certain that he had a speaking role. Indeed, the essence of tragedy as the 
depiction of man’s sufferings and the conflict between human and divine causation 
would be undone should the greatest god appear on-stage to account for his will and 
the misery it may have caused. More than anything, what this chapter hopes to have 
shown is that there is interaction between the thought o f Aeschylus and Presocratic 
philosophy, which can be seen where Zeus, at times, appears to be a god that 
encompasses far more than the Homeric and Hesiodic conceptions of the god, where 
Zeus is a universal, underlying principle and where he has assimilated (though not 
completely) the functions and role of the god of the underworld.
73 In contrast with the MSS gloss that reads 'AiSou at 1386-7.
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4: THE JU STICE OF ZEUS
THE GUILT OF AGAMEMNON?
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has put forward an examination of the nature of Zeus 
by highlighting and discussing certain key aspects of the god’s character within the 
context of the plays and fragments by Aeschylus, as well as in relation to the 
dialogue into which Aeschylus entered with Presocratic philosophers, such as 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, concerning the nature of divinity. On the foundation 
supplied by the discussion put forward in the previous chapters, this chapter will 
consider the god ‘in practice’, with a close discussion of the justice of Zeus. I will 
examine the Oresteia trilogy and in particular one issue, from which many others 
arise, the question of Agamemnon’s guilt.
Irrespective o f how one interprets the guilt or otherwise o f Agamemnon, 
what is understood by guilt is sometimes far from clear in studies of the term in the 
Agamemnon, and as a result it will be worthwhile to spend a moment clarifying what 
is meant by it here. Among some of the key factors in discussions concerning the 
guilt o f Agamemnon have been the question of inherited guilt and the role of the 
curse of the House of Atreus.1 While these considerations have an important part to 
play in the interconnected nature of divine and human causality throughout the play 
and trilogy, what is under discussion in this chapter regarding Agamemnon is his 
personal response to the unfolding o f events, his decisions, and whether it is possible 
to determine at any point whether his actions provoke, or give clear indication of 
having provoked, divine anger.2 As a consequence, what I take as a working 
definition of the term of ‘guilt’ is that someone, in this instance, Agamemnon, has 
committed an act which is seen as unjust and by having committed the injustice has 
become ‘guilty’ in the eyes o f a third party. In the context o f this study, the third 
party with whom we are concerned are the Olympians gods, especially Zeus. And by 
transgression, I understand the act by which someone may become guilty, i.e. having
1 See Lloyd-Jones (1962) 187-99, (1971) 79-93; Sewell-Rutter (2007) 15-77.
2 For the issue o f  choice and decision-making in Aeschylus see, among others, Dover (1973) 58-69; 
Rosenmeyer (1982) 284-307; Sewell-Rutter (2007) passim-, Herrmann (2013) 39-80. For further 
bibliography on specific passages in the Agamemnon, see below throughout in this chapter.
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transgressed the boundaries of what is thought o f as just by the gods. It is with these 
definitions in mind that the following discussion of the justice of Zeus and the guilt 
of Agamemnon will begin.
How the nature of justice and the role of the divine are understood in the 
thought of Aeschylus depends, to a large extent, on the way in which one incident in 
one play is interpreted. It is for this reason that the problems surrounding the death of 
Agamemnon, its antecedents and its consequences -  notably the deaths of Iphigeneia 
and Clytemnestra, and the trial of Orestes -  have been the subject of continuing 
debate for a century, or more.
It is still often held that Zeus first sent the Atreidae to Troy and that Zeus, or 
one of the Olympians, then had Agamemnon killed for sacrificing Iphigeneia,4 or for 
some other transgression committed in the course of exacting vengeance on Troy.5 
There are also those who state that Agamemnon was punished for the ‘guilt’ he 
incurred when sacrificing Iphigeneia, or for the ‘guilt’ he acquired in the course of 
exacting vengeance on Troy, but who do so without making clear in whose eyes 
Agamemnon is ‘guilty’ — whether in Clytemnestra’s eyes, in Zeus’ and the 
Olympians’, or in the eyes o f both, or indeed, in the eyes of the author or the 
audience.6 However, the language o f ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’ employed in these latter studies 
suggests that underlying their arguments, there exists an implicit acceptance of a 
religious dimension to Agamemnon’s death and that he was, by consequence, 
punished by Zeus and the Olympians.
In contrast, the following discussion will attempt to show that Agamemnon, 
in spite of appearances and common (mis)conceptions, did not commit any act of 
transgression that earned him the wrath of the gods, and that his death was 
consequently neither sanctioned and ordained, nor desired by Zeus or any of the
3 Peradotto (2007) 211-44, esp. 230, does, however, contest this issue. Though he raises an important 
question about how w e should interpret the chorus’ statement that ‘Zeus sent the Atreidae,’ (Ag. 60-2) 
Peradotto neglects the obligation o f  an offended party to exact retribution or restitution and the effect 
the position o f  Zeus as the god who presides over xenia has in Agamemnon’s decision to go to Troy. 
This issue will be dealt with in greater detail in the course o f  the chapter.
4 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 63, (1962) 187-99, (1971) 90-2, (1983) 102; Kitto (1964) 1-5, (1966) 58; 
Denniston and Page (1957) xv, xx-xxix; Otis (1981) 3-65, esp. 64-5; Cohen (1986) 132-4.
s West (1979) 4-5.
6 Fraenkel (1950) 2.98-9, 441, 625; Lesky (1983) 13-23; Nussbaum (1986) 34; Conacher (1987) 13, 
76-96; Sommerstein (1996) 275-87; Dodds (2007) 255-64; Peradotto (2007) 237.
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Olympians.7 This will be done by showing how passages commonly thought to 
indicate Agamemnon’s guilt can in fact be read to show otherwise, and that there is 
at least greater ambiguity in the play than previously thought.
ORESTES SiKtjyopog -  A TEST CASE
In order to understand issues relating to the justice of Agamemnon’s death, 
the deaths o f Iphigeneia and Clytemnestra, and the role or roles which Zeus and the 
gods play in all three, it is necessary to come to some understanding about the 
concept o f justice applicable to Aeschylus’ Oresteia. To do this, I shall start by 
looking at the actions of Orestes and the role the gods play in determining and 
supporting them. It is uncontroversial that Orestes is sent by Apollo -  through whom 
Zeus speaks (Eu. 17-19, 614-21, 713-14) -  to avenge the death of Agamemnon. This 
we are told several times in both the Libation Bearers and the Eumenides (Ch. 260- 
305, 555-60, 831-7, 900-2, 939-41, 1026-33; Eu. 64-6, 84, 203, 465-7, 579-80, 593- 
4). We are left in no doubt about the position of these gods in the decision to see 
Clytemnestra punished for the death of Agamemnon. Due to the explicit role of 
Apollo (and Zeus), it is possible to see Orestes’ act of killing Clytemnestra as a just 
act in the eyes o f the highest and most powerful Olympian deities. If Orestes’ act is 
just in the eyes of the gods, Clytemnestra must therefore be seen to have acted in a 
way that deserved or required punishment. Punishments by their very nature act, at 
least in part, as retribution or restitution for damages suffered or incurred.8 An initial 
transgression is thus necessary for there to be a punishment, because punishments 
attempt to reset and realign a balance upset by a transgression, by acting as a 
counter-balance for the transgression. Clytemnestra’s killing of Agamemnon is, of 
course, the reason supplied by Orestes and by Apollo for her death, which in turn 
implies that Agamemnon’s death requires vengeance.
So, although Orestes, like Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, has killed, his act 
is categorically shown to be just in the eyes o f  the Olympian gods once he is
7 The first in recent decades to question the validity o f  the traditional view  that sees or implicitly 
accepts Zeus as sanctioning, ordaining or even desiring the death o f  Agamemnon was Fontenrose. In 
spite o f  the seriousness o f  the questions raised in his article, Fontenrose’s arguments have met with 
little resonance. See Fontenrose (1971) 71-109; cf. Tyrrell (1976) 328-34.
8 See Gagarin (1986) 100-6; Rawls (1973) esp. 3-17 for this discussion; cf. Hugo Grotius (2005). 
Indeed, this manner o f  conceiving justice as a balance between transgression and punishment can be 
detected on a universal level in Anaximander B l .
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protected by Apollo and freed by Athena’s vote in the Eumenides? If the cycle of 
revenge had continued, we could not say this, because either the acts of killing would 
be unjust, or alternatively just from one perspective and unjust from another. But, by 
ending the cycle of revenge and acquitting Orestes, Aeschylus has shown that 
irrespective of how anyone judges any of the previous killings, at least Orestes’ act 
o f killing his mother was just in the eyes of the Olympians. It is for this reason that 
Orestes’ retributive and restitutive killing of Clytemnestra and his subsequent 
protection and release at the hands o f the Olympians can be seen as a model of 
justice applicable to the Oresteia as a whole, and one according to which it may be 
possible to judge and to understand the respective justice of Agamemnon’s and 
Clytemnestra’s acts of killing.10 This is not to say that Agamemnon should 
automatically be considered innocent just because Clytemnestra is killed for killing 
him. What is highlighted here is that there is a consistent thread through the narrative 
of the trilogy with regard to the presentation of justice, and what will be 
demonstrated throughout the rest of this chapter is how it is possible to read the 
Agamemnon in a way that brings into question whether Agamemnon’s death was 
desired by the gods and thus whether he was killed in line with their justice: i.e. 
whether he is guilty or not.
THE KILLER OF AGAMEMNON
Clytemnestra’s hatred of Agamemnon is well documented in the play. We 
need neither speculate whether she actually killed Agamemnon, nor do we need to 
ask too many questions concerning her motives. But, we should not simply lay sole 
blame at the feet of Clytemnestra. First, she names four reasons that have a bearing 
on Agamemnon’s death:
i) Iphigeneia’s sacrifice (Ag. 1412-25, 1431-7, 1525-9; cf. 154-5);
9 There are other factors to consider with regard to the nature o f  justice more w idely in the 
Eumenides, particularly in relation to the conflict between the Olympians and the Erinyes, the split 
vote o f  the court and Orestes’ pollution, which is discussed below  in the section Zeus, the Erinyes and  
the Vote o f  Athena. But for now it is enough to note that Orestes’ act o f  killing is perceived by the 
Olympians as just.
101 am aware that questions have been raised about whether what applies in a later scene is applicable 
to an earlier scene in the same play or trilogy (see T. von W ilamowitz (1917)). But, due to the 
interconnected nature o f  themes and issues in the O resteia, as well as the thread o f  causality and 
linearity o f  events, such arguments do not apply in this case.
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ii) The accursed House of Atreus and the pollution connected with it 
(Ag. 1397-8);
iii) The Alastor/Salpcov o f the House (Ag. 1497-1504);
iv) Agamemnon’s infidelity (Ag. 1438-47).
Secondly, the chorus give two reasons:
i) The Sodpoov of the House (Ag. 1468-74);
ii) The will o f Zeus (Ag. 1475-81).
Thirdly, Aegisthus involves himself in the murder-plot to avenge the death of his 
brothers, and makes known the curse o f Thyestes (Ag. 1600-2).
But, while there are seven potential reasons that have a bearing on 
Agamemnon’s death stated by three characters, we are faced with only two agents 
that are said to be directly responsible for the act itself:
i) Clytemnestra;
ii) The Alastor/daipcov of the House.11
Clytemnestra does not hide that she killed Agamemnon; indeed, she initially 
flaunts the fact (Ag. 1379-98). There is no attempt by her to conceal the murder once 
it has been committed. One could argue that there is even an element o f relief in her 
openness and the way she freely outlines her reasons for killing Agamemnon. 
Clytemnestra presents the death of Iphigeneia if not as the origin of her resentment 
of Agamemnon, then at least as the catalyst without which she would have been 
unlikely to commit the murder. The sacrifice is also the reason she dwells on most 
during the final scene of the play, and it is repeated on three separate occasions. Her 
resentment and brewing anger are even hinted at in the parodos when the chorus 
narrate the sacrifice of Iphigeneia at Aulis (Ag. 154-5).
The association of Clytemnestra with the Saipcov of the House complicates 
any explanation of who is responsible for Agamemnon’s death. The dual agencies, 
one human, one supernatural, blur the distinctions between the two to the extent that 
it becomes difficult to pin-point or to direct sole blame at either alone. Indeed, the 
insidious and somewhat unclear manner in which the Satpoov operates only 
exaggerates this difficulty. As has been said, Clytemnestra at first exults in her place 
within the cycle of destruction, and she does not seem to comprehend fully the
11 Aegisthus is excluded, because although he is involved in the plot, he is not involved directly in the 
murder.
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implications of her association with the baipcov and the cycle of destruction. She 
makes it clear that she and no one else slew Agamemnon (Ag. 1379-87), and that it 
was from her perspective by Justice, Ate and Erinys that she killed him (Ag. 1432-3). 
The association o f Clytemnestra with supernatural agencies comes to the fore at this 
moment. It gradually builds over the course of the next two hundred lines, and it is 
from this moment that she begins to shift her position with regard to Agamemnon’s 
death and her responsibility for it. At 1468-74, when the chorus mention that the 
baipcov of the House is falling upon it, Clytemnestra follows their statement by 
saying that they are right in their judgement to speak of its involvement. The implicit 
shift in position, begun at 1432-3, here becomes explicit, and this movement toward 
dissociation reaches its climax shortly after, when Clytemnestra says outright that 
Agamemnon’s death was not her deed, but was exacted through her by the Alastor, 
which took revenge on Atreus by sacrificing Agamemnon as a victim for the 
children Atreus had killed a generation earlier (Ag. 1497-1504):
ai>xei<; sivai xobe xoupyov epov
pi) 5’ £7nX£x0fic; ’Ayapepvoviav sivai p’ aXoxov
(pavxa^opevoq be yuvaud veicpou
xobb’ o 7caX,aio<; bpipix; &A,aaxcop
Axpeax; xa^srcoi) 0oivaxrjpo<;
xovS’ (X7C8X8108V, xekeov veapoiq 87ti0i>aa<;.
You say with confidence that this deed is mine; but you shouldn’t deem me to be the 
partner of Agamemnon. Only appearing as the wife of this corpse, the ancient bitter 
avenging spirit of Atreus, the cruel host, has taken vengeance upon this one here, 
sacrificing (him as) a perfect victim for the young offspring.
The act serves the dual purpose of functioning as an act of vengeance for two 
sets of killings. As Agamemnon had sacrificed Iphigeneia, the spirit manifesting 
itself through Clytemnestra has ‘sacrificed’ Agamemnon, avenging one act of 
sacrifice with another; and as Atreus had slain the children of Thyestes so the son of 
Atreus is slain in turn. This latter interpretation points to Aegisthus’ role in the plot, 
as well as to the larger framework of familial child-killing that has beset the House 
over the course of three generations, which Clytemnestra now sees as being finished
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by herself and by the Alastor. Indeed, the word teXeov which Clytemnestra uses, and 
which is here translated ‘perfect’, inherently possesses connotations which lend 
themselves to the context and to the multi-layered nature of Agamemnon’s death and 
the differing ways in which it can be interpreted.12 So, Agamemnon is not just the 
‘perfect’ victim in the literal sense of being an entire victim without blemish as a 
good sacrificial victim should be, he is also teXeov in the sense of being a fully- 
grown victim, contrasting the youth of the previous victims with the age o f the 
present one. Thirdly, tsXeov can take on the meaning o f ‘valid’ in a qualitative sense, 
which is thus suggestive of the aptness of sacrificing a child of Atreus for/to the 
children of Thyestes. More than this, teXeov can take the meaning ‘final’, arguably 
the original sense o f the word, so that Agamemnon is not just the most apt fully 
grown adult victim without blemish, but is also the final victim in the long chain of 
victims. Agamemnon, in all these senses, is truly tsX£o<;.13
However, in spite of trying to distance herself from involvement in 
Agamemnon’s death and the cycle of killings, Clytemnestra’s initial openness and 
apparent joy in it undermines her later statements which attempt to distance herself 
from it. She is caught between pride as an avenger o f previous wrongs and all the 
potential, yet very real, consequences that come from being connected with the 
House o f Atreus and its destructive spirit o f vengeance.
Although we cannot dismiss without due consideration the involvement o f 
the avenging spirits Ate, Alastor, Erinys or the baipcov o f the House in the death of 
Agamemnon, we also cannot take the line Clytemnestra would have us take when
12 xe^eov echoes Clytemnestra’s call to Zeus xsAsioq in line 993-4, where she asks the god to fulfil 
(xsXei) her prayer. For a discussion o f  xetaioq, see Rosenmeyer (1982) 278-83; and for Zeus as the 
ultimate fulfiller within the context o f  his presentation as an all-powerful deity, see discussion above 
in Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’.
13 xsXsov can even take on yet another meaning, referring to som eone who is fully accomplished in a 
qualitative sense. Agamemnon could be seen as being at the acme o f  his life, having just returned 
from leading a successful expedition to destroy Troy and having reclaimed Helen for his brother. 
Denniston and Page (1957) read xeXsov as ‘fully-grown’, as does Groeneboom (1966) a d  loc, who 
reads 1503-4, ‘den volwassene offerend na de knapen ...d.w.z. Agamemnon na en ter vergelding van 
de kinderen van Thyestes.’ Both Denniston and Page and Groeneboom thus intimate in their 
translations o f  xsXeov the contrast in age between Agamemnon and the children o f  Thyestes, while 
also potentially implying the sacrificial aspect o f  an entire, full victim. However, in both translations 
this latter, sacrificial aspect o f  the word is left unclear, in spite o f  the sacrificial meaning inherent in 
the Greek 87u0uaaq. Verrall (1904), on the other hand, makes explicit the sacrificial meaning o f  
xeXsov as well as the age aspect implied in the word. Only Fraenkel (1950) gives any indication o f  
other meanings the word can carry in this passage. He translates the lines, ‘rendered this full-grown  
man as payment to the young, a crowning sacrifice.’ In the word ‘crowning’ we are o f  course met 
with notions o f  finality and accomplishment in the qualitative sense, which qualify the meanings 
already supplied by ‘full-grown’.
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she claims it was not her deed but the Alastor’s, appearing in her form. It would be 
reasonable, given these prior considerations, to conclude as the chorus do when they 
say (Ag. 1505-8):
cbq pev avamo<;14 el
xou5e cpovoD x(<; o papxupfjooov;
7io5 two; rarcpoOev be cn)A,Xri7txcop yevoix’ av dA.doxo)p.
Who will bear you witness that you are not responsible for this murder? How can 
you not be, how can you not be? But an avenging spirit of the father may well be 
your accomplice.
The chorus accept that the Alastor may have had involvement in the death of 
Agamemnon, but they also express that, though this may be the case, Clytemnestra 
cannot be cleared of all, or indeed the main, responsibility for it. As the Alastor may 
be Clytemnestra’s gyXXrjTcxcop, one may be justified in calling him cruvaixioc; but 
Clytemnestra is the one who remains in a true sense aixioc;. The death of 
Agamemnon is thus connected with both Clytemnestra’s anger at the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia and with the House of Atreus’ spirits of vengeance. It is important to note 
that while we are presented with this twofold reasoning concerning who or what is 
responsible for Agamemnon’s death, we are not faced with Zeus and the Olympians 
in Clytemnestra’s reasoning or justification. Clytemnestra, in contrast with Orestes 
in the Libation Bearers, never asserts that she was ordered by Zeus or any other god 
to kill Agamemnon. As already stated, she supplies four reasons for her involvement 
in his death, none of which include divine instruction or a divine imperative issued 
by an Olympian god. If she had been ordered by Zeus, or by any other Olympian, to 
kill Agamemnon -  or even if she had just felt that she could reasonably claim that 
this was so — it is reasonable to expect that she would have said as much, and 
Aeschylus would have had to mention such an injunction in the absence o f any 
earlier version of the story containing such information. Indeed, if she had been 
ordered to kill Agamemnon it is also possible that she would not have been so
14 Compare avcuxio<; at Ch. 873; cf. PI. 77 42d. Cf. also the discussion o f  aixio<; by Sedley (1998) 114- 
32, which highlights that, when coupled with the genitive, the adjective designates a cause or assigns 
responsibility for a thing. The discussion also draws attention to the word’s legal associations.
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concerned with the baipcov during the final scene of the play, because her act would 
have been intrinsically linked with a being higher and more powerful than the 
baipcov, which would supersede it in importance. The chorus even draw attention to 
the potential role and will of Zeus in the death o f Agamemnon (1481-8), which only 
seems to emphasise that Clytemnestra does not do so. Or, if we cannot say that 
Clytemnestra would not have been so concerned with the baipcov should Zeus or an 
Olympian god have ordered Agamemnon’s death -  as Orestes is pursued by the 
Erinyes in spite of being ordered by Apollo (and Zeus) to kill Clytemnestra -  it 
would nevertheless be expected that she would mention their involvement, if only to 
deflect attention from herself for a moment, or to gain the gods’ help. But, 
Clytemnestra does not mention Zeus or any other Olympian at all during this final 
scene. And while Clytemnestra does invoke Zeus at 973-4 shortly before she kills 
Agamemnon, such an invocation does not imply, or even just suggest, that the god 
will fulfil the act.15 So, as she does not mention Zeus after the killing, we are 
justified in concluding that Zeus and the Olympians had no part in Agamemnon’s 
death, or, at the very least, that they were not thought by Clytemnestra as having any 
part in it.
ZEUS XENIOS
Although it has not been possible to find evidence of Zeus’, or any other 
Olympian’s, being involved directly or indirectly in the death of Agamemnon 
through ordaining or sanctioning the actions of the killer herself, it might 
nevertheless be possible to elicit information from the text which indicates that 
Agamemnon committed some transgression that earned him the wrath o f Zeus or 
some other Olympian; or it might even be possible to determine whether 
Agamemnon’s death in some way fitted the will of Zeus or one of the Olympians. At 
this juncture of the investigation, it is important to state outright that the will of Zeus 
or that of any other Olympian in Aeschylus is not depicted as arbitrary, but in fact as 
perfectly consistent. The arguments laid out here will work towards showing this 
conviction to be correct and justified.
15 See, for example, Horn. II. 2 .419-20, 12.173-4 for Zeus not listening to prayers and appeals for 
help.
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On several occasions, Zeus is said to have been directly involved both in 
sending the Greeks to Troy and in the city’s destruction. First, the chorus explicitly 
state that Zeus Xenios sent the Atreidae against Alexander Paris: outcd 5’ Aipscoq 
naXSaq o Kpdoacov l in ’ AA^avSpco Ttsjmtsi ^eviog I Zevg 7ioAoavopo<; apxpi 
yuvatKoq, ‘And thus, the one who is stronger, Zeus of Guest-friendship, sends the 
sons of Atreus against Alexander for the sake of a woman of many husbands’ (Ag. 
60-2). The chorus also see Zeus involved as much in the fall o f Troy as they had 
previously seen him involved in sending the Atreidae to the city (Ag. 355-60, 367- 
84); they see the fall of Troy as Aioq iikayav ‘the stroke of Zeus ’ (Ag. 367). For the 
chorus, Zeus is a constant force working for the punishment o f Paris and the fall of 
Troy (Ag. 361-6), and shortly before Agamemnon’s entrance, they reiterate this view 
confirming their belief in the efficacy of Zeus’ will (Ag. 699-708, 744-9). The 
Herald, too, indicates awareness of Zeus’ involvement in the war, saying that 
Agamemnon destroyed the Trojan land with the axe of Zeus, bringer of justice (Ag. 
525-6), and that the war was fulfilled by the grace of Zeus, x&pig Aio<; (Ag. 580-2).16 
Moreover, Agamemnon himself sees the gods playing their role in the destruction of 
Troy, recognising divine involvement in the expedition (Ag. 810-16, 851-3). It is, 
thus, clear that the expedition to Troy and the city’s destruction are presented as in 
line with the desire of Zeus, and that Agamemnon is aware o f the god’s involvement.
THE ANGER OF ARTEMIS AND THE SACRIFICE OF IPHIGENEIA
Though it is possible to establish that Agamemnon was sent to Troy in line 
with the will of Zeus, and as such that the expedition to Troy was not in itself a 
breach of justice, that does not, of course, remove the possibility that Agamemnon 
committed some transgression in the process of exacting punishment on Troy. In line 
with the accusations supplied by Clytemnestra after his death (Ag. 1412-25, 1431-7, 
1525-9; cf. 154-5), the sacrifice of Iphigeneia at Aulis is commonly seen as an 
example, if not the primary example, of Agamemnon’s transgressing the boundaries 
of justice.17 But although the sacrifice constitutes the taking of a life, it is 
nevertheless unclear how we should understand the sacrifice and what it constitutes a
16 For a discussion o f  the grace o f  Zeus and the gods and its ambivalence, see the section Hymn to 
Zeus below and, in particular, on A g. 182-3.
17 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 63, (1962) 187-99, (1971) 90-2, (1983) 102; Kitto (1964) 1-5, (1966) 58; 
Denniston and Page (1957) xv, xx-xxix; Otis (1981) 3-65, esp. 64-5; Cohen (1986) 132-4.
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transgression of, because although it is a transgression of the father/mother-daughter 
bond, it is not necessarily a transgression of the will o f Zeus and the Olympians. So, 
therefore, if we want to see Agamemnon as an impious and unjust man in the eyes of 
Zeus and the Olympians, it is necessary to find evidence that he has transgressed the 
boundaries of divine justice imposed by Zeus and in so doing angered the gods. It is 
not enough simply to find an act we, as a modem audience, may consider unjust (no 
matter how abhorrent or cruel) — or for that matter an act which an ancient audience 
considered abhorrent -  and to assume automatically that it is a transgression of the 
justice of Zeus. So, if we are to determine whether Agamemnon is guilty in the eyes 
o f Zeus, we must first determine whether he has committed an act which transgresses 
the will and justice of Zeus.
When adverse winds are sent by Artemis, Calchas puts forward a remedy for 
stilling them -  the remedy being the sacrifice of Iphigeneia -  erasi 8s K a i 7UKpou I 
XSipaxoc; aXXo pfjxap I PpiGuxspov Tipopoiaiv | pavxi<; £KA,ay^ev, I 7tpotpspo)v 
Apxsjiiv, ... ‘And when the seer cried out to the leaders, putting forward another 
remedy heavier even than a bitter winter-storm, making known Artemis (as the 
cause)...’ (Ag. 198-202). Agamemnon is faced with the decision either to sacrifice 
his daughter for the sake of the expedition and appease the winds and Artemis who 
sent them, or to forsake the expedition and all it entails in order to preserve his 
daughter’s life. He chooses to sacrifice his daughter (Ag. 205-47).
Some have questioned Agamemnon’s own personal awareness of his role in 
fulfilling the will of Zeus.18 If Agamemnon is not conscious of the will of Zeus at the 
moment of deciding to sacrifice Iphigeneia, the sacrifice could be seen purely as a 
decision to glorify himself at any cost and as an act of hubris. The yoke of necessity 
which he puts on, avajKaq e8d AixcaSvov (Ag. 2 18), would thus not refer to a pre­
existing or external divine compulsion placed upon him by divine necessity, but 
could either refer to the compulsion placed upon him by the duty he feels towards his 
fleet or the necessity of subsequent events. At this moment, I do not wish to get into 
a full discussion of free will, determinism, over-determinism or compulsion 
concerning Agamemnon’s decision at Aulis to sacrifice Iphigeneia,19 as my main
18 See, for example, Lesky (1983); Conacher (1987) 89; Dodds (2007) 256-64; Peradotto (2007) 226- 
43.
19 The issue o f  free will and decision making permeates many studies o f  A eschylus’ Agamemnon and 
the question o f  Agamemnon’s guilt (see n .l& 2 for bibliography). The notion o f  what constitutes free
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argument is not dependent on any one interpretation regarding this issue. I will now, 
however, discuss the extent to which the gods, in particular Artemis and Zeus, may 
or may not have been a consideration in Agamemnon’s decision, and attempt to shed 
light upon the possible causes which led to Iphigeneia’s sacrifice, so as to determine 
whether Agamemnon did in fact transgress the boundaries of justice.
Shortly before Agamemnon dons the yoke of necessity he is reported to have 
said (Ag. 206-17):
(3a p s i a  p s v  K ijp  t o  p i)  7t i0£ a 0a t ,
(3a p e i a  5’ s i  t s k v o v  S a i'^ a ), 5o p c o v  a y a A p a ,
piaivoov 7iap0svoo(pdyoiaiv
p£i0poiq Ttaxpcbiotx; yfpaq
KsXag (3c o p o ir  x i  xa>v5’ a v £ i>  k o lk co v ;
roSc; A u to v a t x ;  y s v c o p a i
^ u p p a x i a t ;  a p a p x c b v ;
7tauaav£po\) yap
0i)a ia < ; 7i a p 0£ v io u  0’ a i p a x o q  o p y a  
7t £ p i6py(o<;‘ olko 8’ a u S a  
© £ p i <;. £ u  y a p  £ tr |.
Grievous is the fate if I am not obedient, and grievous it is if I slay my child, the 
glory o f my house, defiling the hands of a father with streams of blood from a 
slaughtered maiden at an altar. Which one of these things is without evil? How can I 
desert the fleet, doing wrong by my alliance? Indeed, it swells with excessive anger 
for a sacrifice and for a maiden’s blood to still the winds: Themis forbids it. May it 
be well!
Before commencing with a discussion of the interpretation of this passage, it is first 
necessary to undertake a discussion of the text, lines 214-17. It is possible to see the 
main contention resting primarily with whether we read the phrase opya | 7t£pi6pyco<;-
will and the ability to make a decision freely can be seen to lie at the heart o f  Greek tragedy, with the 
essence o f  any plot relying on action and the ability o f  the protagonist to choose. However, the 
introduction into the debate o f  an idea such as free w ill perhaps raises more questions than it answers, 
because what can truly be considered a free choice, when are characters in tragedy ever not acted 
upon by som e form o f  external necessity? As has been said, (Herrmann (2013) 72): ‘Decision as a 
free, spontaneous act presupposes a mental faculty, such as ‘the free w ill’.... whose capacities are in 
no way determined by external factors, by considerations o f  necessity and constraint.’
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ano 5’ a\>5a | @spi<; or op|ya 7ispiopyco<; 87ii0i)|psiv Gspiq, and the two words: ai)Sa 
(which West reads following M jq T, Keck (1863)); and £7ii0up£iv (following thus 
Fraenkel), which is found in an alternative tradition to the reading given above. The 
more common reading of 214-17 (following Q., thus Fraenkel, Page OCT) is given 
here:
Tcaocavspoo yap Bocriaq 
7tap0£viou 0’ ai'paiot; op­
ya 7t£pi6pyco(; etciOd- 
p£iv 0£piq. eu yap rify
The first issue which casts suspicion on these lines is with the ‘presence of the 
unexplained variant abSa for opya’;20 the second is that £7ti0up£iv is a regular gloss 
for opya and that 7i£piopyco(; £7u0v|i£iv seems rather an extreme phrase and does not 
appear elsewhere in Aeschylus -  though, as Fraenkel ad loc points out, it does 
appear elsewhere in tragedy (S. Track 617, E. Ale. 867). West argues that £7ii0up£iv 
is likely a gloss and that with its removal it is possible to explain the presence of the 
variant reading of a68a without amending or removing opya.21 One must point out 
that by reading £7u0D|i£Tv, it is necessary to have opya taking the genitive object. 
While it is not impossible for the verb to take the genitive, the construction is not
99found anywhere else. But, in spite of this, West’s reading gives greater and fuller 
an account of these two key textual problems.
Nevertheless, while I agree with West’s text here, my interpretation o f it 
differs. In reading these lines, I understand as the object of euro 5’ au8a |0£fii<;, the 
subject of the previous question Amovaix; ycvcopai. In so doing, I understand that ano 
5’ av8a |@£px<; is the response to the former question, which seems reasonable not 
least because ouio 8’ auSa |0£pa<; seems in this context to be some form of definitive 
answer or statement. The basis for this conviction is, first, the use of yap in line 214, 
which indicates that lines 214-16 are a continuation of thought and suggest why if 
Agamemnon were to desert the fleet, he would be doing wrong by the alliance. What
20 West, M. L. (1990) 179.
2‘ West, M. L. (1990) 179-81.
22 Fraenkel (1950) 2.124. The closest examples, given by LSJ, are found in Aristophanes’ Lys. 1113, 
Birds 462 and do not have an explicit object.
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Themis forbids is for Agamemnon to desert the fleet, not the sacrifice. But, more 
importantly, if we take into consideration Zeus’ role in the build up to the war (Ag. 
55-62) and Themis’ connection with Zeus and his will (Hes. Th. 901), it is natural 
that Themis would forbid Agamemnon to desert the alliance and war against Troy, a 
war which has been sanctioned by Zeus and one which requires Agamemnon to take 
vengeance on Paris’ transgression of the laws o f xenia. This reading of 206-17 is 
also supported by the rest of the passage, which I will discuss now.
Another contention lies in how we interpret line 206, PapsTa psv Kip to  pp 
7ii0sa0ai, ‘Grievous is the fate if I am not obedient.’ To whom must Agamemnon be 
obedient? The first two lines of Agamemnon’s decision speech weigh up two 
considerations: whether to disobey something unnamed or to kill his daughter. The 
unnamed something is likely to be relatively simple to deduce, even if it is not 
immediately self-evident, because if it were not, Agamemnon’s decision would lose 
much of its poignancy, purpose and meaning. Most have seen the unnamed 
something as that consideration named a few lines later, namely deserting the fleet, 
7rcoc; Autovauc; ysvcopai I ^i>ppaxia<; apapitbv; ‘How can I desert the fleet, doing 
wrong by the alliance?’23 This I think, however, misreads the sense of the passage. 
There is nothing that necessitates reading the deserting of the fleet as the weighty 
unnamed consideration o f line 206. Rather, deserting the fleet seems to be a 
connected supplementary consideration that is a corollary of the unnamed something 
of line 206 and killing his daughter of line 207. So, when Agamemnon asks the 
question, xi tgdvS’ owed kcikcov; ‘Which one of these things is without evil?’ he is 
referring to those two considerations he has just stated: the unnamed something and 
the killing of his daughter. And when he asks the question, 7tcc><; Aurovonx; ysvcopai I 
^uppaxiac; apapicbv; ‘How can I desert the fleet, doing wrong by the alliance?’ in the 
next line he is referring to an additional, though not independent, third consideration 
in addition to the previous two.
Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia should be seen as a choice 
between incurring divine wrath and killing his daughter.24 It has already been 
established that Agamemnon was sent to Troy by Zeus Xenios and that he was
23 Fraenkel (1950) 2.212; Lawrence (1976) 101; Tyrrell (1976) 323; Lesky (1983) 16-18; Conacher 
(1987) 12-13; Sommerstein (1996) 363-4; Dodds (2007) 259.
24 See Fontenrose (1971) 82, who correctly asserts that the fleet could hardly bring a heavy heart upon 
Agamemnon. Denniston and Page (1957) xxvi, also understands 206 as Zeus’ divine command.
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conscious of divine involvement in the expedition.25 With this in mind, it seems 
more plausible that the unnamed something of line 206 is related to the gods, and it 
is likely -  because of the prominent position of Artemis and Zeus in the parodos -  
that it is one or both o f these gods that is playing on Agamemnon’s mind. And so, 
when he chooses to sacrifice his daughter, Agamemnon should be seen as making a 
conscious decision to subordinate the bond and connection that exists between 
himself and his daughter in favour of following the will o f the gods. This in turn 
supports my reading of the text at 216-17: ano 5’ au8a |©spi<; as referring to 
Agamemnon’s concern about deserting the fleet and the divinely sanctioned 
expedition, not the sacrifice.
What of the presentation of the sacrifice itself? What of the moment when 
Agamemnon decides to sacrifice his daughter? Is there any indication in this scene 
that Agamemnon has acquired ‘guilt’ that would bring about the anger of the gods? 
The passage reads (Ag. 218-27):
S7i8i 5’ avayKaq e8u A87ia5vov 
tppevoq26 7rv£cov SoaoePfj ipo7iaiav 
avayvov aviepov, x60ev 
to 7tavTOToApov27 (ppoveiv pexeyvco.
Ppoioix; ©pacruvsi yap aiaxpopqnq 
xaAatva 7tapaK07td 7ipcoxo7rrjpcov sxAa 8’ ouv 
Ouxfjp ysveoOat 
0uyaxp6(;, yuvaiK07coivo)v 
jcoAepcov apcoyav 
Kai TCpoxsAeia vacov.
And when he put on the yokestrap of necessity, the wind of his phren veering in a 
direction that was impious, impure, unholy, he thereupon turned to a mindset that 
would stop at nothing. The fostering of base designs, a wretched madness, the first 
cause of ill, emboldens men. And so he dared to be the sacrificer of his daughter, to
25 See above section Zeus Xenios.
25 For a recent discussion o f  psychological terminology in Aeschylus, see Darcus Sullivan (1997).
27 mxvxoToApov = 7tdvToApov, here translated as ‘stop at nothing’, elsewhere always refers to a 
negative character in Aeschylus: Ag. 1237 refers periphrastically to Clytemnestra; Ch. 431 to 
Clytemnestra; Th. 671 to Polyneices.
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give help to a woman-avenging war and to perfom the preliminary sacrificial 
offering for the fleet.
This scene has commonly been taken as an example that demonstrates the 
criminality of Agamemnon’s actions in killing Iphigeneia, and the religious wording 
employed by the chorus Sixjaepfj... avayvov avispov is often cited as evidence that 
Zeus wanted to see Agamemnon killed.28 These lines have also been highlighted as 
the moment when Agamemnon becomes overcome by a divine madness,29 when his
•>A ^
‘wits’ have been taken from him. It is at this moment that Agamemnon is 
understood to be altered irrevocably, and it is this change in his nature which is taken 
to account for the decision he makes to step on the purple cloths when yielding to 
Clytemnestra’s desires (Ag. 956-7).31
However, it is not necessarily the case that the scene shows Agamemnon 
putting himself on the wrong side of divine justice by sacrificing his daughter; nor 
does it necessarily demonstrate a permanent change in his mind under the influence 
of a divinely-sent madness. This is not to make the claim that the act is not horrific, 
abhorrent or worthy of condemnation. The chorus are, obviously, disgusted that a 
father could perform such a deed as sacrificing his daughter, and this is indicated 
clearly in the chorus’ choice of words throughout the strophe (e.g. TcavxoxoApov in 
line 221) as well as the vivid and moving depiction of Iphigeneia’s death in the 
following verses (Ag. 228-47). Agamemnon also demonstrates his own awareness of 
the ethically dubious nature o f sacrificing his own daughter at 206-11. But, an act 
that seems to break the laws of nature, nurture, familial care and paternal love is, 
nevertheless, not necessarily the same as an act which breaks the laws and justice of 
Zeus, especially in a trilogy o f plays in which different types of natural and divine 
justice are at issue. It is necessary to be careful how we read this scene and not to 
confuse the chorus’ human disgust at the sacrifice with statements (let alone the 
author’s statement) of religious transgression. So, when the chorus say that
28 See Lloyd-Jones (1956) 63, (1962) 187-99, (1971) 90-2, (1983) 102; Kitto (1964) 1-5, (1966) 58; 
(1957) xv, xx-xxix; Otis (1981) 3-65, esp. 64-5; Cohen (1986) 132-4; Fraenkel (1950) 2.98-9, 441, 
625; Lesky (1983) 13-23; Nussbaum (1986) 34; Conacher (1987) 13, 76-96; Sommerstein (1996) 
275-87; Dodds (2007) 255-64; Peradotto (2007) 237.
29 Conacher (1987) 14-15.
30 Lloyd-Jones (1962) 197. Lloyd-Jones draws a comparison between this scene and Iliad  19, in 
which Agamemnon’s behaviour is accounted for as the result o f  Ate.
31 Conacher (1987) 37.
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Agamemnon breathed forth an air irreverent, impious and unholy, it is possible to 
see this as exhibiting a subjective, human response to the killing of a daughter by a 
father, without necessarily understanding the words as a reflection of the position of 
Zeus, because although the chorus employ religious terminology, there is nothing in 
the text that suggests the sacrifice of Iphigeneia runs counter to the divine will of 
Zeus (or any other god) or that the god sent a divine madness upon Agamemnon. 
Indeed, all that is indicated in the parodos (and the play and trilogy as a whole) is 
that Artemis (Ag. 134-8, 198-202) desires the sacrifice and Zeus (Ag. 60-2) requires 
the punishment o f Paris and Troy.
Moreover, there is nothing which necessitates that we should understand this 
scene as a demonstration of lasting madness (divine or otherwise) overcoming 
Agamemnon, by which his subsequent decisions are affected. While the chorus refer 
to a wretched madness (i&Aaiva TiapaKond), the madness to which they refer is 
context-specific and does not seem to extend to Agamemnon outside of the scene. It 
is the act of fostering of base designs (aiaxpopqnq) which is called a wretched 
madness; Agamemnon is not himself called mad; and the chorus’ conviction can 
thus be understood as referring to the act of sacrifice alone. While it may be possible 
to argue that the chorus’ statement that ‘the act of fostering base designs is a 
wretched madness’ can be considered a universal truth applicable to Agamemnon’s 
character and decisions generally, its inspiration is nevertheless Agamemnon’s 
decision to sacrifice his daughter in favour of going to war. This is indicated not least 
by the position of lines 222-3 in the middle o f a whole stanza concerned solely with 
the sacrifice and directly after Agamemnon is said to turn his mind to the deed.
Also, the language used in lines 222-3 does not in itself give any clear 
indication that Agamemnon was overcome by any lasting madness. The moment at 
which Agamemnon is said to change or alter his mind reads: xoGsv xo 7cavx6xoApov 
(ppovEiv psxsyvoo, ‘he thereupon turned to a mindset that would stop at nothing’. The 
use o f the aorist psxsyvco suggests that the change of mind was a simple completed 
action and not an on-going process; while the present infinitive cppovsiv implies that 
the thought-process was on-going, which indicates that the madness could in itself be 
a lasting affliction. However, the on-going process implied by the present infinitive 
(ppovsTv is placed in direct relation to the all-daring act to TtavTOToApov, which thus 
implies that cppoveTv need not be understood to have any reference outside of this
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specific context. So, the aioxpopquq to which the chorus refer in line 222 can be 
seen to refer directly to and pick up on the thought process (ppovsiv psxsyvo) 
described in the previous line. While the chorus present Agamemnon’s decision to 
sacrifice Iphigeneia as an act o f madness, the madness which they ascribe to him 
need not be read as a lasting affliction. In this way, the stanza can be seen to present 
not so much a lasting change in Agamemnon’s nature, as to depict how, in the 
chorus’ mind, he could possibly steel himself to complete the sacrifice of his 
daughter. The madness seems therefore to be used as an ex post facto  rationalisation 
by the chorus of how a father could possibly kill his daughter in order to wage a war: 
i.e. ‘How could Agamemnon sacrifice his daughter? He must have been overcome 
by some kind of madness.’32
While it is possible to determine that Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter 
because of the desire not to incur the anger of the gods and that he did so without 
incurring any ‘guilt’ or being overcome by any lasting madness, it has not been 
established why the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is necessary, in accordance with whose 
justice it is exacted, and how these considerations in turn affect the framework of 
justice within the Oresteia. It is easy enough to deduce that Artemis requires the 
sacrifice, and that it is she alone who desires it (Ag. 134-8, 198-202). Artemis 
behaves as a ‘separate godhead’33 and, though constrained by the overarching power 
of Zeus and the need for cosmic balance, she nevertheless acts independently of Zeus 
in this case.34 The sacrifice itself is an act of requital that needs to be paid if 
Agamemnon is going to exact vengeance on Troy. The blood Agamemnon is to 
shed at Troy is denoted by the much-discussed omen of the eagles, which depicts a 
pair of eagles devouring a hare pregnant with young, while Iphigeneia will provide 
the blood Agamemnon gives in payment to Artemis (Ag. 131-8).
Without getting diverted from the central issue o f this chapter with 
discussions of various readings of the portent, it is sufficient here to state that, as the 
interpretation of the omen in the text suggests, the eagles signify the Atreidae and the
32 This is also true o f  the Hymn to Zeus. See the section below  for this argument.
33 Tyrrell (1976) 331.
34 Fontenrose (1971) 79; see also Allan (2006) 1-36.
35 There is no mention here o f  the alternative version o f  the story that sees Agamemnon kill a sacred 
stag belonging to Artemis. This version would probably have been known to A eschylus’ audience not 
least from the Cypria, which we can also see reflected in Sophocles’ E lectra  566-76. See also 
Fraenkel (1950) 2.97-8.
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pregnant hare Troy.36 The first thing which needs to be drawn from the passage is 
that it is foreseen that Agamemnon will be responsible for the destruction of Troy 
and the deaths of many Trojans. He will shed blood. The second thing which needs 
to be observed in this passage is the anger of Artemis at the death of the hare and its 
young. She pities the pregnant hare and hates the eagles’ feast and what they denote. 
As a consequence of what Artemis sees as the future destruction of Troy, the 
goddess sends winds which detain the Greek fleet. In order for the Greeks to be 
released from the ship-detaining winds, Agamemnon is required to sacrifice 
Iphigeneia for Artemis (Ag. 198-202).
It has been argued that the ‘fundamental maxim 5pdoavn 7ca0siv cannot be 
supplanted by a Spaoovn 7ta0siv’37 and thus that Agamemnon could not be seen as 
paying in advance for the destruction of Troy, which the portent denotes. However, 
this argument neglects the direct connection between the sack of Troy (Ag. 126-33) 
announced by the seer and the omen of the eagles (Ag. 134-8) which is said to have 
angered Artemis, with one spoken directly before the other and with the former 
leading into the latter as one continuous and uninterrupted thought. The argument 
also overlooks the fundamental nature of prophecies as bringing the future into the 
present and that (in Greek tragedy, at least) they are always proven correct.38 In this 
way, as an event is foreseen, thus it will come about, and because it is foreseen so it 
has occurred. The infallible nature of prophecy in the Greek tragedy of Aeschylus 
and Sophocles means that, in many respects, the event prophesied is fulfilled the 
moment the prophecy is pronounced, and that it can be treated as such. Indeed, the 
first thing Calchas is reported to say in the parodos is that the expedition will capture 
Troy (Ag. 126-33). There is no doubt that this will happen.
Also, although the actual destruction of Troy and the omen at which Artemis 
is angry are separated by ten years, by mustering the troops at Aulis Agamemnon has 
embarked on the action that will lead to the destruction o f the city. Agamemnon has 
set events in motion. This telescoping of events, moving what is ostensibly the future 
into the present, is strengthened by the fact that the omen is spoken of in the present 
tense: Artemis hates the feast of eagles, oruysT 5s Ssucvov aisxwv (Ag. 138). It seems
36 See also Fraenkel (1950) 2.96.
37 Fraenkel (1950) 2.97.
38 See, Kamerbeek (1965) 29-40; Mikalson (1991) 88-101. Mikalson (1991) 94 also provides a 
detailed list o f  prophecies in Greek tragedy.
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that for Artemis her anger and hatred belong to the present and that Agamemnon can 
be and is culpable for the destruction of Troy, because the mustering of the Greek 
forces at Aulis belongs to the causal nexus that will bring about -  and that is -  the 
fall of Troy.
It is not only here in the parodos that events are telescoped. Internally within 
the time-frame o f the events of the play we have already had a signal o f Troy’s 
capitulation before we have even come to the omen itself (Ag. 22). The certainty of 
Troy’s destruction which is confirmed by the Watchman, as well as by Calchas, 
foreshadows the omen of the eagles. Within the internal structure of the play Troy is 
known to have been taken by line 22, and within the time-frame of the events at 
Aulis, Troy’s impending capture by the Greeks is pronounced before the omen is 
related. Within both time-frames Troy is known to be taken, in spite of the event not 
being fulfilled in the strict linear time-frame while Agamemnon is still at Aulis and 
yet to set sail for Troy.
But, even if the arguments regarding prophecy and the telescoping o f events, 
and the different time-frames of prophecy and those of the internal structure of the 
play are dismissed, it cannot be dismissed that there exists a causal and logical 
connection between what Calchas says in Antistrophe a (Ag. 126-38) concerning the 
sack of Troy and the anger o f Artemis at the eagles’ feast. One event signifies the 
other, and the destruction of Troy (portended by the omen) is the transgression which 
is to be punished and reset by Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia.
At first glance it may seem difficult to see how the sacrifice could possibly be 
construed as just and why Artemis should desire it. First, there appears striking 
contradictions in Artemis’ desire for the sacrifice. In her anger at the deaths o f many 
she requires yet another; she is said to care for young animals (Ag. 140-4), yet 
requires the death of one; she is the virgin goddess, but desires the death o f one like 
her. But, in spite of this, we should not be diverted or indeed overly concerned by the 
contradictory nature Artemis appears to possess here in the Agamemnon. For, she 
strikes a contradictory figure throughout most of early Greek literature, and her 
contradictions seem to be inherent in her very nature.
In giving Artemis the epithet dyva (‘pure’, ‘holy’ and ‘chaste’), Aeschylus 
follows Homer (Od. 5.123, 18.202, 20.71). The epithet captures both her sexual 
chastity and her traditional natural habitats o f untouched mountains, fields and
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woodlands. Her care for the untouched state of the natural world seems to be bound 
up with her own inviolable nature. In the Iliad, Artemis’ care for the untouched state 
o f nature is also implied by the epithet 7i6tvkx 0r|pcov ‘Mistress of Animals’ (II. 
21.470). But while this epithet may imply a caring maternal attitude towards
39animals, just as the passage from the Agamemnon also suggests (Ag. 140-4), 
Artemis is more often depicted in early Greek literature as an archer or huntress 
exhibiting her dominance over the natural world and mankind (II. 5.53, 5.447, 6.428, 
16.183, 19.59, 20.39, 24.606; Od. 6.102-4, 11.324-5, 15.409-411, 15.477-9, 20.61-3; 
h. Horn, xxvii; Hes. Th. 14, 918). Her maternal care lies in direct opposition to her 
pure, virgin state. So, while being a virgin goddess, sympathetic to young creatures, 
Artemis is also a powerful, wild deity who presides over nature and young creatures 
as protector and destroyer at one and the same time.
It is the sphere of nature and hunting that is hers; the protection of life and its 
taking is hers.40 Artemis’ vested interests in the hunting and protection of life can 
thus be seen to indicate that Agamemnon’s future destruction of Trojan life, as 
signified by the portent, should be construed as a transgression of the boundaries of 
her sphere of power. Indeed, there are real-life parallels of animal sacrifices being 
offered to Artemis before battle, which suggest that there was a need to propitiate the 
goddess and secure protection before blood was shed in battle, in a way comparable 
to Agamemnon sacrificing Iphigeneia to secure the goddess’ consent for the 
destruction of Troy.41 So, if Agamemnon is to take life at Troy, which is here 
portended in the omen of the eagles, he needs first to repay the goddess by 
sacrificing Iphigeneia for infringing upon the boundaries of her ordinance and 
upsetting her. In so doing, Agamemnon is able to quell the contrary winds and calm 
the wrath of Artemis by conforming to the goddess’ desires.
The death of Iphigeneia also presents a problem because she is ‘innocent’ and 
because it is required by a goddess who is, in Homer at least, considered a member 
of the Olympian order. So, how can the sacrifice of Iphigeneia fit within the nature 
o f divine justice? If we consider the role of Artemis in the parodos, we are 
confronted with two ‘innocents’, each treated in a contrasting way to the other. The
39 See also Otto (1954) 82-4.
40 See N ilsson (1925) 28-9, 82, 112; Otto (1954) 80-90; Lloyd-Jones (1983); Burkert (1985) 149-52.
41 See Otto (1954) 86; Lloyd-Jones (1983) 101; Burkert (1985) 151-2. Cf. Call. F r.l 14.
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first is the image of the hare’s unborn young in Calchas’ prophecy, which are killed 
by the eagles together with the hare itself The unborn young, because of the natural 
connotations of ‘innocence’ associated with the unborn, can be seen to denote in a 
broad and general fashion those Trojans who are not directly responsible for or 
involved with Paris’ actions in transgressing codes of xenia. They would thus be 
‘innocent’ of the act committed by Paris and would not be responsible for bringing 
Agamemnon to Troy in order to exact revenge.
The second ‘innocent’ is Iphigeneia. In contrast with the death of the unborn 
young in the omen, her death is required by Artemis and does not elicit any anger. 
The demand for this sacrifice, seemingly inconsistent in the respect it pays to 
‘innocents’ and ‘innocence’, could easily be charged with the claim that it represents 
the arbitrary nature of the goddess, and even the Olympian gods as a whole.42 
However, such a charge misses what appears to underlie the concept of justice 
applicable to the gods of Aeschylean tragedy. Though both examples involve what 
we might call ‘innocents’, their respective contexts are quite different. The omen 
signifies an infringement upon Artemis’ sphere of power, while the sacrifice is 
something required by the goddess for the infringement. What is at issue in the two 
examples is the respect owed to the deity and compliance with her will, and not the 
‘innocence’ of any individual animal or person per se. While Artemis may be angry 
at the death o f an unborn (or what it symbolises), it is not the death in itself that 
angers her, nor the ‘innocence’ of the animal -  for let us not forget that she seems 
equally angered by the death of the hare as by the death of the unborn -  rather, it 
seems she is angered by the omen, because it denotes a breach of her sphere of 
power and thus a lack of respect owed to her particular divinity and the areas over 
which she presides -  something which Agamemnon needs to repay, something 
which he repays with the sacrifice of Iphigeneia.
There are other occasions when ‘innocence’ and ‘innocents’ seem of no 
interest to the Olympian gods in the Oresteia. For example, when Agamemnon and 
Cassandra are killed by Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon, Apollo -  through whom 
Zeus speaks (Eu. 17-19, 614-21, 713-14) -  sends Orestes to avenge only his father, 
and no thought is given by the Olympians to avenging the ‘innocent’ Cassandra -  
though according to Cassandra, Apollo is the only one in whose eyes she is certainly
42 Cf. Cohen (1986).
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not innocent, especially of transgression against him.43 However, whether we 
consider Cassandra as innocent or not in the eyes of Apollo, her death nevertheless 
has no weight or worth, and this is confirmed by the fact that her death is forgotten 
as soon as it is accomplished and mentioned no further in the subsequent plays of the 
trilogy. Indeed, Cassandra’s role seems almost to be confined to the function she 
fulfils within the dramatic structure in the Agamemnon. Conversely, Agamemnon, 
who is responsible for many deaths, including his daughter’s, and even the razing of 
a city, is avenged by his son at the behest of Apollo (and Zeus). Thus, the act of 
killing does not in itself carry a ‘moral stigma’ in Aeschylus.
Rather, there must be some other criterion by which we judge what is just or 
otherwise in Aeschylus. The Olympian gods seem to be more concerned with the 
respect paid to their power and position.44 In this way, Artemis’ reaction to 
Agamemnon’s expedition to Troy bears similarity to Zeus’ reaction to Paris’ 
disregard of xenia. Zeus sanctions the destruction o f Troy because of Paris’ 
transgression, just as Artemis requires the death of Iphigeneia because of 
Agamemnon’s transgression. Before we even come to the sacrifice of Iphigeneia 
required by Artemis, punishment by means of death for the transgression of a god’s 
sphere thus has a precedent in the play (in the form of the Greeks’ sanctioned siege 
and destruction of Troy). It is not what might be termed through Christian/post- 
Christian eyes the ‘moral worth’ of either the Trojans or Iphigeneia that concerns 
Zeus or Artemis in either case, but the respect the gods feel is due to their position as 
divinities. What may be perceived as the moral worth of the victims seems of no 
concern to the deities. Indeed, what seems of greater concern to the gods in the 
Oresteia is the choice of punishment and how it fits the transgression. The sheer 
scale of Zeus’ punishment of Paris with the destruction of Troy and everything in it 
reflects the god’s power and position within the divine world, and arguably the 
complicity of the Trojans as a whole in Paris’ rape of Helen, indicating the gravity of 
Paris’ transgression, while the characteristics of Artemis establish a natural parallel 
between herself and Iphigeneia, and suggest the latter, on one level, as the fitting
43 O f course, Cassandra is not family, which is a significant factor in the trilogy and has a role to play 
here as well as in the Eumenides. But, it is still worth here bringing out the role that innocence plays 
(or does not play) in the nature o f  justice in the Oresteia.
44 For the importance o f  uprj in the trilogy and its significance for the resolution at the end o f  the 
Eumenides, see further the discussion o f  the Erinyes in the section Zeus, the Erinyes and  the Vote o f  
Athena  below.
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sacrifice which Agamemnon must make in order to achieve the destruction o f Troy. 
The justice of Artemis’ requirement of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice can therefore be seen as 
consistent with the justice presented by Zeus’ desire for retribution against Troy for 
Paris’ actions. These two acts demonstrate the need for compliance with the gods’ 
will and how if such compliance is not forthcoming it is treated as a transgression of 
the boundaries o f justice, and as such will be punished. Both the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia and the destruction of Troy should thus be seen as just acts and 
Agamemnon as a just man for executing them, because in each instance his exacting 
of the gods’ will resets and realigns the balance of justice. This is not meant to 
prejudge the issue of the relation between the justice of Zeus and the justice of 
Artemis, but merely to demonstrate that there is a consistent line taken by either god 
in these two examples about what is and is not considered just, and what is required 
should an imbalance be created by a transgression.
THE HYMN TO ZEUS
It has been argued above that, when it comes to the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, 
Artemis acts independently o f Zeus. This raises questions about what role (if any) 
Zeus had in the sacrifice, outside of his position as a significant motivating force 
behind Agamemnon and the Greeks going to Troy. It will be argued here that in spite 
of the prominent position of the Hymn to Zeus in the choral ode, the striking thing 
about the sacrifice o f Iphigeneia and the parodos as a whole is the absence o f Zeus. 
In addition, it will be suggested that while the god remains a figure detached45 from 
the events narrated in the parodos, Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia, 
nevertheless, reflects Zeus’ ordinance of rcaOsi paOoq (the meaning of which will be 
discussed in the course of this section, as will choral authority) and further 
demonstrates the king’s awareness of the god’s desire to see Troy and Alexander 
punished for the theft of Helen.
First, it is necessary to consider exactly what the Hymn to Zeus says about 
the god and how it fits within the context of the parodos. Having cut-off from 
pronouncing the prophecy of Calchas, the chorus turn their attention to the nature of 
Zeus, saying (Ag . 160-83):
45 For a discussion o f  the detached and invariant nature o f  Zeus, see Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Z eus’ 
above.
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Zeuc;, oaxiq nox’ ecxiv, ei xo5’ au-
XCp (pi^ OV KSKlr|[!£VCp,
XOUXO VIV 7CpOO£W£7CCO'
oi)K £%co 7tpoaeiKdaai
rcavx’ £7naxa0pd)p£vo<;
nXi\v Ato<;, £i xo paxav ano (ppovxCSoq axOoq
Xprj PaX,£iv exrixx3|j.co<;.
oi)0’ ooxiq 7tapoi0£v rjv p.£ya<;
7cappdxco 0pdosi Ppucov,
ouSe ^£^<£x>ai rcpiv © v
o<; x’ erceix’ £(pu, xpiaK-
xfjpoq oixexat xuxcbv
Zfjva 5e xiq Ttpocppovcoc; eTtiviiaa kXo^ cov
xeu^exat (ppevcov xo 7tav,
xov cppovsiv Ppoxodq o5cb- 
aavxa, xov 7ta08i pdOog 
08vxa Kupicoc; 8%£iv. 
cxa^et 5’ av0’ u7cvou 7ipo KapSlai; 
pvT|ai7urjp©v rt6vo<;- Kai 7iap’ a- 
Kovxaq rjX,08 acocppovciv.
5aipovcov 5e 7ioo46 xbpic,,
Piouco<; ciXpa cepvov fjpevcov;
Zeus, whoever he is, if this is dear for him to be called, this is how I address 
him; if it is necessary, in all truth, to cast off the vain burden from my mind, 
weighing all things in the balance, I do not have anything to which to liken the vain 
burden on my mind except Zeus.47
46 Following manuscripts M V. For the significance o f  this reading on the meaning o f  the Hymn to 
Zeus and the justice o f  Zeus, see the discussion below. Cf. Pope (1974) 100-13.
47 This is one o f  the most troubling passages grammatically in Aeschylus, and arguably in the whole 
Greek corpus. The crux o f  the problem rests on how we translate the verb 7tpoasiKdaai ‘to liken 
something to something e lse’. It requires both an accusative direct object and a dative, neither o f  
which is overtly supplied in the Greek. However, I think some information can be inferred from the 
Greek itself, and the rest can be supplied from the context. First o f  all, the accusative direct object, as 
has been translated, is ‘anything’. This reading is based on the assumption that ouk ex©..-, ‘I do not
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The one who was previously great, swelling with a boldness that would 
enter battle with all, will not be spoken of as having been before. And then he who 
sprung forth met his over-thrower and is gone. But the one who willingly cries out 
victory songs for Zeus will achieve understanding of everything,
Zeus, the one who set men on the course to comprehension, established the 
ordinance to be held good that understanding comes through painful experience. 
And remembrances o f sufferings past drip before the heart instead o f sleep. Even to 
the unwilling temperance comes. How can this be the grace o f the daimones, seated 
by force upon their august thrones?
As with Supp. 86-103, the Hymn to Zeus presents the Aeschylean chorus entering 
into a speculative and revelatory discourse about the nature of the highest and most 
powerful god.48 Although the formula in lines 160-2 is itself traditional,49 the Hymn 
to Zeus is not a traditional prayer or invocation,50 as Zeus is not addressed directly in 
the second person. From the opening statement at line 160 we are confronted with 
what appears to be a statement expressing the unknowable nature of Zeus: Zeuc;, 
ocmc; tcox’ scmv, si io5 ’ au- | xcp (pttaw KeicXripsvcp, | xouxo viv 7ipoaewe7rco. This 
tentative naming of the god indicates that the chorus cannot frame Zeus’ nature in a 
single name. It seems as if Zeus is of such a nature that we as humans cannot 
possibly or successfully conceive of him fully.51
have (anything) ...’, in line 163 are read as a direct result o f  the everything that is weighed in the 
balance (7iavx’ £7ncn:a0pco|i£vo<;) in the following line. So, here I think we are supposed to take 7cdvx’, 
the direct object o f  the participle £7noxa0pcop£vo<;, as the ‘everything’ from which the chorus 
determine that they have nothing to which they can liken (^poaeiKdcrai) the burden weighing on their 
mind. The assumption is thus that having weighed all things in the balance, ftdvx’ £jnaTa0pd)g£vo<;, 
one then uses that which has been weighed as one variable to which another is to be likened. This then 
deals with the direct object; the implied dative o f  that to which the referent o f  the direct object is to be 
likened is, however, more elusive. It seems best to take Us referent from the subordinate clause. This 
is, as I have translated, the ‘vain burden weighing on my mind’, and this translation o f  the Greek is 
more easily rendered into English i f  the subordinate clause is read before the main clause, because it 
gives greater clarity to the dative object o f  7rpoG£iKdaai by the very fact it is spoken o f  before the 
‘likening’ is mentioned. For an examination o f  the meaning o f  7ipoaeiKdaai, see Smith (1980) 8-12.
48 For a discussion o f  Supp. 86-103, see Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’.
49 So, Fraenkel (1950) 2. 99; Norden (1956) 144-63. Cf. Heraclitus Fr. 32; E. Tr. 884-7, Ba. 274-6.
50 See, primarily, Norden (1956) 163-6; see also Pulleyn (1997) 101-3.
51 So, Fraenkel (1950) 2.100. Cf. discussion o f  Supp. 86-103 in the above chapter on the Nature o f  
Zeus, where the chorus o f  Danaids also profess an inability to know or understand the nature and will 
o f  Zeus. It is important to note here that what the chorus are indicating in the Hymn is distinct from 
the unknowabililty o f  divine names, which is at the heart o f  Heraclitus Fr. 32 and E. Fr. 912; for a 
discussion o f  these fragments, see above Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’.
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After this opening address to the god, the chorus move on to express their 
desire to be rid of the vain burden that weighs upon their mind, saying that they have 
nothing to which they can liken it, except Zeus: ouk ex® 7cpoasiKdoai | 7iavx’ 
S7cioxa0pcbfisvo<; | 7iXqv Aio<;, si to  paxav and (ppovxi5o<; ax0o<; | XP1! Po&eiv 
sxriTupax;. But, whether or not the reading of Ag. 163-7 is accepted in line with the 
translation and explanation provided above, the question still remains what exactly 
the vain burden is. Scholars have put forward various answers to this question which 
fall into three broad groups. Within these groups, opinions are more often than not 
dependent on the scholar’s outlook concerning the position and role of Zeus and the 
gods both in the Hymn and in the Oresteia as a whole. The first of these groupings, 
sometimes referred to as the optimistic tradition, sees the Hymn as a statement of the 
positive and benevolent power of Zeus. Working in line with this tradition, Fraenkel, 
for example, argues that: ‘xo paxav ax0o<; is the burden of the folly which induces 
men to believe that Zeus is not the almighty ruler, who directs all that is done among 
mankind.’52 In opposition to this tradition, Lloyd-Jones writes that: ‘The 'vain 
burden' is presumably a burden which the chorus is seeking to cast from its own 
mind... [and that] whatever it is, I doubt if this expression has any religious 
implication.’53 With a different line of attack and without strictly falling into any 
particular tradition, Gagarin sees the vain burden as ignorance of the fate of the 
Greek expedition and the anxiety of Agamemnon’s safe return.54 By contrast, in the 
pessimistic tradition, which finds little or no comfort in the power and justice of 
Zeus, P. M. Smith argues that the vain burden is the chorus’ inability to account for 
the sacrifice of Iphigeneia or, indeed, ‘to understand it as an effect corresponding in 
some way to an adequate cause.’55
While the Hymn has resonance beyond its immediate context and its 
contemplative subject-matter could tempt one to see something of the set-piece about
52 Fraenkel (1950) 2.103. The optimistic tradition is by far the most prevalent and can also be seen  
expressed by Kitto (1961) 70, (1964) 6; Lesky (1965) 74-5; and more recently Conacher (1983) 163- 
6, (1987) 11, who responds directly to the more recent pessimistic tradition and, in particular, to the 
arguments put forward by Smith (1980).
53 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 62; cf. Denniston and Page (1957) 83-6 for a similar view  that sees no 
‘profound philosophy’ in the Hymn to Zeus.
54 Gagarin (1976) 140.
55 Smith (1980) 16; cf. Pope (1974) 100-13. Smith (1980) 26-30, however, later abandons the 
pessimistic view  o f  the justice o f  Zeus in discussion o f  the Hym n’s second strophe, where he argues 
that the sacrifice o f  Iphigeneia, the destruction o f  Troy and the great loss o f  life is a grace o f  Zeus and 
the gods. See further discussion o f  the second strophe below.
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it, and while the Hymn does break up the narrative structure between lines 160 and 
183, not least with a change in the metre,56 there is not a complete change in the flow 
of the parodos and the shift in focus may not be as dramatic as some have 
suggested.57 First, on a structural level, the Hymn does not have a strophe, 
antistrophe, epode format as we may expect from a set-piece that disrupts the 
narrative. Such a format could thus be seen to separate the Hymn off from the 
surrounding verses through both its content and structure. Rather, it continues the 
strophe, antistrophe, strophe format throughout its three verses and fits neatly with 
the surrounding verses and the resumption o f the retrospective account of the 
sacrificial scene at line 184. Indeed, there are further reasons to believe the Hymn to 
Zeus is something other than a set-piece not, or only loosely, connected to its 
context, and this can be seen in the meaning of the vain burden of line 166.
The chorus begin the Hymn to Zeus in line 160 having previously been 
relaying Calchas’ pronouncement of the anger of Artemis and how the ship- 
detaining winds can be calmed. After the Hymn is finished in line 183, they revert 
back to the story at Aulis which moves on to describe the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. The 
position o f the Hymn within the parodos, the chorus’ desire to cast the vain burden 
from their mind and the unknowable, detached nature of Zeus are placed in direct 
relation to the concern the chorus exhibit over the death of Iphigeneia within the 
retrospective account of the mustering of the Achaean forces at Aulis.58 While, of 
course, from the chronological perspective of the play’s internal structure, the 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia has not been mentioned by the time the Hymn is sung, it must 
be taken into account that the parodos is a retelling of events and the chorus know 
what is to come, and one can presume (from a knowledge o f the canonical myths 
revised and retold throughout antiquity) that the audience in this case do too. So, 
when the chorus weigh all things in the balance and they have nothing to liken the 
vain burden of their minds to expect Zeus, it is possible to determine what they have 
on their mind from the surrounding lines and from the event they are considering 
before and after the Hymn: the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. It seems that the chorus, 
concerned and dismayed by the events that they are relating, cannot find any other
56 See Goldhill (1984) 25-6.
57 E.g. Fraenkel (1950), Kitto (1961, 1964).
58 So, Smith (1980) 1-7 ,30-35.
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cause or reason for what happened to Iphigeneia at Aulis, except in the highest and 
most powerful god.59 What the vain burden thus denotes60 rests on the knowledge 
that Zeus is the almighty god and the fact that he allowed the sacrifice of Iphigeneia 
to be completed through what is at the very least a passive acceptance of the events 
played out at Aulis.
The chorus’ unwavering belief in the power and position of Zeus as the 
greatest of all the gods that have ever been is depicted in the antistrophe (Ag. 168- 
75), where the chorus firmly situate Zeus at the top o f the divine world as the 
strongest and most powerful god. They sing of the succession myths, starting with 
Kronos’ win over Ouranos: ouO’ ocm<; 7idpoi0sv61 rjv psyaq | 7rappd%cp Gpaaet 
ppucov,| ou5s X£^<8i>ai 7Cpiv ©v ‘The one who was previously great, swelling with a 
boldness that would enter battle with all, will not be spoken o f as having been 
before;’ (Ag. 168-70) before moving on to Zeus’ victory over Kronos: oq r  eneir’ 
sqm, TpKXK-| xfjpo<; oixsxai tdx©v ‘And then he who sprung forth, met his over­
thrower and is gone.’ (Ag. 171-2), concluding the verse with the lines: Zfjva 5s ziq 
7cpo(ppov©q 87uviiaa kM^cdv | tsd^sxai (ppsvdov to  7cav, ‘But the one who willingly 
cries out victory songs for Zeus will achieve understanding of everything,’ (Ag. 173-
5).
By outlining the succession myths, which leaves Zeus as the sole ruling 
deity, the antistrophe demonstrates that the chorus cannot see how Zeus can be 
absent or uninvolved in the sacrifice when he is such a powerful and omnipotent 
god.62 It must be stated here that while the chorus find Zeus culpable, this does not 
necessarily mean that within the framework of the play as a whole we, the audience, 
are meant to think so as well. Although Zeus is omnipotent, he is not responsible for 
every single event -  in spite of the chorus’ desire to see him as such. The Hymn is 
a statement of Zeus’ power and position over gods and men, and not a conclusive or 
unambiguous pronouncement of the god’s involvement in the sacrifice. It expresses
59 So, Smith (1980) 34.
60 See below for discussion o f  why the burden is ‘vain’.
61 It is also possible to read this as Ouranos here and then Kronos at 171 (oq x’ en sn ’ ecpv), thus 
Fraenkel (1950) 2.103. However one interprets these lines, what matters is a recognition o f  the 
violence o f  the intergenerational familial feuds between the three consecutive ruling gods.
62 See Chapter 3 ‘The Nature o f  Zeus’ for a discussion o f  the power and limitations o f  Zeus.
63 Such a belief in the over-arching power o f  Zeus is intimated elsewhere in the play, not least at Ag. 
1485-9; see the discussion below, as w ell as the section The Power and Limitations o f  Zeus in Chapter 
3.
151
more the chorus’ desire to see the god involved in the lives of men, rather than an 
unequivocal insight into his workings in this and every event. This, nevertheless, 
does not mean we should discount everything the chorus say about Zeus. Though we 
should be careful not to view everything the chorus say as ‘gospel’ when it comes to 
the workings of the divine within the internal structure of the play -  because as 
human characters with no special connection with the gods it is possible that they 
may be mistaken -  their views about the nature of divinity, nevertheless, still present 
a genuine, valid belief in the nature and workings of the god, and it is this belief in 
the god which is of interest for this discussion. It is thus their view of the over­
arching power of Zeus and their concern regarding his apparent absence surrounding 
the sacrifice which inspires them to sing of Zeus, since Zeus must, in their mind, 
have some involvement in the sacrifice and the events surrounding it.
The question of choral authority and reliable access to knowledge underlies 
almost any discussion o f the Hymn to Zeus and the question has significance for 
much of this chapter, if not the thesis as a whole.64 The role and position of the 
chorus within the narrative of tragedy and its relation to the authorial voice has also 
been the subject of scholarly debate over the last couple of decades, a debate which 
has been aimed at developing and critiquing the traditional view of the chorus as 
being in some way the voice o f the author or an ideal spectator. Among the first to 
reassess the role and position of the chorus in tragedy were Vemant and Vidal- 
Naquet. They postulated that the chorus were representatives of the polis, who were 
an ‘anonymous and collective being whose role is to express, through its fears, hopes 
and judgements, the feelings o f the spectators who make up the civic community.’65 
This view of the chorus, however, runs into problems when one considers that the 
‘chorus, with only two exceptions in the surviving plays, enacts the response to 
events, not of representatives of the citizen body, but precisely of those ... marginal 
or simply excluded from the controlling voice of ‘the people’.’66 So, if the chorus are 
not characters that would play a key driving role in the democratic process of the 
polis as part of the core citizen body of male citizen-hoplites, but are old men, 
women or foreigners (whether non-Athenian or non-Greek) that are in some way
64 What follows picks up the discussion at the beginning o f  Chapter 2 on ‘choral authority.’ The 
discussion here adds to, clarifies and applies to context what is said before.
65 Vemant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 24.
66 Gould (1996) 220.
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marginalised from this integral group, how can such a collection be representative of 
the ‘civic community’? Gould, in fact, argues that the chorus are not in any way 
detached from the action, representative of the people’s voice or the poet’s voice, but 
are characters whose ‘otherness’ has a role within the structure and plot of tragedy. 
The chorus present another view of the action unfolding before our eyes, one that, 
because of their ‘otherness’ as slaves, women or old men, acts as a counterpoint to 
the main protagonists. Indeed, at the heart of Gould’s argument is that the chorus 
‘exists completely within the tragic fiction’68 and does not stand detached from the 
action: the chorus are characters just like any other dramatis persona and possess no 
special channel between themselves, the poet or the gods.
In response to Gould’s hypothesis, Goldhill argues against this position and 
instead adheres to Vemant’s view (with modifications). While Goldhill concedes 
that the context of each play is important, he also states that it is essential for the 
chorus to speak with ‘collective authority’ because at the heart of tragic drama is the 
need to question and explore ‘authority, knowledge, tradition with the dynamics of 
democracy’s ethics of group and individual obligations’69 and that being socially 
marginal figures who are ‘other’ should not detract from the chorus’ authority. As a 
result, the chorus, for Goldhill, has a privileged position, but is not a mouth-piece for 
the poet -  in much the same way suggested by Vemant. But, to my mind at least, it is 
difficult to see how the chorus can speak with collective authority, yet not be in some 
way similar to an authorial presence within the play. What distinguishes ‘privileged 
presence’ from ‘authorial voice’? It seems far more plausible to see, with Gould, the 
chorus as characters within the narrative, as distinct personae, as Egyptian women, 
Erinyes, old men of Argos, or serving-women who exist within the fictional 
framework. This is not to say that what the chorus say should be dismissed. Goldhill 
correctly stresses the need for tragedy to question, comment on, critique authority 
and received traditions and that the chorus is a significant vehicle by and through 
which views can be expressed: ‘the chorus both allows a wider picture of the action 
to develop and also remains one of the many views expressed.’70 But what the 
chorus says should be treated in much the same way as what the protagonist says and
67 Gould (1996) 224.
68 Gould (1996) 232.
69 Goldhill (1996) 253.
70 Goldhill (1996) 255.
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to possess as much ‘authority’. So, Electra and the chorus of the Libation Bearers 
can discuss the justice of the gods to act as avengers of murder {Ch. 119-23); or 
Orestes, Apollo and Athena and the chorus of Erinyes can debate the relative justice 
of murder in the Eumenides. While the poet creates a fictional world, this fiction is 
not immune from views on justice and the divine or any other issue being expressed, 
discussed or considered. The chorus is as much a privileged presence as any other 
character and as detached from the play. So, when the chorus in the Hymn to Zeus 
consider the role of Zeus in the sacrifice of Iphigeneia they possess as much 
knowledge concerning it as any other character. For the chorus, Zeus must have had 
some involvement since he is all-powerful, but in their song they cannot find any 
trace of the god’s involvement -  outside of ‘sending’ the Atreidae to punish Paris. 
Indeed, the absence of a definitive or clear-cut answer and the speculative nature of 
the Hymn seems only to support the view expressed here that the chorus possess no 
special knowledge, have no special authority and have as much or as little a 
privileged presence as any other character.
The ‘vainness’ (pdiav) of the burden also provides a clue that Zeus is in 
some way responsible for the burden which the chorus need to cast from their mind. 
With the exception of Fraenkel, who highlights the foolishness of those who do not 
believe Zeus to be the almighty ruler, the issue of why the burden should be a vain 
burden, to  udiav a^Qoc;, is rarely addressed by scholars. The noun |x<xtt|, with which 
the adverb paxav is etymologically connected, means fault or folly and, in this way, 
paxav denotes the false or wrong way in which something is done. This could thus 
imply that the burden the chorus need to cast from their minds is that of wrong 
thinking or false thought: the burden is a weight on their mind that need not be there; 
it is a false, pointless burden. Indeed, it seems that the reason why the chorus deem 
the burden a false or futile one is because they know what the burden is: it is the 
belief that Zeus must in some way be culpable for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, 
because he is the highest and most powerful god, ruling over humankind. This seems 
to be confirmed when the chorus proceed in the Hymn’s antistrophe to outline Zeus’ 
dominance and superiority over the divine and human spheres, removing any other 
(higher) power from consideration. Zeus is where the buck stops. How could he not 
be in some way responsible?
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Having isolated Zeus as the almighty ruler of the universe, the chorus then 
describes the manner in which Zeus rules over mankind. They say: xov cppovsTv 
ppoxoug 6 8 6 -1 oavxa, xov 7ra0si paGoq | Gsvxa Kupiax; sxstv. ‘Zeus, the one who sets 
men on the course to comprehension, establishes the ordinance to be held good that 
understanding comes through painful experience.’ The meaning of these lines, 
especially the ordinance of 7td0si pa0o<; and to whom it refers, is a problem which 
has as varied an interpretative history as to what or whom the vain burden refers or 
denotes. It was once common for the three lines to be interpreted, broadly speaking, 
with an optimistic and quasi-Christian tilt (whether conscious or not) whereby Zeus 
sets men on the path to wisdom (cppovsTv) having established the doctrine which 
dictates that understanding comes through suffering (raxGsi pdGog).71 While this does 
not take into account every nuance of the ‘optimistic’ way of interpreting these lines, 
it does highlight one very important aspect in this strand of thinking, which is the 
stress placed on the connection between wisdom and suffering in the path that Zeus 
lays out for mankind. Such an understanding of the ordinance laid down by Zeus 
often implicitly draws comparisons with the Christian doctrine of Penance, and it 
was in opposition to such readings that scholars such as Lloyd-Jones and Denniston 
and Page first raised objections.72 Thus, Denniston and Page translate the lines: ‘He 
who set men on the path to understanding, who laid down the law “learning through 
suffering”, to hold good.’73 Though Denniston and Page still maintain the reading of 
‘through suffering’ for the word 7td0si, it is not in conjunction with gaining the virtue 
of wisdom, but rather with acquiring understanding. And it is in this vein that over 
the past fifty years or so scholars have tended to take a more neutral approach by 
finding terms other than ‘wisdom’ or ‘suffering’ to translate cppovsTv74 and 7td0si75 
respectively.
But, does this reading with its variants, and do those translations of cppovsTv
Hf\and 7raGsi pd0o<; do justice to the text? First, following Pope, it is perhaps best not 
to read anything more into cppovsTv than the notion of thought, comprehension or
71 For example, Weir Smyth (1926) ad  loc, Fraenkel (1950) ad  loc, Lattimore (1953) a d  loc , Kitto 
(1956)7 .
72 Lloyd-Jones (1956) 61-3; Denniston and Page (1957) 83-4.
73 Denniston and Page (1957) 84.
74 For example, Gagarin (1976) 142.
75 Thus, Ewans (1995), Collard (2002).
76 Pope (1974) 107-10.
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understanding, as that process which makes humans more than simply animals, 
rather than claiming anything so grand or exalted as wisdom.77 As Pope says: 
‘cppovsTv used by itself and without an adverb meaning 'rightly' never implies
• 70  #
wisdom elsewhere in Aeschylus.’ He goes on to state that the significance of 
cppovsTv rests on what it is to be human: ‘Thus cppovsTv ppoxouq [at/lg.176] implies 
not only that we have consciousness but that we also have something which, without 
being too philosophical about it, we may call free will.’79 So, what Pope brings out 
in his interpretation is the ability of humans to take control o f their actions, because 
Zeus gave mankind the ability to think, to comprehend, cppovsTv.
By reading cppovsTv in this way, it places stress on the actions of the 
individual human characters in the trilogy, not least within the immediate context of 
Agamemnon and his decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia. The focus on the explicit role 
of Zeus and Artemis in the build-up to the Greeks going to Troy could easily make 
one overlook the human element in the sacrificial scene. But, the Hymn to Zeus and 
the path which Zeus lays out for mankind highlights the individual’s responsibility 
for their decisions and shows that although Zeus is an almighty god, he has 
nevertheless given to mankind the ability to reason, to make their own decisions and 
to come to their own conclusions based on rational thought processes. So, no matter 
how intertwined the human and the divine may be in any given circumstance, 
humans are no less culpable for any decision or action, because they have the ability 
to come to a rational, reasoned conclusion themselves: they are no mere puppets of 
the gods.
But, understanding/comprehension (cppovsTv) does not come easily to 
humankind. As the chorus say, Zeus establishes the ordinance that learning comes
QA
through painful experience, 7td0si pa0o<;. It has been a matter of contention and 
confusion to whom the law of 7ta0si pd0o<; refers and whether Agamemnon is 
subject to it, because it is easy enough to see what Agamemnon suffers or
77 This is, o f  course, not to deny or dismiss the significance o f  these lines, but to move interpretation 
away from unjustified Christian connotations.
78 Pope (1974) 109; cf. 107. For passages see: Th. 807, Supp. 176, 204 (being rational, avoiding 
panic); Ch. 517 (synonym for being alive); Eu. 115 (to wake up, be alert).
79 Pope (1974) 109-10.
80 The law o f  itaOsi pdOoq is in many respects a simple doctrine and one which is not new by the time 
Aeschylus employs the doctrine in his plays. A eschylus’ use o f  the notion can be seen as comparable 
to (though not identical with) what Hesiod says at Op. 218. See West (1978) 211 for further similar 
passages and notes on Op. 218.
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experiences, but it is far more difficult to see what he learns.81 There are two points 
which need to be clarified straightaway. The first is the far-reaching and universal 
nature of lines 176-8, because Zeus sets mankind as a whole on the path to 
comprehension (cppovsTv Ppoioix;) by establishing the rule that understanding comes 
through painful experience (7ta0si pa0o<;). It is thus a doctrine which is not limited to 
any one individual in the play or trilogy. As Conacher states: ‘It is important to note, 
too, the generalizing power of the passage... [it] need not be limited to any particular 
'sufferer', be it an Agamemnon, a Clytemnestra, a Paris, or an Orestes.’ It is, also, 
possible to extend the generalising power of the doctrine beyond not only any one 
‘sufferer’, but beyond any one single event in a sufferer’s life. Understanding, 
comprehension, is a continuous process which Zeus has put mankind on, a process 
which is not limited to one painful experience. The second point which needs to be 
made about the doctrine of rca08i pa0o<; is that due to the proximity of the statement 
to the narrative of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, it can be seen to have particular 
resonance for Agamemnon and his actions -  though, as stated, the significance and 
reach of it is not limited solely to Agamemnon and his actions.
So, what does Agamemnon suffer and what does he learn? He can be seen to 
suffer many things, not least his own death at the hands of his wife on his arrival 
home from Troy, as well as the death of his daughter, which he exacts as a result of 
the complusion he feels placed upon him by divine imperative and the necessity 
placed on him by the forces mustered. For the time being, if we consider just the 
‘painful experience’ of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, the pain which this decision 
causes Agamemnon is clearly related by the chorus and can be seen from the 
moment the remedy to still the winds is named (Ag. 202-17). But, what Agamemnon 
learns (pd0o^) is a slightly more difficult matter to determine. Is it enough to 
conclude: ‘he shall learn that man cannot escape the punishment imposed by Zeus on 
crime; what he does, he must pay for.’? Does Agamemnon learn that he must pay 
for the crime he commits in sacrificing Iphigeneia or for the many deaths he causes 
in the course of the Trojan War? This cannot be it. As is argued at length in this
81 See Denniston and Page (1957) 85-6; Conacher (1987) 12, 83-5.
82 Conacher (1987) 12. Indeed, Conacher can be seen not to go far enough in stating the generalising 
power o f  the passage, because it is possible to argue that each ‘sufferer’ suffers and learns in a 
plurality o f  different instances. And further, i f  men learn through suffering, is this confined to their 
own suffering?
83 Denniston and Page (1957) 86.
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chapter, Zeus has nothing to do with the death of Agamemnon: the god neither 
ordains it nor does it fit his will.84 Rather, what Agamemnon is depicted as learning 
seems to rest on his coming to a fuller understanding of the nature and justice of 
Zeus. That the king makes a conscious decision to subordinate the paternal bond 
between himself and his daughter in order not to incur the wrath of Zeus has been 
argued and shown at length above.85 Indeed, this decision seems to be confirmed 
during his speech at Ag. 206-17, which he concludes by acknowledging the role and 
position of Themis (Right). So, having worked through the choices open to him, 
Agamemnon is then reported to say: 7cauoavspou yap | Oucriaq xcapOsviou 0’ aipaxoc; 
opya | 7l£pl6py(jO(;• axco 8’ abSa | @spi<;. eu yap eiq. Indeed, it swells with excessive 
anger for a sacrifice and for a maiden’s blood to still the winds: Themis forbids it. 
May it be well! (Ag. 214-17).
In Agamemnon’s mind, what makes his decision ultimately the correct one is 
that Themis forbids, cnro 8’ au8a ©spi<;, him to desert the fleet and to do wrong by 
the alliance. This presents us with the indication that there is some form o f divine 
sanction for what Agamemnon is about to do in sacrificing Iphigeneia -  or at least 
that Agamemnon believes there is.86 More than this, due to the already long-standing
87tradition by Aeschylus’ time which connects Themis with Zeus and Justice, a 
connection can also be seen between the sacrifice o f Iphigeneia and the justice of 
Zeus, and by extention between Agamemnon’s decision to fulfil the sacrifice and the 
law of TiaOsi pa0o<; which Zeus has established for humankind. In this way, it can be 
seen that Agamemnon’s actions and behaviour conform to the paradigm of 7id0si 
pa0o<;, because, first of all, he goes through the terrible experience (7td0si) of being 
faced with the impossible decision of either sacrificing his daughter or defying the 
will of Zeus; and, secondly, in so doing, he seems to come to some understanding 
(pa0o<;) concerning the nature of the divine, recognising that it is Themis and Zeus 
who stand behind the course set out for him, seeing that there is no other path open 
to him in the face of the supreme divine being Zeus and his rule. So, it is not only 
possible to see how these lines fit thematically with the surrounding verses, but how
84 See further arguments about Agamemnon’s excesses at Troy and the will o f  Zeus below.
85 See the above sections: Zeus Xenios and The Anger o f  Artem is and the Sacrifice o f  Iphigeneia.
86 See Fraenkel (1950) 2. 126 and Hogan (1984) 85 for two examples o f  the view  that A gam em non’s 
claim that his act is in accordance with Themis goes against what the divine sphere would deem  
‘right’.
87 For the relationship between Zeus, Themis and Dike, see Hes. Th. 901-2; cf. Od. 2. 68.
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Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia is influenced by his own awareness of 
the justice of Zeus.
The final issue of the Hymn that will be discussed here in relation to 
Agamemnon and the justice of Zeus is the meaning of the closing lines of the second 
strophe. The lines read: 5aipovcov 5s 7iou x&pr^ I Pt&lax; crsfyia aspvdv fjpsvoov; 
‘How can this be the grace of the daimones, seated by force upon their august 
thrones?’ (Ag. 182-3). There are two different interpretations of line 182, already 
reflected in the manuscripts: namely, 5s Teem in MV and 5s non (with 7tov as an
OQ
enclitic) in TrF. This latter reading would make the sentence a statement rather 
than a question and would thus supply a very different tone and meaning to the 
Hymn, especially to the interpretation of the doctrine o f 7ia0si pa0o<; and the justice 
o f Zeus. This is because the chorus would not be questioning whether the justice of 
Zeus outlined in the previous lines is a grace of the daimones (6aipovcov 
would be stating outright that it is a grace. The TrF tradition of interpreting the text 
is far more widely supported by modem commentators and editors than the MV 
reading. This has far more to do with individual interpretative tendencies than any 
textual consideration concerning the various manuscripts. Arguments have been
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made against the TrF readings based on textual concerns, but it is not on 
grammatical or linguistic grounds that arguments will be raised here. Indeed, it has 
been stated convincingly that ultimately the decision between the two traditions must 
be made on interpretative reasons. As Conacher says: ‘the decision between 7rou 
interrogative and 7100 enclitic must finally be based on our view of the comparative 
appropriateness to the context of the two quite different meanings which result.’90
Those commentators who read tcod enclitic, following manuscripts TrF, fall 
within what has above been referred to as the optimistic tradition, which interprets 
the Hymn in a way that finds comfort in the power and justice of Zeus.91 By reading 
lines 182-3 as a statement, the nature of justice outlined at the opening of the second 
strophe of the Hymn is asserted as Saipovcov x&Pl?> ‘a grace of the daimones’. The
88 For this tradition, see: Fraenkel (1950) 2.112; Denniston and Page (1957) 85; Smith (1980) 28-30; 
Conacher (1976) 328-36, (1987) 85.
89 For a discussion o f  the textual merits o f  reading 5s rani in line with manuscripts M V, see Pope 
(1974) 100-13.
90 Conacher (1976) 330. O f course, in the original text there would have been no accents, which left 
room for greater ambiguity and personal interpretation.
91 See also above discussions o f  t o  paxav axOoq and raiOci pdOoq for the optimistic and pessimistic 
readings o f  the Hymn to Zeus and the nature o f  justice depicted by Aeschylus.
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justice o f  Zeus and the gods is thus stated without any equivocation as a good thing 
for mankind.92 This way o f reading the lines has been supported by comparing ‘the 
juxtaposition o f mercy and absolute power... [found in] the earlier collocation o f 
7ia0si and jLid0o<g’ as well as in the formulation: Kai 7iap’ cxkovtck; rjX0s acotppovsiv. 
‘Even to the unwilling temperance comes’.93 What lies at the base of the optimisitc 
view o f  these two lines (as well as the Hymn and trilogy as a whole) is that Zeus and 
the present order of gods have mankind’s best interest at heart, because they will 
bring understanding (jidOog) even if it is sometimes by painful means (rcaOsi) or is 
unwanted (aKOVtaq).
However, to my mind, it does not seem that the chorus do, in fact, find 
comfort in the justice o f Zeus or that they are attempting to show Zeus as a 
benevolent figure. Rather, it seems that the chorus have doubts concerning the nature 
o f Zeus’ justice and that while they accept Zeus and his rule as a fact o f life, they do 
not see it as something ultimately kind. Indeed, if one accepts the premise that the 
Oresteia enters into a discourse about the nature o f justice, about the role and 
position of the gods and mankind within this framework, then the position o f the 
Hymn to Zeus in the opening choral ode in the opening play o f the trilogy could be 
seen as a perfect spot to pose questions about the nature and justice o f the highest 
and most powerful god, setting into motion a dialogue that may or may not be 
satisfactorily resolved by the end o f the trilogy’s final play.
The interpretation that lines 182-3 are not a statement, but rather pose a 
question about the x<*pt<; o f the gods and Zeus94 rests on several key points. First, in 
optimistic interpretations o f the Hymn, the line, a ia^si 8’ av0’ v7rvov 7tpo KapSiaq 
pvrjaurrjpcov 7covoc;- ‘And remembrances o f sufferings past drip before the heart 
instead o f sleep.’ (Ag. 179-80) is often ignored, neglected or simply overlooked. But, 
if we take the lines into consideration together with the next one, it can be seen to 
create a more negative and tempered picture of the justice Zeus has established for
92 It is also possible to read the statement as ironic, which would thus question the justice o f  the gods 
as som ething other than beneficial for mankind. This adds further to the idea o f  being able to read the 
text both ways and that all is interpretation.
93 Fraenkel (1950) 2. 112.
94 The phrase baipovcov x&pi<; is rea(J here, as Fraenkel (1950) 2.111 puts it, as ‘in essence no other 
than %apiq Aioc;.’ This is sim ply because the entire content o f  the three verses is concerned almost 
solely  with Zeus and his nature. It seem s that A eschylus has extended Z eu s’ power and reach to refer 
to the w hole divine world, thus making Saipovcov x&P1^  a periphrastic w ay o f  denoting Z eus’ all- 
encom passing nature. For further discussion o f  baipcov, baipovei; as denotations o f  a god or gods, see 
above chapter on balpcov as deity.
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mankind. Lines 179-81 form two halves of a whole, separated between tc o v o c ; and 
Kai, and can be seen as revising or rephrasing of the formulation of raxGei paGoq. 
Within the context of the strophe, it is possible to equate pvr|oucrj|icov novoq with 
TtdGei a few lines before. If we accept this premise, one could see that memories of 
past miseries are a way of leading man on the way to understanding (paGoc;). In this 
way, we may expect to find something about understanding or comprehension in the 
next line or two. However, there is nothing about p&Goq or cppoveTv mentioned in this 
line or the next; rather, we are presented with something quite different and this is 
the idea of aoocppovsiv, which means something like, ‘to be modest, temperate’ or ‘to 
show self-control or discretion’.95 It does not mean ‘to be wise’. So, instead of 
wisdom, acoq>povsiv here means something like a form of control which is imposed 
on mankind by Zeus and the gods. Modest thought and behaviour will come to 
everyone, even to those who do not necessarily want it.
Such an imposition of moderation and temperance by the gods on mankind 
can be seen as comparable to instances where an individual is brought low by the 
gods for excessive actions. It is in such a context that Aeschylus uses the verb 
ococppovsTv to describe Xerxes in the Persians as needing to exhibit greater self- 
control in order not to bring further misfortune upon himself: Zsvq xoi KO?uxaxf|<; xa>v 
i)7cspK0pjtcov ayav | (ppovqpaxcov 87teaxiv, euGuvoq papuq. | rcpoq xaux’ b k s i v o v  
ococppovsiv Ksxpr||i8voi | 7 i i v u o k £ x ’ £t>A,6yoiai vou0£xf|jj.aGiv | Xfj^at 0£opX,apoi)V0’96 
U7i£pKop7icp 0pao£i. ‘Zeus is there after the deed as the punisher of those with overly 
arrogant thoughts, a weighty judge. With regard to this, urging him to show 
prudence, correct him with kindly-worded admonitions to stop doing harm against 
the gods with his arrogant impetuosity.’ (Pers. 827-31). Although it is not Zeus or 
any other god who will bring oco(ppov£iv to Xerxes, but (it is hoped) gentle words of 
warning, it is the potential threat that Zeus bears which is the impetus behind the 
words of warning.97
95 For parallel instances o f  acoppovsco elsewhere in Aeschylus see, e.g.: Pers. 829, Ag. 1425, Eu. 521.
96 0£opXaPouv(ra) usually means ‘stricken by the gods’, but here is clearly active and means ‘doing 
harm against the gods’. Cf. Broadhead (1960) 207, Garvie (2009) 318. However, it is possible that 
Aeschylus uses the word, more commonly found in its passive sense, because it suggests and hints at 
the possibility that i f  Xerxes does not stop offending the gods, the gods will turn the tide and do harm 
against him.
97 The reading o f  acoppovsiv as ‘moderation’ is supported by the use o f  the verb elsewhere in 
Aeschylus (cf. Supp. 1013, Ag. 1425, 1620, Eu. 521, 1000). In all but the example from the Suppliants
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The form of justice depicted in the Hymn to Zeus, especially in its final 
verse, can be seen to depend upon a balance between the human and divine worlds 
and the respect humans pay the gods. The path that Zeus puts mankind on is that of 
comprehension, o f understanding what it is to be human and what position 
humankind holds in relation to the gods. But, while this may not be a wholly 
pessimistic view o f the justice of Zeus, it is not a completely positive or optimistic 
one either. Zeus is great and powerful, he is not altruistic or benevolent, and this 
depiction of the god is played out through the three verses of the Hymn. In the first 
strophe, the chorus are unable to see how Zeus cannot have had some involvement in 
the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, even if it is only through passive acceptance. In the 
antistrophe, the chorus describe Zeus’ final victory over his father Kronos, showing 
that Zeus is the highest and most powerful of all the gods. In the second strophe of 
the Hymn, with Zeus’ victory' having been outlined, the chorus then describe the 
manner in which the god is to rule over mankind. Just as was indicated with his 
(in)action regarding the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in the first strophe, the justice which 
Zeus establishes for mankind is not that of kindness, but of painful experience 
(rcaGsi) and suffering (rcovoc;), which will bring about understanding for mankind 
concerning their position in relation to the gods and moderation in their behaviour, 
even if they are unwilling to do so.
The concept of justice outlined in the final verse is, as stated above, a general 
one and applicable to all mankind. So, in order to demonstrate the applicability of the 
concept to the Agamemnon and its significance to the events surrounding it in the 
parodos, we have focused on the actions of Agamemnon (as we have throughout this 
chapter so far).98 As has been discussed and demonstrated above, Agamemnon is 
very aware of the role of both Zeus and the gods in the expedition to Troy and in the 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia. He is aware that he must sacrifice Iphigeneia for Artemis in 
order to go to Troy and exact retribution against Paris for his transgression o f xenia, 
a custom over which Zeus presides. The desires of the gods are clearly presented 
throughout the parodos, and when Agamemnon makes the choice between his 
daughter and the gods, among the last words of his decision speech are, goto 8’ au8a |
acocppoveiv is also employed in reference to either learning or justice, which, o f  course, fits neatly 
with the context in which it is used in the Hymn to Zeus.
98 The applicableness o f  the doctrine o f  7ia0si pa0o<; and the conception o f  justice outlined in the 
Hymn is picked up on below in the section Zeus, Erinyes and the Vote o f  Athena.
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© sjlik; ‘Themis forbids it.’ The divine will of Zeus is foremost in his mind and takes 
precedence over any other concern. Agamemnon is all too conscious of his position 
in relation to the gods, exhibiting moderation and prudence in the face o f the god’s 
power and justice. It is thus when confronted with this horrible event, with the 
effectively impossible decision of sacrificing his daughter or disobeying the gods 
that Agamemnon can be seen to come to a true understanding of the justice of Zeus.
AGAMEMNON’S EXCESSIVE ACTIONS AT TROY?
In spite of the arguments advanced here that Agamemnon’s execution of the 
sacrifice, as desired by Artemis, should not be interpreted as an act that infringes 
upon divine law, we cannot exclude the possibility that Agamemnon at other times 
acts in an excessive or unjust fashion in the eyes o f  Zeus and the other Olympians. 
Indeed, Agamemnon’s actions in destroying Troy could easily be seen as excessive 
and a transgression of justice, even though, as has been seen, he is sent to Troy by 
Zeus to destroy the city (Ag. 60-2, 355-60, 367-84)." There are several passages 
which could be adduced to support this allegation. The passages in question are Ag. 
456-74, 750-82, 1331-42,100 and they have been variously interpreted as evidence to 
support the view that Agamemnon acted in a transgressive manner which brought 
about his downfall at the hands of the gods.101 But before we turn to a detailed 
interpretation of what the chorus say, preliminary consideration should be given to 
the context of these utterances in the overall structure o f  the play.
For, even if these three passages could be shiown to be directly concerned 
with Agamemnon and with his excessive actions, and the gods’ desire for his death, 
the chorus’ statements should not be treated as imipartial or unambiguous. The 
chorus’ knowledge of the fall of Troy and the potential excesses of Agamemnon 
during the expedition do not have their origin in the Heerald’s announcements, but are 
formed from Clytemnestra’s interpretation of the beacon fires (Ag. 338-47). During 
the interpretations of the beacon-fires, when Clytemntestra is asked by the chorus to 
elaborate on how she knows that Troy is taken (Ag. 317-19), she does not explain the 
mechanics of the beacon-fires as she did in her first speech (Ag. 281-316), instead
99 At Ag. 822, I read i37r£pic67iou<; instead o f  urcfipKOTOuig/ctx;, folllowing Heath’s correction (1762), in 
line with the general consensus.
100 For the texts, translations and detailed interpretations see belo\w.
101 See, for example, Otis (1981) 30, 34; Sommerstein (1996) 275<-8; Dodds (2007) 256-7.
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she gives a fictional, and only potentially accurate, account of the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of Troy (Ag. 320-50). While it is possible that Clytemnestra’s 
account o f the sack of Troy is accurate, there is no possible way for her to know 
whether or not it is, because she, like the chorus, has no fail-safe way of knowing for
i rvo
certain what is going on at Troy. All she knows is that it is taken. Rather, 
Clytemnestra takes advantage of the beacon-fires and the chorus’ ignorance by 
manipulating the fires’ true meaning. She places concerns within the chorus’ mind 
about Agamemnon’s safety and about his character, and she suggests that he and the 
Greeks have desecrated temples and sanctuaries in the course of sacking the city (Ag. 
338-47). She warns the chorus that conquered by greed and impiety the 
expeditionary forces may put their safety in jeopardy and compromise their return 
home. By raising concerns about the army as a whole, Clytemnestra is able to direct 
these concerns upon Agamemnon as leader of the forces. This amounts to nothing 
more than character defamation of Agamemnon. By manipulating certain aspects of 
this fictional tale of the fall of Troy, Clytemnestra can thus use them for her personal 
gain. So, when, at the climactic moment of the play, Agamemnon treads on the 
purple cloths, it may be seen to confirm the notion formed in the interpretations of 
the beacon-fires of Agamemnon as an arrogant and destructive man loathed by the 
gods for his excessive and transgressive behaviour. The decision of Agamemnon 
(under the persuasive coercion of Clytemnestra) to tread on the carpets, when 
coupled with Clytemnestra’s manufactured portrayal of him, supplies what 
Clytemnestra wants the world to see as a religious dimension for his death, which 
she clearly presents later after killing Agamemnon (Ag. 1431-3), a reason the chorus 
will understand and may even agree with.
The chorus’ knowledge of the fall of Troy is thus not based on any first- 
person account. Indeed, the Herald’s own accounts of the fall of Troy and the return 
home do not suggest that Agamemnon has acted in any excessive or transgressive 
way. Even before the Herald’s entrance at 503 and before any first-person account of 
Troy’s overthrow, the chorus have sung an ode concerning Troy and the respective 
fortunes o f the besieged and besiegers (Ag. 355-487) -  a passage traditionally seen as
102 Strictly speaking, Clytemnestra does not know that the city is taken. But this issue is not exploited 
in the play. See Goldhill (1984) 38-9, (1986) 9-10 for interpretation, misrepresentation and 
manipulation o f  signals in the beacon-fire scene.
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demonstrating Agamemnon’s excessive behaviour.103 But, if the chorus sing an ode 
about the fall of Troy without any factual, first-person account of it, how can we use 
their words at 355-487 as evidence of Agamemnon’s actions at Troy? Moreover, if 
the Herald does not say anything about Agamemnon committing crimes of excess, 
how can we take the chorus’ statements at 750-62 or at 1331-42 as examples of 
Agamemnon behaving in a transgressive fashion at Troy?
But, before we can pursue this line of enquiry, a few words need to be said 
concerning line 527. If the line is not considered an interpolation, the Greeks’ 
destruction of the altars and temples of the gods could indicate excessive and 
transgressive actions. Giving the passage in full, it reads (Ag. 524-8):
aXX> eu viv ac7tacaa0e, Kai yap ouv np&nei,
Tpoiav KaiacKayavxa ion 5iKr|(p6pou 
Aioq paKsA,Xr|, if) Kaxsipyaoiai tieSov 
(Pcopoi 5’ afaioi Kai Gecov iSpbpaxa}
Kai G7i£ppa ;tdar|<; E^anoXXmax %Qovoq.
B ut, greet him  w ith  kind w ords, as is on ly  fitting: by utterly destroying  Troy w ith  
the axe o f  Z eus, bringer o f  ju stice , he w orked over the land w ith  it (an d  the altars 
and tem ples o f  the god s d isappeared} and the seed  o f  the w h o le  earth perished  
com pletely .
Fraenkel, following Salzmann104 and Headlam,105 argues that line 527 does not 
belong to this passage and, as he says, ‘intrudes like a foreign substance.’106 Fraenkel 
supplies four reasons to support this conviction. First, the line interrupts the 
agricultural metaphor which extends from KaxaoKai|/avxa to %Qovoq. Secondly, the 
line is an almost exact copy of Pers. 811, pcopoi 5’ dl'axoi, 5atpovcov 0' i8pupaxa, 
which could suggest a scribe copied in the line from the Persians by error whether or 
not it had previously been added as a gloss in the margin. Thirdly, for the Greeks
103 Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1962) 193-9; West (1979) 4; Otis (1981) 29-30; Lesky (1983) 19; Winnington- 
Ingram (1983) 88-93; Sommerstein (1996) 277; Dodds (2007) 256.
104 Salzmann (1823).
105 Headlam (1898) 245-9, (1902) 434-42.
106 Fraenkel (1950)2 .266 .
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‘the destruction of holy places by the enemy seemed an unparalleled atrocity’107 and 
thus it is unlikely that the Herald in describing the triumph of the Greek victory 
would refer to the sacrilegious behaviour of the army, if indeed there had been any. 
Indeed, it is when describing such atrocities and their religious consequences that the 
passage at Pers. 811 is used by Darius to explain why the Persian expedition failed. 
The fourth reason, which, to my mind, deserves more attention than it has received 
by scholars,108 argues that had those who defend authenticity of line 527 are all too 
willing to find more evidence of Agamemnon being a ‘godless villain’.109
Concerning this issue, Denniston and Page raise objections against Fraenkel 
and state that ‘of these arguments the third alone seems considerable.’110 For what 
reason the other arguments are not ‘considerable’ is not explained. Denniston and 
Page in turn argue that it is reasonable to assume that the Herald would speak of the 
destruction of the temples and altars for two main reasons.111 The first is that 
Clytemnestra mentioned the possibility that sacrilege could be committed by the 
Greeks and that without this line the possibility she raises would not be answered. 
But, as has been demonstrated above (and will be further below), Clytemnestra’s 
words cannot be taken at face value, and indeed one wonders why her words need an 
answer anyway. The second reason is that if the Greeks did utterly destroy the land, 
how can the destruction of temples and altars not be included within it too? This may 
seem a reasonable question to pose, except that it is our ignorance concerning the 
precise details of the sack of Troy which is at issue here and so to assume the 
presence or existence of any one particular aspect of the aftermath of the overthrow 
of Troy seems really to be pre-judging the issue. For, it is entirely possible that the 
Greeks left the temples and altars untouched and undesecrated, or at least there is an 
element of ambiguity surrounding the whole issue.112
There is an issue which could support the notion that the Greeks committed 
acts of impiety at Troy before sailing home. It is that Cassandra, as a priestess, is
107 Fraenkel (1950) 2.266.
108 It is neglected by Denniston and Page (1957) 120-1, even though they raise the first three reasons 
supplied by Fraenkel.
109 Fraenkel (1950) 2.267; cf. Denniston and Page (1957) xx-xxxvi, 120-1.
110 Denniston and Page (1957) 120.
111 Denniston and Page (1957) 120-1.
112 Indeed, were one allowed to add speculatively how characters in literature could have reasoned, 
one could say that the Greeks were no doubt aware that they still had a long trip home over the 
treacherous sea, and in light o f  the delays at Aulis on the outward journey the Greeks may have 
realised the problems that can be caused by the gods.
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brought home with Agamemnon as a prize. If we can use intertextual evidence to 
inform our readings of the play, it seems that she was taken from her temple by the 
lesser Ajax -  something which caused offence to Athena (cf. E. Tr. 70-86). But, it is 
difficult when using evidence from other texts to know what Aeschylus intended the 
audience to be aware of and what not, or at least the reasons behind certain events. 
For instance, in Euripides Athena is the goddess whom Cassandra attends, while in 
Aeschylus it is Apollo; also in Aeschylus there is no mention of the actual theft o f 
Cassandra from the temple, which is, at the very least, strange, bearing in mind all of 
the horrors and torments she relates before her death. One may argue that this 
particular version is hinted at by the dispersal o f the Greek fleet on the way home, if 
not by her very presence in Argos. But, the use of intertextual evidence is 
particularly dangerous concerning the Agamemnon myth, because of the variations 
regarding his killer. So, in an earlier source, Homer’s Odyssey, it is related that
I n
Aegisthus killed Agamemnon (1.28-43), but in Aeschylus it is Clytemnestra. If 
Aeschylus’ version of the myth varies in such key details from what appears in 
Homer, how can we be entirely sure what details he wanted assumed and what not? 
Is not Aeschylus’ silence concerning the presence of Cassandra deliberate? Are we 
rather supposed to be left in ignorance, with our attention focused on those details 
we are supplied with?114 Or, if the presence of Cassandra is enough to draw our 
attention to the reasons behind her being there, can we be sure that Agamemnon is 
responsible for any act of sacrilege or that Aeschylus wanted us to think so? Perhaps, 
indeed, the point is that Cassandra’s presence raises doubts over the piety or impiety 
of Agamemnon in the same way Clytemnestra’s ‘beacon speeches’ did, but with no 
answer forthcoming or supplied by the end of the play.
So, Denniston and Page’s objections offer little that can be seen to detract 
from the arguments Fraenkel raises concerning the likely spurious nature of line 527. 
It seems that Fraenkel’s concerns, especially regarding the unnatural interruption of 
the agricultural metaphor, the similarity of the line with Pers. 811 and the almost 
universal desire by scholars to see Agamemnon as an impious man (as opposed to a 
just and pious individual) present far stronger arguments and supply a far stronger
113 See Sommerstein (1996) 190-204 for discussion o f  the Agamemnon/Orestes myth and whether 
Aeschylus was original in his treatment.
114 See Taplin (1977) passim  for an extensive discussion o f  this issue.
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position for understanding the line as an interpolation, rather than those arguments 
which defend the line.
Although we are presented with several accounts of Agamemnon’s supposed 
transgressions, it is only his act of treading on the purple cloths that happens before 
the audience’s eyes. It is this act that seemingly confirms or reaffirms notions of 
Agamemnon as a character inclined to commit excessive and impious deeds.115 It has 
also been seen as confirming his state o f mind overcome by Ate, a state initially 
formed by his decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia;116 as well as being in some way an act 
symbolic of the guilt he has accrued since the sacrifice.117 But, it is also the case that 
these arguments, which see Agamemnon’s act of treading on the cloths as being 
indicative of his guilt or of him being on the wrong end of divine justice, highlight 
the type of reasons Clytemnestra wants to bring to the fore before killing 
Agamemnon. So, the significance of this scene does not lie in confirming 
Agamemnon’s prior transgressive actions as much as in demonstrating 
Clytemnestra’s effective character defamation of Agamemnon.
This much can be said on the assumption that the chorus intend to suggest 
that Agamemnon’s actions at Troy were excessive. However, a close reading of the 
text does not even seem to suggest this. The three passages under consideration are 
all similar in tone and meaning, all hinting at the dangers of lives lived at the 
extremes. The first example comes in the third antistrophe of the first stasimon (Ag. 
456-74):
(3apsTa 5’ aaxcov cpauq £,uv kotcoi,
5r||iOKpd<v>ioi) 8’ apd<; tivsi yp&oc,’ 
psvei 5’ aKoucai xi pou 
pspipva vuKTnp£(pe<;' 
tg)v 71oAa)Kt6voov yap ouk 
daKOTtOl 0£Ol, KSA.CH- 
vai 5’ ’Epivusg xpovcoi 
TDXHpdv ovt’ avsi) 8hca<;
7caA.ivruysi xpipai (Mod
115 Cf. Denniston and Page (1957) 151-2.
116 Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1962) 196-7; Conacher (1987) 38-9.
117 Cf. Taplin (1977) 311; Otis (1981) 12-65.
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x i0 £ to ’ a p a o p o v ,  s v  8 ’ a l 'a -  
xot<; tea eOovtoc;  ouxic; aX-Ka. 
to  8 ’ l)7t£pKO^CO<; k A.'u siv  £"5 
P a p i r  pdA .^£xai y a p  o a c o u ;
A io 0 £ v  K spauvoc;.
Kpivco 8’ d(p0ovov oA,pov 
pr|x’ £vr|v 7cxoA.m6p0r](;, 
pfjx’ ow ai)xo<; oloiyq vx’ 61- 
Xcov piov KaxiSoipi.
Weighty is the rumour of citizens with anger in it. It repays the debt of a curse 
ratified by the people. My thought waits to hear something shrouded by night. For, 
the gods do not fail to see those who have caused many deaths. But in time the dark 
Erinyes place obscurity upon the man who is fortunate without justice, with the 
reversal of fortune wearing away his life. There is no help when a man is among the 
unseen. Being excessively well spoken of has a heavy consequence. Indeed, a 
thunderbolt is thrown by the eyes of Zeus. And I decide in favour of prosperity 
without envy: May I never be a sacker of cities; may I never look upon my life as 
conquered by another.
The passage contrasts the life of those who are the target of vicious rumours, Pap£ia 
8 ’ a o x c o v  cpaxiq ^ u v  k o tg o i, ‘Weighty is the rumour of citizens with anger in it,’ with 
the life of those who are held in very high esteem, t o  5 ’ UTtspKoraix; kA aisiv  e u  I papif 
‘Being excessively well spoken of has a heavy consequence,’ warning o f the dangers 
of both. It warns of the gods’ awareness of those who kill many; that Zeus can throw 
a thunderbolt upon those who are excessively praised; and that Erinyes can destroy 
those men who have no justice. This passage is qualified later in the play at 750-82, 
where the chorus contrast the common view that good fortune in itself brings about 
misfortune with their own view that impious deeds bring about misfortune.
Although these passages warn of lives lived at the extremes of praise and 
fortune (Ag. 456-74) and warn of the result of ill deeds (Ag. 750-82), neither strictly
i i o
relate to Agamemnon. Rather than being statements of fact about Agamemnon’s
118 Indeed, the first stasimon as a whole (Ag. 355-487) is primarily concerned with Paris; cf. 
Fontenrose (1971) 75-8.
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crimes and the crimes of his descendents,119 they are considerations that are brought 
about as a result of the chorus’ own apprehension concerning Agamemnon’s return 
to Argos.120 The chorus do not know what has happened to their king and there is 
uncertainty about the truth o f the reports concerning Troy’s fall (Ag. 475-8). Their 
words are not informed by anything concrete, but are expressions of their own 
concerns about the safety of their king, because they fear that any excessive actions 
o f his at Troy could result or may have resulted in the gods bringing about 
retribution (Ag. 461-2, 472).
The third of the three passages warning against excessive behaviour, in 
contrast with the other two which come before it, comes after Agamemnon’s safe 
return to Argos. The position of this passage directly before Agamemnon’s death 
hints at an implicit connection between his death and the chorus’ concerns about 
excessive and transgressive actions and what has been termed Agamemnon’s 
‘abnormal prosperity’121 (Ag. 1331-42):
to p£v £v  rcpaoosiv aK opsaxov 8(po 7tdai (3pOTOia<iv>,
5aKT\)A,o5eua;cov 5 ’ outi<; d7t£Uta>v eipyei peXaGpcov,
“pr|K£T’ EaEA.GTm”, Ta5£ (poovcov.
K a i tc o iS s  7ioA.iv p,£v sXelv sSooav p d K a p sq  n p i a p o o ,
0£OTipr|TO<; 5’ oucaS’ hcavst- 
VUV 5 ’ £i 7ipOT£pCOV ai|T a7IOT£ia£l 
Kai t o T o i  Gavouat Gavdjv aXkcov 
7coivd<; Gavaxcov ETttKpavci, 
t i q av <£^>£u^aiTO Ppoxcov aaiv£i 
8ai(iovi (puvat t& 5 ’ c lk o u o d v ;
It is natural for all men to be insatiable when it comes to prosperity, and no one 
shuts it from the walls barring the way with pointed finger, saying, ‘you may no 
longer come in.’ And the blessed ones gave to this man the capture o f  Priam’s city 
and he has returned home honoured by the gods. But now, if  he should pay for the 
blood o f people before and dying for those who died complete requital for other 
deaths, hearing this, what man could boast to be bom with a harmless daimon?
119 See Dodds (2007) 255-64 for this view.
120 See Fontenrose (1971) 75-6.
121 West (1979) 4.
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The passage offers opposing ideas of Agamemnon and the justice of his actions. On 
the one hand, Agamemnon is bestowed with divine favour, which has seen him sack 
Troy and conducted back home safely; on the other, we are presented with his 
potential death, its justice in the eyes of the dead and what appears to be the 
complete absence of divine favour for him. But what are the reasons for this 
apparently contradictory view of Agamemnon, the justice of his actions and the 
position of the gods? At first glance, it seems that at some point during the 
expedition against Troy divine favour has been retracted. But this does not explain 
why he is conducted back home still honoured by the gods. It thus seems incorrect to 
approach the passage in this way. Indeed, rather than hinting at Agamemnon’s 
change of fortune in the eyes of the gods, the passage can be seen to present 
something quite different. The lines, Kai xcoiSs 7roX.1v psv sXsTv sSoaav p&Kapec; 
npidjaou, | 0soxlpr|xo<; 8’ oucaS’ hcavst* ‘and the blessed ones gave to this man the 
capture of Priam’s city and he has returned home honoured by the gods,’ are 
statements of what appear to be accepted truths, either in the eyes of the chorus, or in 
the eyes of both the chorus and Aeschylus. In either case, the divine favour bestowed 
on Agamemnon at Troy and the honour he received seems not to be in question in 
these lines.
However, the lines, vuv 8’ si 7rpoxspoov alp’ a7roxslasi | K a i xoiai Gavouoi 
0ava>v dXX.Gov | noivaq Gavaxcov E7iiKpavsi, | xlq av <s£>s6£,atxo ppoxcov acnvsT | 
8aipovi (puvai xa8’ (xkougov; ‘But now, if he should pay for the blood o f people 
before and dying for those who died complete requital for other deaths, hearing this, 
what man could boast to be bom with a harmless daimon?’ do not reflect the views 
o f the chorus in the same way. First, they relate a possibility, whereas the previous 
statement relates accepted truths, statements of apparent facts. Secondly, these lines 
are focalised in a different manner, spoken through the eyes of the dead, whose 
passing was in some way seen by them to be caused by Agamemnon. The chorus 
here do not state their own view, but what they imagine the dead would feel. Indeed, 
the chorus interject their own understanding of events in the final line by asking the 
rhetorical question that if Agamemnon dies, thus fulfilling the prayers of the dead,
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who could claim to be bom with an aoivsT Saipovi.122 In spite of the potential 
ambiguities surrounding the precise meaning o f derive! Salpovi, the general idea of 
the sentence is nevertheless fairly clear. If a man favoured by the gods, as 
Agamemnon is, should be killed for the deaths of those who have died in the course 
of exacting the gods’ will, then what man could say he was bom with a harmless 
guiding spirit or an unhurt fortune? So, the underlying notion of acnvei 8a{|iovi 
within the context of the passage could be seen to suggest that no one will have or 
can be seen to have an untroubled course through life even if they are favoured by 
the gods, because even they can be killed or come unstuck in some way.
The focalisation of the passage, therefore, indicates not the justice of 
Agamemnon’s death should he now die, but rather the misfortune of it. What the 
latter sentence implies is not the anger of the gods at Agamemnon, nor indeed their 
displeasure at him for the many deaths he may have caused in exacting their will; 
rather the sentence speaks of the gods’ absence in his death should he die and the 
prayers of the dead be answered.123 It is this that seems to be behind the concluding 
line of the question, ‘hearing this, what man could boast to be bom with a harmless 
daimon?’ It is also important to note that although Agamemnon may die seemingly 
unprotected by the gods who previously favoured him, it does not necessarily mean 
that he is killed by them or at their behest. While his death will answer the prayers of 
those whose death he may have caused, it will not fulfil the gods’ desire. Indeed, if 
Agamemnon should die at the gods’ order or by their desire, what purpose would 
there be in Apollo (and Zeus) sending Orestes to avenge his death? It would make no 
sense, or at least a sense which is not explored in the trilogy, if they send someone to 
avenge a death they caused or wanted. The prayers of the dead should thus not be 
equated with the desires of the gods here, in much the same way as the desire of the 
Ghost of Clytemnestra in the Eumenides who wants to see Orestes killed in requital 
for her death is not equated with the will o f the Olympians who sent Orestes to kill 
her and who subsequently protect him.
We can see that it is at least questionable whether the chorus at any point 
pronounce Agamemnon’s actions to be excessive. But even if this interpretation does
122 amvrjq can take either the meaning ‘unhurt’ or ‘harmless’ in this context. The complexities o f  what 
5cujig)v means are discussed above in Chapter 1.
123 This can be compared again with Artemis’ lack o f  intervention at the end o f  Euripides’ H ippolytus.
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not convince, it has nevertheless been demonstrated above that Agamemnon is not 
shown to have incurred divine anger at any point. It has also been shown that the 
fears of Agamemnon’s actions at Troy can be traced back to Clytemnestra, who 
forged and manipulated them during the beacon speeches, and that they are, to say 
the least, not based on any first-person account. Without an example of a 
transgression or an excessive action which can be seen to incur the anger of the gods 
before the so-called ‘tapestry scene’, it is thus difficult to see how the tapestry scene 
can be interpreted as confirmation of any prior ‘guilt’. What is more, the act of 
treading on the cloths is not shown in itself to provoke any divine wrath or 
punishment, in spite of Agamemnon’s fears of the gods’ jealous gaze (Ag. 921-5, 
946-7); and as has been shown before, Clytemnestra does not speak of the gods’ 
involvement at any point in her act o f killing.
In the ‘tapestry scene’, there are three moments when Agamemnon 
demonstrates awareness that should he step on the tapestries he could bring about 
anger against him. First, Agamemnon tells Clytemnestra not to spread the tapestries 
on the floor for him to walk on, honouring him as if a god, because for him as a 
mortal man, such actions are not without fear (Ag. 921-5). Secondly, Agamemnon 
states that he fears the voice o f the people should he agree to Clytemnestra’s wishes 
and step on the cloths (Ag. 938). Thirdly, the fear Agamemnon relates before (Ag. 
921-5) is reiterated at Ag. 946-7, when he says that he hopes no god will cast envy 
from their eyes. So, it is possible to see that concern about offending the gods by 
treading on the tapestries is presented as a significant factor for Agamemnon during 
the verbal tussle with his wife. In spite of the act seeming like an example of excess, 
there is no indication outside of Agamemnon’s concern not to anger the gods by 
treading on the tapestries that the gods are angered by the act. To see divine desire 
for Agamemnon’s death on the basis of the act seems, at best, tenuous.
Moreover, as has been shown before, Clytemnestra does not speak of the 
gods’ involvement at any point in her act of killing and there is no other indication in 
the text that the gods wanted him dead. Indeed, the fact that Apollo (through whom 
Zeus speaks) sends Orestes to avenge Agamemnon’s death in the Libation Bearers 
may be seen to suggest the opposite, that they did not want him dead -  or, at least, as 
an ex post facto  indication that there is greater ambiguity concerning the guilt and 
death of Agamemnon than has often been seen. It can also be argued that the fear
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Agamemnon exhibits during the carpet scene demonstrates sensitivity to the gods’ 
desires and his position as a mortal in relation to them, more than a lack of 
sensitivity or a desire to commit transgressive acts. Parallels can be drawn with his 
concerns immediately before the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, where thoughts o f the gods 
weigh heavily upon him when he makes his decision. Agamemnon presents 
awareness of and sensitivity to his own position with respect to the gods in this 
scene, as he does before, and the absence o f any clear evidence showing divine anger 
at him both before and after his death, coupled with the absence of the gods in 
Clytemnestra’s reasoning for her decision to kill Agamemnon, indicate that his death 
was neither desired nor exacted by the gods.
A FITTING END?
Though Agamemnon cannot be shown categorically to have committed any 
act that incurs the wrath of the gods, there may be evidence to suggest that 
Agamemnon’s death fits the will of Zeus. Arguably the most significant passage that 
sees Agamemnon’s death as divinely ordained comes at Ag. 1485-8:
id) if|, Siai124 Aioq 
7iavaiTiou 7iavspy8xa* 
xi yap Ppoxoiq aveu Aioq xeXetxai; 
xi xcov5’ ou 0£OKpavx6v soxiv;
Oh, oh! A nd all by the w ill o f  Z eus, the cause o f  all th ings, the effector  o f  all e ffects; 
for w hat com e to pass for m ortals, excep t by Z eu s’ doing? W hat o f  all th is is not 
d iv in e ly  ordained?
This statement of Zeus’ power, which has parallels with the endings o f other 
tragedies (e.g. Soph. Trach. 1278), must of course be read against the background of 
a religion in which even the highest god is not omnipotent in a way comparable to 
the Christian God.125 So then, how are we to interpret this statement of Zeus’ power? 
What effect does it have on how we view Agamemnon’s death? Does it affirm the
124 See Garvie (1986) 220 for ambiguity o f  Siai + gen. as instrumental or causal in Aeschylus.
125 For a fuller discussion, see the above section The Power and Limitations o f  Zeus in Chapter 3 ‘The 
Nature o f  Zeus’.
174
belief that Zeus willed Agamemnon’s death? Are those who see this passage as proof 
of Zeus’ desire for Agamemnon’s death right to do so?126 The proximity of the 
passage to Agamemnon’s death, the chorus’ repeated statements concerning 
excessive actions and Agamemnon’s stepping on the tapestries together present 
apparently strong cumulative circumstantial evidence for Agamemnon’s death being 
divinely desired, ordained or executed. But as has been argued, each instance in itself 
does not present a strong case against Agamemnon, or is at least open to being 
interpreted as ambiguous. The same is true here. In spite of the passage’s proximity 
to Agamemnon’s death, the language is general and abstract and is not necessarily or 
specifically directed at Agamemnon — though, of course, this does not preclude 
reference to him. Indeed, one commentator has seen this passage as a statement of
127Zeus’ intent to have Clytemnestra and Aegisthus killed rather than Agamemnon. 
While I do not think that enough evidence can be found in the Agamemnon to 
support this view either, there is at least an abundance of evidence supplied in the 
subsequent plays of the trilogy which can support it (cf. Ch. 260-305, 555-60, 831-7, 
900-2, 939-41, 1026-33; Eu. 64-6, 84, 203, 465-7, 579-80, 593-4), quite unlike the 
evidence which can(not) be supplied to demonstrate that Agamemnon’s death was 
desired by Zeus.
Rather, the passage presents an absence of understanding about religious 
workings on the part of the chorus. The chorus are upset: they have just witnessed 
the return of their king, absent for over ten years, about whom they have worried 
since hearing reports of the capture of Troy, and are now faced with his death. They 
do not understand why this has happened, and they question Clytemnestra about the 
act and condemn her for it. As in the parodos, where they are faced with Iphigeneia’s 
death and a series of events beyond their comprehension, they see Zeus as the cause 
of all and the way to understanding for all (Ag. 160-83).128 Lines 1485-8 echo such a 
view here. They do not express categorical confirmation of Zeus’ desire for 
Agamemnon’s death, but an inability to understand why bad things happen to good 
people (cf. 1331-42). Although, of course, Agamemnon can by no means be 
viewed as a perfect man, he has acted in accordance with divine justice in sacrificing
126 See Lloyd-Jones (1956) 63, (1962) 187-99, (1971) 90-2, (1983) 102; Denniston and Page (1957) 
xv, xx-xxix; Kitto (1964) 1-5, (1966) 58; Otis (1981) 3-65, esp. 64-5; Cohen (1986) 132-4.
127 Fontenrose (1971) 101.
128 See the section The Hymn to Zeus above for further discussion.
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Iphigeneia and in going to Troy, and in so doing has not committed a transgression 
of the boundaries of divine justice. The chorus, aware of the favour the gods have 
granted Agamemnon (cf. Ag. 1331-42), are faced with what on all accounts is the 
complete opposite of divine favour. What the passage at 1485-8 thus presents is the 
chorus’ inability to understand why Agamemnon has died. In their ignorance or 
disbelief concerning divine workings (or lack of divine workings) surrounding
19Q •Agamemnon’s death, they present it as ‘over-determined’ by needing to see Zeus 
as somehow involved not only in the over-arching fate of mankind but also in the 
fate of each individual. As a result, we should be careful not to take the chorus’ 
words at 1485-8 as a genuine insight into divine workings in the Oresteia, as if the 
chorus were some form of collective authority or privileged presence,130 nor should 
Agamemnon thus be seen as having incurred the wrath of the gods on the basis of 
what the chorus say here.
So, Agamemnon’s death should therefore be seen as far from being divinely 
ordained or desired, or as fitting the will of Zeus. The favour Agamemnon receives 
from the gods is indicated by their role in Troy’s fall (Ag. 60-2, 355-60, 367-84, 525- 
6, 580-2, 699-708, 744-9, 810-16, 851-3); in seeing that he gets home safely (Ag. 
661-6, 851-3); and in the gods’ desire to see his death avenged (Ch. 260-305, 555- 
60, 831-7, 900-2, 939-41, 1026-33; Eu. 64-6, 84, 203, 465-7, 579-80, 593-4).131 
Even during the sacrificial scene at Aulis he decides it is better to shed the blood of 
his daughter than to risk incurring the wrath of Zeus for not going to Troy.
SUMMARY REMARKS ON THE GUILT OF AGAMEMNON?
As I have tried to demonstrate throughout the course of this chapter so far, 
Agamemnon can be seen never to transgress the boundaries of justice and never to 
anger the gods in any way. His behaviour purposefully and deliberately attempts to 
keep the gods on his side. Even when his actions could indicate that his judgement 
has lapsed, such as when he treads on the purple cloths, there is no evidence in the 
plays that the gods are angry with him for it. The peculiar thing about the deaths of
129 Cf. Dodds (1951) 1-18, (2007) for ‘over-determinism’.
130 See the section The Hymn to Zeus above for further discussion o f  the role and authority o f  the 
chorus.
131 The chorus also hint at the favourable position Agamemnon has in the underworld, further 
indicating that Agamemnon is far from being despised by the gods (Ch. 354-62).
176
Agamemnon and Cassandra is the inactivity of the gods and their silence during the 
scene and immediately after it. When contrasted with the death of Agamemnon, the 
death of Clytemnestra and the overtly involved divine forces behind Orestes’ actions, 
as discussed toward the beginning of the chapter, support the line taken here that 
Agamemnon’s death was neither desired nor ordained by the gods.
If we trace the gods’ will throughout the three plays, a consistent pattern 
emerges. First, Agamemnon goes to Troy and punishes Paris’ transgression in line 
with the will of Zeus. Secondly, on the way to Troy, Agamemnon must restore 
balance within the separate Artemisian sphere by sacrificing Iphigeneia for and to 
the goddess. Artemis relents of her anger once the sacrifice is performed and balance 
is restored. Contrary to a belief still widely held, the sacrifice, far from being an 
example of a transgression, is in fact an example o f restitutive justice. Indeed, in 
completing the sacrifice, Agamemnon is able to go to Troy and punish Paris’ 
transgression in accordance with Zeus’ will. Thirdly, Clytemnestra is punished by 
Orestes for murdering Agamemnon with the loss of her own life in accordance with 
Apollo’s (and Zeus’) demands. The last major example of justice being exacted in 
the play is the trial scene of the Eumenides, where Orestes is protected by Apollo and 
freed by Athena’s vote. By Orestes being allowed to go free, his act of killing is 
shown categorically to be just. As outlined earlier, if his act of punishment had itself 
been punished it should not be seen as a restitutive killing, because no balance would 
have been restored and the cycle of revenge would have continued. But, by Orestes 
being acquitted and the cycle o f vengeful killing being ended, Aeschylus shows that 
Orestes’ killing of Clytemnestra is categorically a just act that accords with the will 
of Zeus.
So, while Agamemnon, Clytemnestra and Orestes are all killers, it is 
Clytemnestra’s act which is unjust in the eyes of the Olympian gods Zeus, Apollo 
and Athena, and thus worthy o f punishment; both Agamemnon’s and Orestes’ acts of 
killing, however, are in line with the divine will, and it is for this reason that, in the 
Oresteia, Agamemnon should be considered a pious man who is not guilty of any act 
that transgresses the boundaries of divine justice.
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ZEUS, THE ERINYES AND THE VOTE OF ATHENA
It has been argued in the preceding pages that the trial scene of the 
Eumenides helps to show conclusively that both Orestes and Agamemnon act justly 
and in accordance with the will of Zeus, and that the opposite is true for 
Clytemnestra. But, we have yet to discuss the events which unfold in the final play 
of the trilogy, in particular the trial o f Orestes, the vote of Athena and the near 
fracture that is created in the divine world between the Olympians and the Erinyes, 
and what they tell us of the nature o f justice presented in the Oresteia.
One of the most important issues that must be addressed when discussing the 
nature of justice in the Eumenides is whether a new form of justice is introduced 
during the play with the establishment of the court of the Areopagus. It is generally 
accepted that there is a progression during the Oresteia from simple eye-for-an-eye 
retribution -  which is exemplified in the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers -  to 
a more ‘advanced’ court-based system, presided over by an impartial and neutral 
judge and/or jury, who deliver a verdict substantiated by concerns of motivation and
132reason, as well as cause, i.e. whether the defendant did or did not commit a crime. 
Such a progression in the nature of justice is sometimes seen in conjunction with 
Zeus becoming a more sympathetic god,133 which is, in turn, connected with the 
optimistic notion of the god as a benevolent force working for the benefit and 
betterment of humankind.134 In contrast, however, it will be argued here that for the 
purposes of the play’s plot and structure the court’s significance has been greatly 
over-emphasised by scholars in its position as a departure from the manner of justice 
depicted in the previous plays of the trilogy and that, in fact, there is a consistent 
portrayal of divine justice throughout the Oresteia.
This is not to deny that a change of sorts is brought about by the 
establishment of the Areopagus court. It is not as an empty gesture that the court is 
set up. First o f all, it serves an important aetiological function by suggesting that the
132 Those who see a progression and development in the nature o f  justice are in the majority, and such 
views can be seen expressed, for example, by Kitto (1961) 91-5, (1964) 54-86; Podlecki (1966) 74- 
81; Conacher (1987) 166-9; Sommerstein (1989) 19-25, (1996) 282-3. For the opposing view , see 
Lloyd-Jones (1971) 91-5; Gagarin (1976) 74-9.
133 Such a view  is exemplified by Kitto (1961) 91-5, (1964) 54-86; Sommerstein (1989) 19-25. For an 
opposing and very interesting argument concerning the development o f  justice in the O resteia, see 
Solmsen (1949) 163-224, who argues that in the ‘Eumenides it is the Erinyes who change, not Zeus’ 
and that the justice o f  Zeus manifests itself equally in all three plays.
134 For a discussion o f  the optimistic reading, see the section The Hymn to Zeus above.
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murder-court had an ancient and divine heritage.135 Secondly, it has also been 
argued136 that if the type of justice upheld by the Erinyes was in itself sufficient for 
the purposes of settling the dispute concerning Orestes or if it was identical to the
♦ 137justice represented and practised by the Areopagus, there would not have been any 
need for the court to have been established by Athena. The court can thus be seen to 
represent the gods’ involvement in the affairs of humankind and is created 
purposefully by them as a means of assisting the settlement of cases in a way that 
will help bring an end to the cycle of vendetta {Eu. 471-5). In this way, it acts as a 
significant statement laid down by the Olympian gods regarding how they wish 
mankind to settle murder-cases from that moment on {Eu. 482-9, 683-4). But, while 
such considerations are important and while the justice upheld and represented by 
the Erinyes may not have been sufficient in this instance for the purposes o f Orestes’ 
case, it is questionable whether the establishment of the Areopagus necessarily 
signifies a change in the underlying nature of justice. There is, of course, a change in 
the delivery o f justice and the manner of its conception with the introduction of the 
court, but what underpins this model of delivery in the trilogy is the same: the power 
and might of Zeus and the Olympians.
It is not, after all, the court which puts an end to the cycle of revenge killings, 
but Athena and Zeus. While the Areopagus acts as a significant statement laid down 
by the Olympian gods regarding how they wish mankind to settle murder cases from 
that moment on {Eu. 482-9, 683-4), it is not because of, or by means of, the court 
that Orestes is freed or indeed that the Erinyes are calmed and brought under the 
Olympian wing and into coalescence with the Olympian rule once again -  the two 
key outcomes of the play. Rather, the manner in which acts and deeds are considered 
just or not is the same throughout the Oresteia. What the Areopagus represents and 
symbolises for the Athenians and for an audience with democratic ideals is, without 
question, of real importance -  and, I think, it is because of this that scholars may 
have over-emphasised its function within the dramatic framework o f the play. But, it 
is difficult, or rather impossible, to imagine the resolution of the play not resulting in 
the fulfilment of the Olympian will and their victory. So while the court has
135 See Podlecki (1966) 74-100, Conacher (1987) 195-206, Sommerstein (1989) 1-32, Mitchell- 
Boyask (2009) 19-23, 97-107.
136 See Conacher (1987) 168-9 for this objection.
137 Such a view  is argued for by Lloyd-Jones (1971) 94-5; Gagarin (1976) 74-9.
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significance for later generations and the audience watching at the time, the court 
seems to perform a symbolic role which helps placate the Erinyes by giving the 
illusion of fairness.
But, before we enter into a discussion of the nature o f justice and the 
significance of the Areopagus court in the settlement of Orestes’ case, a few words 
need to be said concerning the political context of 458BC. Although the historical 
setting of the play is not strictly the concern of this chapter, it is nevertheless 
important to establish, at least in outline, my position regarding the newly reduced 
function of the Areopagus as solely a homicide court and Aeschylus’ presentation of 
the institution in the Eumenides. It seems to me that the most obvious way of 
interpreting Aeschylus’ depiction of the Areopagus in the play is that the playwright 
wishes his audience to see Ephialtes’ and Pericles’ reduction of the court’s remit 
within the Athenian political and judicial system as in essence no radical change, but 
a movement back to the court’s original function. Thus, Aeschylus is making the 
statement that jurisdiction of homicide cases was the Areopagus’ original purpose, a 
purpose that was given divine sanction by the highest gods. In this way, Aeschylus 
can be seen either to be siding with Ephialtes and Pericles; or, at least, to proffer a 
declaration of reconciliation to the more conservative members of Athenian society 
with a message along the lines of: ‘what is done is done, let us move on’.
So, to return to the play itself, let us first consider how and why the conflict 
between the Erinyes and the Olympians arises in the Eumenides. In both the 
Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers, the Erinyes appear as ministers of Zeus’ 
justice (Ag. 59, 463, 645, 749, 992, 1119, 1190, 1433, 1580; Ch. 402, 577, 652) with 
their remit broader than the single issue of matricide, as it appears to be in the 
Eumenides (Eu. 210-12, 355-6, 421).138 Indeed, as has been pointed out above in 
discussion of the guilt of Agamemnon, the Erinyes in the Agamemnon do not seem 
concerned about the death of Iphigeneia and the fact that she is ‘kindred blood’. In 
the final play, the Erinyes can be seen as single-issue characters, while in the 
preceding two plays they act more generally as spirits of vengeance and act in 
accordance with the will of Zeus.139 Nevertheless, in all three, the Erinyes are
138 See Winnington-Ingram (1983) 165-70 on the narrowing and broadening o f  the Erinyes’ 
presentation.
139 See Dietrich (1967) 91-157, 232-40 for discussion o f  the origins o f  the Erinyes and the Erinyes in 
Homer.
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reactive, single-visioned deities (whether ‘single-issued’ or not). They are concerned 
with the act committed and not the circumstances around and concerning which the 
action has arisen; while one could argue that Athena and the Olympians take into 
consideration the circumstances of the action, and as such Athena asks the Erinyes 
for what reason(s) Orestes killed his mother (Eu. 425-7) and sets up a trial so that 
both sides can relate their version of events. So, it is possible to see that the 
narrowing of the Erinyes’ office and their single-visioned nature create the 
circumstances out of which a conflict could arise. Indeed, one could even argue that 
it was more a matter of when and not if the justice and over-arching power of Zeus 
and the Olympians came to an impasse with the narrow, single-visioned justice of 
the Erinyes. The Erinyes and the Olympians, as two independent sets o f deities 
concerned with justice, seem to have co-existed harmoniously only while there were 
no conflicts of interest.
However, although the Olympians and the Erinyes can be seen to embody 
two different -  though by no means independent -  conceptions o f justice, it is not 
the justice of Orestes’ case which angers the Erinyes, but the dishonour they feel is 
done to them by the Olympians.140 As is made clear when the Erinyes ask Athena to 
preside over the trial of Orestes, all that they require is for the goddess to show them 
due respect (Eu. 433-5). The Erinyes feel that the resolution of the trial does not give 
them, their office, or their sphere of influence the honour it deserves. They exclaim: 
id) Gsoi vscbxspot, nakaiovq vopoix; | KaGuurdaaoGs kmc %ep(bv siXsaGs poxr | eyd> 8’ 
axipoc; fj xataxiva Papuxoxo^, | ev ya xaSs, cpsu, ‘Oh you younger gods, you have 
trodden upon the ancient customs and have taken him from my hands. I am 
dishonoured, the wretched, heavy wrath, in this land. Alas!’ (Eu. 778-81) One 
could, of course, argue that it is the justice wrought by the Olympians which brings 
about the freeing of Orestes and, as a result, it is the justice of the case with which 
the Erinyes are angry. But, it seems that it is not the justice of the case in itself which 
angers the Erinyes, so much as the result and what it signifies for them. If they 
cannot exact or fulfil their will within their own sphere of power, their function 
within the divine world is all but worthless. And so, the Erinyes feel that with
140 It is worth noting that for all the attention Lloyd-Jones (1971) pays to xipi) in the Iliad, he 
completely neglects its significance in the Eumenides. For the role o f  Tipf) in the Eumenides, see 
Macleod (2007)291-300 .
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Athena giving Orestes the deciding vote, the Olympian gods have interfered with 
and over-ridden their (the Erinyes’) office. Indeed, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that within the cycle of familial killings and vengeance, ‘an eye for an eye until 
everybody is blind’ is a means and an end, though, of course, not a very satisfactory 
one. So, the Erinyes can rightly claim to be the ministers of a respected and 
legitimate mode of justice, which (at least) half of the Areopagus recognise as 
possessing a just claim.
The prominent role that the concept of honour (xipq) plays within the final 
scene o f the Eumenides is suggested by the greater frequency with which the word 
xiprj and its verbal and adjectival cognates -  as well as the negative axipia and its 
respective derivatives -  are used after the conclusion of the trial and the departure of 
Orestes at line 777. This is because, when the play reaches its climax in this scene, 
with the Erinyes about to wreak revenge upon the city o f Pallas, creating a fracture 
within the divine world, it can be seen that what is at issue is the notion which is 
firmly on the protagonists’ tongue: i.e. honour, xiprj. As the tension is increased 
during this scene, so is the frequency with which xiprj is used: in the Eumenides, xipfj 
and its cognates appear seven times before line 777, while they appear twelve times 
in the final 270 lines;141 and dxijnia and its cognates also appear seven times before 
line 111, while they appear eight times from line 778 onwards.142 What is more, the 
fact that there is no change in the frequency with which Suer) and its cognates occur 
after line 111 can also be seen to indicate that it is the negation of honour felt by the 
Erinyes and not the nature of justice practised during the trial which brings about the 
confrontation between the two sets of deities. Indeed, the Erinyes only relent of their 
anger when they are shown due respect by Athena. Her initial words of persuasion 
are of no use in stating that they are not dishonoured, as the Erinyes are not 
convinced that this is the case (Eu. 794-823). Even the not-so-veiled threat of Zeus’ 
thunderbolt has no tangible impact of the Erinyes (Eu. 824-80). It is only when the 
goddess offers the Erinyes something concrete, some share of the city and its 
worship, that they finally give up their anger and threats of violence (Eu. 881-
141 For Ttyu) and cognates: Eu. 209, 227, 228, 419, 624, 747, 773, 845, 853, 854, 868, 879, 891, 894, 
9 1 5 ,9 6 7 , 993, 1029, 1037.
142 For dxigia and cognates: Eu. 213, 215, 324, 369, 394, 712, 722, 780, 792, 796, 810, 822, 824, 884, 
917.
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1047).143 What matters to these powerful deities is neither words nor threats, but 
respect and honour which is their due as ancient ministers of divine justice. But, in 
spite of the case against Orestes and the tied vote of the court, their pursuit of 
Orestes and their case is ended by half of the court and the Olympians.
So, Orestes is freed and is allowed to leave Athens without being molested. 
Orestes’ acquittal is a direct consequence of the role and actions of two Olympian 
gods: Apollo, who protects Orestes from the Erinyes and acts as his defender during 
the trial; and Athena, who casts the deciding vote in his favour to free him from 
punishment. Both of these two gods have an innate connection with Zeus in the 
Oresteia: Apollo, Zeus’ son, is a mouth-piece for Zeus, speaking only what his 
father commands (Eu. 17-19, 614-21, 713-14); Athena is bom of Zeus alone (Eu. 
663-6, 735-8), knows the key to the house in which Zeus’ thunderbolt is kept (Eu. 
827-8), and is given keen understanding by him (Eu. 850). Indeed, Athena, just as 
Apollo, says and does what Zeus wills (Eu. 798-9, 826). It is thus possible to infer 
from this that Orestes is protected and freed in line with the will of Zeus -  Zeus, 
who, of course, started (as well as finished) the (final) turn in this cycle of familial 
killings with the command given to Orestes through Apollo in the Libation Bearers 
(Ch. 269-305).
If we trace the will o f Zeus through the Oresteia, we can see that it was the 
will of Zeus that punishment should be exacted against Troy for the theft of Helen;144 
that Agamemnon’s death should be avenged; and that Orestes, as the minister of his 
justice, should be allowed to go free from any punishment. Although it is in many 
ways an obvious point to make that the will of Zeus is always fulfilled, it is 
important to note that just as with the ‘guilt’ of Agamemnon, the underlying justice 
of any act depends on how it corresponds to the will of the highest and most 
powerful god of the Greek pantheon. There is no greater authority than Zeus: he is 
the ultimate dispenser of justice and the justice o f any deed must always be 
considered in relation to his will.145 This is all the more significant in a discussion of 
justice in the Eumenides (and the Oresteia as a whole), because in contrast to other 
extant plays of Aeschylus such as the Persians or the Seven Against Thebes, the
143 Compare the use o f  5oupovs<; and 9eai in reference to the Erinyes as a mode o f  flattery in the above 
chapter on 8oupcov.
144 See section Zeus Xenios above.
145 See Chapter 2 for further examples o f  Zeus as the god o f  justice.
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Olympian gods have a tangible presence and direct involvement in the affairs being 
depicted on the stage: their will is presented right in front of the audience. It is thus 
in light of Zeus and his will that we should look at the decision of the court of the 
Areopagus and the vote o f Athena.
The vote of Athena is determined by factors unrelated to the actual trial and, 
in spite of the goddess’ appearance and bearing, she is far from being an independent 
or neutral adjudicator. After Athena enters the stage at line 397, she states that she 
does not know who the Erinyes are, saying that she has never seen their race before 
(Eu. 410-12). But the goddess then acknowledges that her inability to place the 
Erinyes among the spectrum of gods and men could be deemed disrespectful. In 
recognising this she opens the door for the chorus to speak, by saying: Aiyeiv 5’ 
dpojnpov ovta toix; n E E a q  kcxkox;, | 7tp6aco Sucalcov q8’ ctTiooxaTSi 0spi<;. ‘That 
someone may speak ill o f his neighbours without being blamed for it, that law stands 
far from what is just.’ (Eu. 413-14) And it is in a good-natured vein that Athena and 
the Erinyes subsequently converse. Indeed, in their first dialogue, it is apparent that 
the Erinyes consider Athena a fair judge who will show them respect if given respect 
(Eu. 435), and as such they ask her to preside over the dispute between themselves 
and Orestes (Eu. 433-4). However, this is in spite of the manifest differences in their 
respective views on the nature of justice, which are indicated in an exchange about 
the ethical and legal position of Orestes as the killer of his mother (Eu. 425-7):
X O : cpovsix; yap e iv a i |xr|Tp6<; fj^iw oaxo.
A 0 :  a5|ir)<; a v a y ic q q ,  r\ t iv o <; ipeajv  k o t o v ;
X O : 7iou yap Toaouio<v> Ksvipov cbq pqipoKTOvsiv,
Chorus: Indeed, he thought it fair to  be the slayer o f  h is m other.
A thena: U nsubdued  by n ecess ity , or f le e in g  from  the w rath o f  another?
Chorus: H ow  can there be so  great a goad  that can force so m eo n e  to k ill h is m other?
Athena at first appears to stay true to the picture the Erinyes have of her as a fair and 
neutral judge, because having heard the initial testimony of Orestes she considers the 
case to be too great a matter for her to pass judgement on, fearing the wrath the 
Erinyes may bring down upon her and her city (Eu. 470-4). Instead, Athena
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establishes the court of the Areopagus, formed of the greatest Athenian citizens {Eu. 
482-9) and the trial unfolds with both sides given the opportunity to state their case. 
But then there is a shift: on asking the judges to go and cast their votes, she declares 
that she will, in turn, cast a vote for Orestes should the court deliver a tied verdict 
{Eu. 734-41).146 In so doing, Athena revises her prior statement that the matter is too 
great for her to pass judgement on alone. Indeed, the belief that she would bring the 
wrath of the Erinyes upon her and her city should she determine the verdict turns out 
to be correct -  although, o f course, the goddess is able to assuage their anger, 
bringing them within the pantheon of polis deities.
Athena’s actions in the play indicate that she occupies an ambiguous 
position.147 She is seen as trustworthy and fair-minded by the Erinyes, who believe 
her to be in some way neutral and independent, while in reality she is nothing of the 
sort, as is intimated even before she casts her vote in favour of Orestes {Eu. 425-7). 
It is, o f course, true that the Erinyes never state outright that they consider Athena 
neutral or independent, but only that she will give them due respect. Nevertheless, in 
asking Athena to preside over the dispute as judge, it is expected that she will behave 
as, if not actually to be, a neutral and independent judge during the trial, otherwise 
the Erinyes would be placing themselves at an automatic disadvantage. But, in spite 
of this and although the goddess was not directly involved in the cycle of killings 
within the House of Atreus and can in this respect be seen as detached from the 
events, she is inherently connected with the death of Clytemnestra by being an 
Olympian and through her innate connection with Zeus. She has a vested interest in 
preserving the Olympian rule in which she is a leading player, and her own 
Olympian nature thus determines that she cannot be independent. So, when Athena 
comes to cast her vote at Eu. 735, she does not do so as a neutral or independent
146 It has been a matter o f  some debate whether Athena’s vote breaks a tie or causes a tie. The problem 
arises out o f  the perceived ambiguity in lines 7 3 4 -4 1 .1 will not repeat the respective arguments here, 
because much has been written on the issue and the balance o f  the voting is not o f  strict concern for 
this discussion. All that matters for the purposes o f  my argument is that Athena votes, does so in 
favour o f  Orestes and in so doing determines the outcome o f  the case. For arguments in favour o f  
Athena’s vote breaking the tied vote o f  the court, see: Verrall (1908) ad loc; Hester (1981) 265-74; 
Conacher (1987) 164-6; Seaford (1995) 202-21. For arguments in favour o f  Athena’s vote causing a 
tie, see: Gagarin (1975) 121-7; Goldhill (1984) 257-9; Vemant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 418-20; 
Sommerstein (1989) 221-6. Taplin (1977) 395-401 side-steps the issue, but raises concerns over the 
corruption o f  the text between lines 574-777.
147 That Athena occupies an ambiguous space has been highlighted in relation to her gender by 
Winnington-Ingram (1983) 125-31, Goldhill (1984) 258-61.
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adjudicator as the Erinyes expect. It is generally accepted by scholars that Athena’s 
vote is not arbitrarily cast in favour of Orestes,148 with most pointing to 
considerations related to the tension concerning the gender-role of the goddess, who 
is introduced as saying that she favours the male in all things but marriage {Eu. 736- 
40), as well as highlighting her innate connection with her father.149 But, while such 
arguments are no doubt correct in highlighting the importance of Athena’s gender 
and her connection with her father in the way she votes, they nevertheless overlook 
that it is not purely the male-ness o f Zeus (and Athena) which is a determining 
feature for the way the goddess votes, but what Zeus represents as the head of the 
Olympian order and that he is minister of justice. It is through Athena that Zeus is 
able to determine that Orestes goes free and it is the will of Zeus that underpins 
events from Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia all the way through to the 
trial scene of the Eumenides. It is his will which ultimately determines what is just, 
not Athena and not the court. In this way, can we really say the nature of justice has 
changed?
But, what of motivation? Is not the ability o f the defendent to state his case in 
front of a neutral and independent judge or jury a departure from the retributive, eye- 
for-an-eye paradigm employed in the previous two plays of the trilogy? Orestes 
does, of course, get the opportunity to state his reasons for killing his mother and he 
does not deny that he committed the act {Eu. 462-4). This could perhaps be seen as a 
notable departure from the way justice and the framework of transgression and 
punishment were portrayed in the earlier plays of the trilogy, where individuals can 
be seen to ‘take the law into their own hands’. But, even then, to say that each 
individual took the law into their own hands is a misreading o f events, because 
neither Agamemnon nor Orestes act without divine sanction, and neither went 
beyond the perimeters established by divine law;150 only Clytemnestra can be seen to 
behave ‘outside the law’, by acting on her own desires and her own concept of what 
is right and wrong.
148 Contrast with Lloyd-Jones (1971) 92, who sees no justifiable reason for Athena to vote in the way 
she does.
149 See, for example, Thomson (1946) 288, Gagarin (1976) 10-3, Winnington-Ingram (1983) 125-31, 
Goldhill (1984) 258-61, Conacher (1987) 167-8, Sommerstein (1989) 229-30.
150 Such a conception o f  justice is also explicitly related in Homer, Od. 1.32-43.
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Also, we should not overlook the fact that the motivation of each individual 
plays an important part in the relationship between transgression and punishment 
throughout the trilogy. Agamemnon goes to Troy and sacrifices Iphigeneia in order 
to keep Zeus on his side and to placate Artemis. Although Clytemnestra does kill 
him (in spite of the divine will), his death is avenged in line with the divine will 
through Orestes. So, in spite of Agamemnon committing a heinous act in killing his 
daughter, which rightly horrifies the chorus and is an act which transgresses the 
familial bonds between father and daughter -  an act (among many others) for which 
Clytemnestra does eventually kill him -  it is due to his motivation to keep the divine 
will on his side that the gods do not want him killed -  which is, of course, directly 
comparable with what happens with Orestes in the Eumendies. In contrast, 
Clytemnestra is punished by the gods, because her motives and actions were in 
opposition to the will of Zeus. So, although Agamemnon, Clytemnestra and Orestes 
are all killers, it is because Agamemnon’s and Orestes’ motives are in line with the 
will of Zeus and their actions designed to keep Zeus and the gods on their side that 
Orestes is sent to avenge his father’s death and that Orestes is subsequently freed by 
the vote of Athena, while Clytemnestra is killed for the transgressive killing she 
commits and her death not avenged by any of the Olympians. Thus, an individual’s 
motivation is of utmost importance in each of the three plays, and not just in the 
Eumenides.
Rather, what seems to be far more significant to the overall structure and plot 
of the Eumenides is the conflict that arises between the Erinyes and the Olympians 
and the contention that exists between the two sets of deities, and the honour (xiprj) 
due their respective strata of divinity (older/newer, chthonic/Olympian). This is not 
to say that the justice of Orestes’ case is not important, but that it is of a secondary 
nature to -  though by no means independent from -  the conflict between the Erinyes 
and the Olympians. That the justice of Orestes’ case is in some way superseded 
within the play by this conflict is seemingly confirmed by the fact that the play goes 
on for over 250 lines after Orestes leaves the stage.
SUMMARY REMARKS
The Eumenides can thus be seen as depicting the coming together of two sets 
of deities with two differing (though not independent) conceptions of justice. As has
187
been stated, it needs to be noted that it is not the case that the underlying nature of 
justice changes with the establishment of the Areopagus, just the manner of its 
delivery. The Olympians had existed before the start of the play and Zeus 
administers justice consistently throughout the trilogy. The two sets of gods, 
Olympians and Erinyes had existed before the opening of the Eumenides with their 
differing notions of justice and all that has changed is that their wills have come into 
conflict over the case of Orestes. Indeed, before the killing of Clytemnestra, the 
Erinyes had been agents working in harmony with the justice o f Zeus. The 
Areopagus court, rather than being symbolic of a ‘new’ form of justice, signifies a 
confirmation of Zeus’ will and justice, clarifying the manner in which justice is 
administered by Zeus, taking on board the Olympian ability to see further than the 
act itself and understanding the importance of motivation, just as occurs with 
Agamemnon and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia151 and Orestes and the killing of 
Clytemnestra.
151 It is interesting to note that the Erinyes do not seem concerned with the death o f  Iphigeneia, in 
spite o f  the fact that she is the daughter (and thus blood-kin) o f  Agamemnon.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
On the preceding pages, we first examined the meaning and nature of three 
closely connected divine words and concepts: Geoq, Saipcov and Zeus. In the first 
chapter, ‘Aaipcov in the Plays of Aeschylus’, it was argued that the meaning of 
Saipcov and what it denotes depends upon, and is determined by, the contexts in 
which it is used. For example, Saipcov is often found to present a meaning 
synonymous with Gsoc;, where it denotes both a known, specified deity and an 
unknown, indeterminate fulfiller of events. In contexts when no known or specified 
deity can be seen as responsible for an event, Saipcov is used together with Gsoc; and 
Zeus in what has been called ‘the indefinite mode of expression’, where each term is 
treated synonymously to refer to an unknown supernatural intervention. As has been 
seen above, such usage is especially prevalent in the Homeric epics, but is not 
restricted to them.
This is all quite straightforward and shows an easily demonstrable 
consistency in the usage of Saipcov between itself and other divine terms and 
between early Greek epic and classical tragedy. However, in Aeschylus, Saipcov is 
also employed to denote ideas quite different from what is denoted by Gsoc;. For 
example, Saipcov can be used to refer to a deity or being that is in some way lesser 
than and/or distinct from Gsoc;, where the two terms, Saipcov and Gsoc;, are juxtaposed 
and seem to give meaning to one another. So it is, for example, that in the Seven 
Aeschylus juxtaposes Zeus and Typhon, calling the former a Gsoc; and the latter a 
Saipcov, and in so doing uses the two terms as part of his characterisation of the two 
deities. Furthermore, Saipcov in archaic Greek even denotes something akin to the 
idea of an individual’s personal deity and, by extension, someone’s fortune or lot in 
life. In this way, Saipcov came to denote both an active and a passive idea that is 
closely connected with an individual’s lot in life. In other words, Saipcov is that 
which determines a person’s fortune or lot in life and that which is determined by his 
actions or nature. This particular aspect of the word’s often ambiguous and many- 
faceted nature is highlighted by and exemplified in a fragment of Heraclitus (B119): 
qGoq av0pcb7rcp Saipcov, ‘Character fo r  a man is his daimdrf or 'A m an’s daimon is 
his character’. This chapter has shown the different ways Saipcov is used by 
Aeschylus and how the word came to mean different things in different contexts.
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While the precise meaning of Saipcov is context-dependent, there is an underlying 
connection which is linked to the idea of the fulfilment of events and thus to the 
word’s etymological root, dai-, ‘distribute’, whether Saipcov is that which brings 
about an event or is the result of the event completed. However, it has also been 
shown that Saipcov was sometimes used at specific instances to denote a deity 
distinct from and/or in some way lesser than the deity denoted by Gsoc;.
Against this background, the remaining chapters of the thesis were concerned 
with the presentation of Zeus in Aeschylus as the highest and most powerful god. 
First, the second chapter of the thesis, ‘The Characteristics of Zeus’, establishes that 
Zeus is presented in a consistent fashion throughout the six extant authentic plays. 
This conclusion was reached by working chronologically through the Suppliants and 
the Oresteia, picking out how and where the god is spoken of, and identifying the 
key features ascribed to him. This chapter shows that while Aeschylus does use Zeus 
dramatically, by stressing certain aspects of his nature to fit the thematic purposes of 
individual plays, such as supplication in the Suppliants or xenia in the Agamemnon, 
there is a consistent thread running through all the plays of Aeschylus concerning the 
presentation of Zeus: Zeus is always the king of the gods, the god of justice and the 
ultimate fulfiller of events; he possesses the same mythology; he is still the all- 
powerful god.
In the third chapter, ‘The Nature of Zeus’, we examined those aspects of the 
god that make him who he is. Our conclusions were reached primarily by looking at 
the way Zeus is presented in the plays of Aeschylus themselves, but also by 
considering the nature of the god within the context of an age when philosophical 
speculation was prevalent, as well as within the context of an established literary 
tradition. The key areas focused on with regard to the god’s presentation included the 
omnipotence and the limitations of Zeus’ power; his invariance and 
anthropomorphism; the god as a primal substance; and Zeus’ relationship and 
connection with Hades. The result o f the discussion is that while the underlying 
nature of Zeus is similar to that in the Homeric depiction of the god, there are also 
noteworthy differences. For example, there are also indications that Aeschylus is 
interacting with Presocratic arguments and theories about the nature of the highest 
and most powerful god, such as can be seen clearly in the parodos of the Suppliants. 
But, such interaction with philosophical speculation should not be considered at all 
surprising or the result of a desire to see a simple progression from ‘primitivism’ to a
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more ‘advanced’ monotheistic conception of the highest god. Instead, it is argued in 
this thesis that we should recognise that this aspect of the Zeus o f Aeschylus is the 
product o f an age in which philosophical speculation about the highest and most 
powerful god was prevalent.
In the fourth and final chapter, arguably the most significant aspect of Zeus’ 
nature is discussed. ‘The Justice of Zeus’ examines how and by what Taws’ the god 
rules the world. This is done by initially asking one question: should Agamemnon be 
seen as guilty in the eyes of Zeus? In asking this question, we discussed whether the 
king should be seen as committing any act that transgresses the justice of Zeus. This 
chapter re-evaluates how the nature of justice and the relationship between the gods 
and men should be understood. By closely considering the framework of justice 
within the Oresteia, what justice is and how it is depicted by Aeschylus, and by 
putting to one side preconceptions about innocence, innocents and the inherent worth 
of life itself, that every life is ‘sacred’ or equally valued, this chapter examines the 
balance between transgression and punishments, looking at what is said and depicted 
in the Oresteia itself concerning the nature o f justice. Indeed, by discussing the 
question of Agamemnon’s so-called ‘guilt’ in light of the premise that the gods, 
including Zeus, may not actually be kind and benevolent forces working for the 
betterment of mankind, it is possible to see that the Oresteia is better understood and 
appears far more rational in its depiction of the gods and justice if Agamemnon is 
seen to have committed no act that transgresses the justice of Zeus. Moreover, it also 
seems to be the case after close examination of the Agamemnon that far from being 
impious and unjust, Agamemnon is a pious and just individual who tries to keep the 
gods on his side at all times, recognising the significance of their approval for his 
actions. In so doing, Agamemnon goes to Troy because of the transgression of xenia 
committed by Alexander Paris and sacrifices his daughter Iphigeneia in order to 
appease the anger of Artemis, with both acts ultimately working towards fulfilling 
the will of Zeus and avenging the transgression of guest-friendship.
Then, in the last part of the chapter it is argued that in the Eumenides the vote 
of Athena, the establishment of the Areopagus and the position of Athena and 
Apollo in relation to the Erinyes further indicate that the justice of Zeus does not 
change or develop into something kinder or more understanding than what we see in 
the first two plays o f the Oresteia. Zeus remains the same as in the Agamemnon and 
it is the Erinyes who alter themselves by accepting the offer put forward by Athena
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to be incorporated into the polis religion of Athens as the Eumenides. This is not to 
say that the way justice is delivered does not change with the establishment of the 
Areopagus court, just that the underlying nature of justice and Zeus’ will remains. 
The last part of the chapter thus acts to confirm many of the conclusions drawn in the 
first, seeing Zeus as neither a kind nor a benevolent god who only has the best 
interests of mankind at heart. Rather, Zeus is still the same god whose will is always 
fulfilled so long as he remains the highest and most powerful god o f the Greek 
pantheon.
The Significance of the Argument
On the basis of the conclusions drawn in this thesis, what changes when we 
now read Aeschylus or see his plays performed?
First, with such an ambiguous word as Saipcov, which can refer to -  what 
appear at first glance as -  quite disparate ideas that denote different things depending 
on where the term is used, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of drawing 
conclusions about the precise meaning of Saipcov from the context in which the word 
is used in the plays. By taking this approach with Saipcov, it has been possible to 
show that the meaning of the term often varies depending upon its relation with other 
divine terms, in particular with Gsoq. Furthermore, the context-driven nature of the 
discussion in this chapter enables us to see how Aeschylus’ use of Saipcov fits within 
the broader framework of ancient Greek literature and religio-philosophical thought.
So, in Homer, there is no indication that Saipcov possesses any pejorative 
meaning or connotations, or that it is used to denote a deity in any way distinct from 
what is denoted by Gsoq. Whether this is a reflection of the manner of religious 
thought of the Homeric age, of poetic usage, or whether it is simply an accurate 
reflection of how people spoke about the gods, whether or not it mirrors the 
everyday religious beliefs of people at the time, does not strictly matter for the 
purposes of this thesis now. All that needs to be noted is that when Saipcov is used to 
denote a deity, it acts as a synonym for Gsoq. In Hesiod, however, when Saipcov is 
used to refer to a deity, the deity is in some way lesser than and/or distinct from the 
type of deity referred to by Gsoq. O f the three times Saipcov is used in Hesiod, twice 
it denotes beings that were once mortal, but have become immortal and are thus 
quite unlike the immortal gods denoted by Geoq/Gsoi (in the other instance, Saipcov 
denotes the idea of an individual’s lot in life).
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But, in Aeschylus, there seems to be a synthesis, so to speak, between 
Homer’s and Hesiod’s ways o f conceiving of Saipcov; here it is used both as a 
synonym for 0soq and as a way to distinguish between the respective divinities of 
two -  often juxtaposed -  deities, such as Zeus and Typhon in the Seven, where the 
latter is called Saipcov, while the former Gsog. In writing toward the beginning of the 
classical era, Aeschylus can be seen to hold a significant position with regard to his 
use of divine terminology. His employment of Saipcov both as a synonym for 0eo<; 
and to denote a deity distinct from Gsoq demonstrates that there was not a simple 
progression in the meaning and use of Saipcov throughout antiquity from a synonym 
for 0eo<; to a term that is distinct from it. Rather, the development of the meaning of 
Saipcov is far more staggered and nuanced, because while Hesiod seems to have 
understood something quite different in his use of Saipcov from what is presented in 
Homer, there is no such clear-cut distinction made by Aeschylus (or indeed, by the 
lyric poets o f the archaic and early classical periods). Indeed, it is conceivable that 
Saipcov possesses a range o f meaning in Aeschylus because he works within the 
contexts of Homer and Hesiod, as well as the Presocratic philosophers, and is in 
many respects the sum of the collective Greek literary past, just as Attic tragedy 
brings together the choral aspects of lyric poetry and the narrative elements of epic 
poetry. While much of this, especially as presented in summary form, is not in itself 
new, it was necessary to argue for these results to provide the appropriate 
background to the subsequent discussion of the role of Zeus in Aeschylus.
In the chapters that deal with the nature and justice of Zeus, there was no 
attempt made to re-create the approach of the preceding chapter on Saipcov: indeed, 
as has been stated, such an approach would have been inappropriate for a fully- 
fledged and characterised god. But, this does not mean that any less attention was 
given to close analysis of the primary sources and the contexts they create. As has 
been demonstrated and argued for above, from a close textual-based (re- 
)examination and (re-)consideration of the plays of Aeschylus, it has been possible to 
see that the application of any grand or over-arching religious doctrine or theory to 
the nature and justice of Zeus is inappropriate. It is thus inadequate to see Aeschylus 
as a philosophising poet, who spreads his ‘message’ through the medium of his 
plays. But, this is not to claim that he was a mere copier with no ability to think for 
himself; nor does it mean that he was a hermit or recluse uninterested in or 
unaffected by the philosophical speculation and debate of his age going on about
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him. Equally, this is not to down-play the underlying influence of Homer and 
Hesiod. Indeed, in Aeschylus’ use of Saipcov we have seen what significant influence 
both these writers seem to have had on his works in just this aspect of his thought, 
not to mention the shared literary and mythological history upon which the poet 
bases his plays, as is seen most clearly in the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers. 
Rather, what we see in Aeschylus is an underlying Homeric and Hesiodic conception 
of Zeus and the gods, but there is concomitant with this presentation interaction with 
Presocratic religio-philosophical speculation concerning the nature of the highest and 
most powerful god, which develops and plays with received notions about Zeus and 
his divinity.
In the chapter ‘The Nature of Zeus’, by looking at various characteristics of 
the god it is shown, in the first place, that Aeschylus presents Zeus at one and the 
same time as both all-powerful and yet limited by the existence of other gods in a 
way reminiscent of the Homeric depiction of Zeus. But, in the subsequent section, 
Anthropomorphism and Invariance, Aeschylus is seen as hinting at something more 
than is found in the Homeric presentation of Zeus. For example, at Supp. 86-103 we 
can find descriptions of Zeus’ invariance and detachment which recall Xenophanes’ 
ideas regarding his one god. Also, in the Heliades, Aeschylus may have depicted 
Zeus in a way that alludes to pantheistic notions of divinity, where the language used 
is reminiscent of the works o f Presocratic thinkers, such as Empedocles, Anaximenes 
and Diogenes of Apollonia. Moreover, the presentation of Zeus and Hades further 
indicates that Aeschylus was conceiving of the god in ways not found in the works 
of Homer and Hesiod. What is argued for in this section is that when Aeschylus 
refers to the Zeus of the Dead he is not simply using the name as a synonym for 
Hades, but is thinking of the god in a far more over-arching and all-encompasing 
manner. So, therefore, what this chapter demonstrates is that Aeschylus was not 
bound by the received literary tradition epitomized in the works of Homer and 
Hesiod in the way he depicts Zeus. Rather, it is shown that Aeschylus was not a 
copier, that he was able to reflect on the nature of the highest and most powerful god 
and the arguments put forward by the Presocratic philosophers.
The argument that may have the most significance for a new understanding 
of the nature of Zeus and the theology of Aeschylus as a whole is the one made in 
the chapter ‘The Justice of Zeus’, in which it is argued that Agamemnon should not 
be seen as guilty of any transgression of the will and/or justice of Zeus. It is also
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shown there that Agamemnon’s death was neither divinely ordered nor desired. The 
implication of this argument is not only that Agamemnon should be seen as a just 
and pious individual, but also that we need to re-assess how we read and understand 
the justice of Zeus in Aeschylus. While, of course, what is said in this chapter has an 
impact on how we understand the role of Agamemnon within the play, there is a 
greater underlying significance for how we conceive of the nature of justice and thus 
the nature and will of Zeus. If we accept the conclusion that Agamemnon has done 
nothing wrong in the eyes of the highest and most powerful god -  in spite of killing 
his daughter, who is presented as a young girl innocent of any crime -  then it is 
necessary to re-examine how we understand the balance between right and wrong; 
transgression and punishment; and the role of the gods in the lives of men. We must 
ask ourselves what moral assumptions can be made (if any) in this pre-Christian 
world, where there is no religious codex acting as a moral or ethical guide.
How then should we view the relationship between men and the gods and 
what role does Zeus play within the framework of justice? As is stated at the opening 
of the chapter on ‘The Justice of Zeus’, one way to conceptualise justice is as a 
balance between transgression and punishment, and it is through this conceptual 
framework that we must consider what Aeschylus’ presentation of justice means for 
our understanding of Zeus. But, to think along the lines that there was a single 
conception of justice is misleading. As there was no single text or set of laws sent 
down from on high to guide mankind in their moral judgements, and as there was 
also no single deity, but a plurality of gods, each with their sphere of power and own 
individual wills, it is necessary to think within a system where there is more than one 
conception of justice, and in so doing to establish a new framework by and through 
which to view the relationship between man and god, and to consider its implications 
for how we understand Greek divinity. With a polytheistic religion that has a 
multiplicity of competing and contrasting divine wills, such as is presented by 
Aeschylus, we must recognise that justice depends on the relationships both between 
the many gods themselves and between each individual god and each individual 
man. There is no grand, over-arching conception of justice presented by Aeschylus. 
The justice of any human action should only be considered in relation to the will of 
the god or gods to whom the particular issue is of concern. So, we can see these 
many different and individual relationships in action throughout the Oresteia, where 
the balance between competing divine forces is played out between Agamemnon and
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Zeus and Artemis in the Agamemnon, where the king must act correctly by both 
deities within their spheres of power, and then in the Eumenides between the 
Olympians and the Erinyes.
The nature of justice in Aeschylus is further complicated from the 
perspective of a Christian/post-Christian audience or readership, because Zeus and 
the gods are not paragons of moral excellence. Zeus is not, as is the Platonic 
Demiurge, and as is the Christian God at least on one interpretation, beautiful and 
good as we may expect gods to be, especially the highest and most powerful god. 
But, if the killing of an innocent girl such as Iphigeneia does not bring with it the 
wrath of a god against the perpetrator and if the motivating forces of the gods rest 
only with a concern for their own honour, then it is reasonable to state that Zeus and 
the gods should not be thought of as kind or benevolent and we can question the 
underlying basis of the moral world which we are presented with, understanding that 
the will of Zeus and the laws he has imposed on men have not been established for 
mankind’s own betterment.
Although Zeus is not presented as a kind god and although the laws he has 
imposed on mankind are not for their betterment, this does not mean that Aeschylus 
is presenting his audience with an amoral world-view or an early form of nihilism. 
Rather, the picture is more complex. Aeschylus is depicting a conflict between 
divine will and what we may understand as natural, innate human responses. This is 
particularly telling in the parodos of the Agamemnon, when Agamemnon is steeling 
himself to sacrifice Iphigeneia. In this scene, through the chorus’ eyes, we are 
presented, on the one hand, with the horror of Agamemnon’s action and the pain and 
torment of Iphigeneia’s helplessness while she is cruelly slain at the altar in order to 
appease the anger of Artemis and in order to enable the Greeks to go to Troy and 
please Zeus by avenging Paris’ transgression of xenia. But, on the other side, we are 
given no indication whatsoever that in the gods’ minds there is any thought for the 
human cost involved in fulfilling their wills. Thus, in the thoughts of all the human 
characters depicted by Aeschylus we see the horror of what is to be done by killing 
Iphigeneia: in Agamemnon we see him effectively unable to choose between 
sacrificing his daughter or disobeying the gods; the chorus dwell on the innocence of 
Iphigeneia and the disgust of what Agamemnon does in order to carry out the gods’ 
will; and, indeed, Clytemnestra is so outraged by the act that it drives her to murder 
her husband (or, at least, the sacrifice is the catalyst for her action). But, all the gods
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care for is that punishment is exacted for the transgression of their will. For them, 
there is no objection to the killing o f an innocent girl.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that Aeschylus presents Zeus as presiding over 
justice and as behaving as a just god within the paradigm of justice depicted in his 
plays, this does not automatically suggest that Aeschylus himself considers Zeus as a 
god who is unequivocally ‘just’ or that he presides over a ‘morally just’ system. How 
can the disregard for human life (‘innocent’ or otherwise) be just? This is not to 
retract my earlier argument. Rather, I want to raise the point that Aeschylus seems to 
present in his plays a deliberate juxtaposition between the human and the divine 
conceptions of justice. Indeed, the playwright constructs this contrast without, to my 
mind, taking sides or favouring one conception of what is just over the other. On the 
one hand, Aeschylus shows the horror and disgust o f the sacrifice of Iphigeneia; but, 
on the other, he shows the lasting and over-arching power of the Olympians and their 
ability to resolve the conflict between themselves and the Erinyes peacefully, as well 
as establishing a court o f arbitration for posterity. In this way, Aeschylus does not 
show one conception of justice more worthy than the other, but that man and god 
may have different conceptions of what is just.
The nature of justice in Aeschylus should thus not be seen as a singular 
notion. Not only do gods play-off against one another in the divine sphere, each with 
their own conceptions of justice, as is seen between the Olympians and the Erinyes 
in the Eumenides, but there is also a constant under-current between human concerns 
about the inherent worth of life and the divine will of the gods, as is seen during the 
sacrificial scene of Iphigeneia between Agamemnon/the chorus and Zeus/Artemis. 
Moreover, while we, a modem audience, may value both the human and divine 
concerns equally (if not the human side more so), the power and position of the gods 
in Aeschylus entails that the will of the gods, and Zeus in particular, must take 
precedence over human concerns. It is for this reason that although there is a 
complex framework of competing wills, both human and divine, Agamemnon’s 
decision to act in accordance with Zeus’ will must ultimately be seen as just, in spite 
of his subordination of the natural human concern for the inherent value of human 
life.
But, the arguments made in this thesis also have a wider significance than 
simply helping to supply a greater understanding of the plays o f Aeschylus 
themselves. First, in the area of theology, while I have argued against seeing a
197
simple linear progression from ‘primitive’ polytheism to ‘advanced’ monotheism in 
discussion o f the theology of Aeschylus, it is nevertheless the case that Aeschylus 
falls at an interesting and telling point between our earliest extant literary sources 
(the epics of Homer), which depict fallible anthropomorphic gods, and the works of 
Plato who posits the notion that there was a good and beautiful creator god. So, 
although I do not think that Aeschylus’ ideas of Zeus should be placed within the 
framework o f a linear progression that ‘naturally’ ends up with Plato’s Demiurge, let 
alone the Christian God, Aeschylus’ position at the end of the archaic age and the 
start o f the classical enables us to see what sorts o f ideas about the highest and most 
powerful god were present within Athens during the middle decades of the fifth- 
century B.C.
Indeed, it is possible to argue that the works of Aeschylus possess a greater 
and more far-reaching importance than we may first expect from a work of drama. 
At the time Aeschylus was writing Athens had no real philosophical tradition, 
certainly not to anywhere near the extent the city would have only a short time after 
his death. There is, of course, some evidence that indicates Anaxagoras at some stage 
came to Athens, and although intellectuals in Athens would have had access to 
philosophical works, the city was not the hub of philosophical speculation that it 
would later become. It is, therefore, as is often argued, entirely possible that tragedy 
in some way performed an intellectual and speculatory function which came later to 
be filled and superseded by the philosophers, and which could be seen as a 
significant contributing factor in the way the great age o f tragedy in Athens came to 
an end at the time philosophy in the city started to flourish. So, when we see that 
Aeschylus was depicting Zeus as somehow invariant and more detached than he 
appears in Homer and Hesiod, seemingly taking on board Presocratic notions of god, 
we should not assume that he was alone in Athens as one individual thinking and 
speculating on such ideas, but that he was part o f a wider discourse within Athens at 
the time concerned with how we should understand the nature of the highest and 
most powerful god.
But, it was not just the nature o f Zeus that was being speculated upon by 
Aeschylus in his plays, but also how the gods govern the universe, what in essence 
the justice of Zeus is. The political issues being played out in the Eumenides would 
naturally have had an immediate and direct importance for the Athenian audience 
regarding the radical democratisation of the city’s political and judicial institutions.
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As has been commented on in the main body of the text, the central position of the 
Areopagus court to the play’s plot as simply a homicide court indicates that 
Aeschylus may have been supplying an ex post facto  divine justification for the 
recent changes to it. But, there is also something far more fundamental to the 
presentation of justice in Aeschylus, something which underpins every one of his 
plays. This is that the gods are not kind or benevolent deities attempting to improve 
the lot of mankind, but only care for their own honour and the respect paid to their 
divinity. As we saw in discussion of the Oresteia above, Agamemnon’s death is 
avenged because the gods did not want it and the king had acted in a just manner by 
consistently following their orders. Clytemnestra is killed for Agamemnon’s death; 
and the Areopagus court -  rather than being something strictly for mankind’s 
betterment -  is part of the Olympians’ attempt to placate the Erinyes, which only 
happens when the Erinyes are given honours and subsumed within the order of polis 
deities. As has been argued, the gods seem to be motivated by their own desires and 
by their own sense of honour.
If we now take an example from another play, the Persians, the same pattern 
emerges. Aeschylus supplies both divine and human reasons for why Xerxes is 
defeated by the Greeks: not only is it because the Athenians are a free people 
fighting for their liberty, nor is it just their cunning to deceive Xerxes the night 
before the battle at Salamis; but, it is also Xerxes’ arrogance and transgression of 
what is suitable for a mortal to do. So, he yoked the Bosphoros, trying to overpower 
Poseidon (Pers. 749-52), and he attempted to bring Greece under his domain. While 
Persia’s destruction seems to have been prophesied by Zeus {Pers. 739-42), there is 
no time limit on it: it is Xerxes’ own actions which bring it about there and then 
{Pers. 742). Xerxes’ excessve and transgressive behaviour brings about his and 
Persia’s ruin. The Greeks, however, are not depicted as having acted in any 
excessive or transgressive way. The gods in the Persians and in the plays of 
Aeschylus as a whole do not act out of kindness, and the rule of Zeus is not merciful. 
The justice o f the gods is instead based around a framework of transgression and 
punishment, and Aeschylus seems all too aware of how easy it is to anger the gods. 
What is suggested by the destruction of Xerxes, thus, is that the Greeks’ victory over 
the Persians at Salamis was due largely to the piety of the Greeks and, more 
importantly perhaps, the impiety o f the Persians. Indeed, the recent real-life events 
depicted in the Persians seem also to serve a specific purpose for Aeschylus and for
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his audience, because it can be interpreted as a word of warning to the Greeks not to 
forget the power and wrath o f the gods and the need to keep them on their side at all 
times.
The plays of Aeschylus, therefore, do not present an optimistic idea o f Zeus 
and his justice, but rather a pragmatic and pessimistic view, one which recognises 
that the gods are powerful beings in need of respect and honour whose wills must be 
carefully observed, because if they are not, it could bring about the destruction of not 
only an individual human, but an entire nation.
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APPENDIX: The Theology of Aeschylus and the Prometheus Bound
It has been argued in the preceding pages that the rule of Zeus is not kind, 
and that the god cares primarily for the honour that is due to him. And it is 
uncontentious to say that this is how the Zeus of the Prometheus Bound is generally 
seen. Although it has been argued in the Introduction of this thesis that the 
Prometheus Bound is not part of the canon of Aeschylus and thus excluded from the 
discussion in this thesis, its (likely) proximity in terms of date o f production (late 
440s/430s) means that it may be worthwhile to give some brief consideration to the 
play, as it may be possible to see similarities in the presentation of Zeus with the 
uncontested corpus of Aeschylus. What will follow is a brief, cursory presentation 
(without discussion) of certain passages concerning Zeus from the Prometheus 
Bound that seem to share key details with the Zeus of Aeschylus (as has been 
presented in the thesis). This is not to back-track on the arguments presented in the 
Introduction, nor does it negate the discussions offered throughout the thesis. This 
‘appended’ page or so merely offers a potential starting point for discussions and 
comparisons of Aeschylus’ presentation of Zeus with those o f the Prometheus 
Bound, because while there may be doubts over the play’s authorship, there can be 
no doubt about the play as a work of art and as a play that has something significant 
to say about the presentation of the gods.
As has been said, it is uncontroversial to say that Zeus in the Prometheus is 
not kind, if not cruel. The play is concerned with Zeus’ punishment of Prometheus, 
closely following the Titan’s suffering, and the new rule of the Olympian god. From 
the beginning of the play we are presented with a clear depiction o f the nature of the 
new divine regime. While he is still binding Prometheus (and even as an Olympian), 
Hephaistos fears to talk against, or indeed about, the rule of Zeus, stating: navxox; 5’ 
avdyKri tcovSs poi x6X,pav aysOetv, | sucopid^siv yap 7taxpo<; Xoyovq papO. ‘Still, I 
have no alternative but to endure doing it, for it is dangerous to slight the Father’s 
word.’ (Pr. 16-17) As a clear indication of the power of Zeus and the fear his wrath 
induces in others, it is possible to compare such a image with Zeus in the Suppliants 
(Supp. 347, 385-6, 478-9, 615-7). Power then continues by urging Hephaistos on, 
warning: rix; odmxipr|xfi<; ye xd>v epycov papuq. ‘For the overseer of our work is 
severe.’ (Pr. 77) Here we are presented with the notion of Zeus watching over from 
above, judging deeds, recalling images from Aeschylus (cf. Supp. 381-6, 402-4).
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Within the first 80 lines we are thus presented with several key features of the god, 
which help establish a clear picture of Zeus in the Prometheus Bound early on in the 
play. First, the god is described as wrathful, and others fear to provoke him; 
secondly, Zeus is a detached figure who watches over the actions of others, judging 
them, and is willing to punish those who do wrong by his rule. In both of the 
passages quoted so far, it is possible to see how the image o f Zeus as a powerful and 
wrathful figure comes out strongly.
A little later and in an image that recalls the presentation o f Zeus seen earlier 
and the presentation o f the god in Aeschylus, Okeanos says that Zeus is a detached 
figure and wrathful when crossed: s i  5’ coSs ipa^e!^ K a i  T £ 0 q y p sv o o < ; Xoyovq | plv|/si<;, 
Tax’ &v crou K a i paKpav dvcoxspco | GaKcav k Ax>o i  Zevq, coots o o i  t o v  v u v  oy^ov | 
rcapovTa poyGcov 7iaiSiav slvai S o k s Tv . ‘If you go on hurling out such sharp and 
savage words, Zeus, though he sits far above, may well hear you, with the result that 
the crowd of miseries you have at present will seem like child’s play.’ (Pr. 311-14) 
Here, we are able to see that the picture of Zeus being created by the poet focuses 
again on the idea o f the god as a detached figure, wrathful and powerful, and a god 
whom other characters fear to cross.
In discussion with Okeanos, Prometheus focuses on the power of Zeus and 
one of its key symbols, the thunderbolt. Prometheus urges Okeanos not to trouble 
himself in going to speak to Zeus on his behalf, because he fears Zeus may also 
punish him for doing so. In highlighting the wrath of Zeus, Prometheus draws on the 
example of Typhon who is brought low by Zeus’ thunderbolt (Pr. 351-76). Of 
course, the thunderbolt is a common image in Greek literature, but it is also one 
which Aeschylus has drawn upon in his extant work, most notably in the Seven 
Against Thebes during the ‘Shield Scene’ in reference to Hyperbius’ shield who is 
placed against Hippomedon who has Typhon on his shield (Th. 486-520), and in the 
Eumenides when Athena uses it as a threat against the Erinyes in an attempt to 
prevent them exacting revenge on Athens (Eu. 824-8). Indeed, in a further 
connection with the Eumenides, the chorus refer to the attitude of Zeus and his laws 
towards the older gods: d p s y a p x a  y a p  xaSe Zevq | i5ioi<; vopoiq K p a r u v c o v  | 
w r s p i ^ a v o v  0 so!<; to ic ;  | 7ta p o < ; s v S s i k v u o i v  a i x p d v .  ‘For Zeus, exercising this 
unlimited control under laws of his own making, is displaying the arrogance of 
power towards the gods of old.’ (Pr. 402-5) So, the all-powerful will of Zeus is 
viewed in a negative light when it comes into conflict with the older generation of
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gods. In the Eumenides, the conflict between the older gods, the Erinyes, and the 
younger gods, the Olympians, is something which is drawn upon heavily by 
Aeschylus in his play both in terms of imagery and in terms of language, as is shown 
in Chapter 1 with the use o f the words SaipGov and 0so<;. But, in contrast with the 
presentation of the conflict in the Prometheus Bound, the depiction in Aeschylus’s 
play of the Olympian gods is not negative.
The final passages to which I wish to draw attention focus on the all- 
powerful nature of Zeus and the efficacy of his will, but do so in a less negative way. 
So, the chorus wish: pr|8ap’ o  7 rd v x a  vepcov | 0six’ spa yvcbpa K p a x o q  dvTircaA -ov 
Zzvq. ‘May Zeus, the disposer of all things, never set his power in opposition to my 
will.’ (Pr. 526-7) This passage hints again at the idea of the power of Zeus and the 
fear he creates in others, as is found in the examples from earlier on in the play. But, 
here there is a suggestion in these lines that the chorus is resigned to the way things 
are, that they have accepted the rule of Zeus. This apparent acceptance of Zeus’ 
position as the king of the gods is then repeated, and in a way that is applicable to, 
and reminiscent of, Aeschylus too: o u 7t o ts  | x a v  Aioq a p p o v i a v  O v a x a rv  7 t a p e ^ i a c i  
pouXxxi. ‘Never will the schemes of mortals transgress the ordered law of Zeus.’ (Pr. 
550-1) These two lines first stress the ultimate power of Zeus and the futility of 
fighting him, something that is reinforced throughout the play. Secondly, it brings to 
the fore the notion of Zeus as the distributer and overseer o f justice and order in the 
world, which is also touched upon earlier. The justice o f Zeus is absolute and 
obedience to it is required absolutely.
Furthermore, towards the end of the play, the author of the Prometheus 
Bound presents us with another of the key aspects o f Zeus seen in Greek literature 
from Homer onwards, which is the idea of the god being able to bring about any 
deed he wants. Hermes states that: \|/8u5rjyopsTv yap o u k  87iiaxaxai cxopa | t o  ATov, 
aAXa 7iav 87to<; xetai. ‘For the mouth of Zeus does not know how to lie; he fulfils 
every word he speaks.’ (Pr. 1032-3) The notion of the unfailing will of Zeus and the 
impossibility of overthrowing him is something again which is found consistently in 
Aeschylus and which is discussed at length in Chapter 3. Indeed, the fact that the god 
is said to be unable to lie is comparable to how Apollo speaks of his prophecies and 
Zeus in the Eumenides (Eu. 614-21).
Irrespective of authorship, it is possible to see similarities between the 
presentation of Zeus in the Prometheus Bound and the plays of Aeschylus,
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particularly concerning his power, his will and wrath. As has been demonstrated in 
this thesis, Zeus in Aeschylus is not a kind or benevolent deity who works towards 
the betterment of mankind and the same is true in the Prometheus Bound -  although 
in the latter play this is an aspect of his character stressed to a far greater degree, 
especially in the first half o f the play. The Zeus of Aeschylus and the Zeus of the 
Prometheus Bound are thus both depicted as a god who cares primarily for 
obedience to his will and as a god who punishes transgressions of his justice. So, if 
the authenticity of the Prometheus Bound was not disputed and was considered a 
genuine play of Aeschylus, it would be possible to achieve interesting comparisons 
with the Zeus of Aeschylus. Indeed, it would be possible to argue for a consistency 
in theology between the seven plays and for a more ‘negative’ understanding of the 
justice of Zeus, as has been argued for and demonstrated above in this thesis.
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